


By the same Author

THE BRIDGE OF HEAVEN
LADY PRECIOUS STREAM
THE WESTERN CHAMBER
THE PROFESSOR FROM PEKING
MENCIUS WAS A BAD BOY



CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S HOME, BROOKMOUTH, FENG HUA

The Life of
CHIANG KAI-SHEK

by

S. I. HSIUNG

Illustrated



LONDON : PETER DAVIES

In Memory of
MY DEAR LEARNED MOTHER,
Who taught me to read
The Confucian Classics forty years ago
When I could understand only some
Appreciate even less
But had to recite them all

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PREFACE

JOHN MASEFIELD once said to a distinguished Chinese soldier: 'Why doesn't Chiang Kai-Shek make himself the Emperor of China . . .?' Before the Poet Laureate could finish his sentence, my friend exclaimed: 'If he does, I would be the first to fight against him!' And I should add that the General is Chiang Kai-Shek's most trusted and loyal supporter. I can also assure all lovers of China and admirers of Chiang Kai-Shek—and indeed John Masefield is one—that this represents not only the mind of the Chinese people, but also that of Chiang Kai-Shek himself: he would be the last man to think of making himself an emperor.

Those who are accustomed to enjoy the advantages of Democracy under a Monarchy must think the Chinese people peculiar if not ludicrous. But for a country which has recently got rid of its despotic ruler, even the title of the Head of the State is important. Perhaps we are too good Confucians to disregard the teaching that if the name is not right, whatever you say is all wrong. I have, because of this, given a little more space than necessary in this book to Yuan Shih-Kai's bid for the Dragon Throne. He compares poorly with Cæsar and Napoleon, who also ended unhappily. The Chinese people always look for precedents in history.

The writing of this biography has been almost entirely a matter of compilation: to record and not to create being the golden rule. The book is full of quotations. If anyone complains of its lack of originality I hasten to claim that all the quotations, except for the few which have been duly acknowledged, are original translations which

I have done especially for this book and are appearing in print for the first time, and that they are in most cases literal and in all cases faithful.

The material is all reliable, as the reader can easily find out for himself. I should register here my gratitude and admiration for the hero of this book who has graciously allowed so many of his private letters—letters to him as well as by him—to be made public. Without them I would have been utterly unable to undertake this work: for I consider them to be the most dependable source of the truth. His speeches I have also made use of, but not to the same extent as I have his letters. Speeches are composed for public delivery, and are therefore less interesting and revealing than private correspondence. Moreover, most of them have official English translations and are available both in America and England.

I have sometimes devoted a dozen pages to correspondence which covered only a few days, whereas I have taken a big stride over years when important events were fast moving. That is also because some letters are more interesting than others, and not because of their importance, or of sufficiency or lack of material. In many cases I have found it difficult to write more than I have done when there were ample documents and other sources of information. I always spend much more time and space on events where material is scanty. For example, the monumental work *The Life of Mr Chiang* by Mr Mao consists of twenty volumes. The first volume covers thirty years, the second three years and the last only one month. The reader will find that I have almost done the opposite: I have treated the early years in detail and after the time when he became the unquestioned leader of China, I have merely sketched the outline of the events in which he is involved.

I cannot offer an adequate reason for this, not even a feeble excuse to humour my reader. I stand to be con-

demned for my snobbery. I delight in narrating the steady rise of my hero until he reached the very top and could not possibly rise any higher. After that my interest rapidly decreases, and I cannot help it. But for my defence I may say that, if space had allowed, I would have described the Sian incident in greater detail. That, as is very well known, was the day when my hero was plunged into great danger and obscurity. I have not done so simply for two reasons: first, the two generals who captured him have been silent and left us no documentary material, and secondly, the available reports have been most widely circulated. I hope my critics will not point out that, in spite of his momentary setbacks, Chiang Kai-Shek gained tremendous prestige on account of this incident.

Somewhere in the book I have mentioned the precaution one should take against biased opinions on current events. On many occasions, when I have compared material gathered from two or three different sides, I found my best policy was to remember the virtue of brevity. I have tried to be very wary in offering my opinion on controversial subjects, and I have said in the beginning of the book that it is not my intention to criticise or praise anybody or anything. However, should the reader find a word to have slipped out here and there, he must accept my sincerest apology and assurance that it was an oversight, and not intentional.

Regarding the private life of the great man, I have been asked to leave it out. Happily, I found it most convenient to respect his wishes, as I did not have much material to work on. His first marriage and its dissolution afford little to write about. He wrote a brief separation note in 1921 and had a short divorce announcement published in the newspapers in 1927, not long before his second marriage took place. Even had I been urged to write more, I could scarcely add anything to the mere entry in

the chronological table. As for his second marriage, material there is in plenty, but again I find I can add nothing to what I have written. For those who love romance, there is Miss Emily Hahn's book, *The Soong Sisters* (published by Robert Hale, London) which will give them every satisfaction.

Another book which will more than supplement what I have left out is Mr Hollington Tong's monumental work entitled *Chiang Kai-Shek: Soldier and Statesman* (published by Hurst & Blackett, London). There is much documentary material in these two lengthy volumes, and the reader who wishes to know more is advised to turn to them. Mr Tong was a master in the Dragon River School in the year 1905, when the future President of China was for a very brief period a pupil there. That was not their only association. When the Northern Punitive Expedition of the Kuo Min Tang reached the Yangtze, Mr Tong was a 'newspaper man'. He met his pupil again in Nanchang, and after a lapse of more than twenty years his pupil had become the Commander-in-Chief of the Expedition and the man of the hour. Later Mr Tong took important Government jobs and was invited by his former pupil to write the biography in English which was 'authorised'.

Besides this most useful book, there are quite a number of biographies of Chiang Kai-Shek which go by one name or another. On those I have seen I have no remarks to make, and for those I have not yet seen I have the highest esteem. In writing about the leader of present-day China one could not avoid Chinese politics. That, I think, is the most unenviable job in the world. Chinese politics interest nobody except those who are involved in them. Besides some old 'China-hand', few of the English-reading public understand Chinese politics. Those who understand or are interested prefer their own version and would never agree with what others have written.

I have tried to write for the general public who do not claim to specialise in Chinese politics. I have left out as many proper names as I possibly could without spoiling the coherence of the story. But the spelling of Chinese names is my chief enemy. No uniformity in it at all! There are two main kinds of spelling, neither of which I can disregard: the old Post Office spelling, which is used for such place names as Peking, Kiangsi and Canton, and the Wade system in which names of persons are mostly spelt, such as Yuan Shih-Kai, Hu Han-Min and Wang Ching-Wei. A third is sometimes unavoidable, the Cantonese spelling which generally goes with such words as Sun Yat-Sen, Sun Fo, and Chiang Kai-Shek. My rule is to use the most popular forms, to whichever system they may belong. If any Sinologue criticises me for not sticking to the Wade, I ask him if he can say that 'Sun Yat-Sen' and 'Peking' are misspelt?

The Wade system has at least one drawback. A large number of words are started with an 'Hs'. My surname, for instance. It is spelt 'Hsiung', and in Chinese it is pronounced somewhat like 'Shoong'. I have to say 'H for Harry, S for Sugar, I for India, U for Uncle, N for Nobody and G for George' every time if I want to get it right. Let the reader remember that for 'Hs' he may pronounce 'Sh' and a great difficulty is thus avoided. Regard 'Hsiang' as 'Shiang' and 'Hsu' as 'Shu' and the trouble is over.

The Chinese language is monosyllabic. We have no words of two syllables. That is why 'Kuomintang' appears as 'Kuo Min Tang' in this book. 'Shanghai' should be 'Shang Hai' and 'Hongkong' should be 'Hong Kong'. As people seem to dislike words of one syllable, many terms and phrases which are composed of two or three words have been joined together. The first time a place name appears I divide it up into its original form by means of a hyphen or hyphens; such as Che-Kiang, Wei-Hai-

Wei, Ning-Po. This will be, I hope, of some help to those who are not familiar with China. For all I know, some people may think that 'Kuomintang' should be pronounced with four syllables as 'Ku-om-int-ang' if they do not know it is a three-syllable term.

I am afraid I have been trying to explain Chinese ways and customs a little throughout the whole of the book. In the eyes of a 'China expert' some remarks of mine will seem quite unnecessary. But, as I have mentioned before, I intend it to be read by those who do not regard themselves as 'China experts', for such persons are certainly very rare, and, moreover, their opinions are generally too specialised and profound to be useful to ordinary human beings.

The writing of this book, light though it is, has involved much more work than I had first thought. Many years ago, when the name of Chiang Kai-Shek was still rather unfamiliar to most people in England and America, I was asked to write a biography to introduce him to his admirers in the Western world. Quo Tai-Chi, then our Ambassador in London, was interested to hear this, and very kindly gave me material and advice. Since then many friends and well-wishers have given me help. I want to record my thanks to all of them whose names I cannot list here but who have their place in my heart. However, I must mention the great service my old school-mate and friend General Kwei Yun-Chin rendered me. He obtained for me some of the most valuable material and information, and also furnished me with several photographs.

On the completion of this book I cannot help recalling to mind my good old friend Quo Tai-Chi, the scholar-diplomat. He was very successful in his mission in London, which lasted nine years. He was then asked by Chiang Kai-Shek—nay, requested again and again—to go back to Chungking to take charge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I was afraid for him; he was also afraid

for himself: the climate there would not suit him. I said to some mutual friends that he could hardly fare half a year in Chungking. After six months, he was no longer the Minister for Foreign Affairs. I was sorry my prediction had come true to the letter. He was forgotten for several years, and only recently was appointed Head of the Chinese Delegation to the United Nations. Again he held the office for a very short time. Soon reports came that he was slightly or very ill: his friends said he was slightly ill, and those who were not his friends said he was very ill. Evidently the weather in New York was too much for him. He resigned. A few months ago he was appointed Ambassador to one of those South American States, where, I believe, the air is excellent, and where, I hope, his health will improve rapidly.

I relate his career to indicate the changes of fortune during the time that I have been working on this book. It has been so with the fortunes of China: at first a country for whom everyone had admiration and sympathy, and later of whom almost everyone was saying they had heard bad things. With Chiang Kai-Shek it has been very much the same. He to whom the great statesmen in the West used to refer as 'that great Asiatic hero' has had ups and downs in international politics. When his stock ran high, he was addressed as the Generalissimo, and when his usefulness to them had declined a little he was Marshal Chiang Kai-Shek. And when they decided to promote the Communist representative in Chungking, Mr Chou En-Lai, to be General Chou En-Lai, they also referred to him as General Chiang Kai-Shek. Confucius's method is evidently known all the world over.

I do not dare to follow such good examples. I have refrained from adding any title to the great man. To me he is so many-sided that to address him by one title is to disregard his other activities. In one or two places in this book, however, some of his prefixes have been retained

merely to indicate the way he was addressed in the original sources from whence they have been indirectly quoted. But in China he has been addressed as the Commander-in-Chief, the Chairman, the President of the Council, the Generalissimo or the Director-General. In mentioning these, I have omitted the abusive titles hurled upon him by his political enemies. They include Dictator, Butcher, Murderer, 'the Chinese Mussolini', and even 'the Chinese Mihailovitch'. Throughout this book I have used no other name or title than the plain Chiang Kai-Shek. In writing about Confucius or Washington, do we need to add anything else?

I should perhaps mention that his admirers in China might think this lack of titles means disrespect. I assure them it is quite the contrary. In Chinese publications it is now the rule to leave an empty space before the name of Chiang Kai-Shek. That is a traditional courtesy very much observed before the Revolution. A space for your elders, the starting of a new line for your parents and other persons of great importance, and going outside the border a few spaces for the Emperor or Empress. This had been done away with by the Revolution, and now some people want its return. At one time whenever a speaker mentioned Chiang Kai-Shek in public, the entire audience would stand to attention at the very word and would remain standing until the speaker asked them to resume their seats. But I wonder if the people who are so punctilious are necessarily as respectful as they appear.

A dreadful thing which we have learned from Europe and which still shows no signs of dying out is this slogan business. These slogans are shouted—which is bad enough, but I imagine they harm the shouters more than the hearers—and further, they are put on posters or painted on the walls, which is unbearable. But such slogans seldom produce any effect. Indeed, they often indicate the opposite trend. Whenever we see or hear a slogan saying 'Down

with Chiang Kai-Shek' we know that he is doing extremely well. And whenever we see or hear people shouting 'Up with Chiang Kai-Shek', it definitely indicates that he is in a precarious position. It is a pity that people have not enough sense to see this and to do away with this dreadful 'slogan business' altogether.

As great men are bound to have ups and downs during their lifetime, some people say they would be still greater had they the sense to die slightly earlier. For instance, had Napoleon died before his Waterloo, Wilson before the Paris Conference, Churchill before the General Election, and Chiang Kai-Shek before the recall of Stilwell. No doubt numerous cases could be raked up from history to prove this point, but I do not agree. Napoleon would be incomplete without his Waterloo, and Wilson lived solely for his Peace Conference. As for Churchill and Chiang Kai-Shek, both have accomplished great things in the past and we do not know what the future has in store for them. The kind of mishap which has befallen them was merely a momentary slip, which may have created quite a stir at the time but will soon lose its importance in comparison with other things. The Stilwell case has already become quite different from what it used to be. When the new Burma Road was to be named, Chiang Kai-Shek christened it the Stilwell Road.

Only three of my friends have read my manuscript before it went into print, and I want to acknowledge their very welcome suggestions. Bernard Martin, who was engaged upon the writing of *The Strain of Harmony: Men and Women in the History of China*, wanted to look at it for his chapter on Chiang Kai-Shek, and found the word 'crazy' (which I used to describe the boy Chiang Kai-Shek in a quotation) not appropriate. He suggested 'almost wild with excitement'. He said people might wonder if 'Chiang Kai-Shek in boyhood was a little unbalanced in mind'. This was serious. I had a family con-

ference about it with my children in Oxford, where two of them were doing English Literature and one Modern History: they all agreed with Bernard Martin that 'crazy' was not suitable but unanimously vetoed 'excitement'. I had to accept the verdict. However, they could not substitute a word themselves and reminded me that there was always Bernard Shaw to whom I could turn when I was in a dilemma. Promptly G.B.S. came to my rescue, as he always did. He also agreed that 'crazy' was wrong and said he would translate it 'he could be quite ungovernable'. He added: 'This does not suggest insanity, and does suggest capacity for command.' I finally translated the sentence into: 'He could be wild and ungovernable.'

Tsui Chi, the historian, read my manuscript while he was convalescing in Margate. He made some suggestions regarding my choice of words in translating Chinese terms into English; the most happy alteration was 'People's Party' for 'Nationalists' Party', which had hitherto been extensively used by other authors. It was explicit, simple and faithful. I wonder why so many people prefer 'Nationalists'? But to my friend and publisher, Peter Davies, I am particularly grateful. He read the MS. most carefully just before it went to press, and almost every alteration he proposed was an improvement and was adopted accordingly.

Since I have spent so many years in the writing of this life, many things have happened during this time. The Chinese Embassy in London has had three Ambassadors and several missions have visited England. They have all, almost without exception, been very helpful to me in collecting material and information. Indeed, facilities have been so generously given to me in all official quarters that I must make it known that this is not an official book. It is not even what one calls an 'authorised biography', though the great man himself has been good enough to give me permission to write it. I could not undertake to

write a biography without a perfectly free hand, and all he has asked me is to leave out his private life. As I have mentioned earlier, I have found it most convenient to comply with his wish: it is what I had intended to do even without his request. I hereby claim that I am solely and entirely responsible for the book—all the opinions in it except those from quotations are mine. But I request my reader to take what I have written at its face value and not to construe implications by reading between the lines. And I do crave his indulgence.

S. I. HSIUNG

Iffley Turn House, Oxford, 1948

I

IN preparing this Life of a celebrated son of China, the humble author could not help feeling exalted. Yet often enough there have been times when he found himself in the dilemma after another. It is not an easy undertaking to write about a great contemporary who has a multitude of friends and admirers as well as a host of critics and enemies, many of whom are not only alive but also kicking, and about events of which the right and the wrong have only recently been disputed by people to such an extent as to sacrifice their freedom or even their lives. Remembering the difficulties Confucius must have had in dealing with things which happened to kings and princes in his time when drafting his *Spring and Autumn Annals*, the present author, most humble though he may be, feels a much happier man.

Confucius was, however, a master of the language with which he wrote his book. His style was so subtle that it is generally believed he could indicate his praise or criticism with a single word. Lest readers think a single word means a straightforward adjective such as good or bad, right or wrong, an example or two is called for. The first entry consists of six words about the Calendar, on which commentators have written lengthy essays interpreting the mind of Confucius. The very next entry reads: 'In the first moon, my Lord and I-Fu of Chu made an alliance with Mieh.' There appears no praise or criticism, one would suppose. But scholars who annotated the text said that in calling him by his style 'I-Fu', and not by his official title 'the Viscount of Chu', Confucius actually did praise him

for his being able to establish a good relationship with a larger state and thus to allow his people to enjoy peace.

The third entry reads: 'In the Summer, during the fifth moon, the Earl of Chêng conquered Tuan at Yen.' Poor Earl of Chêng! His victory won him no laurels. On the contrary, this simple record of his conquest became one of the blackest in our history. To call him by his official title 'The Earl of Chêng' was to ridicule him for not having instructed his younger brother properly, said our commentators. As Tuan did not behave as a younger brother, therefore, argued our scholars, he was not called so. Even the word conquered, when applied to a quarrel between two brothers, was a most disparaging choice. In fact, so many essays have been written to expound the moral effect of this entry that it becomes obvious that Chinese readers could read not only between the lines but also between the words. It follows naturally that one could fill up the space before and after each important word with mischievous implications according to one's own imagination. The original text as written by Confucius makes but a very slim book. Nowadays no reputable edition of this classic runs to less than twenty volumes.

The humble author has never dared to compare himself with the Sage. Neither does he expect his readers to be so obliging as to write books for him. When he started to learn to write in Chinese, he was taught to be comprehensive in his choice of words so that the result sounded profound and incomprehensible. Later on, when he began to learn his English, he was warned against ambiguity. To be explicit, or even laconic, but never ambiguous! This was so repeatedly impressed on him by his teachers that he soon formed the habit of preferring clarification to anything else. If there was any space in his writing to be filled, he was sure to fill it up himself before anybody else could have the opportunity to do so.

His readers, therefore, can rest assured that their

collaboration will not be required. Moreover, they may be relieved from anxiety in case they cannot quite decide whether the author is praising or criticising someone: for he considers it wrong to appoint himself the judge. To praise or criticise is not his business. Besides, to spare his readers the complications of various Chinese names, he sticks to the iron rule of calling each person by only one name. Chiang Kai-Shek is always Chiang Kai-Shek, and nobody needs to look for his official title with which the author might indicate criticism.

Chinese biographers and even historians like to add a little extra colour in writing about the ancestors and birth of their great men. In some cases such stories tend to be legendary. They either credit them with fabulous progenitors or decorate their birth scene with a couple of dragons crouching in the court-yard. Regarding Chiang Kai-Shek's forefathers and birth such beautiful tales are lacking. His ancestors, without exception, were all ordinary human beings. In China there is no need to commission a genealogist to trace one's ancestors. Nearly everyone could find all he wants to know in the family clan book, which starts thousands of years ago and is always brought up to date by the subscription of members of the clan who can afford to give voluntarily.

The humble author has to ask his patient readers to forgive him for devoting the whole of this chapter to Chiang Kai-Shek's forbears. Although he has no inclination to translate all the best biographies in the clan book of the Chiang family of Feng Hua, which is comparable in size with the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, there is good reason for him to write at some length about Chiang Kai-Shek's grandparents and parents. In Confucian China ancestors have been so important that the early Christian missionaries, who found their work hampered by this tradition, tended to be militant, starting their campaign by pronouncing ancestor-worship as heathen barbarism.

That was why, after years of suppressed feeling, there were so many supporters of the Boxers' uprising. If it could be appreciated how very much more important ancestors are in China than in the Western world, it would be seen how necessary it is for all proper Chinese biographical works to begin not too far from the time of the Creator P'an Ku, 'when the sky and the earth were like the white and the yolk of an egg'.

Readers who are anxious to proceed from the birth of Chiang Kai-Shek can conveniently skip this chapter and start from the next. But the reader who is not entirely disinterested in the stalk from which Chiang Kai-Shek has come, and who can read this book at his leisure, will perhaps enjoy what is considered a traditional, though to some probably a rather punctilious, preliminary of a proper biography. To him the humble author ventures to offer the following pages. However, he hopes he will be permitted to whisper a word or two in the ear of the connoisseur: the Memoir of Chiang Kai-Shek's mother and that of his grandmother, both written by their devoted and loving child, are specimens of excellent Chinese biographical essays. He only regrets that, faithful though he has been in his translation, much must have been lost through his inadequate skill in this undertaking.

To begin from the very beginning, the present Chiang family of Feng Hua is descended from the third son of the Duke of Chou, a contemporary of Confucius. During the Tang Dynasty, that is the 7th to 9th century, the family moved from the south coast of China to Feng Hua, a prosperous town near the east coast of Che-Kiang Province. They came, not into the town where they now live, but a little way off to a place called the Three Ridges. Here they stayed until the 14th century. The first distinguished member of the family, Chiang Chün-Ming, was a scholar in the reign of Emperor Shên Tsung of the Sung Dynasty

(A.D. 1068-1085). He memorialised the Throne about the Party of Gentlemen and the Party of the Wicked. The Imperial Court was astonished by his frankness and he was given the post of Imperial Censor. His bluntness soon got him into trouble. Because of his straightforward remonstrance, he was to have been banished to the far distant boundary regions. But in consideration of his aged mother, to whom he showed great filial piety, he was pardoned and pensioned off. He was posthumously honoured with the title of Minister of Gold and Purple, and his tablet was ordered to be put into the Temple of the Worthies of his district, to receive sacrifices from posterity.

Both his elder brother Chiang Ch'ung-feng and his son Chiang Ch'ung were also brilliant scholars of that time, and one after the other they passed the highest state examination to become Advanced Scholars. This is the highest honour a man of letters could receive and is sometimes compared to the degree of Doctor of Literature. In some instances the recipient is called a Member of the Forest of Ink, or an Imperial Academician. Such an honour generally leads to an important official post, and Chiang Ch'ung was soon appointed to a governorship. His integrity was well known to his contemporaries. For when his superior official tried to bribe him, with the promise of a recommendation to the Throne for his promotion, to take certain crooked measures beneficial to the influential man, he burnt the letter in front of the messenger. He later became a Minister in the Imperial Court.

Chiang Hsien, great-grandson of Chiang Ch'ung, passed the highest state examination in the second year of the reign of the Emperor Ning Tsung (A.D. 1196) to become an Advanced Scholar, and was eventually promoted to be the President of the Board of Punishments. He retired with the title of Grand Secretary of the Pavilion of Treasured Literature. During his retirement he vowed that he would never act against his conscience, never be

disloyal to his trust, never acquire rice-fields and never buy a house. He styled himself with the nickname of the Hermit of the Four Nevers.

In the later days of the Mongolian Dynasty of Yuan (1264-1367) the family moved to that part of the country where it is now settled. One of the ancestors of the Chiangs made the choice because the place was, and still is, really beautiful. With the waters of the Yen Brook near-by, as calm as a mirror, and the Wu Mountain not far off tucking it in like a pillow, no wonder it immediately captured his heart. In the market-place numerous shops and stores are carefully arranged in rows as closely together as the teeth of a comb. In the open country endless patches of rice-fields and water ponds divide it in shapely squares. Such a piece of landscape is most lovely. In the Chinese language the word landscape is made up of the two characters 'hills' and 'waters', amongst which the wise old man decided that his descendants could either study the classics or plough their fields. Also they could find happiness here by fishing, as well as by wood-cutting. Their new home could, indeed, serve them equally well should they choose to be merchants or to be recluses.

The English transcription of Chinese names is always uninteresting, if not confusing. But in this case the meaning of all the names concerned will somewhat compensate for the monotony of the sound. The home of the Chiangs is called Chi K'ou, and it means Brookmouth, as it stands at the mouth of the Yen Brook. It is also called Wu Ling, meaning Military Ridge, and belongs to the district of Ch'in Hsiao, which means Filial Piety of Birds. Bearing in mind Chiang Kai-Shek's military career, and the Chiangs' well-known devotion to their parents, these ancient names of their native place are most appropriate.

In later generations, the Chiangs followed their ancestor's instructions piously. Their motto was 'Honour your parents and elders, and work hard in the fields.' For

over two and a half centuries not a single member of the family took an official post under the Manchu regime, that is from 1644 to 1911. The fact that none of the Chiangs had ever acted as an official during the entire reign of the Manchurian Dynasty shows that the Chiang family has always been very patriotic. The Manchus, who came from the north-east to overthrow the Ming Emperor and rule over China, have been regarded by many as foreign invaders. But they were soon absorbed by the Chinese, whose language and customs they admired and adopted: and now very few Manchus could be found in any part of the country, including the portion of Manchuria from whence they first came. To-day the Manchurian language hardly exists.

Nevertheless, the Chiangs thought it better to have nothing to do with these foreign rulers. The paternal grandfather of Chiang Kai-Shek, Chiang Yü-Piao, who lived between the years 1814 and 1894, was a good example. Although he was seventy-four years of age when his grandson Chiang Kai-Shek was born, and he died at the age of eighty-one, there existed during those very brief years, between the elderly grandfather and the child, a very close bond and tender affection. Twenty-five years after his death his devoted grandson, then an officer in the army, wrote a touching memoir about him. As it throws some light on the early life of Chiang Kai-Shek and also on the conditions of the Chiang family, a longish quotation is not entirely out of place here:

‘Since our clan moved to live in Embroidery Brook, we have for generations worked diligently in sowing and ploughing. We observe propriety and humility very carefully, and not a single member of the family has ever tried to become an official during the three hundred years of the Manchu regime. In my grandfather’s time he established himself by commerce and became very wealthy in

the salt business. He had a kindly disposition. In dealing with others he was always generous. But in bringing up his children and grandchildren he was very strict. He never wore silk and was a vegetarian. He was devoted to the study of Buddhism and a great expert in various schools of this religion. He copied in his own handwriting a number of valuable Buddhist sutras, which unfortunately must have been lost as they cannot now be found. He had a wonderful physique, which indeed improved as he grew older.

'One day during the year before he passed away, he took me into the bamboo grove deep in the mountain and we rested for a while in the Buddhist Monastery, where we read aloud the Holy Sutra and paid our respects to Buddha. I was barely in my seventh year, and being very happy I hopped and skipped when coming down the slippery mountain slope. I missed my foothold and fell down into the valley. The right side of my forehead was bruised and badly cut. Blood came streaming out. My grandfather was heartbroken to see me in such a state. As there was nothing else he could do, he gathered some medicinal herbs, with which he treated the wound. In a short time the wound was healed, and by the time we got back my mother scarcely noticed it. She was greatly astonished when we told her of the serious condition in which I had been.

'As a boy I was more often unwell than not. My grandfather always treated and nursed me. He was constantly by my bedside. If the malady was serious he would keep watch over me, never going to bed himself at night, exactly as my mother now nurses and cares for my son Wei-Kuo. Nearly all my ailments were healed by the medical skill of my grandfather, a fact for which my mother was very grateful and which she cannot forget even to this day.

'Embroidery Brook is an important thoroughfare in the

centre of the three neighbouring towns. To the north of the Brook there is a convent called the Nunnery of Military Ridge, where travellers from all the three towns usually took a short rest. But there they could neither obtain food when hungry nor drink when thirsty. Seeing this, my grandfather provided free tea and food to relieve their distress. This he continued to do for six or seven years.

‘Whenever any of our relatives or friends could not afford the expense of a proper wedding or funeral and came to him for help, never had they to go away without having their requests entirely satisfied. When there were public works to be done in our part of the country, such as the decoration of a temple, the rebuilding of the Ancestral Hall, the paving of a road or the construction of a dam, he was never stingy with his subscriptions. And if his services were required in these public matters, he would rush forward as if he were afraid that his presence might be too late. It is believed that his devotion to Buddhism was so deep that his love for humanity could be seen everywhere and in everything he did.’

Of Chiang Kai-Shek’s paternal grandmother little record is available. It is presumed that she died before her grandson was born. China has been a country of ancestor-worshippers for many thousands of years. The first thing a successful man does is to tell the world the illustrious virtues of his forefathers. He relates the outstanding qualities of his parents and describes the noble deeds of his grandparents if he knows any of them. In some cases he has to find out about them. But as there are clan books in one’s family, this hardly presents any difficulty. The fact that Chiang Kai-Shek has so far mentioned little about his paternal grandmother indicates that he did not know her well, and does not like to write about things of which he is not quite sure.

Madame Wang, Chiang Kai-Shek's grandmother on the maternal side, lived until he was eighteen, and was the guiding angel not only of her widowed daughter but also of the young grandson. Of her he wrote his recollections:

'Before I was nine years of age I became a fatherless orphan. A year after that my younger brother died. Though I was at that time a mere child and could not entirely realise the painful state my mother was in, I can never forget for a moment during the rest of my life some of its aspects which were impressed on my young mind. The desolate position of my mother and the wretched condition of myself can be imagined by nobody else except one person. This person was my maternal grandmother, Madame Wang of the Yao Family, who often shared our house and always our sorrow, and comforted us from morning till night.

'My grandmother was the daughter of Mr Yao P'ei-Sung of the Shên District. She married my grandfather, Mr Wang P'in-Chai, and gave birth to my fourth uncle, my fifth uncle and then my mother. My grandmother had a very gentle and quiet nature and a mild and sympathetic appearance. She was amiable and kind in dealing with people, and managed her household with diligence and frugality. In bringing up her sons and daughter she had a way of her own, and she loved my mother and myself with special tenderness.

'Even in her advanced age my grandmother enjoyed excellent health. Every year my mother used to invite her to our house and she often stayed for a whole month. During the holidays from my school I would come home and wait upon my grandmother and my mother in the Hall of Winter Sunshine, where I would read my books aloud and my mother would work at her loom, while my grandmother recited the Buddhist sutras. Even to-day when I close my eyes I can see such a picture before me,

and seem to be able to hear the mingled sound of the loom, the Sanskrit, and my reading of the classics.

'When I was in my thirteenth year I studied under Mr Yao Tsung-Yuan, who held his school at my maternal grandparents' house. My grandmother constantly examined my clothing to see if I was too cold or too hot, carefully saw that I had the right food and drink, and made sure that I was progressing satisfactorily with my studies. She was most considerate and kind in inducing me to study. That was why my mother had no worry about me when she had to send her naughty and unfilial son far away from his mother's care.

'There are quite a number of wise and good mothers, most of them have confined their wisdom and goodness to their sons or their sons' sons, but few indeed who have cared so much for the son of their daughter as my grandmother. Most people bring up their children hoping for them to be rich and powerful so as to be a credit to their father and grandfather, and to bring their family into prominence, but few indeed instruct their child to be virtuous and righteous and encourage him to serve humanity in general, as did my grandmother!

'My grandmother was born on the 8th day of the 5th moon in the year of Ting Yu, the 17th of Emperor Tao Kuang's reign (June 10th, 1837) and died on the 13th day of the 3rd moon in the year of I-Tze, the 31st of Emperor Kuang Hsu's reign (April 17th, 1905). She was in the sixty-ninth year of her life.

'My mother wept bitterly when my grandmother died. I was then in my nineteenth year. My mother several times exclaimed to me when looking at me: "I am already a widow and now my mother dies, so what is there worth living for? The only reason that I should wait a little while is that my son is not grown up yet."

'Alas, my mother, too, has been dead these twelve years. While the instructions of my grandmother and my mother

are still fresh in my ears, I have not in the least improved in virtue nor am I flourishing with achievements. The affairs of the country are still in growing difficulties and the hour of invasion of our land by foreigners is getting nearer day by day. I am an unworthy son on whose shoulders rests the trust of my party and country. The safety of our whole nation is my sole responsibility. When I get up early at dawn or retire late at night, I think of this. What shall I do to deserve all this and how shall I act in order to carry out what my grandmother taught me? When I realise the seriousness of these matters, I can seldom stop the tears from falling down my face and wetting my clothes. I record this to warn myself against any further procrastination while I am serving in the army. This short sketch of my grandmother's life is written merely to recollect and describe her kindness to me.

'Written on the 8th of November, the 21st year of the Chinese Republic (1932), by her grandson Chiang Kai-Shek.'

The humble author thought it necessary to translate and quote in its entirety Chiang Kai-Shek's memoir of his maternal grandmother because the reader can see for himself how grateful Chiang Kai-Shek was to her for the shaping of his character, for which she and his mother were largely responsible. From his earliest childhood until he determined to go abroad, he was constantly cared for by Madame Wang, the sole comforter to the young widowed mother and the fatherless child.

Chiang Kai-Shek's maternal grandfather, who was born in 1820, died in 1882, five years before the boy was born. But a few months before the above biography was written, he composed a short essay on the old man whom he had never seen. The material, he said, came from what he had heard from his mother. It can easily be deduced from this that out of his profound affection for his grandmother, he



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thought it fit to write about her husband, though he had to do so from second-hand information. The essay begins thus:

'My maternal grandfather, Mr Wang P'in-Chai's school-name was Yu-Tze, and he belonged to Ko Brook in the District of Shên. From his youth he was wise and studious, and an expert in the classics, particularly *The Book of Odes* and *The Book of Rites*. When he grew up he gave up his literary career and travelled far away to the four regions of the country. He was tall and big, and had a majestic and dignified appearance. Such was his popularity that no one in the neighbourhood, whether they knew him personally or not, but would be able to tell at first sight that he was *the* Mr Wang of Ko Brook.

'After the fall of the T'ai P'ing Kingdom, he felt heart-broken at the submerging of the Chinese race, and became constantly unhappy at his home. So he travelled to the south of An-Hwei and west of Che-Kiang, and finally at An-Chi and Hsiao-Fêng he gathered together all those who were displaced and homeless and started plantations and farming. In a few years the rice-fields were increasing and the estate became very rich. For scores of *li* [a *li* is about a third of a mile] the property was all his. In the district where his estate was situated he dredged the rivers, laid out new roads, and trained the people to defend themselves. He trained them how to make war, secretly assigning them military duties, rewarding them or imposing fines upon them justly; there occurred no law-breaking and his part of the country lived in peace—a fact which is talked about even to this day.

'Although he was rich, he lived a diligent and frugal life, and brought up his children on strict principles of propriety, righteousness, purity and honour, especially paying attention to his daughters. My mother was well versed in poetry and other literary subjects and an expert

at needlework, so she was the favourite of her parents. When she married and came to settle down in our family, she managed the house according to my grandfather's method. After my father's death, when I was in my ninth year, my mother maintained our independence throughout the hard-up years very well, and brought up his orphans until they could establish themselves. It was mostly because of my grandparents' influence over her that my mother was able to accomplish her difficult task.

'In my childhood my mother once took out some antique porcelain and jade objects and said to me: "These are your grandfather's heirlooms. He brought them from places far away and gave them to nobody else but me, so I have taken the greatest care to keep them safe." She also said to me: "Your grandfather was a devoted fisherman and hunter. If he went out with a hook, never did he come back without catching a fish, and if he went out with bow and arrows, never did he come back without carrying with him some game. Both in hunting with nets and riding out in the fields his ability became better and better with the advance of years. His wisdom and endowments were far above those of ordinary men."

'During his later years he returned to spend his old age in his own country. He opened his purse for the laying of a highway from the Shên district to the town of Feng Hua. He had to cut through forests, make a way through mountains and villages and span rivers with bridges. From its difficult beginning to the very end he sponsored the work all by himself. Most people who are very good at accumulating wealth do not generally know how to spend it, so it is said that rich men are never benevolent. They think that since their wealth has been acquired by themselves with great difficulty, it should be handed down to their children. As these children of rich families have not been brought up properly, we have to-day many proud and lazy young people about. Our country becomes

weaker and the general population suffers on account of them, and these people are incurable.

'A man like my grandfather, who worked for society as if he were working for himself, leading his village folk as if he were leading an army, who was courageous in doing whatever was right in spite of danger and difficulties, and who, when he was not employed by the government on important work, retired to instruct his own relatives and children in propriety, righteousness, purity and honour, can indeed be compared with the worthies of ancient times. Since I was a child I have learned all about his sayings and deeds from my mother.'

The rest of this biographical essay deals with Chiang's reason for writing it and also gives the dates of Mr Wang's birth and death, details of his first marriage, his children by the first wife and their marriages, and those of his second marriage. By comparing the dates it has been observed that Mr Wang was seventeen years older than his second wife—an extraordinary match in China.

Chiang Kai-Shek is a zealous patriot—a fact even the bitterest of his enemies could not refute—and from the above essay the reader can easily find out from whom he inherited his patriotism. The T'ai P'ing Heavenly Kingdom has always been known as the T'ai P'ing Rebellion. Because millions of innocent people were slaughtered through this civil war, the leaders have been generally looked upon as bandit-chiefs. Chiang Kai-Shek was one of the first to declare openly and in black and white that one of his forefathers was at least a sympathiser of this group of men, if not actually a member. With a touch of romance, the author could conveniently draw a picture of a Chinese Robin Hood, tall and majestic, dashing about with his bow and arrows on a swift horse. He was respected by a large following who looked up to him as if he were their king. Wherever he went his word was law.

For those who like to be fashionable, the picture of Robin Hood could be altered into something utterly modern. A popular journalist would certainly say that Mr Wang, grandfather of Chiang Kai-Shek, could rightly claim the title of the first guerilla-warfare leader of China, and a forerunner of the Chinese revolutionary force which fought against and finally overthrew the Manchus.

Should the reader choose to think this way, he is perfectly at liberty to do so. But the humble author cannot trust himself, in case he should be carried away by imagination. He has decided to stick to the original and have it translated literally, word for word. In rendering it into English, he has taken only one liberty: he has omitted the word 'late' which preceded almost every 'mother', 'father', 'grandfather' and 'grandmother' in these essays. To indicate a deceased relative, the word 'late' is always used preceding the noun in the Chinese language, but its repeated occurrence would annoy an English reader.

It is very helpful to his biographers that Chiang Kai-Shek has personally written about three of his four grandparents. Though they are all rather short sketches, they greatly help the reader to piece together a picture of the Chiangs' family life before the boy was born and in his childhood days. In these three essays there are several glimpses of Chiang's mother, about whom, however, a long quotation from her son's writing is to come later.

As for his father, apart from the fact that he died before Chiang Kai-Shek was nine years old, nothing about him was mentioned in any of these writings. Nearly a quarter of a century after the death of his father, Chiang Kai-Shek asked a man of letters, who was also a very good friend of his, to write an inscription for his father's tombstone. It is an excellent piece of writing, well worth translating and quoting in full for its beautiful and original style, as well as its subject:

'My friend Chiang Kai-Shek said to me: "When I was in my ninth year my father died. It was more than twenty years ago, but I have never forgotten for a moment the words he said to us just before he passed away. When he was dying my mother was by his bedside. Looking at me and my younger sister, my father addressed my elder brother: 'Your brother and sister are still young. After I have gone your mother will be so afflicted by sorrow that she will not know what to do. You are the eldest. Can you be filial to your mother and look after your brother and sister so as to set my mind at ease?' My brother wiped away his tears and said that it would be his duty to do so. Then my father closed his eyes, to open them no more. Alas! Alas!

' "My father had a very strict nature and a strong sense of justice. In dealing with people he acted with sincerity. His countenance was always dignified and he led a diligent and frugal life. These principles he maintained all his life and also trained us to follow them. When sending me off to start my studies, he took me aside and instructed me: 'From my youth I have followed the profession chosen by our ancestors. I could not work for the State, but I have endeavoured to promote education in our village and district and to correct bad old customs. Now I can devote all my energy to working for the welfare of our relatives and kinsfolk so that they can live in peace and free from any anxiety. You must concentrate your attention on your studies, and if in future you can become useful to society you will have made up to some extent what has been my regret in life.'

' "In later years his love for my brother and me became ever greater than before, and at the same time he became even more strict in supervising our studies. Now that his coffin is buried, I am still a man without any accomplishment. But may I ask you to write an inscription?"

'Ever since I made the acquaintance of Mr Chiang Kai-

Shek, I have been deeply impressed by his strong personality. Now that I have learned from him about his honourable father's life, I begin to realise from whence came his calmness and thoughtfulness, his courage and resolution. This request is a great honour which I dare not refuse, therefore I write reverently.

His school name was Chao-Chung, and his style was Su-An, and he always lived at Brookmouth of Feng Hua, in the Province of Chekiang, trading in salt. During the reigns of Tao Kuang (1821-1850) and Hsien Feng (1851-1861) there was the revolution of the T'ai P'ing Heavenly Kingdom, when the whole of Chekiang Province was attacked and destroyed. Every profession was brought to ruination, and the Chiang family, though in its heyday, was no exception. At that time Su-An and his brother were still youths in their teens. When the disturbance gradually subsided a little, and he was older, Su-An, following his father's instructions, revived his salt business. With almost nothing to start on, he very rapidly got it going again and in a few years he became as rich as before. The prosperity of his business soon restored the prosperity of his home town.

But the people of Embroidery Brook had one failing: they liked to go to law. Once involved in it, they could seldom get out. Su-An thought that was not the way to determine what was right and what was wrong. Whenever he met with people who wanted to go to law he would do all he could to dissuade them. And when at last he found out that the wronged party could not get justice in any other way, he would give all the necessary money to get a fair trial and to see that the wrong-doers were punished. So lawsuits became fewer and fewer, and at last people had almost no cause for litigation. After his death, when there occurred a quarrel which had to be settled by law, the elders of the country would invariably exclaim to each other: "Had Mr Su-An been alive, it would not

have come to this!" This is indeed a clear proof that his kindness and benevolence to his countrymen were long and profound.

"When he had made a success of his long-ruined salt business, all his country-people realised that in him they had a man of ability. Whenever there was anything of importance to be decided, nothing would be done without a final word from his lips. They had established a religious society to the left of Embroidery Brook and called it the Military Mountain Society. It had a large and prosperous estate in rice-fields, and the man in charge of the Society made a good profit out of it, which all went into his own pocket. In the end the funds of the Society became so low that people thought the estate was unmanageable. But the elders of the country held a meeting, and they resolved that no one but Su-An could put the whole thing in order again. They insisted on asking him to be the head of the Society. Such a request was put to him three times, and three times he declined. At last they moved the tablets of the deities of the Society to his house and there religious sacrifices to these deities were offered by the members. Not until he consented to be their head would they move the tablets back. In the end he had to undertake the work, and in a very few years the Society's property doubled its original value.

"Whatever he did for his country and village was always like that. The thing for which he worked most was the free school. Scholars who were hard up and could not afford to go to school were invariably helped by him, and those whom he helped and who later became useful were many.

"It has been observed that nowadays people are generally very thrifty in managing their own property, whereas in managing public property they always find it decreasing. The better ones prefer to maintain their integrity and are careful to shun public work: they will do nothing for

others. Therefore we usually find that any public work belonging to a whole village or town is left unattended to. Such a trend becomes general and the country consequently becomes crippled. Confucius said: "If you see what is right and don't do it, you are a man without courage." A man like Su-An was a man of courage indeed!

'What a modest man he was! In his instructions to his son he seemed to be dissatisfied with himself. But he need not have been so. Those who have done all they could do personally have no reason for regret about the work which did not come their way. The merits they achieved will accumulate, to appear later on, and perhaps indirectly. Now Chiang Kai-Shek has helped our President, Sun Yat-Sen, to bring light to China. His ideas and his work have attracted the attention of the whole world, and he is a very studious scholar. He has more than fulfilled his father's ambition.

'Su-An died on the 5th day of the 7th moon, seventeen years before the establishment of the Chinese Republic (August 24th, 1895), in the fifty-fourth year of his life. He first married a lady of the Hsu family who died after giving birth to a son, Hsi-Hou, and a daughter, Sui-Chun. He then married a lady of the Sun family, who died without issue. Lastly he married a lady of the Wang family, who gave birth to two sons, Kai-Shek and Sui-Chin, and two daughters, Sui-Lien and Sui-Chu. Hsi-Hou is a distinguished scholar of his district, and Kai-Shek a major-general in the army. Sui-Chun has married Sung Shih-Chang of the same district, and Sui-Lien has married Chu Chih-San, also of the same district. Sui-Chin and Sui-Chu unfortunately both died young. He had three grandsons: Kuo-Ping, Chin-Kuo and Wei-Kuo, who all showed early signs of scholarship. After they had buried their father at the top of the right side of the Peach Mountain, to the north of the village of Embroidery Brook, on the 31st day

of March in the second year of the Chinese Republic (1913), Hsi-Hou and Kai-Shek asked me to write an inscription for the gravestone. The inscription is as follows:

*'His ambition was to help the state,
His benevolence still remains in the country.
His son, who has inherited his virtue,
Has achieved greater brilliance than his ancestors.
A pine tree lives but a hundred years,
But his spirit and purity prevail for evermore.*

'Written in the month of August in the 7th year of the Chinese Republic (1918) by Chu Ta-Fu.'

It should be noted that in the year 1918 when this was written Chiang Kai-Shek was still a major-general in the Cantonese army. Although this sounds a high rank, the position was by no means an important or enviable one. At that time, the Central Government of the Chinese Republic was still in Peking in the north, and in the hands of what were known as the War Lords. The Cantonese army was formed in the extreme south under the supreme command of Sun Yat-Sen, and it was against the Northern Government, who had greater military and financial support than Sun Yat-Sen. This little army was poorly equipped and badly paid, if paid at all. It had to fight incessantly against almost everybody around for its mere existence. Major-General Chiang Kai-Shek was not then an august personage whom everybody tended to flatter in extravagant terms, therefore this biographical sketch may be reasonably accepted.

As Chiang Yu-Piao, the grandfather, died when Chiang Kai-Shek was seven, and Chiang Su-An, the father, died the next year, the boy's upbringing was entirely in his mother's hands. Madame Chiang must have been a re-

markable woman, one would think, and there seems no doubt that she was. People writing about her or her son generally compare her with the mother of Mencius, the most celebrated good and wise mother in Chinese history. But the proper thing to do is to translate word for word and in its entirety what her son wrote about her when she died in 1921:

‘My mother came from the Wang family and her honourable name was Tsai Yü. She was the daughter of Mr Wang Yu-Tze of Ko Brook in the district of Shên. When she was twenty-three, she came to our home to marry my father, Su-An. A year later I was born. In my childhood I was often ill and on many occasions the illness was dangerous and critical. But as soon as I was recovered, I would play about as gaily as ever, hopping and skipping all day long. I was, therefore, frequently exposed to the risk of being drowned or burnt to death, or else severely cut or wounded. My poor kind mother’s anxiety over me doubled that of other mothers.

‘In my sixth year I went to school, but was much naughtier than before. My mother had, on the one hand, to teach and persuade me to study, and on the other hand she had to use the birch repeatedly in order not to spoil me. In the year of I-Wei (1895), unfortunately, my father forsook us for good, and every duty of our household, within and without, fell solely on the shoulders of one person: my mother. To make things worse, several calamities came upon us one after another. Death and trouble arrived alternately. My mother had to smother her mournful feelings to bear these hardships. It was most pitiable to see her suffer, and to-day I simply dare not recollect those heart-breaking days.

‘When I went out to study under a new teacher in my thirteenth year, my mother said to me with tears in her eyes: “Since your father’s death I have suffered endless

hardships to enable you to continue your studies. I do not wish you to obtain by this means an influential official post, nor to acquire a great deal of wealth. All I hope of you is that you should serve your country well and respect yourself. I shall be content if you can maintain the good reputation of our ancestors." This was, indeed, what she often taught me when we were alone at home.

'During the last days of the Manchu regime, the intellectuals of the whole country raised the cry that to save the state from ruination one must go abroad to study. When I was in my eighteenth year, my ambition was to sail eastwards to Japan in order to study military science. There were many who tried to stop me from going, but my mother greatly approved my resolution. She raised the passage money and other necessary expenses, and strongly urged me to start my long journey. After that she had to work much harder than she had ever done before, so that with scraping and saving she could send me the money for my tuition.

'In the year of Hsin Hai (1911) the People's Army started the Revolution. I led my men against the Manchu government between Shanghai and Hangchow. Most of my relatives and kinsfolk, hearing of my part in the revolution, were astonished and frightened and even turned pale. But my mother only said: "This is a man doing his duty to his country. If he has to die, he dies. I can bear it." Later on, when the news of my victory came, my relatives and friends were overjoyed and started to congratulate each other, but my mother not only received the news without excitement, but also sent me frequent letters warning me to be cautious and not to let my success go too much to my head.

'After the Republic had been established and I was entrusted with the work of training new soldiers in Shanghai, I planned to invite her to stay with me in Shanghai so that I could discharge a little of my filial duty

to her, but she only consented to come for ten days. On her departure, she instructed me as follows:

“You must never for a moment forget the hard things you have gone through. And above all, you must act with the greatest discretion and do all you can for your country. If you can only maintain all the merits accumulated by our ancestors, and will not be the one to spoil it all, then I shall feel much more comfortable at home in obscurity than with you among the comforts of Shanghai.”

When she went home, she continued to be a vegetarian and to wear no silk. When she was not reading the Buddhist sutras, she was working at her loom: these were the only two things the sound of which one could hear coming out of the house. In her countenance no one could detect any sign of pride or joy. And for this she was respected all the more by our relatives and neighbours.

In the year of Kwei-Chu (1913) our righteous army was defeated, and I had to fly for my life overseas. While all our relatives and friends were alarmed and disheartened, and thought that some great calamity was coming, my mother went on with her work as calmly as usual. While abroad, because of the shortage of money both for public use and for my private needs, I sometimes wrote to her for help. Some of her timid friends, fearing that this might compromise her, advised her to ignore my letters and have nothing to do with me, but my mother said resolutely:

“Is there a mother in the world who would blankly ignore the urgent need of her son when he was in danger? If I have no son, of what use is it for me to keep the estate to be inherited by my descendants?”

For years she never once refused my financial calls upon her when I was an exile. During these years there were times once or twice when a grasping official was in our district, and came to know about her help to me.

When he tried to threaten and blackmail her, my mother simply ignored him, and he could do nothing to her.

For over twenty years she kept her eternal fast on vegetables and her worship of Buddha. As she grew older she became more religious. People observed that her pious devotion to Buddhism was the reason why she could live so calmly and at ease through all her extraordinary hardships, and also be so pure and simple, so kind and virtuous. She could recite fluently and explain the meaning of the Suramgama Sutra, the Vimalakirti-Nirdesa Sutra, the Vajracchedika-Pranaparamita Sutra and the Avalokitesvara Sutra. She also had a profound knowledge of the various schools of thought of this religion. Whenever I went home to visit her, she would always teach me about Buddhism. She explained everything to me untiringly and her instructions were crystal clear and in minute detail. In recent years I have sometimes dabbled a little in the philosophy of nature and the logic of the Sung dynasty scholars, and have occasionally discussed problems about Buddhism. Such studies were entirely inspired by the teachings of my mother.

My mother's nature had always been kind and benevolent. Whoever in our country and village became an orphan and helpless, she never once failed to relieve and comfort him. But to those relatives who were lazy and neglected their work and came to her for loans, she would refuse their requests with clear-cut words, not even showing them any sympathy. She was especially interested in the public works of our district. Of all the bridges, ferries, roads and pavilions within twenty *li* of the Military Ridge, my mother built eighty or ninety per cent. Even at the moment when she was lying ill in bed, she subscribed an immense sum of money to the public hospital of Fang Bridge, built the pavilion of Motherly Clouds in the Sandy Plain of a Thousand Feet and the Free Tea Pavilion of the Military Ridge. The only wish

she expressed just before she passed away was to give half of the money she left to establish a free school, so that all the children of the district who could not afford to study should have the opportunity of being educated. This is but an example of her devotion to works of public welfare.

'From her childhood my mother was well known in her village and neighbourhood for her intellect and wisdom. Neither in her studies nor her needlework were any of her sisters as good as she was, and so her parents loved her much more than they did the others. Her marriage to my father was his third, following the death of his first two wives from the Hsu and Sun families. My elder sister Sui-Chun and my elder brother Hsi-Hou were children of the first wife, but my mother nursed and taught them and brought them up exactly as if they were her own. Even their marriages she considered as her sole responsibility.

'Three years after my mother gave me birth, my younger sister Sui-Lien was born, and three years after that my third sister Sui-Chu was born, who unfortunately died young. My younger brother Sui-Chin was born three years after my sister Sui-Chu's birth. Being the youngest of our generation and also endowed with such extremely good looks, which none of the others of us had, he was my mother's favourite. After the death of my father, my mother divided up the estate, which was allotted to us three male heirs. Because my elder brother was the son of the first wife, he was given the biggest share. Less than two years after this, my younger brother Sui-Chin died. My mother mourned bitterly over his death, and both mentally and physically she suffered intensely. Since then she has centred all her hopes on me, hoping anxiously that I should make a name for myself.

'Alas! I have been without the guidance of my father for twenty-six years. I have always tried to avoid going astray, and fortunately neither my elder brother nor my-

self have been entirely forsaken by the worthy and honourable men of our time. This good fortune of ours has been wholly due to my mother's careful and strict instructions.

'Alas! my mother endured thirty-six years of hardship. She swallowed much bitterness and never refused any kind of toil, all for her unfilial son, who, she hoped, would establish himself. But I was not worthy of her. Not only have I been unable to achieve deeds of virtue or do work of importance so as to fulfil my mother's ambition for me, but I have also failed utterly in the filial duty of a son to look after his mother's health constantly and in making her happy even for a single day. On the contrary, she has been allowed to drag on with some kind of serious illness for over ten years. Recently she has suffered from a weak heart, and during the past two months it has sometimes taken a turn for the better and at other times for the worse. At last, at the hour of the Dragon (about 8 a.m.) on the 14th of June in the Tenth year of the Chinese Republic (1921), she left her unfilial children, to come back no more. This was the fifty-eighth year of her life. Alas! alas! Unfilial though I am, I know that my sin is as great as the Heavens, and were I to die a hundred deaths I could never redeem it. The grey sky has existed for an eternity, but how can it be as long as my sorrow! I have herein reverently stated some of her feminine virtues, but they do not represent one ten-thousandth part of what she possessed.

'Written in tears in the tenth year of the Chinese Republic by the orphaned and mourning son, Chiang Kai-Shek.'

This touching pen-portrait gives the reader a vivid picture of an excellent housewife and sagacious mother. Chiang Kai-Shek was most unfortunate in losing the

guidance of both his father and grandfather at a tender age, but how extremely fortunate he was to have such a capable and wise mother! As his younger brother died very early, Chiang Kai-Shek could practically be considered as an only son. A young and widowed mother usually spoils her only son, but Madame Chiang, according to the above essay, acted in the most commendable manner. Some people hold that a man's future is mainly shaped during his youth, and even if that is not entirely true, Chiang Kai-Shek certainly has had, thanks to his mother, a very good foundation.

As in the case of his maternal grandparents, the age of Chiang Kai-Shek's parents also differed greatly. Madame Chiang was her husband's junior by as many as twenty-two years, and as he died comparatively young, but a few years over fifty, they had lived together in wedlock for only nine years when she found herself a widow at the early age of thirty-one. And till death a widow she remained for nearly thirty years.

Of the four pieces written by Chiang Kai-Shek himself, his portraits of his grandmother and his mother read the most vividly: they were written with affection, whereas his memoirs of his menfolk were written with respect and filial piety. The former, it could be said, with the heart, and the latter with the mind. The author finds that to paraphrase them would not do them justice, and he has tried his best to retain their original form as closely as possible.

From the foregoing five biographical sketches the reader will gather that the Chiangs came from a well-to-do and respectable family in a remote part near the east coast of Southern China. They are generous and full of public spirit. They have a strong sense of justice but have preferred to have nothing to do with the Manchu rulers. They have been men of influence, but have led a simple life of frugality and diligence. They have had great

admiration for scholarship, and brought up their children with strict discipline. They were always a loving family, and have taken pride in this. Their women, also, have been as judicious, courageous and energetic as the men-folk. They have borne almost unbearable hardships with remarkable will-power.



CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S HANDWRITING

II

IN the year 1887, about a quarter of a century before Sun Yat-Sen's revolution which established the Chinese Republic, the Manchu Emperor nominally ruling over China was a boy of barely sixteen. His regal title was Kuang Hsu, and it was the thirteenth year of his so-called reign. The power behind the throne was his august aunt, the tyrannical Empress Tzu Hsi, the Motherly and Auspicious. To say she was the power behind the throne is, in her case, a grossly insulting understatement. For twenty-seven years, ever since her husband Emperor Hsien Feng died suddenly in 1861, she had held the power of the Empire in her small, exquisite but deadly hands. On the untimely and mysterious death of her son Emperor Tung Chih in 1875, she put her baby nephew on the throne, to the astonishment of everybody. And later on, in 1881, she disposed of her co-regent, the Empress Tzu An, the Motherly and Restful, who was foolish and rash enough to stand in her way.

Though the T'ai P'ing Revolution was subdued by some of her abler Chinese generals, the foreigners across the ocean were still her great anxiety. Having once been forced by them to flee to Jehol, where her Emperor husband died, she was further mortified by having to give the Liu Chiu Islands to the Japanese, Annam to the French, and Burma to the English. Even the people of such a small country as Portugal were insolent to her. They wanted Macao, which she generously gave to them in that year.

Everywhere there was a feeling of apprehension and restlessness. While the conservatives were bemoaning the passing away of the golden age, the intellectuals were

beginning to think of reform, and the reckless few were even planning a revolution. Sun Yat-Sen, then a young student of twenty-one, studying under James Cantlie in the medical college of Alice Memorial Hospital in Hong-Kong, was starting a secret political society with some of his friends. They had not quite decided by what name they should call their new organisation.

It was in this thirteenth year of the Emperor Kuang Hsu, in the ninth moon, on the fifteenth day and at the hour of ram—which, to transfer into Western order and translate into the Western calendar, is about two o'clock in the afternoon on the 31st of October, 1887—when Chiang Kai-Shek was born in his ancestral house behind the salt shop with the signboard of Jade Serenity, in Military Ridge, a small town about a hundred miles south of Shanghai. The grandfather was immensely pleased with this increase of family and chose for the newly-born baby the name Sui-Yuan, meaning Auspicious and Original. As that name did not stick to him very long, he will be hereafter referred to throughout this book as Chiang Kai-Shek, which name he afterwards adopted. Although this baby was the second son and the third child of Chiang Su-An, the new arrival was the first born of his mother, who had been married only a little more than a year.

The boy Chiang Kai-Shek was somewhat of a problem child. During the next few years he gave his family endless trouble. At the age of three he one day thought of making an important discovery. He decided, it is recorded, to find out how far down was his tummy. To carry out his experiment without the help of modern scientific instruments, he had to use a chopstick to see if it would reach the bottom of his digestive organ. In a well-to-do family like that of the Chiangs, chopsticks are made either of ivory or silver. They are about the size of a very thin pencil and generally seven or eight inches in length. They are fairly heavy and very slippery. For

a child of Chiang's tender age such an article is extremely difficult to manage. As he did not wish to have an assistant for his experiment, he had to do it furtively. Fortunately the chopstick was very obliging; it readily consented to slip down his throat, but once inside it had no further regard for orders and simply refused to come out again.

A doctor had to be sent for to extract the chopstick and revive the child, who, after having made strenuous efforts to get the obstinate chopstick out in vain, had become unconscious. Early the next day his grandfather, having had no encouraging news about him, came to his bedside and asked:

'Has my grandson become dumb?'

'Grandson can talk! Not dumb at all!' replied the boy, jumping up in high spirits.

In the winter of the following year he had another misadventure. There was a large jar under the eaves of his house, half-full of water. One cold morning he was overjoyed to see that the water was frozen. The ice looked like a huge round mirror, and he wanted to get it out to play with. The edge of the jar was high, and a boy of four could not very easily reach the ice with his hands. He had to climb up and balance himself on the edge of the jar. He became top-heavy and in a second had toppled over. In South China the ice seldom becomes thick. Having broken the ice by his fall, he found himself immersed in the water head downwards with his feet kicking in the air. It was with great difficulty that he at last struggled out of the water, after having drunk plenty of it, and by that time he could scarcely hold out any longer. A narrow escape indeed!

But that was not all. The brook was but a few paces from his door. In warm and fine weather a dip in it was most enjoyable, and such a temptation the boy could never resist. For a child of under five, swimming in the

brook was a dangerous undertaking. While he was having the time of his life in the water, twice the torrents, rushing down into the brook from the mountain, forced him out of his depth, and twice he was rescued in the nick of time from drowning.

His mother, at that time, had her hands more than full. As is stated in one of the biographies, a girl was born to her three years after Chiang Kai-Shek's arrival. Besides having this infant at her breast, she was soon to have another daughter, who died very young. She was worried about her naughty boy, and so, with the permission of her father-in-law and the approval of her husband, she engaged a tutor to start schooling him at home in the spring of 1892.

Beginning to learn to read and write at the age of four years and a few months is perhaps a little too early. There is no record of his academic accomplishments for the next year or two, until 1894, when it is said he finished the Confucian classics *The Great Learning* and *The Middle Way*—the latter title sometimes translated as *The Golden Mean*. To spend more than two years over a small book the text of which is but some six thousand words seems rather slow going, and a little explanation is needed here. These two works, which generally compose a single slim book, are in classical style. Rarely could a boy in his early teens really understand their meaning. But they are the first two volumes of the famous Four Books of the Confucian Classics, which are invariably imposed upon any youthful beginner who is intended for a scholastic career. It was no wonder that it took Chiang Kai-Shek more than two years to read them and that during the studying of them he changed his tutor again and again. However, these two years or so were spent with great profit. He learnt a lot at this time, and even to this day he is wont to quote from these two classics for the benefit of his followers.

While he was making very little headway in his studies, he made good progress in his activities outside the school-room. The game he liked best was playing soldiers with his companions in the neighbourhood. He was always the commander-in-chief, training the others and organising them for battle. The home-made weapons, wooden swords and spears, he was quite good in handling, and his playmates were only too anxious to follow his lead. It has also been recorded that ever since his childhood he has been quite a good public speaker. During these years, while he should have devoted most of his time to learning the classics with his tutors, he spent a large part of it mounting on a platform and addressing his playmates. What he talked about is very vaguely stated. Telling stories or else merely talking nonsense, wrote Mr Mao, at one time his tutor. He did not pay much attention to what his pupil liked to say to his fellow truants, but mentioned that the boy's art of public speaking excelled almost that of a professional story-teller: he was very eloquent on all subjects and extremely free with his gestures. His audience was, as a rule, spellbound, even when nobody could comprehend what he was talking about.

The year 1894 is important in the life of Chiang Kai-Shek for several reasons. Not only was it the year in which he finished his first book, but also when he lost the care and guidance of his kindly grandfather. Moreover, two important historical events happened in that year. Civil strife started in Korea, where both China and Japan sent their armies, and this led to the first Sino-Japanese conflict, a conflict which continued on and off for half a century. The other epoch-making event was the establishment in Honolulu of the Resurgent China Society—Hsing Chung Hui—by Sun Yat-Sen. This Society later became the People's Party—Kuo Min Tang—of which Chiang Kai-Shek is to-day the Director-General.

In the year following, 1895, another misfortune fell on

the Chiang family. Chiang Su-An, Chiang Kai-Shek's father, died, comparatively young—still in his early fifties. From now on the up-bringing of the boy was entirely in his mother's hands. There is an old saying in China to the effect that until his father is dead the son will not be wise. How much truth there is in the proverb it is difficult to say. But in the case of Chiang Kai-Shek, the year in which his father died was a notable turning-point. Instead of piling up more mischievous records, Chiang Kai-Shek was credited that year with completion of the two remaining classics of the series, *The Analects of Confucius*, which is in two volumes and much more than three times the length of the first two combined; and *The Sayings of Mencius*, which is roughly twice the length of *The Analects*.

It will be noticed that Chiang Kai-Shek studied his Four Books in their orthodox order. Such order was arrived at simply by measuring their respective lengths: the shorter ones first and the longest last. No doubt it was thought that the early completion of a short book might encourage the disheartened young scholar to tackle the longer ones. Unfortunately for the student, the shorter the book, the more difficult it is. While the longest, *The Sayings of Mencius*, is full of interesting, witty and even humorous parables, dialogues and discussions, many of which the youthful reader could understand and enjoy, *The Analects of Confucius* is slightly on the heavy side, with a great deal of purely moral instruction which tends to be dull and even obscure, while the two shortest books, *The Great Learning* and *The Middle Way* are almost entirely composed of abstract philosophical teachings, nine-tenths of which are utterly wasted on a child.

For this reason some teachers reverse the orthodox order of the books: they teach their pupils Mencius first, Confucius second, and last of all the two short ones. It

may take longer for a child to learn Mencius, but the result is generally more satisfactory. He can at least appreciate some of it. Also there are plucky people who leave out *The Great Learning* and *The Middle Way*. This unorthodox action is highly commendable though not frequently adopted. As a student probably will read *The Book of Rites* on completion of the Four Books, it is superfluous for him to study these two short books which are only two chapters taken from *The Book of Rites*. But most teachers like to have the satisfaction of seeing their pupils complete the entire series of the Four Books in case they do not go on with the other classics.

To be able to complete the Four Books before he was nine, Chiang Kai-Shek must have been an extremely clever and studious child. Yet in the authorised Chinese biography of him no such indication is to be found. It merely says that he finished reading the Four Books and that Mr Jen, his tutor, was extremely strict in supervising his pupil's studies.

After the Four Books, a Chinese scholar tackles the Five Canons. They are: *The Book of Odes*, *The Book of Ancient History*, *The Book of Changes*, *The Spring and Autumn Chronicles* and *The Book of Rites*. These five works, together with the above-mentioned four, comprise the Nine Major Classics, most of which are believed to have been written or compiled by Confucius or his followers.

From 1896 to 1903, that is from Chiang Kai-Shek's ninth year until he was sixteen, he studied these five important Confucian Canons. Again, he followed the orthodox order carefully: *The Book of Odes* he read first of all. This is a book of songs and ballads, many of them sung and composed by the common people all over the country at or before the time of Confucius. The Sage collected and selected three hundred and eleven from them to be handed down to posterity, but only three

hundred and five have been preserved. Like all other Confucian Classics, this book has also been greatly enlarged with wishful annotations by fastidious scholars and philosophers of later generations, who insisted that even the simplest of the love songs was undoubtedly allegorical, that loyalty and statecraft were the disguised themes of nearly all the ballads, and that the gentle lover referred to in them was the King and the doting maid his minister.

As such a theory has been generally accepted for ages, this collection of ancient songs and ballads eventually became a handbook for potential statesmen. All the old-fashioned students in China who wanted to pass their state examinations so as to be appointed government officials made a point of learning it by heart. After centuries of study, these three hundred and five old songs and ballads naturally found their way into every book and indeed every essay written by prominent scholars. So many literary allusions have been formed around these songs that it is now impossible to read and understand anything without first acquiring a good knowledge of the original songs and their accepted though misleading interpretations.

Chiang Kai-Shek's new tutor who taught him this important book was a rather stiff scholar; for together they spent a much longer time over it than one would think necessary. He was also a very painstaking teacher, who, in spite of his pupil's slow progress, was well pleased with the boy's studies. For three and a half years he taught him, besides these ancient songs and ballads, how to read classical prose. After Chiang Kai-Shek had read and learned this important Confucian Classic he was able, according to the belief of pedantic scholars, to express his emotions, to observe other people's feelings, to mix in society and air his grievances, to serve his parents at home or his master in distant quarters, and also 'to know a great many of the names of birds, beasts, herbs and trees'.

Therefore the tutor thought the time had come for him to start composing essays in the traditional style; hence he had to study numerous prose works which would be useful as models.

An occasion soon came for Chiang Kai-Shek to voice his feelings by trying essay writing. His younger brother, who was very clever, good-looking, and dearly-loved by all the members of the family, had died at the age of three. His mother was heart-broken. While he was in an emotional mood, the youthful Chiang Kai-Shek wrote his first essay. The dedication of his earliest literary work to his younger brother was not a passing fancy. Many years after this, when he was married and his first-born, a son, came into the world, Chiang Kai-Shek announced that the boy was to be considered as the adopted son and heir of his late younger brother, whose lineage was thus kept continuous in the clan book.

At the age of ten, Chiang Kai-Shek began to take up his duties as an active member of his family. His mother taught him for the first time to take part in sacrificial and other kinds of ceremonies. She would say to him: 'Be graceful in your movements. In getting up or bowing down when you are paying your respects be sure that there is rhythm, and that every move of your hand or foot is in harmony with the music that is being played on such occasions. You must never forget this, my son.'

His mother was generous and hospitable, and she taught her boy to be so also. As soon as he started to act as host at functions where guests were entertained, he would look after them until they had drunk almost to intoxication. At a social party in China, it is considered good manners for the guest to be what is called 'guest-like', that is, not to drink or eat much however much inclined to do so. A good host has to be persuasive. Chiang Kai-Shek from his boyhood was a good host. In his early teens he used to urge his guests to eat heartily and to eat the best. Should

one of them try to take food inferior to the delicacies provided, he would prevent the guest's chopsticks from touching the inferior dishes, or else would order the servants to take them away so that only the best food was left on the table. It was his habit also to see that every article in the guest-room was the best in the house.

His tutor, besides teaching him the moral conduct of the Confucian school, also imparted to him the knowledge of the modern world. In one of his discourses, he talked about the democracy of the United States of America. When he mentioned that the President of the United States was no more than a public servant, who was not followed wherever he went by a big retinue like that of a great official of China, all his listeners except Chiang were astonished. Chiang, who was then only ten, said: 'The President is a citizen just as any other man, therefore there isn't much difference between them. What is there, then, to be astonished about?' No wonder the tutor once said to Chiang's mother: 'Your son's nature and wisdom are above those of other children. He is sure to be a great man in the future. Heaven is going to reward you as you richly deserve.'

His next tutor, who taught him *The Book of Ancient History*, was also impressed by his cleverness. As Chiang Kai-Shek was now living at his maternal grandmother's house, he used to tell Chiang's uncles: 'Your nephew has extraordinary understanding. If he is thoroughly educated and well brought up, there is no limit to his future.'

It was under this tutor that he began to write poetry. One of his first compositions was on 'Bamboos.' He wrote:

*'Abundant bamboos come into view on the mountain,
Creating an atmosphere of coolness in these Summer
days'*

which his tutor liked and praised very much.

He spent a year on *The Book of Ancient History*, and next year he went to another place near-by to study *The Book of Changes* under another tutor. This was in the year 1900, when the boy was approaching his fourteenth year. Previously when he had left his mother to go and study it was to live under the roof of his grandmother, who could look after him as his mother did. But now he was really going away from home, and on his departure his mother said to him:

'A young man travelling from home must be extremely cautious in every situation. All the time he must beware, lest some accident happen. It is more important to avoid risks and danger than to find luck. You must always remember this, my son.'

On this mystic classic *The Book of Changes* Chiang also spent a year. But during this period he had a certain number of holidays, which he spent at home with his mother. He liked to help her in her daily work: when she was cooking, he would make and look after the fire; when she was tidying the rooms he would make the beds; when she was attending the silk-worms he would gather mulberry leaves or do garden work. They enjoyed their manual labour, wearing coarse dress and eating coarse food without feeling the least discomfort.

In 1901 he went to another place and a new tutor to study the enlarged text of *The Spring and Autumn Chronicles*, and to write discursive historical essays. Though he finished this classical history in a year, he spent a good part of the next year in reviewing it under another teacher, Mr Mao, who had a school not very far from Chiang's home. More than thirty years after this, Mr Mao compiled a very detailed biography of his distinguished pupil. This consists of twenty volumes, and has been a great help to the humble author in the earlier part of his present work.

Besides reviewing *The Spring and Autumn Chronicles*, about which much has been written earlier in this biography, Mr Mao also supervised Chiang Kai-Shek in reading and punctuating *The Chronicle Outline of the General Mirror*, a complete history of China from the earliest times. In the summer of this year, that is 1902, Chiang went for the first as well as the last time to attend the state examination. Mr Mao does not say whether his pupil was successful or not, but merely records 'he went to the examination to satisfy his curiosity, and was disgusted by the cruel and humiliating regulations of the Examination Hall.' He further says that soon his pupil was delighted to hear of the abolition of this examination system and of the foundation of schools where teaching was carried out according to new methods.

Of Chiang Kai-Shek's school days Mr Mao has written this curious paragraph:

'At play, he would regard the classroom as his stage and all his schoolmates as his toys: he could be wild and ungovernable. But when he was at his desk, reading or holding his pen trying to think, then even a hundred voices around him could not distract him from his concentration. His periods of quietude and outburst sometimes occurred within a few minutes of each other: one would think he had two different personalities. I was greatly puzzled by him.'

He was with Mr Mao for a year. In 1903 he again moved to another place. This time it was to enter the Phoenix Mountain School in the city, where, in accordance with the new method of education, he was taught for the first time English and arithmetic. However, in those early days Chinese classics and history were still the major subjects, and he finished his *Book of Rites* under a prominent member of the Imperial Academy.

Having completed the Four Books and Five Canons a Chinese student is considered to have built a sound

foundation for his learning. In the following year, 1904, Chiang Kai-Shek left the Phoenix Mountain School to study under a famous scholar and thinker, Mr Ku Ching-Lien, who was lecturing in the Pavilion of Literature in the northern part of the city. In later years Chiang Kai-Shek used to say: 'Abundant are our books, extensive and profound are our arts and learning. That I can dabble a little in them, and know how to read those books and find my way in them I owe all to one man, Mr Ku, who did it single-handed.'

Besides instructing Chiang in his classical studies, Mr Ku also instructed him to read the works of the ancient philosophers. *The Art of War*, a military classic written by Sun Tze, a famous general who lived shortly after Confucius, and the writings of Tseng Kuo-Fan, the scholar-general who quelled the T'ai P'ing Revolution, are the two important works which he studied under Mr Ku at this time, and which proved to be very useful to him for the rest of his life. Mr Ku was not only a thinker and a philosopher, but also a very practical man, who could tell whether his pupils would have a future or not. Of his pupil he was very fond. His advice to him was that he should be prepared to serve and defend his country. 'A young man like you,' he said, 'who wants to achieve great things must acquire new knowledge. The best way is to go abroad and study in foreign countries.'

Mr Ku also saw in his pupil a revolutionary and patriot. He often discussed with Chiang Kai-Shek affairs of state. Of Sun Yat-Sen, the Chinese revolutionary leader, Mr Ku told his student a great deal, and he noticed that whenever he was talking about this 'rebel', the young man was entranced. Chiang was particularly excited when he heard that in 1896, when Sun was in London, the Chinese Embassy serving under the Manchus kidnapped and imprisoned him. It was through the help of his English friend, James Cantlie, who arranged legal assistance for

him, that he was at last set free. Since then, Chiang Kai-Shek has had a great respect for England, where both Government and the common people observe their laws.

It was during those years that Chiang Kai-Shek started to become politically conscious. No wonder! Mr Ku was one factor; but the prevailing cause was that during those years so many important historical events took place in China. After being defeated by Japan in 1894, China was forced to conclude, in the following year, a very harsh peace treaty with her exacting victor, surrendering the island of Formosa and agreeing to many outrageous demands on her territories and national rights. The whole country cried aloud in protest, but this produced little effect. While Sun Yat-Sen and his followers were organising the Resurgent China Society for revolution, which they attempted in the Autumn of 1895, but which failed, a number of the moderate intelligentsia worked for a general reform movement. In 1898, the Reformers succeeded in getting the young Emperor, Kuang Hsu, to issue a hundred and more high-sounding edicts, which amounted to nothing. The stumbling-block in the path of the Reformers was the Empress Dowager.

When the European powers saw that China was utterly unable to defend herself against a force which was only comparatively modernised, they lost no time in starting to fish in troubled waters. Russia started the ball rolling by making claims on railway rights in Manchuria, and in 1896 she forced China to sign what was officially called an agreement, in which she made China give her certain rights in the Chinese Eastern Railway. In 1897, France claimed mining and other rights in many parts of South China. Germany had her eyes on North China; in November of the same year she seized Tsing-Tao and the Bay of Kiao-Chou. In 1898 Russia went further inland and obtained a lease of Darien and Port Arthur. France

now seized Kuang-Chou Wan (the Bay of Canton), while Great Britain made China lease to her Kow-Loon and Wei-Hai-Wei. During those years the European Powers acted as though they were looting a house on fire: all they needed to do was to help themselves, but they must be very quick about it.

Those who believed in the General Reform Movement thought the Reformers could work miracles. It was rather disappointing to realise that the issuing of reform edicts was one thing, while saving the country from ruination was another. Not only were the Reformers utterly unable to work miracles, but they were also powerless to resist the overbearing Empress Dowager, who arrested the Emperor and beheaded six of their leaders.

Her crushing of the Reform Movement was undoubtedly a selfish act—she wanted no interference by the Emperor and his Reformers—but it would be wrong to think that it was an unpatriotic one. On the contrary, she was so patriotic that she thought if she could defeat all the foreigners in the world with one blow, China would resume her position as the top nation once more. In 1899, in the Northern province of Shan-Tung, where the Germans had murdered a number of people and had seized Tsing-Tao and Kiao-Chou, there started an extremely patriotic society called the Righteous Harmonious Boxers. Though they were ignorant and superstitious, they were fanatically patriotic. Their slogan was ‘Help Manchus exterminate foreigners’.

Such a slogan was half the battle: it soon won the approval of the Empress Dowager and the unthinking masses. But there it ended, and ended in a disastrous way. To use a multitude of ill-equipped and untrained rabble against a modern force, however small, was to court calamity. When they outnumbered the foreigners many times they easily won the first half of the battle, but when the foreigners brought in their reinforcements Peking fell

with hardly a struggle. The Empress Dowager and the Court had to flee. With their army in the Imperial Palace, the Allied Powers could comfortably dictate their terms for a Peace Treaty. It was not how much they should ask, but how much China could pay. After careful consultation with experts, who said that she could not possibly pay more than three hundred million, the sum fixed for indemnity was four hundred and fifty million ounces of silver. As she could not pay cash, it was arranged for her to pay this in instalments spread over thirty-nine years, with interest at four per cent, this bringing the total to just under a thousand million.

The percentage figures obtained by various countries were as follows:

Russia	-	-	-	29%
Germany	-	-	-	20%
France	-	-	-	15.75%
England	-	-	-	11.25%
Japan	-	-	-	7.7%
America	-	-	-	7.3%
Italy	-	-	-	5.9%
Belgium	-	-	-	1.9%
Austria	-	-	-	0.9%
Other Countries	-	-	-	0.3%

It must be pointed out here that America was the first country to waive the indemnity, which she asked China to use for educational purposes. A college was therefore established, and the graduates of this College were sent to American Universities under the benefit of this fund.

The harshest part of the terms was not the indemnity, but the rights the Powers obtained to station their armies in a number of places near the Capital and in other strategical regions. Because of this an aggressor would have no difficulty in occupying Peking, as was done in 1937.


After the Boxer uprising and the subsequent Peace

Treaty, more people in China began to see that Sun Yat-Sen was right. To save the country, the government of the Manchus must go. The Empress Dowager and her ministers noticed this tendency, and they became more cautious and did their best to suppress the Revolution which was brewing everywhere, especially in the South. In 1904 Japan invaded Manchuria, which is Chinese territory, to attack the Russian forces which had marched into Manchuria in spite of protest, and the famous Russo-Japanese war was fought on Chinese ground. In 1905 the Russian forces were defeated and China was made to agree to the transfer to Japan of all the rights which Russia had obtained from China in the Manchurian provinces. The Empress Dowager saw that the whole country knew that the Government of the time was not good enough to cope with the new situation, and soon she issued an Imperial Edict to tell the people that preparations were being made for a Constitutional Government.

It was in the early part of 1905, when Japan was still fighting hard with Russia, that the youthful Chiang Kai-Shek decided to go to Japan to study military science. He had recently left Mr Ku to enter the Dragon River Middle School in the same city. In this school he had stayed but three months when he sailed for Japan. As his father and grandfather had not wanted to go into the Civil Service, although they were good scholars, neither did Chiang Kai-Shek intend to serve the Manchu Government when he decided to become a soldier. Years later, when he was studying in a military school in Japan, he composed a poem to send to a cousin of his, with these two concluding lines:

*'To bring a new dawn to our beloved celestial land
is to fulfil my duty;
The aim of my eastward voyage is far from seeking
military honours.'*





Very few records have been preserved about his brief stay in the Dragon River Middle School. Mr Hollington Tong, who wrote a detailed biography of him, was at that time teaching English in this school, and they occupied rooms on the same floor of the school building. He says:

‘Chiang Kai-Shek was an early riser, and after his matutinal ablutions it was his custom to stand erect on the verandah in front of his bedroom for half an hour. During this time his lips were compressed, his features were set in determination and he stood with his arms firmly folded. It is, of course, impossible to say definitely what thoughts filled his mind at such times, but it was fairly obvious that he was thinking of his future. In fact, it is clear from his own diary that during those few months at the School he was formulating plans to go to Japan to study military science in order the better to equip himself for a career which was to be wholly dedicated to the nation.’

Mr Tong also mentions that his pupil spent other times of the day away from the crowd in order to meditate by himself. To quote Mr Tong again: ‘Perhaps it should be noted that at this time a certain aloofness—that has often since been mistaken for pride—manifested itself. Although he was ready to join in any game in which physical fitness was a requisite—he ran third in a race at the first inter-school athletic meeting in Ning-Po—he was averse to spending his time in empty talk. Often, while others were engaging themselves in the “tremendous trifles” that pre-occupy schoolboys, he wandered away by himself and was evidently ruminating deeply.’

Over what did Chiang Kai-Shek ruminate? Mr Tong suggests that he was thinking of his future. But it would be more correct to say ‘*the* future’ instead of ‘*his* future’. Because there was another thing which made a deep impression on Mr Tong: the avidity with which Chiang Kai-Shek seized upon the newspapers as they arrived from

Shanghai. In those early days of the century not many copies of newspapers managed to penetrate into such interior districts as Feng Hua, for the simple reason that there was not a great demand for them. But in a little reading-room assigned to the scholars of this School, Chiang Kai-Shek was always the first to get hold of them and he spent a lot of his time over them. Mr Tong says that to his recollection no one was so keen to learn about the march of events in the outside world as Chiang Kai-Shek, who to this day is still an insatiable newspaper reader, feeling that it is an important part of his duty to keep himself well informed of happenings and developments in China as well as in other parts of the world.

There were three reasons for Chiang Kai-Shek's sudden determination to leave the Dragon River Middle School. The first was, as stated earlier in this book, the advice of his former tutor, the patriotic Mr Ku, who said that in order to achieve great things he must acquire new knowledge, and the best way was to go abroad and study in foreign countries. The second was evidently that, since he had been reading newspapers diligently, he had come to know the critical condition China was in and was confirmed in the general belief that she was heading for ruin at the hands of blundering Manchu rulers. He must prepare to join those who were planning a revolution. And lastly, there came upon him an outrageous happening.

A certain citizen of his native place failed to pay his rice tax and was nowhere to be found. The authorities served a writ on the whole neighbourhood in order to collect the money from the man's neighbours, among whom were the family of Chiang Kai-Shek. Seeing that the head of the family was a helpless widow, the officials knew that a little more easy money could be squeezed out of them by frightening them. They arrested Chiang Kai-Shek and brought him to the Magistrate's Court, where they threatened to imprison him if he did not agree at once

to pay what they asked. Madame Chiang considered it a great insult to the family to have her son treated thus, and Chiang Kai-Shek himself said afterwards that this was the first spark which kindled his revolutionary fire. To clear the country of such ruffianly rulers he must go to Japan to join the followers of Sun Yat-Sen.

In this decision he must have been quite outspoken, for many of his kinsfolk and relatives soon knew about his aim of going abroad and came to dissuade him. But he was not to be dissuaded. To put a stop to all this interference he did a daring thing, which indicated that he had destroyed his bridges behind him: he cut off his queue and entrusted it to a friend to take home. The country people were annoyed as well as frightened. Ever since the Manchus came into China in the seventeenth century it had been proclaimed all over the country that every man must shave his forehead and keep a queue on his crown. By cutting it off, Chiang Kai-Shek had committed an offence against the law. It was a thing which those law-abiding people had never heard of. Nevertheless, this drastic step immediately produced its intended effect. Nobody tried to stop him any more. As far as they were concerned, the farther he went the better.

It was at such times that Madame Chiang showed the world of what stuff she was made. While a soft-hearted mother would hardly have allowed her fatherless only son to leave her to go far away, she, as soon as she saw that he had good reasons for taking this determined step, raised the necessary money for him to go. Thus, in May of 1905, her beloved son Chiang Kai-Shek went to Japan, and that was only a month after the death of her mother.

On his arrival in Japan, Chiang Kai-Shek made inquiries about his prospective matriculation into some military academy. But, alas, he was disappointed! Japan had previously agreed with China to take precautionary

measures regarding the training of military students. In order to prevent dangerous revolutionaries getting into such schools, they would only admit those who were sent over by the Chinese Board of War. No private student could possibly hope to get into any of them. It might well be said that these measures were specially introduced to bar such people as Chiang Kai-Shek.

Though this trip did not fulfil his heart's desire, it was very fruitful in one respect: he met, in Tokyo, Chen Chi-Mei, the greatest follower of Sun Yat-Sen, and through him he came to know a number of revolutionaries. This was, in fact, his first actual contact with the great movement which later on became his life's work. About this great revolutionary, Chen Chi-Mei, more will be written in the next chapter, because he and Chiang Kai-Shek soon became sworn brothers and life-long friends, until 1916, when Chen Chi-Mei was assassinated by Yuan Shih-Kai, the foremost of China's war-lords, who crowned himself the new Emperor of China and reigned about three months.

During his short stay in Tokyo, Chiang Kai-Shek went to study the Japanese language at the Saika Gakyo. This also served him extremely well at a critical point, which will be related in its proper place.

While Chiang Kai-Shek was wandering in the wilderness, it was again Madame Chiang who showed determination. She saw that it was not good enough for her son to linger on in Tokyo if he could not get the education he wanted, so she summoned him home in the following winter on the pretext that she needed his help to marry off her young daughter. In those early days a wedding or a funeral was a most important event in a good respectable family. Chiang Kai-Shek could not possibly refuse his mother's summons and had to bid his revolutionary friends a temporary farewell, promising that he would come back to join them again, and perhaps soon.

A good story-teller would find this the most convenient time to describe the first meeting of Chiang Kai-Shek and Sun Yat-Sen. It might not be true, but it would be very convincing. Sun Yat-Sen had gone to Europe early in the spring of 1905, his aim being to recruit members for his revolutionary society among Chinese students studying in various countries. He wanted to reorganise his Resurgent-China Society; he had his first meeting in Brussels, where he gave a lecture on the Three Principles of the People, and more than thirty members were sworn in. The second meeting was held in Berlin, where he secured a further twenty odd members, and in Paris he gathered more than ten followers at his third meeting. In July he arrived at Tokyo, and on Sunday, July 30th, the historical preparatory meeting of the new Tung Meng Hui or The China Union took place, and several hundred members were enlisted representing people of every province of China except those of Kan-Su. This was not because of a lack of patriotism among men of that province, but for the simple reason that there was not a single Kansu student in Japan. On August 20th the Inaugural Meeting was held, and Sun Yat-Sen was elected the Leader. As the China Union later on became Kuo Min Tang or the People's Party, of which Chiang Kai-Shek is the leader, and as in 1905 he had just got to Tokyo hoping to join Sun Yat-Sen's movement, nothing would fit in better than to say that these two leaders met then and there.

But Chiang Kai-Shek did not join the China Union until much later. It is very difficult to believe that he would not have joined the Union if he had had a personal contact with the magnetic Sun Yat-Sen at this time.

On his return to China, he found that the Pao-Ting Military Academy, established by the Board of War, was recruiting students all over China through competitive examination. From the province of Chekiang sixty

students were to be selected. When he went to put his name down, he learned that there were over a thousand candidates, and of the sixty vacancies forty-six had already been allocated to persons put up by various influential officials of military organisations, leaving only fourteen vacancies to be filled. The chances were roughly a hundred to one. However, he was not disheartened, and he passed his examination successfully. When he went to Paoting he had to pass a further entrance examination. He was not well, suffering most probably from the common malady of a stranger in a strange land. Southerners sometimes do not feel fit when they first come in contact with the climate of the North. This is generally called 'not being agreeable with the water and earth of the place'. But in spite of indisposition he did very well at this second examination, and early in 1906 was admitted into the Academy.

The entrance into the Military Academy was indeed the beginning of the realisation of his ambition, and he ought to have been very happy there. Unfortunately, in this Academy the distinction between the Manchus, who came mostly without going through competitive examinations, and the sons of Han, that is, people of the eighteen provinces of Interior China, was marked. The Manchus considered themselves the unquestionable ruling class, and naturally did not want the ruled classes to share their privileges. But what Chiang Kai-Shek suffered from most was not this class distinction: the fact that he was the only one in his company to be without a queue made all the people look upon him as a rebel. Because of this he had to be particularly careful in his conduct.

One day, during a lecture on hygiene, the instructor, who was a Japanese, putting a lump of earth on the desk, said: 'This little lump of earth, roughly about a cubic inch, could contain as much as four hundred million germs.'

Japan had just defeated Russia and acquired from her

all her special privileges in China, whom she had also defeated a few years before. She was also one of the victors in 1900 when the Allied Powers marched into and occupied Peking. That nearly every Japanese felt very superior, and even more so when he met with the people of China, was an undeniable fact. This Japanese instructor, though he was paid to work in a Chinese school, was no exception. When he happened to mention the round number of four hundred millions something suddenly came to his proud mind. He added: 'This lump of earth could be compared with China, whose population is four hundred million—the exact number of germs which could live in this lump of earth.'

While the Japanese instructor was enjoying his insulting joke on his students, Chiang Kai-Shek, bursting with indignation, rushed forward to stand in front of the desk. He divided the little lump of earth into eight equal parts and, staring angrily at the lecturer, asked: 'Japan has a population of fifty millions. Could they be compared with fifty million germs which could live on one-eighth of this lump of earth?' The Japanese instructor was for the moment bereft of speech, but he quickly recovered his arrogance and shouted at Chiang, pointing at his short hair: 'Are you a member of the revolutionary society?' Chiang was not frightened and protested: 'I'm asking you whether my comparison was right or not. Let us not talk about anything beside the point.' As the Japanese could not find a good reply, he went immediately to report this act of insubordination to the Chancellor, requesting him to deal with it sternly. According to the regulations of discipline in this military school, an act of insubordination against instructors was a serious offence. To be expelled and sent home was to be treated leniently, otherwise the offender would be arrested and court-martialled. But the Chancellor saw that the Japanese instructor was much more to blame than Chiang, so he merely ordered the

Director of the Academy to give the offender a disciplinary talk, after which the incident was considered closed.

Towards the end of 1906 the Board of War decided to select a number of students from the Academy to be sent over to Japan to study military science. The selection was to be done by a competitive examination, but Chiang was not allowed to sit for it because he did not belong to the section in which the Japanese language was one of the major subjects of study. Chiang was not to be put off so easily. He petitioned the Chancellor in a long letter, saying that he fully appreciated the sagacious decision of the authorities not to include students who had not studied the Japanese language, but that he had been once to Japan and had made a conscientious study of the language. This petition had been sent in some time ago, but no reply had come up to the day before the examination was to take place. He had given up hope. But towards midnight a messenger, holding a lantern, came to his room with an order from the Chancellor. He was awakened from his dreams to learn that he was to be allowed to sit for the examination the next day. He was overjoyed, and scored a success in every subject of the examination. By the following Spring his ambition was to be really fulfilled. He was to sail to Japan to study military science at long last.

No exact dates for his departure from Paoting Military Academy and his entrance into Shinbo Gakyo, the Preparatory Military Academy in Tokyo, are known. It is merely recorded that the examination was held at Paoting Academy at the end of 1906 and that Chiang Kai-Shek was admitted into the Tokyo Academy in the Spring of 1907. As this was his second trip to Japan, and as in those days no passport or visa, or any kind of formalities were needed for Chinese nationals going to Japan, it can be

assumed that nothing could or would hold Chiang Kai-Shek back for a day from his urgent desire to join his revolutionary friends in Tokyo.

As Sun Yat-Sen had gone in March to Annam to restart his active attempts to overthrow the Manchus, it is assumed that Chiang Kai-Shek arrived at Tokyo some time before Sun Yat-Sen's departure, and that it was then when the two first met, with the result that Chiang became Sun's most devoted follower. Also it is on record that at this time Chen Chi-Mei initiated Chiang Kai-Shek into the China Union. Since then Chiang's work has been entirely in accordance with the Three Principles of the People as laid down by Sun. While Chiang's activities for the next few years were confined to two places, Tokyo and Shanghai, Sun was obliged to leave Japan under pressure from the Japanese Government, who granted the request of the Manchus because they agreed that Sun was promoting revolution and gathering a big following in Japan. From then onwards he made Hongkong his headquarters, and for a number of years was unable to set foot either in Japan or in Shanghai.

Sun Yat-Sen claimed, in the year 1921, that he had by then enjoyed Chiang's friendship for over ten years. Thus it is clear that they must have met for the first time either in 1905, when Chiang first went to Japan, or else in 1907, when he went there a second time. As Sun was recruiting members for his China Union on a large scale in 1905 and Chiang did not join it in that year but in 1907, it seems to the author that the later date is more probable.

From the Spring of 1907, when Chiang entered the Preparatory Military Academy in Tokyo, to the Winter of 1909 when he finished his course, he led a very busy life. Sun Yat-Sen had started seven abortive revolutions in various parts of North China, and many ardent followers had sacrificed their lives. On many an occasion Chiang had offered to take an active part, but it was the

unanimous decision of the party that they must keep him, having this marvellous opportunity of being trained to be a military leader, to finish his training in preparation for more important events.

Every Summer, during the long vacation, he made it a rule to go home and spend a little time with his dear mother. In his journey to and from home he had to pass Shanghai, where he would stay for quite a while. After Tokyo and Hongkong, this was the most suitable place for revolutionary activities. There was usually a large number of rebels here planning to start an outbreak somewhere, or else coming from attempts that had failed and hiding here in the International Settlement where the Imperial Government could not touch them. He liked to join them in their discussions of their future work, or in finding ways and means of liberating those who had been imprisoned. He helped them to raise money and to recruit new members, and was very glad to be able to do some practical work.

During term time, besides being busy with his studies and training, his spare time was entirely spent in seeing and exchanging ideas with his fellow revolutionaries. On Sundays, when he had the whole day off from school, he held regular secret meetings with them, when they could discuss their future plans in detail and at leisure.

In November, 1908, both the Empress Dowager Tzu Hsi and the Emperor Kuang Hsu died. Before her death the Empress Dowager had put upon the throne her sister's grandson, Henry Pu-Yi, whose reigning title was Hsuan Tung, and who later became the puppet Emperor of the Japanese-created 'Manchukuo'. She had also nominated as Prince Regent her sister's second son, the new Emperor's father. The Prince Regent, however, must refer all matters of State to the new Empress Dowager, who was the daughter of Tzu Hsi's brother. Many people believed that

Tzu Hsi, knowing that she would not live much longer, feared that the Emperor Kuang Hsu would undo what she had done once she was gone, and so she immediately ordered the Emperor to be poisoned. She wanted to keep everything nicely in the family.

At the end of November 1909, Chiang Kai-Shek graduated from the Preparatory Military Academy, but before he could be admitted into the Military University he had to enter the army to get practical experience in the rank and file. He was sent to Takada to join the 19th Field Artillery Regiment, which belonged to the 13th Division of the Japanese Army. The Commander of the Division was the famous 'Long Beard General' Nagaoka, and the commanding officer of the Regiment, which was also known as the Takada Regiment because of the place where it was stationed, was Colonel Himatsu.

When Chiang Kai-Shek left the Academy and joined the Takada Regiment it was the beginning of 1910 and the weather was bitterly cold. He had to get up very early to groom his horse before he went to his morning drill. And in the evening, after his strenuous training in the open for the whole day, he had to work in his own quarters as hard as any new private of the Japanese Army. He took up his duties with clenched teeth and, if not exactly with alacrity, certainly with high spirits. 'In days to come,' he used to remark to his companions, 'the hardships on the battlefield will be much more severe than this. One must get used to it. There is nothing unbearable.'

He was in the Japanese Army for a year and a half. While he was utterly unknown to the world nobody took any notice of him. Such has always been the case with the great men in history. But one day, when it was suddenly realised that the leader of a quarter of the world's population had years ago been a humble soldier under their command, they began at once to write memoirs about him. In a special article published years later in the Tokyo

Asahi Shimbun, or *Tokyo Rising Sun News*, General Nagaoka, the retired Commander of the 13th Division, tried to recall to his mind what kind of a man Chiang Kai-Shek was while under his command. He confessed candidly that he knew the Chinese leader only superficially, and it seemed to him that at that time he 'could see nothing special about the young man'. He asked himself: 'How could such a youth, who seemed exactly like any other ordinary man, become such a great person?' He tried to find the answer, and had to think hard and long, but alas, in vain. He then asked the commanding officer of the Takada Regiment, Colonel Himatsu, whose remark was almost identical with that of the General himself: 'This Mr Chiang I do remember. But certainly I never thought that such a man would in future become a great historical figure.'

But the General would not give it up. He wanted all the more now to find out the secret of Chiang's success, and a benevolent Providence seldom lets a determined seeker of truth go unrewarded. At length the old General believed that he himself had made the important discovery. A part of his Memoir is worth quoting:

'I made the discovery by accident later on.

'Two years ago, in 1927, Mr Chiang was for the moment disappointed on the political stage and prepared to travel abroad. He came to Japan, which he knew so intimately. On the very evening of his arrival in Tokyo (October 23rd, 1927) he rang me up from the Imperial Hotel saying: "Your Excellency my divisional commander, I ought to come at once to pay my respects to you. But I am slightly unwell and have to go to Unzen [a famous Spa in Japan] to take a short rest. As soon as I'm better, I'll come to call upon you. Please convey also my respectful greetings to my regimental commander, Colonel Himatsu."

'A few days later Mr Chiang came back from Unzen. So I invited Mr Himatsu and Mr Chiang to have a very intimate tea-party—just the three of us—at my house.

'This time, when I set eyes on Mr Chiang again, he was quite different from what he used to be. He was dressed in a faultless tail coat. If you looked at him casually you would say he was a dashing young diplomat rather than a great soldier or statesman. To be slightly flippant, you would say he looked somewhat like a smart film star. During our conversation he kept addressing me with "Your Excellency my Divisional Commander" and Mr Himatsu with "Regimental Commander". Of course Mr Chiang knew very well that I was no longer a divisional commander, but he insisted on calling me so. I think he had not forgotten his Takada days.

'This gradually brought those former days back into my memory and soon I got used to his addressing me as "Your Excellency", in the same way as my addressing him as "you".

'When he was about to return, he wrote a panel specially for me with these four characters: "Never neglect Master's instructions", and signed it with his name. Up to the present I have helped quite a large number of Chinese students. But so far there hasn't been a single one of them who, like Mr Chiang, forever bears in mind what little help he had from others. I then reflected that, although Mr Chiang wasn't particularly distinguished when he was a student, his success to-day was probably because of his possession of such a virtue.

'In 1927 when Mr Chiang came to Japan, it was just at a moment of disappointment. But even at that time he was full of great ambitions and high hopes, waiting for an opportunity to arise again.

'For Mr Chiang, who is never disloyal nor ungrateful, I must forever show my respect.'

The author has no inclination to comment on these

typical remarks of the Japanese general. It is quite evident that neither the General nor the Colonel knew a great man when they saw one, but they knew it immediately they had been told by others, and the old soldier was very anxious to make up for his earlier negligence.

It is not to be expected that in the army a general or even a colonel would really notice a young cadet. The self-imposed task of General Nagaoka is quite superfluous. For a more detailed and illuminating description of Chiang's Takada days one naturally looks to his sergeant, assistant-instructor Shimoda, who, strange to relate, was fairly familiar with the young cadet. After Chiang Kai-Shek had been the *de facto* head of the state in China for many years, the Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun, or *Tokyo Daily News*, published on January 9th, 1936, an interview with Sergeant Shimoda. Again it proved to be a rather disappointing article. Both the sergeant and the reporter filled up the space with material of little interest.

The article started with a statement that in the early Spring of 1910 a small number of Chinese cadets were sent to the 19th Regiment, that he, Sergeant Shimoda, had been there for three years, and that he was put in charge of these Chinese cadets.

He further stated that he had been selected to assist their chief instructor, Lieutenant Naito, and had had frequent contact with these Chinese cadets. Like the others, he had not taken any special notice of Chiang Kai-Shek, who was to be the Commander-in-Chief of all the Forces of China; but he observed that all these Chinese young men were cultured people and were very keen on learning the general construction of the field-gun and its various accessories. In fact they were so much so that they put the sergeant into a very awkward position by asking him incessantly for detailed explanations and he had to borrow from Chief Instructor Naito, and study by night, the literature in which were the description and

explanation of some three hundred and fifty accessory articles of the field-gun. Sergeant Shimoda recorded this incident with considerable pride: he said that he had answered their questions one by one to their complete satisfaction, and that he had never once revealed to any of them the slightest military secret of Japan.

Among those young Chinese cadets he particularly liked a man called Yen Chu-Chin, whose greatest accomplishment, according to the sergeant, was 'his ability to sing fluently even the folk-songs of Japan'. As for Chiang Kai-Shek, he didn't think much of him. Chiang Kai-Shek was usually silent and 'there was nothing in him to attract anyone's attention'. The only thing remarkable in him, said the sergeant, was 'his impressive and forbidding expression, which would instantly come upon his face when he was ordered to clean the stables'. But in the Army, orders are orders; he had to do as he was told. To show he was a strict disciplinarian the sergeant cited as an example that when he was drilling them in running, and when all of them had been running briskly until they were dog-tired, he still shouted at them fiercely and said they were utterly good-for-nothing.

Regarding Chiang Kai-Shek's revolutionary activities, the sergeant had a less than hazy idea. He was not quite sure whether both Mr Chiang and Mr Yen, his favourite, were among those who supported or opposed Dr Sun Yat-Sen's revolutionary work, which, according to him, 'started not long afterwards'. But he remembered clearly that one day Mr Chiang 'suddenly received a telegram' and 'instantly asked for permanent leave', and 'on that very night left the place where he was receiving his training'.

After this, he stated, he received two letters written to him by Mr Chiang, addressing him as 'my strict sergeant', and for more than twenty years he had heard no more from him. It was only because he saw the name of Chiang

Kai-Shek appearing everywhere nowadays that he began to remember the young cadet. Chiang's rise to such an unexpectedly high position had moved him, and he exclaimed: 'To think that formerly we used to go to have refreshment together! I was his superior officer at that time and so there was no difficulty between us whenever I wanted to see him. Now that he has become the chief player in the drama of Sino-Japanese problems to be enacted on the International stage, I am really deeply moved with feeling!'

Though these two articles show what kind of men they have in the Japanese Army, they reveal little of Chiang's life in Japan. The reader will have to be content with such scanty material of his Takada days, which came to an abrupt end in the Autumn of 1911, when the Chinese Revolution finally succeeded in Wu-Chang and soon spread all over the country. Since then, Chiang Kai-Shek, who had been trained and was waiting for such an outbreak, has become indispensable to his motherland.

III

YUAN SHIH-KAI, who had promised to support Emperor Kuang Hsu's reforms, betrayed his royal master at the critical moment, and so in 1898 the Emperor was imprisoned and the Reform Movement collapsed. Such treacherous act could neither be forgiven nor forgotten. The poor Emperor used to draw a large tortoise—a creature symbolic of the greatest contempt in China—and write the name of Yuan Shih-Kai on it. He would then stick it on the wall and shoot at it with a toy bow and arrows. After that he would take it down, cut it into small pieces and throw them away. But as long as the Empress Dowager Tzu Hsi was living, Yuan was safe. The helpless Emperor couldn't really do anything against him.

In 1908, when the Empress Dowager was seriously ill and it seemed as if the Emperor might come into power again, Yuan's fate hung on a thread. But, very luckily for him, he came through safely. The Emperor died suddenly and mysteriously almost simultaneously with his august aunt. When the Emperor realised that he was breathing his last, he struggled to take hold of a brush-pen and succeeded in writing a not quite complete message expressing his hatred of Yuan Shih-Kai. With the passing away of the old Empress Dowager, Yuan's star fell abruptly. The newly appointed Prince Regent had no love for the soldier-statesman. Respecting the wishes of his late royal mother he ordered, in the name of the new Emperor, the immediate degradation of Yuan Shih-Kai, who had, said the Regent, a very serious foot disease and consequently was not fit to hold any military post. Yuan had to hurry back to his native place to live in retirement.

But his political career was far from ended. The New Army, which had been equipped with modern arms, had been trained by him and was still commanded mostly by his followers. It was scattered all over the country and proved to be very useful to him in 1911, when his star was to rise once more.

Up to the Autumn of 1911 Sun Yat-Sen and the members of his China Union or Resurgent China Society had planned and carried out no less than ten unsuccessful revolutions in various parts of South China. Consequently many lives had been lost and financial support was urgently needed. When the eleventh and final attempt was made in the city of Wuchang on October 10th, Sun himself was travelling in America, trying to raise money and enlist supporters. Some days before the outbreak he received a cable from his followers in Wuchang. As he had not his code-book with him, and had not expected they would start so soon, he kept the cablegram uncoded until he could get access to the secret book ten days later. Even after he had learnt the contents of the cable he did not dream it was the eve of the successful revolution. For the telegram asked for money for the impending outbreak, and money he had none. But a bomb exploded by accident in the secret headquarters of the China Union situated in the Russian Concession of Han-Kow on October 9th, and the members had to strike at once. So Sun Yat-Sen first heard the good news through American newspapers. From coast to coast every paper was reporting the sensational news that Wuchang was occupied by Revolutionaries.

Chiang Kai-Shek was also taken by surprise. He was home on a short leave in the Summer of 1911, when he spent some time in Shanghai, hoping to organise an outbreak in either the Province of Kiang-Su or in Chekiang, his native Province. In planning this he was working with his sworn brother Chen Chi-Mei, who had by this time

come back to China and made his headquarters in Shanghai. But things did not turn out as they had hoped and soon Chiang's leave was drawing to its close. He had to go back to his barracks in Takada in September, and in less than a month came the overwhelming news that the Chinese Revolution had already started successfully in Wuchang.

That Chiang Kai-Shek left Japan immediately and arrived in Shanghai in the latter part of October to join Chen Chi-Mei there is no doubt.

However, there are two different records existing about his departure from Japan. The first is by his official biographers, who more or less agreed that he obtained a very short leave—some put it as 48 hours—from his regiment, and that he changed into civilian clothes and sailed for China. One said he embarked at Tokyo where he obtained his passage money, and the other said he sailed from Nagasaki. It was even stated that he sent back to his regimental headquarters his military uniform, together with his sword, by parcel post.

That finishing touch is so convincing and interesting that it renders this story most acceptable. But there is a second version: both General Nagaoka and Sergeant Shimoda in their articles about Chiang Kai-Shek profess that his departure was no secret. The Sergeant said, as will be remembered, that Chiang Kai-Shek 'asked for permanent leave' when 'one day he suddenly received a telegram'. The General's description of the departure was more detailed. It runs thus:

'When the New Army in Wuchang under the command of Li Yuan-Hung started the great Revolution in China in 1911, it was October, and in Takada heavy snow had already fallen. When Mr Chiang and his friends heard that fighting was fierce in their native country, they wanted to go back in a great hurry, and so we held a farewell feast for them. At the table of the feast I said:

“If all of you are not wine drinkers, you may drink water. In Japan a Bushido Knight who drinks water at a farewell shows that he is determined not to come back alive.”

‘One by one I offered them water; and when Mr Chiang’s turn came he finished his cup of water at one gulp, and said to me:

“Your Excellency, I will most certainly dedicate my life to it.”

‘When Mr Chiang was saying this, the expression on his face showed his excitement and determination. But I never thought that this Mr Chiang would later on become such a great man.’

On his arrival at Shanghai, Chiang Kai-Shek was at once entrusted by Chen Chi-Mei with the task of bringing the Province of Chekiang over to the side of the Revolution. It was Chiang’s own Province: he ought to know the place and many of its men, especially those in the New Army. Chiang went to Hang-Chow, the provincial seat of Chekiang, where, thanks to his earlier work, he was able to enlist the promised support of the men of the New Army which was stationed there: the 81st and 82nd Regiments. They were waiting eagerly for a signal and a lead to start.

Back to Shanghai went Chiang again, to report in person to Chen Chi-Mei how things stood in Hangchow, and also to collect some brave men who would go with him to his native Province to ‘set it free’. Having recruited and formed a company of ‘dare-to-die’ vanguards numbering a hundred strong, he rushed once more to Hangchow with his men. Shanghai raised its revolutionary flag and proclaimed its independence from the Manchu regime on November 3rd, and Chen Chi-Mei was elected the Commander-in-Chief of the People’s Army in Shanghai. On the 5th, at two o’clock in the morning, Chiang Kai-Shek,

with his company of 'dare-to-die' vanguards, set out to attack the Governor's *yamen* from his hide-out, which was none other than the Feng Hua Guild Hostel—Feng Hua, as the reader may remember, is Chiang Kai-Shek's own district.

This was Chiang Kai-Shek's first experience of going into battle. He was twenty-four and he had with him but a handful of ill-equipped and mostly untrained men. He was to fight against the pick of the Governor of Chekiang's well-equipped troops, who must have outnumbered his by ten or even twenty to one. Moreover, it would not be a surprise attack. For twenty-five days since the Wuchang outbreak every Governor in the Empire had been preparing for his defence. As it was a matter of life and death for him, he would leave no stone unturned to see that severe punishment was given to those who came. The *yamen* would be well fortified with several defence lines, and the attackers would have to fight in exposed positions. The defenders had cannon carefully placed in strategic positions and the attackers had but small arms and hand-grenades, which could be used only at very close quarters.

Such were the odds against him when for the first time in his life he went into battle. But on the other hand, he and his comrades knew that they were fighting for a cause for which they had worked for years and in support of which they had the whole nation behind them. It was the time for one to disregard utterly the principles laid down in *The Art of War* and hope for the best.

It was under such conditions that Chiang Kai-Shek and his 'dare-to-die' vanguards stormed the Governor's *yamen* with hand-grenades. Soon after they had started the assault they were reinforced by the 3rd Battalion of the 82nd Regiment of the New Army, who had promptly kept their promise. The fighting was brisk but brief. Early in the morning they broke into the building and captured Tseng Yuen, the Manchu Governor, alive.

When the head of the Province became their prisoner, the rest was easy. The 81st Regiment, divided into two forces, attacked the Provincial Munition Store House and the Garrison-General's Headquarters, both of which they soon took. The only substantial resistance they encountered was when they brought their forces to face the encampment of the Banner Men. These Manchu soldiers defended themselves vigorously until late in the afternoon, when, realising that all was lost, they capitulated. Because of their brave resistance they were leniently treated, and most of them were enlisted and reorganised into the People's Army to fight with the Revolutionaries against their former master. With the surrender of the garrison force of the Banner Men, the Province of Chekiang now came under the flag of Revolution.

As soon as order had been restored in Hangchow, Chiang Kai-Shek hurried back to Shanghai again to help Chen Chi-Mei to take over other parts of Kiangsu Province. A regiment of infantrymen was immediately recruited to be trained under Chiang's command, and this was called the 5th Regiment of the Shanghai Army, which later on became the 93rd Regiment of the Chinese Army.

Excellent and important service had been rendered by Chiang Kai-Shek to the Revolution. His handful of 'dare-to-die' vanguards was the key to the success of the Independence of Chekiang Province, and the early declaration of independence by various Provinces was the key to the success of the whole Revolution. As Sun Yat-Sen said himself when commenting on the success of this 1911 Revolution, it was not the result of work done by any one man or group of men, but was achieved by the unanimous aim of the entire nation, who had set their minds on seeing it through. Within forty days from the outbreak of the Revolution in Wuchang, no less than seventeen Provinces had declared their independence from

the Manchu regime and their adherence to the New Republic which was not yet established.

It must be remembered that the China Union which started the Revolution was a very impoverished organisation. It had no money except occasional donations from its supporters abroad, and those had always been dependent upon Sun Yat-Sen's eloquence. Once the Revolution had begun and was spreading on a big scale, an enormous amount of money was needed to keep it going. At the time, Sun Yat-Sen was unable to get hold of any substantial sums of money. Indeed, when he arrived in Shanghai at Christmas, all his followers were hoping eagerly that he had brought with him a fortune or even many fortunes. He was actually penniless, but he knew how to answer the Press when they asked him whether he had brought with him any money. He said he had brought with him something far more important than money: the Spirit of Revolution!

Years later, when the Chinese Republic was in the state of chaos which naturally follows a revolution in any country, and when Sun Yat-Sen often had to go from one place to another, his critics used to say that he was not a practical revolutionary but merely an idealist. How wrong they were! They never realised that to be a really good practical revolutionary one needed high ideals. Especially at the time when funds were low it was such a spirit which kept the morale high.

Madame Chiang, the widowed mother of an only son, was a model to women of her time. When Chiang Kai-Shek came to Hangchow and was about to go into battle, he sent a letter of farewell to his mother and his half-brother, telling them that he had sworn to give his life to the Revolution, and asking his mother to forgive his negligence of his filial duties, and also to give full instructions about the disposal of his personal and family affairs in case he was killed. After receiving this touching letter,

his mother sent to him in Hangchow this message by a member of her family: 'To die or not, do as your duty calls, and never worry about things at home.'

It is more than probable that our earlier historians who wrote about the 1911 Revolution have tended to neglect Chiang Kai-Shek's share, just as later ones tended to exaggerate it. At the time of this Revolution, he was a young man of barely twenty-four and had been a member of the China Union for four years. He had many seniors both in age and in rank. Those who had taken part in previous attempts were naturally enjoying the privileges. Moreover, there were quite a number of men of influence who, because of their important positions in the old regime, figured very prominently in history though they had joined the Revolution at the eleventh or even the thirteenth hour. More than one Governor of the Manchurian Dynasty became a Military Governor of the Province of the Republic by merely changing into a new uniform.

Mere words on paper mattered little to Chiang Kai-Shek. He used to say: 'At that time I had only two aims for the Revolution: first, I wanted to bring down the Manchus and to restore our China, and secondly to free the common people from their sufferings. No other thoughts of any kind were in my mind.'

Ku Nai-Ping, who commanded the 82nd Regiment, the 3rd Battalion of which reinforced the 'dare-to-die' vanguards in their attack on the Governor's *yamen*, wrote a book called *The Record of the Independence of Chekiang*. He described the fighting in Hangchow fully, and singled out Chiang Kai-Shek as the hero of the day. He said that the overthrow of the old regime in Chekiang was chiefly the work of Chiang Kai-Shek. But when Chiang received a presentation copy of the book, he wrote a correcting letter to the author. He told Ku that he did not covet honours for himself and that in future editions full justice should be done to some other comrades of the company

of 'dare-to-die' vanguards whom Ku had not mentioned in his record.

When nearly all the New Armies stationed throughout the Empire joined the Revolution, the Manchu Court was disheartened. The young Empress Dowager Lung Yu, in consultation with her brother-in-law the Prince Regent, decided to reinstate Yuan Shih-Kai, and he was immediately appointed Viceroy of Hu-Peh and Hu-Nan. The New Army had been trained by him, and they thought that he could restore their former efficiency. But Yuan was a cunning fox. He saw the helpless state of the widow and her child. He insisted that his non-existent foot disease was still very serious and that he could not receive the Imperial favour by coming to Peking.

The Court was frightened and had to eat humble pie. The Prince Regent, who had formerly dismissed Yuan, had to retire and Yuan was appointed Commander-in-Chief of all the Imperial Forces and also elected as the Prime Minister of the first Cabinet with real power. Furthermore, he asked for and received ample funds from the Manchu Princes and Princesses and other noblemen who, willingly or unwillingly, had to contribute, as the Imperial Treasury was empty.

Once he had obtained power and money, Yuan made a show of fighting. But the Imperial Court soon saw that they had 'led a wolf into their house' to protect them. He ordered his generals, headed by Tuan Chi-Jui, to send him a telegram which was signed by forty-eight high-ranking commanding officers who were supposed to be fighting for the Manchus. In the telegram they said that they were commanding and also representing a total of more than a hundred and forty thousand men and that they didn't want to fight any more. They were all in favour of establishing a Republic, and should the Manchu Court fail to agree, they would lead their men to

the Capital to explain in person the importance of the issue.

In the meantime he sent a representative to negotiate peace terms with the Revolutionaries. Because of the lack of a leader in their uprising in Wuchang, the Revolutionaries had had to drag out a most amiable Colonel of the New Army to be their figure-head, against his own will. Li Yuan-Hung, nicknamed 'Li, the Buddha', knew he was no match for the powerful Yuan Shih-Kai. It was agreed that if Yuan could make the Manchu Emperor abdicate in favour of a Republic, Yuan could name his price. But Yuan was very modest: he only wanted to be the President. All would have been well for Yuan and Li had not Sun Yat-Sen arrived at this critical moment. He was the leader of the Revolution, for which he had worked ever since he was a youth. On his arrival he was elected by the representatives of seventeen provinces, with a majority of sixteen to one, to be the first Provisional President, to be installed on January 1st, 1912, in Nanking, the new Capital. (Nanking means South Capital, while Peking means North Capital.)

This was an unexpected blow to Yuan Shih-Kai. He went back on his promise and started to say that his representative was acting beyond his authority. He even went so far as to say that he was not quite sure what kind of government would really suit China, and at any rate he would not hear of the existence of a Provisional Government in Nanking.

But Sun Yat-Sen knew what was wrong. Yuan was assured by him that as soon as the Emperor abdicated he would resign in favour of Yuan. But he had doubts about Yuan's *bona fides* in supporting the Republic. If Yuan would guarantee that, Sun would not stand in the way. Yuan promised, and memorialised the Throne with this threat: 'Had the King of France, at the time of the French Revolution, followed sagacious advice, it would never

have happened that every single descendant of Louis had perished.'

This was enough to frighten any woman. The last Imperial Conference almost resembled a funeral. The Empress Dowager sobbed and her tears flowed, all the Princes and Ministers wept loud and long. Finally the Empress Dowager said to the Emperor: 'The fact that you are still alive to-day is entirely due to the excellent services of your great Minister Yuan', and she ordered the Emperor to come down from his Imperial Throne to thank the great Minister Yuan. The great Minister Yuan, trembling and knocking his head on the ground, refused to be thanked and, keeping his head down and weeping, was unable to raise his face.

The Abdication Edict was issued on February 12th, and in it the Empress Dowager not only agreed to the establishment of a Chinese Republic, but also recommended that Yuan Shih-Kai be given plenipotentiary powers to form a new Government. Sun Yat-Sen kept his word and, resigning punctually, nominated Yuan as his successor. The seventeen representatives went to vote again and Yuan was elected Provisional President unanimously.

While Yuan was grasping position and power, Chiang Kai-Shek gave up his command and sailed for Japan once more. His reply to Mr Ku Nai-Ping's letter contained these words: 'The time of destruction is ended and the work of reconstruction is beginning. Well do I know myself that my knowledge and ability are not sufficient for such tasks and so I have sailed eastwards to continue my former studies. How kind of you to say I do not stay to enjoy the fruits of my success! When I hear this, I feel rather uneasy about it.'

Once in Japan, Chiang resumed his military studies and worked doubly hard. Besides studying, he also edited and published a magazine called *The Voice of the Army*, to

which he made regular contributions. The leading article he wrote for the first issue has now become an historical document of considerable importance, and it starts with his proposal for a World Utopia:

‘The world to-day is a place in which we must be armed to maintain peace. If all the nations would only put humanity before everything else and realise that international conflict would bring human beings great suffering and that aggression is not right, then instead of maintaining a balance of power, there would be a universal commonwealth, uniting all the five continents without dividing them into various foreign countries. When we have established a World-Republic comprising people of the yellow, white, red and black races, we shall only need a police force to maintain interior order in those united states, and that would be sufficient to keep trouble away. A central government could be created to deal with greater matters, and should there arise disputes between the states, they could go to the Central Government for justice, when right and wrong would be declared. Land and sea defences would therefore be unnecessary, and the huge expenses for maintaining armed forces could be used in promoting industry. If this could be done and last from one generation to numerous generations, and the universal commonwealth could be maintained forever, then there would never be wars and the people would never see horrible calamities. Would not that be the glorious day for which we all hoped and prayed, the realisation of what the German philosopher Kant and the English philosopher Bentham had been advocating?’

He was no dreamer. He fully realised that such a proposal would not be adopted under present circumstances. He then gave a shrewd analysis of the world situation in general and pointed out that China, with her

very long coastline in the Pacific, was the focus of international struggle. Of the powers who wanted to set their feet in the Orient he singled out Japan as 'three islands in East Asia, with their Bushido spirit and little but crafty tricks, which have been forging ahead to wrestle with the Great Empires for a leading position in the world'. He said that trouble was already brewing in the Orient and might arrive in the twinkling of an eye. To avoid being swallowed up by her powerful enemies, China must prepare to defend herself.

He explained that the Revolution which had taken place recently was not merely an interior affair. The Manchus, who had to give away the Bay of Kiao-Chou, Port Arthur, the Bay of Dairen and Port Wei-Hai-Wei through their incompetence both in civil and military government, had practically surrendered all our strategical points to foreign countries. Such a move left us in a very dangerous position. That was why we had to sacrifice our lives to bring about the Revolution and establish a powerful republic. That being done, we could prepare ourselves in order to deal with those foreign powers who were aggressive, and before we could deal with those countries we must first pay attention to our military strength, without which no fair treaty could be concluded with other nations.

He advocated the following six measures: to promote military interest among the common people; to popularise military science; to discuss the conscription law; to plan national defences; to subsidise military education; and to investigate the military conditions of other countries.

He concluded the essay with a warning that we must prepare for the rainy day while the sun was still shining.

During the years 1912 and 1913 he wrote a great number of articles on current events in China, and occasionally about world affairs. When Outer Mongolia was induced by Russia to sever its relations with the Central Government of China, he wrote "Proposal for Making War with

Mongolia", citing the case of the Russo-Japanese War and estimating the conditions of a possible Sino-Russian War. He also wrote "Fundamental Solution of the Mongolian and Tibetan Problem", in which he pointed out that to fight for Mongolia was better than to fight for Tibet, and to appease Britain was better than to appease Russia. Because of the mutinies of men in Peking and other places, he wrote "Post-War Military Management" and "Problems of Military and Civil Government". In the latter he pointed out the danger of allowing the Military Governor of a Province to hold concurrently the civil governorship. He said that it was most important that the Central Government alone should be trusted with full military power, otherwise ambitious governors would bring the country into constant trouble. When the Balkan States were in danger of conflict he wrote "War in the Balkans and its Influence on China and her Diplomacy".

Chiang Kai-Shek's stay in Japan was cut short because he was soon called back to Shanghai for a second revolution. Yuan Shi-Kai, the Provisional President, began to act in his own way without any regard to democratic principles. His cabinet consisted of eleven members, five of them, including the Prime Minister, were Sun Yat-Sen's followers and China Union men. Chen Chi-Mei was given the post of Minister of Industry and Commerce, but he refused to work with Yuan. Sung Chiao-Jen, another brilliant China Union member, was Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, and he was the first to find Yuan out and he left Peking after a very brief association with the new Government. Soon all the members of the Cabinet who were China Union men found it impossible to work with Yuan, and they resigned *en bloc*.

In the Provisional Parliament the China Union held a majority in both the Upper and Lower Houses. When Yuan found that sometimes they would not pass the

measures which he desired, he just over-ruled their decision and did as he pleased. He wanted money urgently, and in spite of the New Constitution by which he had sworn to abide and which proscribed that Parliament's consent was essential for any loan, he borrowed twenty-five million pounds sterling from an international financial organisation called the Consortium. This body was formed originally by bankers of six powers: America, England, France, Germany, Russia and Japan. Wilson, then President of the United States, did not approve of the loan and so the American group withdrew from it.

Sung Chiao-Jen was one of the ardent opposers of the loan as well as one of the most active members of the China Union, which by this time had been reorganised into a political party known as the Kuo Min Tang, or The People's Party. In March, 1913, he was assassinated by ruffians, who were later on discovered to be in Yuan's service. In April Sun Yat-Sen said openly to Yuan in a telegram: 'You are betraying the country. I must now oppose you in the same way as I did the Manchu Dynasty.' In May, Sun telegraphed Yuan to ask him to resign, which, of course, the latter would not think of doing. In July, Sun, in a circular telegram to all the Provincial Governors throughout the country, asked them to denounce and fight against Yuan.


While a number of Sun's followers in Parliament did not want to start a civil war, Chen Chi-Mei and Chiang Kai-Shek prepared for action in Shanghai. Having arrived secretly in Shanghai from Japan, Chiang became chief-of-staff to Chen, who was made by Sun Yat-Sen the Commander-in-Chief of the Shanghai Anti-Yuan Forces. Now Shanghai had been in the hands of Yuan's men for a long time, and Chiang hoped to take the Arsenal first, which was guarded by the 93rd Regiment. It will be remembered that the 93rd Regiment was originally the 5th Regiment of the Shanghai Army formed and commanded by


Chiang himself in 1911. There were in it still many men who had been under Chiang and who might come over to him when he raised the call.

The Garrison Commander was a stout supporter of Yuan, and he had taken precautionary measures. He moved the 93rd Regiment away from the Arsenal and stationed his own safety guards there. The Navy officers in Shanghai were also heavily bribed by this able henchman of Yuan. While they had declared they would support Chen and Chiang in their anti-Yuan movement on the one hand, they received the bribe eagerly and waited for the turn of the tide.

On the night of the 22nd July a hurriedly made-up force attacked the Arsenal. It was ill-prepared and ill-equipped, and so, after a few fierce but unsuccessful assaults, had to retreat. The Navy sat tight. Although they were on the river near-by, and if they had helped, Chen and Chiang would have succeeded, they had no intention of giving the support which they had promised. Still, battles continued until the 28th, when Chen and Chiang's men were gathered near the place to which the 93rd Regiment had recently been moved. Here, with their men and ammunition rapidly decreasing, they decided to make a last stand against their ever-increasing enemy, who had been able to get reinforcements from other places during the course of the fighting. At night-fall Chiang tried to steal into the headquarters of the 93rd Regiment to enlist their help, but the Garrison Commander's safety guards had already sent their advance sentinels all around the place, and Chiang was promptly caught by one of the sentinels.

The author regrets that it could not be determined how Chiang got free, for in the official biography it was merely stated that he 'got away by a trick and very luckily reached the Headquarters of the Regiment'. Here he found that the new Regimental Commander had already





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become a faithful follower of Yuan and, hiding away, would not see him. Chiang had to take matters into his own hands, and he asked various captains to summon their men to hear his harangue. He was a very eloquent speaker and his cause was good, so a battalion was immediately formed which rushed to the rescue of Chen's dwindling army.

Reinforced by such a strong body of men, the followers of Chen and Chiang advanced to attack the Arsenal once more. Fighting became extremely fierce and casualties were heavy on both sides. While the defenders held out with determination, the attackers proceeded with such unrelenting vigour that the Commander of the Battalion was killed in action. In the meantime the Navy continued to maintain their neutrality, but one of the warships turned her searchlights on the battlefield, which actually helped the defenders. This so enraged the attackers that they fired at her and put her searchlights out of action. When the other warships saw the insurgent army attack them, they all started to bombard Chen and Chiang's men, who suffered very heavily. But they maintained their grasp until midday next day, when their ammunition began to run short. By nightfall the defenders launched their counter-attack successfully, and Chen and Chiang had to fall back.

By the following morning they had to retreat to the north of Shanghai, where they met a combined force of merchant corps and foreigners from the settlements, who were all siding with Yuan. They were then disarmed by these people and the uprising against Yuan Shih-Kai in Shanghai thus ended. Chiang Kai-Shek went to Nanking and found that there, too, the attempt had been unsuccessful. This forced him to return the following day.

Not only had Chiang Kai-Shek failed in his rising against Yuan, but also the other leaders in various provinces

who had risen for the Second Revolution were defeated by Yuan's armies. Sun Yat-Sen was compelled to flee to Japan, where Chiang Kai-Shek also went. With all those who had actually fought against him gone, Yuan Shih-Kai forced Parliament to elect him, on October 6th, 1913, the First President, for hitherto he had only been Provisional President, and on the following day Li Yuan-Hung, the Buddha, was made Vice-President. As the Kuo Min Tang still had a majority in Parliament, though most of its radical members were gone, Yuan had to prepare thoroughly. At first he arrested a few members of Parliament because he said they were connected with the rebellion in the South. These arrests, together with some voluntary departures, were still not enough to reduce the majority into a minority. Therefore, on the day of his election, he hired several thousand so-called 'citizens' to hold a mass meeting outside the Parliament House, clamouring that unless Yuan Shih-Kai, 'the idol of the nation', was elected President not a single member would be allowed to leave the premises.

The members were not entirely intimidated. Twice they went to the poll, and twice Yuan did not secure sufficient votes to meet the requirements, though nobody else had got as many votes as he had. At nightfall, while the hired 'citizens' were still surrounding the House, clamouring for Yuan's election, it was announced that according to a proviso in the election regulations the members must choose either of the two candidates who polled most as President. As Yuan and Li the Buddha were the two who polled most they had to choose between these two. When finally at 10 p.m. Yuan was returned as President, the crowd outside broke into loud applause and dispersed to let out the members, who had been kept in the House from 8 a.m. When they went the next day to elect the Vice-President, not a single 'citizen' bothered to come near the House.

Having been elected President, Yuan had no further use for Parliament. He first announced on November 4th the dissolution of the Kuo Min Tang, together with an order that Kuo Min Tang members were disqualified from Parliament. With several hundred members disqualified, Parliament could never form a quorum, and so, on January 10th, 1914, Yuan ordered the suspension of the authority of Parliament. It was then quite clear that Chen Chi-Mei, Chiang Kai-Shek and all the other radical members of Kuo Min Tang were right: they ought not to have tried to accommodate Yuan, but should have fought him with a united effort in the beginning. Now things were more difficult than before.

In the Summer of 1914 Chiang Kai-Shek came back to China secretly to start another uprising against Yuan in Shanghai. He had made a fairly complete plan to occupy all the strategically important points around Shanghai and part of the coast. But the Garrison Commander who had defeated him less than a year before got to know of it through his extensive secret service. On the 30th May Chiang's headquarters were raided, and then they proceeded to search for Chiang himself. He was visiting a friend and, finding the place empty, left the house after having sat there awaiting his comrades for some time. While he was waiting in the house a spy noticed him and hurried along to report to the Garrison Commander. At once soldiers and police came in force and surrounded the house to search for him. When he returned to the place after a short visit to another friend near-by, he saw from a distance that it was full of his enemies looking for him. He went away, not without a chuckle to himself.

He went back to Japan, and from there he travelled to Manchuria. For Chen Chi-Mei and Sun Yat-Sen had heard through a follower that the armies in the Provinces of Ki-Rin and Hei-Lung-Kiang were ready to rise against Yuan and were only waiting for a leader to start. On

arriving at Harbin in the early Autumn, Chiang Kai-Shek found, to his great disappointment, that the report was entirely without foundation. The man who had made the false report to Sun Yat-Sen was merely trying to obtain money. Soon war started in Europe, and Chiang Kai-Shek returned to Tokyo to join Sun Yat-Sen.

While he was an exile in Japan, Chiang found a little time to study again. He read our philosophical classics and important works on military science. He examined his moral conduct very carefully and started to write his diary. He formed the habit of reviewing his thought and work of the day and putting down in his diary what mistakes he had committed. A famous philosopher once wrote that he began to see that he could not redress what had already passed, and always felt that he was wrong yesterday. Chiang went further. He thought that he had been wrong yesterday, but that even to-day he might still not be right. He must continue to search for the truth and never be content with his endeavours.

In 1915, Yuan, fully satisfied that he could do whatever he liked, began to take steps to crown himself the new Emperor of China, breaking his Inaugural Oath to maintain the Chinese Republic when he took office as President. He ordered a number of his henchmen to publicise the idea that Monarchy was the most suitable system for governing China and that Yuan was the best man.

In the meantime, Japan entered the war on the side of the Allies, and attacked the small German force in Shantung. She occupied Tsing-Tao and the Bay of Kiao-Chou, and decided not only to stay there but to extend further inland into Shantung and other parts of China. Knowing that China could not expect any other power to help her because they were all busy fighting in Europe, she demanded special privileges and rights in Shantung and Manchuria, mining rights in Central China, also that China

must not lease any port to another country, and that she must engage Japanese advisers to work in her financial and military organisations.

These outrageous demands were presented to Yuan in secret, and, hardly to be believed, the request that the whole matter should be negotiated in secret was agreed to by Yuan and his ministers. For months negotiations went on secretly, until rumours got around, and Japan had the audacity to blame China for the leakage. As Yuan was hoping to become Emperor, an early recognition by a friendly power would be very helpful. So, when Japan finally sent an ultimatum on May 7th, 1915, pressing for the acceptance of her infamous Twenty-one Demands, Yuan accepted them on May 9th, the day after which the ultimatum would expire.

Yuan went on to organise what he believed to be legal bodies to promote his coronation. At last he had a People's Representatives Convention held, and the job was so thoroughly done that in December, 1915, when these 1,993 People's Representatives voted, the result was 1,993 votes returned in favour of changing the government into a Constitutional Monarchy, and that those 1,993 voters unanimously recommended Yuan Shih-Kai as Emperor.

But he was modest. When he received their petition he issued an order saying: 'Since the Convention has unanimously decided to adopt a Constitutional Monarchy system, there is no further place for me, the President, to discuss it. But the recommendation has shocked me to an indescribable extent. Heaven creates the people and appoints their kings. The Mandate of Heaven could never be altered. But only he who has great merit and profound virtue could receive such an appointment. I, the President, have been in Government service for thirty years, and though I have experienced repeatedly extraordinary changes, I have achieved scarcely anything. The Republic has been in existence for four years, during which period

I have had numerous hardships and feel that I have committed many blunders. While I have hardly any time to remedy my past errors, how can I be credited with merit?' He even mentioned that if he were to be crowned, he would have a guilty conscience when he thought of his abdicated Emperor. He also mentioned that he could not go back on the oath which he took to support the Republic when he was sworn in as President.

But he also remembered that he promised before the world to do his utmost for the welfare of his country and people in spite of whatever should happen to himself, or whether he should be praised or censured. In short, he was prepared to sacrifice himself for his country. As for the Recommendation, he hoped the Representatives would not force him to do what he didn't want to do. 'Please reconsider the matter very carefully,' he concluded, 'and recommend someone else.' And to show his determination not to accept the offer, he returned the Petition to the others together with this order.

A second petition, in which long lists of Yuan's achievements and merits were listed in extraordinarily flattering terms, was immediately sent to him. The petitioners argued that while the people wanted a Republic the President's oath was valid, but when they wished for a Monarchy, the President immediately became nonexistent and of course his oath was revoked. The responsibility was on the shoulders of the people. It had nothing to do with Yuan Shih-Kai, their 'Emperor'!

The petition was signed by the Representative-in-Chief on behalf of the Convention, and the last part read: 'In short, you, our Emperor, have great merits and extensive virtues. Your reputation and good faith have ever been widely known. You are the only man in China: you cannot put away your duty to be taken up by anyone else. The Benevolent Heaven favours and blesses you. The hearts of millions and billions of people go to you. You

must not delay the Mandate of Heaven too long. The common people must not be without their Emperor too long. Pray try your best not to be too modest and look at things clearly in their right perspective. Don't follow the ceremonious way of politeness and humility which would leave the precious will of Providence forever unfulfilled. Issue an Edict immediately and let the whole world be told. When you have mounted your throne and assumed your office, the hungry and thirsty desire of your subjects even in the remotest parts beyond the seas will be satisfied, and the auspicious and great foundation for ten thousand years of our Chinese Empire will be firmly laid. Signed by the Representative-in-Chief, while he is overwhelmed with joy, excitement, earnest expectancy and urgent anxiety.'

The counting of votes, the sending in of the Petition and Yuan Shih-Kai's first rejection were all done in the space of one day. And the second Petition, part of which has just been quoted, was presented to him on the same evening. On the following day he had to accept it reluctantly: 'Recommended by millions and billions, I feel my responsibility is very heavy. How can a man of my humble virtue and meagre ability shoulder it? As the people's directive becomes more strict and their wish more acute, it has made me utterly unable to explain my difficulties or to evade the call.' The very next day an order was issued in which it was said: 'The change of the system of government is the wish of the people. Should there be trouble-makers trying to spread rumours and foment agitation, they will be punished sternly according to law.'

The Vice-President Li, the Buddha, was made the Prince of Military Righteousness, and the enthronement took place on January 1st, 1916, amidst the loud acclamation of the newly ennobled men in Peking, but also amidst the fireworks which broke out all over the country. One Province after another declared independence, and Yuan

Shih-Kai was dismayed to find his military strength begin to dwindle and then to collapse.

Chiang Kai-Shek came back to Shanghai from Japan in the autumn of 1915, and he and Chen Chi-Mei discussed how they should attack. As the able Garrison Commander had defeated them twice before, it was decided that he must be removed first. On November 10th bombs and pistols were used in an attack on him, and he was instantly killed. With the most shrewd enemy leader gone, they started a general rising on the evening of December 5th.

There were several warships stationed in the Whampoo River at the time and all the captains were on shore that evening giving a feast to the local authorities. The captain of the cruiser *Chao Ho* and some of her crew were with Chen and Chiang. Yang Hu, an ardent member of Kuo Min Tang and a good friend of Chiang's, leading some thirty men, sailed in a small boat to tackle this cruiser. Another sectional leader, with little more than two hundred comrades, attacked the Police Headquarters. Two other small forces were dispatched to occupy the Bureau of Works, the Electric Plant and the Telephone Office.

Chiang and Chen left their secret headquarters in the French Concession for the Chinese City when the guns on the cruiser *Chao Ho* were roaring with fury. They thought all would be well. As they hurried southwards, they perceived that the numbers of their men were fast dwindling. When they arrived at the gate of the Bureau of Works, they found they were the only survivors and, what was worse, the guns of the cruiser *Chao Ho* were by then silenced by their enemies. In the distance Yuan's soldiers sprang up rapidly and their numbers continued to increase. Luckily it was fairly dark, and they could not distinguish Chiang and Chen. Soon two other cruisers opened fire on the remaining forces on Chiang's side. They had failed to capture the Police Headquarters and their re-

inforcements had also been intercepted and could not reach them in time.

It was now obvious that the cruiser *Chao Ho* had been captured by the enemy and soon they learnt that all their forces were defeated. In the river outside the Bureau of Works a small boat was anchored. Chiang and Chen jumped into the boat and sailed through the enemy fire towards the Bund of the French Concession. Leaving the boat, they went to their secret headquarters, where they met a few comrades who were discussing the possibilities of occupying another cruiser, the *Yin Jui*, and making fresh attacks on other less heavily defended points.

Suddenly police and detectives of the French Concession broke into the building and started to arrest the inmates. Chen Kuo-Fu, Chen Chi-Mei's nephew, purposely protested against his arrest in an extraordinarily loud voice, making sure that it was quite audible to his uncle, Chiang, and other comrades who were upstairs. Chen and Chiang had to climb over to the next building and from there Chiang dragged Chen to hide in his, Chiang's, private apartment, because Chen's residence was next to the headquarters and might also be raided by the French police.

Chiang was seriously affected by this failure, and soon had to take to his bed. Madame Chiang, having heard of her son's dangerous adventure, his defeat and eventually his illness, came to Shanghai to nurse him in spite of strong attempts at dissuasion by her friends and relatives. She knew when her son most needed her comfort and care, her sympathy and encouragement.

Chiang's courageous uprising in Shanghai, though itself a failure, inspired many other uprisings all over the country. On December 25th the Province of Yun-Nan declared its independence. A New Army was formed with the sole purpose of protecting the Chinese Republic from the throne-snatcher Yuan Shih-Kai. Yuan, with his

recent success in Shanghai fresh in his mind, sent an army immediately to conquer his opponents.

As soon as he was well enough to resume his activities, Chiang, taking Yang Hu as his lieutenant and a small body of men, launched a surprise attack on the Kiang Yin Fortress, which stood in a strategical position on the south bank of the Yangtze River between Shanghai and Nanking. He and his followers fought the defenders fiercely and the fortress soon surrendered. He reorganised the surrendered soldiers as part of his own army and held the fortress against Yuan's reinforcements for five days until almost all his original officers and men had been disabled. When the newly surrendered men saw Chiang's strength was rapidly weakening, they broke out into a mutiny, and the remaining faithful comrades had to escape as best they could. Chiang did not want to give up the place for which he had fought so hard; he intended to use it as a base for further and bigger operations along the Yangtze Valley. But by midnight on the fifth day he was the only man left guarding the fortress. Two loyal soldiers came back to him and entreated him to go: 'The fortress is actually empty. Please go away immediately.' Their advice was at last followed, and they guided him out of the surrounded place into safety. Once out of danger he returned to Shanghai.

But Yuan's local victory over Chiang Kai-Shek could not possibly counterbalance uprisings on a much bigger scale which started in other places, more or less at the same time as Chiang's efforts. In the Spring of 1916, after Yuan had satisfied his ambition to crown himself the Emperor of China, the Provinces of Kwei-Chow, Kwang-Si, Kwang-Tung, Hu-Nan, Kiang-Su, Che-Kiang, Shan-Tung, An-Hwei, Sze-Chuan, and Shen-Si, following the example of Yun-Nan, declared their independence one by one. The fact that in some of the Provinces the heads were formerly Yuan's supporters had disheartened the old

schemer. Telegram after telegram arrived at his Imperial Palace denouncing him for his treachery, and Yuan was compelled to climb down from his Throne.

Having squandered his loan of twenty-five million pounds in wasteful wars against his opposers, and having made many enemies out of his one-time friends, Yuan had, after all, to take off his coveted Imperial crown and dragon robe. That was on the 22nd March, 1916, only eighty-one days after his coronation. He tried to be very obliging. Since people did not want him to be their Emperor, he said, very well, they must have their way, and he would condescend to become their President once more.

Unfortunately the people who had rebelled could not appreciate Yuan's condescension. Those who had declared their independence continued to do so as time passed, and more followed. There were, of course, a few of his former subordinates who remained fairly loyal to him and supported him in his new proposal that he should remain as President. But most of them did so in a half-hearted fashion. They did not want to offend those powerful military leaders whose cry was 'Yuan must go'.

At last two of his most ardent supporters, the military governors of Szechuan and of Hunan, deserted his cause and declared their independence. This was indeed a mortal blow. He could not get over it and soon took to his bed, from which he never got up. He died on June 6th, 1916.

Shortly before he died, Yuan had accomplished one revengeful act. The insolence of those powerful military governors who had huge armies behind them he had to bear by swallowing his pride. As for such reckless rebels as Chen Chi-Mei and Chiang Kai-Shek, however, who had been an eternal headache to him, he was determined to get rid of them by hook or by crook. Though he could do nothing to the treacherous war-lords, he was full of ways and means of punishing those penniless revolu-

tionaries. He could ill afford to send large armies to fight his powerful foes, but he was rich enough to buy assassins. And in this he was an expert.

On the 18th May, 1916, Chen Chi-Mei was lured to visit a friend's house, where Yuan's hirelings shot him in cold blood. Next on the list was Chiang Kai-Shek. Had Yuan lived a little longer it is quite probable that Chiang would have been his next victim.

How much Chen's death moved Chiang could be seen in the prose elegy which the latter composed to be used as a sacrificial oration addressed to his deceased friend. It runs as follows:

'On the twentieth day of the month of May in the fifth year of the Chinese Republic (1916), I, your younger sworn brother Chiang Kai-Shek, offer this sacrifice to you, the spirit of the late Chen Chi-Mei, with these words.

'Alas! From now on where can be found a man who knows me so well and loves me so profoundly as you did? From the year of Ting Wei (1907) to the present time ten years have gone by. What has been the cause for which we jointly worked? Hasn't it been the cause of our country on which our safety depended? What has been our oath to each other? Hasn't it been an oath that we would live or die together?

'To-day one of us is dead while the other lives and the country is still in a state of confusion. I have not acted according to our oath. You who are dead have attained greatness and righteousness, and can look back on your life with satisfaction. And should I, who want to be faithful and keep my word, be afraid to die?

'Alas! Great hardship is only beginning to come, and our chief enemy is still unslaughtered. To fulfil the ambition of the dead is the responsibility of the living; to complete the task of the dead is the duty of the living. Only

when the living does not die can the dead have his work carried on as if he were living. The unfulfilled wish of the dead will be fulfilled by the living and the unfinished task of the dead will be finished by the living. Until they have been fulfilled and accomplished, I will neither stop nor die, but go on and on. This I promise you as I promised you "to be another you if you died" when we bade each other farewell in Japan last Spring. I will keep my promise.

'Alas! When I reflect on bygone days I find they were full of sorrow with little joy, plenty of worry and even more regrets. Before the year of Hsin Hai (1911) we planned to capture Chekiang and Kwangtung. Nothing was accomplished, while hardships befell us more and more. As we grew to understand each other more day by day we could hardly distinguish which was I and which were you. After that year calamity and trouble following each other came to us: and a hundred unimaginable things happened to us. Had we not been so intimate with one another we could hardly have helped being separated by our enemies. After the shattering defeat of the year of Kwei Chu (1913) how many people were left who would follow you wherever you went and never forsake you from morning till evening?

'Now that you are gone forever, who is there besides myself to continue your work without changing the aim you had originally in your mind? How about those who used to flatter you when you were influential and tried to get rid of and slander me? How about those who now feel happy at your misfortune, and were jealous of you and sarcastic to you? Are these people your true or false friends? Are they right or wrong? I do not mind that you believed their lies about me when you were living. All I want is that I should have a clear conscience after you are dead.

'Alas! I had no chance to open my mind to you. The

treacherous found their opportunity and my good advice was overlooked. The result was the present tragedy. Oh, woeful and sorrowful is the day! From now on there will be no one to teach me, encourage me, love me and help me; to share my comfort, my risks, my happiness, my hardships, my thoughts and my aspirations!

'All is lost! When I feel such loneliness, what have I to say? The path of the world is rugged, and the mind of men is dangerous. When I look ahead, and when I reflect on the past, I shudder but can do nothing. Your parents, with their grey hair, are still living, while your children are still young and have barely left the arms of their mother. I shall look after the elderly people and support the young ones and shall always keep you in my thoughts.

'Oh, you Spirit! If you are here, do come and partake of my offerings.'

This valuable document is most illuminating. It shows what a true and loyal friend Chiang Kai-Shek is. His devotion to his deceased friend is really touching. As the years went by, it was proved that Chiang kept his promise to the letter. Chen Chi-Mei's two able nephews, Chen Kuo-Fu and Chen Li-Fu, are to this day Chiang Kai-Shek's most trusted associates.

Yet by examining the elegy carefully it can be seen that Chiang indicated that Chen had been acting against his good counsel in the later days. Had he listened to Chiang's advice it seems probable that Chen would not have been lured into a death-trap. Although there had been this slightly jarring note in their great friendship Chiang always speaks of his deceased friend in the highest terms of esteem. Once he wrote about friendship to Sun Yat-Sen, whom he served with unbounded devotion, and in the letter he candidly told Sun that although he served him with the same devotion he had had for Chen, Sun did

not treat him as Chen did. After this frank discussion, Sun soon remedied his negligence.

The death of Chen Chi-Mei was not only a great blow to Chiang Kai-Shek, but also an irreparable loss to Sun Yat-Sen and the Kuo Min Tang. Chen had always been one of its most active and loyal supporters, and after May, 1916, Chiang Kai-Shek had to perform his duty to the party single-handed, while hitherto he had always had the guidance of his inseparable sworn-brother.

In June, 1916, Chiang was sent to Shantung, where more than two divisions of revolutionary men had been formed into what was called the Chinese Revolutionary North-East Army, and responsible leaders were urgently needed. Sun Yat-Sen ordered Chu Cheng, an old partisan, to be Commander-in-Chief, and Chiang Kai-Shek Chief-of-Staff. When Chiang arrived there he found there was a chief Aide-de-Camp who had already taken everything into his own hands. Without authority from his superiors, he had reorganised the army into two divisions and a brigade and had commissioned two Divisional-Commanders and a Brigadier-General, as well as all the other officers for the whole army from among his personal friends. There was hardly any discipline in the army and the men only knew that there was the Aide-de-Camp, being hardly aware of the existence of the Commander-in-Chief.

In spite of this, Chiang did his best to bring things into order. To matters great and small he attended personally and worked on undismayed, until Chu Cheng, the Commander-in-Chief, thinking it utterly impossible to succeed with such a thoroughly disorganised army and resigning his post, left for Peking. It was then that Hsu Chung-Chih, another faithful Kuo Min Tang supporter, was appointed as acting Commander-in-Chief. The name of Hsu Chung-Chih is mentioned here because during this brief period he and Chiang worked together in perfect

harmony, and this marked the beginning of a long and devoted friendship, which will be dealt with in the next chapter.

When Hsu Chung-Chih took over the post of Commander-in-Chief of this Chinese Revolutionary North-East Army, he conferred with Chiang Kai-Shek about the true condition of their army, and it was immediately decided that the best course would be to recommend to Sun Yat-Sen its dissolution. This was accordingly done, and Chiang went to Peking to observe the political situation in the capital. There he stayed until the autumn, when he returned to Shanghai once more.

With the death of Chen Chi-Mei ended Chiang Kai-Shek's activities in and around Shanghai. With his association with Hsu Chung-Chih, Chiang started a new series of military operations in the southern provinces of Kwangtung and Fu-Kien, following a very brief preliminary in the Northern Province of Shantung.

IV

‘ONE dies, and a hundred difficulties are consequently solved,’ says a Chinese proverb. When the whole country was rising to denounce Yuan Shih-Kai and he was most reluctant to go, his sudden death on June 6th, 1916, seemed to be the best solution. And on the very next day following his death, Vice-President Li, the Buddha, became the President according to the Provisional Constitution. Everything seemed to proceed smoothly at first; Sun-Yat-Sen sent a circular telegram to all the military leaders asking them to withdraw their armies, and those provinces which had declared their independence soon announced its cancellation. Moreover, Sun Yat-Sen wired Li Yuan-Hung, the new President, to ask him to respect the Constitution and reassemble the Parliament. This Li Yuan-Hung did immediately.

Although Yuan Shih-Kai was gone he had left behind him his influence: the War Lords. As it has been pointed out, many of his followers later on turned against him. That means that many former followers of his remained to be powerful after his death. Moreover, the Kuo Min Tang, after having been persecuted by Yuan for years, and after its repeated failures in its risings against Yuan, was by then a very weak political party. Some members had gone over to other parties and many had died. As for the rest, only a small portion remained faithful to Sun Yat-Sen, while a considerable portion had reorganised into ‘The Association for the Discussion of European Affairs,’ supporting a new leader whose name was Chen Chun-Hsuan, and who was a Kwangsi man.

All the War Lords, most of whom had been Yuan Shih-

Kai's subordinates or colleagues, modelled themselves after their dead leader. They understood only one thing: military strength; and they were most selfish and ruthless. Li, the Buddha, was of course no match for them, yet he had the two strongest of them at his door. Feng Kuo-Chang, the Vice-President, and Tuan Chi-Jui, the Prime Minister, had been Yuan's most powerful supporters. They considered the President quite superfluous, while Li couldn't take action without their consent or approval.

In the later part of 1916 and during the years immediately following, the whole country was in a state of chaos. The Central Government in Peking existed in name only. The Military Governors fought each other whenever they liked, and whoever succeeded in driving away his opponent was rewarded with his opponent's territory and possessions. Not only was the reassembled Parliament unlawfully dissolved in June, 1917, but also the abdicated boy Emperor was restored for a few days in July, to be driven away again by Tuan Chi-Jui and his associates.

Li Yuan-Hung was not wrongfully nicknamed the Buddha; his rightful place should have been in a niche in a temple. The general who restored Henry Pu-Yi was not so generous as Yuan Shih-Kai. Only a dukedom was granted to Li, the Buddha, who, however, did not accept the honour. When the Republic was established for the third time after this brief Restoration they did not want such an imbecile figure-head at all, and the Vice-President, Feng Kuo-Chang, who had hitherto been the Military Governor of the Kiangsu Province, succeeded him as Acting President. The other War Lord, Tuan Chi-Jui, however, remained Prime Minister, a post which he had held four times before, once under Li, the Buddha, and three times under Yuan Shih-Kai.

Immediately after the unlawful dissolution of the Parliament, Sun Yat-Sen, supported by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of the Navy—both were Kuo Min

Tang members and both left the Cabinet when the Parliament was dissolved—sailed to Canton with all the warships of the First Fleet, and on July 22nd sent out a circular telegram to the whole country to announce his determination to 'Protect the Constitution'. In August there were four Provinces which had declared their independence from the Peking Government: Kweichow, Kwangtung, Kwangsi and Szechuan, and the Members of Parliament who left Peking to come to Canton numbered a hundred and thirty strong.

An Emergency Meeting was held by the Members of Parliament in Canton on August 25th, and Sun Yat-Sen was elected Generalissimo of the Chinese Army and Navy, and head of a new Government which was in opposition to the one in Peking.

Although Chiang Kai-Shek was at the time in Shanghai, he sent on September 20th to the new Government in Canton a carefully worked-out plan for a proposed Northern Punitive Expedition. First he analysed the military strength of the enemy, the armies under Tuan Chi-Jui and Feng Kuo-Chang, and then gave a rough estimate of generals and their forces in the South whom Sun might hope to muster under him. Next he mapped out the expedition route to be followed, and suggested that the plan should be carried out in two steps: the first step was to tackle, together with the Navy, the Provinces south of the Yangtze River, and the second step was, after the occupation of all the territories along the Yangtze River, to reinforce themselves with men and materials and to proceed north, with Peking as the goal.

In such early days this plan sounded like a day-dream. Nobody would have thought that in less than ten years it would be put into operation successfully, with the man who drafted it as Commander-in-Chief.

Ten days after he had submitted his first plan he presented a second one, on October 1st. This time he was less

ambitious. It was a proposal for attacking the two Maritime Provinces immediately north-east of Kwangtung: Fukien and Chekiang. Though it was a trifle premature, it was not very long afterwards partially adopted, and within a year Chiang Kai-Shek had the great pleasure of seeing himself one of the sub-commanders of such an expeditionary force.

It happened that most of Sun Yat-Sen's collaborators in Canton were Kwangsi men. After they had welcomed him to form this new Government to protect the Constitution, they found out very soon that they would like him better if he could be persuaded to leave Canton and that the farther he went the better.

In November, 1917, Sun Yat-Sen and other Cantonese succeeded in organising a small Cantonese Army of twenty battalions, and the command of this force was given to Chen Chiung-Ming, of whom more will be related later. Under him were two vice-commanders; one was Hsu Chung-Chih who had been in Shantung with Chiang Kai-Shek, and the other was Teng Keng. The Kwangsi military leaders had allowed the formation of this Cantonese Army on the express condition that it must leave Canton on its Fukien expedition immediately.

On March 3rd, 1918, Chiang Kai-Shek left Shanghai for Canton after he had received a telegram from Sun Yat-Sen urging him to go south to join the newly-formed army. When he arrived at Canton he spent several days with Sun Yat-Sen in discussing political and military matters. It was a precarious time for Sun and his followers, for the Peking Government had sent out two expeditionary forces, one into Hunan and the other into Kiangsi, both with Kwangtung as their objective. In Canton itself considerable forces of Kwangsi troops were stationed and they were decidedly hostile to Sun's Cantonese Army. Chen Chiung-Ming, the Commander-in-

Chief of the army, had his headquarters in Swatow, a coastal town near to Fukien, and more than two hundred miles east of Canton. From Canton Chiang Kai-Shek went to Swatow to see Chen Chiung-Ming and his Chief-of-Staff Teng Keng, and on March 15th was given the post of Head of the Field Operations Department.

As soon as he had taken up his job, Chiang set out for a tour of the district where future operations were to take place. First he went north-east to the coastal town of Ung-Kung, about fifty miles away, where a detachment of their forces was stationed, and then to the important town of Chao-Chow, which is about twenty miles almost due north of Swatow. From there he went towards the border of Fukien, to Sam-Ho-Pa, their chief base of supply, a little less than a hundred miles north of Chaochow. From Samhopa he went farther north to Tsung-Kow, where the reserves were, and lastly to Chen-Ping, about forty miles north-west of Tsungkow, also very near to the Kwangtung-Fukien border. The tour lasted about two weeks.

In the Staff Conference held soon after his tour of inspection Chiang proposed that, to facilitate their operations, the General Headquarters should be moved to the small town of Samhopa, where the base of supply was. This was opposed by everybody present, who would not hear of leaving a big coastal town for a tiny place in the interior and much nearer to their enemy. He had to explain patiently to them that in the impending general attack it would be an excellent place to concentrate their forces, with the Southern coast as their right wing, and their detachment forces in the North as the left wing. his proposal was at last adopted.

In the beginning of May, he went to Tsunghow again to make preparations for the attack, after which he returned to Samhopa, where the Headquarters had now moved. As their forces scattered over other parts of Kwangtung might be easily wiped out by their potential

enemy, the Kwangsi troops, this general attack on Fukien furnished a good excuse for moving them eastwards, to be concentrated near the border. Hsu Chung-Chih, commanding officer of the left wing at Chenping, was the first to force his way into Fukien, where he defeated the 1st Brigade of the Fukien Army and occupied the town of Wu-Ping, about a hundred miles north of his original base. From Wuping this detachment of the Cantonese Army, after pausing a moment awaiting fresh supplies, turned eastwards to form the left half of a pincer movement. In a fortnight Hsu and his men occupied the town of Shang-Hang, which is about forty miles away.

This initial good news of the Cantonese Army's victory was sadly counter-balanced by two pieces of bad news. The first was that the Extraordinary Parliament at Canton, under the influence of the Kwangsi leaders, had decided to reorganise the Generalissimo's Headquarters into a formal Military Government, to be controlled by a Commission of seven political directors. Sun Yat-Sen, instead of being the head of the Organisation, was now elected one of the seven. The elected Chairman of the Commission was Chen Chun-Hsuan, the leader of the Kwangsi clique of the Kuo Min Tang, about whom mention was made at the beginning of this chapter. The other news was even worse. The Peking Government, having heard of the organisation of the new Cantonese Army, had now appointed Li Hou-Chi, Military Governor of Fukien, to be the Commander-in-Chief to lead a joint force of Chekiang and Fukien troops to attack Kwangtung. The First Division of the Chekiang Army, whose commander was Li Hou-Chi's second in command, was rushing his men south into Fukien.

At the end of May, Sun Yat-Sen left Canton for Sam-hopu. Chiang Kai-Shek went to the quayside to meet him and was deeply touched to see how worry had aged his leader. Indeed, Sun looked so worn out that Chiang

shed tears of compassion. They had much to tell each other, and though military affairs were quickly on the move, and Chiang soon had to go out on duty, they talked at Headquarters deep into the night. Chiang then went north-eastwards to Tai-Pu, a town about twenty miles away, and from there he went twenty miles farther north to Yung-Ting, a town inside the Fukien border. Men on both sides were fighting hard for the place and Chiang's personal instructions to the Battalion Commander enabled him to take this strategical point on the following morning.

Chiang found time to hurry back to Sun with the good news, and Sun began to beam with joy when he heard Chiang's first-hand report. They continued to discuss military defence measures until June 1st, when Sun bade him farewell and left for Shanghai.

The month of June was a month of setbacks. The right wing, under the command of Teng Keng, lost the coastal town of Ungking, and within three days Jao-Ping, a town about twenty miles north of it, also fell to the enemy. As Jaoping is not very far short of fifty miles south of Sam-hopu, their Headquarters, the loss was very serious. The enemy was now threatening their central and main column. By the end of June the position of the Cantonese Army was so precarious that Sun Yat-Sen sent them a telegram from Shanghai, which can be interpreted as follows:

'To Commander-in-Chief Chen Chiung-Ming and to be forwarded to my Elder Brother Chiang Kai-Shek:

'Chang Hwei-Chih's large army has arrived in Kiangsi; expected to attack Kwangtung soon. Also there is a Northern Army of 2,000 men going to Swatow by sea to be landed there to reinforce Lung. Li Hou-Chi's [Governor of Fukien] army in Fukien is increasing rapidly. Several secret agencies of our party in Fukien have been discovered and raided. Chao-Chow and Ka-Ying

[about sixty miles north of Chaochow] are threatened from north and east by Li and Chang. No defence will be possible along the coast. We are surrounded on three sides and our position is extremely dangerous. If we could risk an attack now, we still have hopes of survival, otherwise we are sure to be besieged. To defend by attacking raises our morale, inspires support and disheartens foe. A small advance would bring wonderful results; otherwise we shall lose the confidence of our men, discourage our supporters and bring up the enemy's morale. Our men must win the battle as they cannot afford to lose; the ground we occupy is only good for advance, but no good for retreat. We'll not survive a defeat. Hoping all my Elder Brothers consider this quickly,

'SUN YAT-SEN.'

In the beginning of July the Cantonese Army was still withdrawing to shorten its defence line. Chiang Kai-Shek saw that the original plan was no good and offered a revised plan of operations. It was a detailed plan of six thousand words and there were many drastic measures in it. Such a plan easily frightened the Commanders. It was not adopted, and before the end of the month came, Taipu, their last stronghold just before their Headquarters in Samhopa, passed into the enemy's hands after they had lost Yungting. The central column now fell back on Samhopa. As all the officers and men were at a loss to decide what to do, Chen Chiung-Ming gave Chiang Kai-Shek full power to act in order to save the situation.

That marked the turning of the tide. In the beginning of August, Taipu was recaptured and then Yungting. Hsu Chung-Chih and his men in the left wing also counter-attacked and recaptured Shanghang. At the end of the month, thanks to Chiang's command, the Cantonese Army was more than fifty miles inside Fukien, their left wing having occupied Lung-Yen, east and slightly north of

Shanghang, and their right wing having occupied the important prefecture city of Chang-Chow, very near to the coastal town of Amoy.

Thirteen years after this battle, Chiang reviewed his plans of operation. Here is what he wrote, having studied them again after this long interval:

‘At that time I was the head of Field Operations Department of the Cantonese Army and had drafted operation plans for the expedition. The first stage of operations started with our main force advancing from the left: from Chenping and Tsungkow to attack Shanghang and Yungting. It was to press the enemy from mountainous ground on the left side to the right side towards the coast and also to threaten his supply base behind him.

‘Before we started, we decided to move the Headquarters of the Cantonese Army to Samhopa. At the time when the left wing occupied Shanghang and Yungting, it advanced rapidly, as if a knife were splitting bamboos. But the right wing lost Ungking, and had even given up Swatow. I had to wire Teng Keng to stop him, and persuaded him to return quickly to Swatow.

‘Just as I thought, the enemy did not dare to enter Swatow, and thus the base of the Cantonese was luckily saved. Then men from the left wing were shifted to reinforce the right wing. But our left wing was unexpectedly counter-attacked by the enemy and Yungting fell into his hands. So I drafted the revised plan for the second stage of operations at a time before Taipu was lost, hoping to concentrate our strength in the right wing for an attack.

‘It happened that Taipu was lost at this time, and the enemy was approaching Samhopa, while all those at Headquarters were preparing to withdraw and then Chen Chiung-Ming found his hands as good as tied, not knowing what to do. I forced them not to retreat and altered the plan of operations. The main forces of the right wing

were immediately shifted to the centre to launch a counter-attack on Taipu. For three days and three nights I did not sleep, and went to the front to give instructions. Luckily the battle brought us a decisive victory, but it also made the other officers jealous of me. When I reflect on it to-day, I still feel the pain remain in my heart.

‘May, 1931.’

Chiang Kai-Shek's personal attendance at the front had proved a great asset to the Cantonese Army. In all the important battles during these two last months it was always he who went forward to supervise personally the emplacement of guns, after which they never failed to hit their targets. People began to think that he was almost a god, but he merely said that he had been trained in the artillery.

The month of September brought in some important changes. In the Peking Government Feng Kuo-Chang's term as acting President ended, and Hsu Shih-Chang, also a close friend of the late Yuan Shih-Kai, was elected to fill his place. Tuan Chi-Jui, who had been called back to the office of Prime Minister for the sixth time by Feng Kuo-Chang in March, after his resignation in the previous November, resigned for the last time. As Shu was a civilian while Tuan was a soldier, this change considerably altered the attitude of the Northern Government, which had been always very militant towards the South.

Another great change happened in Russia. Imperial Russia was by now gone forever, and in her place sprang up the Bolsheviks. At a time when all the other nations in the world looked upon Lenin with hostile eyes, Sun Yat-Sen was one of the first to send him a cable of congratulation on the success of the Revolution. This was a memorable event in the history of Sino-Russian relations.

But the change in the Cantonese Army which was fight-

ing in Fukien Province concerns the reader most. Hsu Chung-Chih, who had been doing remarkably well when leading the 2nd Detachment of the Cantonese Army, was now promoted to be the Commanding Officer of the Second Army of Cantonese Forces. This was because, with the reorganisation of their men and the prisoners who joined them, the original Cantonese Army had to be extended into two armies. Who could be more suitable to fill the vacancy left by Hsu Chung-Chih than his good friend Chiang Kai-Shek? On September 26th, 1918, Chiang was made Commander of the Second Detachment, which consisted of four battalions, roughly a little more than a thousand officers and men. Though it was a small force, it was well-seasoned, for Hsu had led it through many defeats, but through many more victories. The Headquarters of this Command was situated at Chang-Tai, a city about ten miles north of Changchow, on the other side of the Kui-Lung River.

The condition of the Cantonese Forces in Southern Fukien and Eastern Kwangtung at the time when Chiang Kai-Shek was given the command of the Second Detachment can be gathered from a letter written to Sun Yat-Sen by Shao Yuan-Chung on October 1st, 1918. Shao was a veteran member of the Kuo Min Tang, and became later on the chief compiler of the Party History. His loyalty to Sun and Chiang was well known. He was the only important official who was killed in the *coup d'état* at Sian in December, 1936.

Shao reported that he arrived at Changchow in late September. Chen Chiung-Ming he met at Headquarters, and learnt that Hsu Chung-Chih was directing operations at the front and Chiang Kai-Shek was at Changtai preparing troops to reinforce Hsu's men. Shao then told Sun about his visit to Hsu at the front on the preceding day when he had given to Hsu both Sun's letter and message. 'I told him,' the letter went on, 'that the reason why our

party could not put into practice our principles was that we had no military strength, nor a place for a base. Now our only hope was either Fukien or Szechuan, where our comrades were fighting, especially Fukien with its coast. If the latter came into the possession of our party, it would enormously help our diplomatic relations and also our intercourse with overseas comrades. We must form our plans very carefully, protect our gains desperately, never letting them go again easily.

'Hsu Chung-Chih told me,' Shao continued, 'that the greatest difficulty we suffered in this war was lack of arms. Luckily since the beginning of hostilities we had captured altogether from the enemy more than two thousand rifles and several million cartridges. So at present what we were using were once entirely the Northern Army's property. He hoped that you would contrive to buy more ammunitions.' Shao reported that Hsu also had captured nearly two thousand men, and Chen more than a thousand. With sixteen battalions at the front, Hsu Chung-Chih was waiting for the arrival of sufficient ammunition for a decisive battle. He added that of the captured cartridges only those of suitable size could be used, while the others had to be sent to Taipu, where a factory had been erected to remake them, and a large supply of such products was expected to arrive any day.

The last part of this long letter was as follows: 'Both Chiang Kai-Shek and Hsu Chung-Chih were unable to write to you personally because they were at the front, so they have asked me to write this to you. I have nothing to do here because Chen Chiung-Ming has a very mixed staff under him. Moreover he has no organisation. Every clerk is directly responsible to the Commander-in-Chief. Everything goes on in its own way, there is no co-ordination. A newcomer could not help him at all. So I will wait until Hsu Chung-Chih has solved his problem at the front and is going to the Provincial Capital, where I can help

him, as we suit each other better. At present I have to stay at Chen Chiung-Ming's place temporarily. If you have any instructions for Hsu Chung-Chih, Chiang Kai-Shek or me, please get Chu Ta-Fu to write to me and I'll pass them on.'

No comment is needed upon this document, but the remarks about Chen Chiung-Ming in the last part of the letter were an early indication of the important development which was to come.

Hsu Chung-Chih's subsequent bid to take Foo-Chow, the provincial capital, very nearly succeeded. It fell short in its last stage, and he had to be content with his progress so far. In November his Headquarters were at Sien-Yu, about eighty miles from Foochow. This is roughly half-way between Changchow and Foochow. Chiang Kai-Shek and his detachment also fought northwards, and after he had met and conferred with Hsu Chung-Chih at Sienyu towards the end of November, he decided in December to attack Yung-Tai, a strategical town about fifty miles north of Sienyu and forty miles south of Foochow.

The December weather in this part of China was tricky, and Chiang Kai-Shek, unaccustomed to the Fukien climate, fell ill. Many of his men were in the same condition. However, they managed to forge ahead and, chasing their enemy all the time, arrived outside the city of Yungtai on December 7th. It was at this juncture that Chiang Kai-Shek received the order to cease fire from his Commander-in-Chief. He was heartbroken, and exclaimed that with a small army deep in the enemy's territory he and his men had suffered innumerable hardships and a third of them were ill, while dead and wounded were scattered everywhere; how could he have the heart to stop when success was assured!

Chiang Kai-Shek recorded this battle fairly in detail when he had a little time to spare early the following year. He described his difficult progress during the first fort-

night, when he and his men had advanced about seven hundred *li* along a zigzag and rugged road and succeeded in getting into communication with Hsu Chung-Chih's Army once more. They encamped on the night of the 7th a few miles away from the city of Yungtai, their encampment being opposite that of their enemy.

'On the 8th, at dawn,' continues the record, 'we renewed our attack. The Northern Army, after having resisted for a few hours, saw that they could not hold out any longer. So they retreated again to make a last stand on a piece of high ground very near to the city of Yungtai, and there they defended this strategical position. My detachment followed in their wake, attacking all the time, and reached the city. Commander Chu's men tackled the enemy's front, Commander Liang's men his right side and the Fukien People's Army, to help us, went around to attack his left side. Besieging and assaulting our enemy on three sides, we advanced as if a knife were slitting bamboos. When the enemy realised his hopeless position, he retreated late on the 8th, making good his escape by night, but in disorder. The Cantonese Army, on the same night, went into the city to restore order.'

Chiang went on to say that both Commander Liang and Commander Chu, leading their men, continued to chase and attack the enemy to a place only sixty *li* from the provincial capital, which they could easily have captured had they not been stopped by the order to cease fire. The record says: 'Since the order had arrived, we could not plan to advance. According to instructions received, we stayed in our positions to show good faith on our part. In the meantime I sent an official letter to Li Hou-Chi [the Military Governor of Fukien] to tell him of the cease fire order and ask him whether he would observe it exactly like the Cantonese Army and remain in his position.'

'In Li's reply he promised unreservedly to agree to what

I said, and even added: "I have already wired to Changchow to negotiate direct with Commander-in-Chief Chen." The Cantonese Army, thinking that since the enemy had agreed to a truce they could go back and remain at their position, did not take advantage of their recent victory to attack the provincial capital. While they on their part acted in good faith, Li acted utterly without honesty and showed no regard for his promise. Taking advantage of the cease fire order, which had slowed down our advance, he secretly ordered his men to counter-attack us on the 15th.'

Chiang Kai-Shek said that Li was secretly in touch with one of the Fukien Brigadiers who had previously surrendered with his men and sworn allegiance to the Cantonese Army, and that Li succeeded in persuading this Brigadier to change sides again. With five thousand infantrymen and a battalion of artillery gathered from the vicinity of Foochow, the Brigadier marched stealthily towards Yungtai. 'Burning houses and murdering innocent people all the way merely to give vent to his vengeance and to fan his anger, he attacked with all his strength on our detachment of about a thousand men. Our front-line defenders were luckily not caught unawares, and resisted the intruders determinedly until the afternoon. I realised that we had been deceived when Liang and Chu and other sections withdrew without my orders. At about 4 p.m., the enemy's bullets came heavily into the city and I knew there were hardly any men left at the front. When the enemy had forced his way into the city, I had to fight my way out by myself.' Chiang's conclusion was that he had learnt a bitter lesson from this costly experience: a small solitary army fighting deep in the enemy's regions must never stop short before reaching the final stage of its operational plan; he had also learnt never to expect a treacherous enemy to keep his promise.

Soon after this forced retreat, Chiang received a letter

from his Commander-in-Chief in reply to Chiang's complaint about this matter. Unfortunately Chiang's letter to Chen Chiung-Ming has been lost, but the answer throws some light on the situation at that time:

'To Commander Chiang Kai-Shek—

'I have received your letter and am very grateful to you for your concern about the general situation and your attention to military affairs. As to those which have to be improved and prepared immediately, I will do as you suggest; but those which are difficult to put into practice at present will have to be left until the general situation becomes slightly better . . .

'As for the failure to reach our destination during this campaign, it was not because of your mismanagement nor of the soldiers' inefficiency. It had a variety of important reasons: fighting had nothing to do with it.

'Though we have to retreat for the time being, that is doing no harm to our reputation, nor does it influence our situation. On the contrary, with such an experience we shall be profited in the future. It is indeed no loss, and I hope you will not bear in mind a little victory or failure. Moreover, our army had already occupied Yungtai and was near to and threatening Foochow. Both the Northern and Southern Governments know that we withdrew because we had been deceived. Nobody can regard it as a failure. In short, what really matters to us does not depend upon our victory or failure in this Fukien campaign of to-day. It entirely depends on whether we can succeed in converging and nursing our strength for future use. That will be the day when you can do so much for your country, your party and your friends, while to-day is of no consequence . . .'

Chen Chiung-Ming wrote this on January 15th, 1919. From this letter it can be seen that the Commander-in-

Chief had something up his sleeve, and he had to do his best to coax his subordinates to remain silent.

It will be remembered that the European war ended in November, 1918, and the Peking Government, with Hsu Shih-Chang newly elected as the President, tried to get rid of the Southern Government in a peaceful way. Following the truce in Fukien, peace delegates from the Northern and Southern Governments met in Shanghai, but the gap was too wide and both sides held out. In 1919 at the Peace Conference, China, represented by a delegation from the Peking Government, was expected to hand over part of Shantung to Japan because at the beginning of the war Japan had wrested it from Germany. As China was also one of the victorious Allies, such an unfair proposal at once aroused the indignation of the people everywhere in the country. At a mass meeting in Peking on May 4th, the students led a demonstration against the Government, and when some of these students were arrested the whole country started strikes and other forms of protest to show that public opinion was entirely against the Government's secret diplomacy. Sun Yat-Sen now declared that the old Parliament ought to be reassembled. If that was done it would mean the dissolution of the Peking Government altogether. So the peace talks in Shanghai reached a deadlock.

The refusal of China to sign the Peace Treaty in Paris did not have any effect in Europe. All the other nations, ignoring the protest of China, did what they liked or what they were told to do. People say that so long as there is general agreement, minor differences can be ignored. In China, although agreement between the Northern and Southern Governments could not be reached, the Cantonese and Fukien armies found that they could conclude a partial peace in their provinces. Chen Chiung-Ming, Commander-in-Chief of the Cantonese Army, and Li

Hou-Chi, Military Governor of Fukien, found that the general disagreement could be ignored so long as the two of them could arrive at partial agreement.

This gave Chiang Kai-Shek a moment of respite. Early in 1919 he obtained leave to go home to see his mother, and also to spend some time with Sun Yat-Sen, who was still an exile in Shanghai. When the Cantonese Army was not fighting, Chiang, finding his services not required, resigned so that he was free to travel about for a little. He even thought that his Second Detachment could be abolished, so as to save money. He wrote two long letters to Teng Keng, who was the Chief-of-Staff in the Cantonese Army, to give his reasons for his resignation. He knew that Chen Chiung-Ming would not let him go, so he appealed to Teng Keng, who was more sympathetic. From Shanghai he went to Japan and stayed there for a few weeks to visit a number of friends.

By this time Chen Chiung-Ming had reorganised the Cantonese Army into a force of more than ten brigades, and had appointed a number of his personal friends as Brigadiers and Regimental Commanders without due consideration of their military merits. It became obvious that he didn't like Hsu Chung-Chih, who with Chiang Kai-Shek had played the most important part in the Fukien campaign. Chen Chiung-Ming, however, seemed to value Chiang Kai-Shek's services very highly. Once he wrote that he would rather lose a hundred battles than lose one Chiang Kai-Shek. In December, 1919, he sent a special messenger to Shanghai to meet Chiang on his return from Japan and to urge him to join the Cantonese Army again. In the letter which the messenger took to Chiang, Chen said that single-handed he was utterly unable to do what he wanted, and was hoping anxiously for Chiang's return to Changchow to assist him. Chiang's return, he said, would at least rejuvenate a part of the Cantonese Army, and in due course get it extended to become the main body

of his force for the protection and development of the place which it occupied. The last part of the letter was a threat, which threat he did not carry out:

‘. . . If you, my Elder Brother [meaning Chiang Kai-Shek], will come, we’ll be able to re-form the Cantonese Army and, in the near future, a great and everlasting foundation can be built in Fukien. Otherwise I, because of the lack of capable men ready to co-operate with me, will find it impossible to do my duty to the country. And then the only course left open to me will be to try and preserve my integrity by myself in retirement and obscurity. I cannot tell you in this letter all I want to say, which will be conveyed to you in person by the messenger. Wishing you well in your temporary residence, your younger brother Chen Chiung-Ming. December 5th.’

Even such a letter did not produce an immediate effect. Though Chiang Kai-Shek visited Chen Chiung-Ming’s headquarters several times, he did not really join the Army again until Sun Yat-Sen and a number of his old friends urged him to do so in September, 1920. Sun Yat-Sen, who had been more or less pushed out of Canton by the Kwangsi War Lords, very much wanted Chen Chiung-Ming to fight back to Canton. Now that the Cantonese Army had concluded a temporary peace treaty with the Military Governor of Fukien, who would help Chen Chiung-Ming with ammunition if he would attack the Kwangsi troops, Sun Yat-Sen thought that Chen Chiung-Ming would need but little persuasion from him. But Chen Chiung-Ming was biding his time. As he had said to Chiang Kai-Shek, he wanted to build a great and solid foundation first. Indeed, he would have remained inactive had it not been that the Kwangsi War Lords in Canton, finding that the Northern Armies were themselves busily occupied in fighting and would not be able to come south for some time, took the opportunity to prepare an all-out

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drive eastwards to annihilate the Cantonese Army. It was only then that Chen Chiung-Ming acted; he was not really obeying the orders of Sun Yat-Sen.

In September, Chu Ta-Fu, the classical scholar who was a trusted follower of Sun Yat-Sen as well as a good friend of Chiang Kai-Shek, succeeded in persuading the men in the Humen Fort at the mouth of Pearl River to declare their independence from the military authorities in Canton. The Humen Fort is very near to Canton and occupies a strategically important position in the water route to Hongkong. The Kwangsi War Lords did their utmost, and finally succeeded in getting the soldiers in the Fort to change sides once more. Chu Ta-Fu, who was in the Fort, was therefore murdered by the soldiers whom he thought were still on his side.

This treacherous act hastened Chiang's decision. He left Shanghai immediately, first going to Hongkong, where Chu Ta-Fu's coffin was, to pay homage to his dead friend. After that he sailed to Swatow to present his plan of operations for the Canton Campaign. His good friend Hsu Chung-Chih, leading the Second Army, was fighting in the North to form the right wing, and on November 6th Chiang Kai-Shek was at the front with Hsu Chung-Chih's men going into action. Hsu was overjoyed to hear that Chiang was with him, and at once telegraphed Chiang to join him. Ten days after Chiang's arrival at the front, Hsu's troops occupied Ho-Yun, an important city a little more than a hundred miles north-east of Canton. It was then when the two friends met again, and they spent a whole day together discussing plans for the campaign. On the following day Chiang presented a second plan of operations, and within a week the Cantonese Army attacked and took the stronghold of Wai-Chow, a city which later on became very famous because Chen Chiung-Ming kept it as his headquarters for many years and it withstood numerous determined attacks.

On October 24th, two days after the occupation of Waichow, Chiang Kai-Shek drafted his third operational plan, and on the same day the leader of the Kwangsi clique, Chen Chun-Hsuan, sent out a circular telegram to say that he was no longer the Head of the Military Government, and fled to Shanghai. But that did not stop Chiang Kai-Shek from carrying out his operational plan. There were still large numbers of Kwangsi troops scattered about, and the Cantonese Army proceeded in every direction in hot pursuit of the enemy. Another two days afterwards the Military leader of all the Kwangsi forces announced that he was taking all his men back to the Province of Kwangsi, leaving the affairs of the Kwangtung Province to be settled by the Central Government in Peking.

This was the last sting he left behind to do some mischief when the time came. Although there was still much mopping-up fighting to be done, the whole of the Kwangtung Province became the property of the Cantonese Army. Chiang Kai-Shek found his services unwanted, and left Canton for Shanghai early in November. By now it was no longer a secret that he could not work with Chen Chiung-Ming.

His uncompromising spirit troubled Sun Yat-Sen. Just before Chiang Kai-Shek went back to Shanghai he received a letter from his leader asking him to try his best to co-operate with Chen Chiung-Ming:

‘To my dear Elder Brother Chiang Kai-Shek,
‘When my elder brother Chen Chiung-Ming fought back to Canton, he was using all his strength to serve our party and our country. We, on our part, are using all our strength to help him. With only one aim and of only one mind, our co-operation cannot be compared with any ordinary temporary alliance. I do hope my elder brother Chen Chiung-Ming will act as Huang Hsing did before 1912, and as Chen Chi-Mei did after 1913; and I trust him

exactly as I did Huang Hsing and Chen Chi-Mei at those times. All I ask of him is that he will uphold my principles and my policy, that is to obey my democratic faith for which I have worked for these thirty years. Am I a tyrant who is pleased only when obeyed blindly? You, my elder brother, having worked with Chen Chi-Mei the longest, should know how I trusted him. Please tell my elder brother Chen Chiung-Ming what is in my mind.

'The sudden and tragic death of Chu Ta-Fu is a loss to me comparable to that of my right or left hand. When I look among the members of our party I find very few who are experts in war and also loyal. Only you, my elder brother, are with us, you, whose courage and sincerity are equal to those of Chu Ta-Fu, and your knowledge of war is even better than his. But you have a very fiery temper, and your hatred of mediocrity is too excessive. And so it often leads to quarrelling and difficulty in co-operating. As you are shouldering the great and heavy responsibility of our party, you should sacrifice your high ideals a little and try to compromise. This is merely for the sake of our party and has nothing to do with your personal principles. Would you, my elder brother, agree with this? Or wouldn't you?

'Sun Yat-Sen.'

This letter from Sun Yat-Sen was not entirely without effect. It stopped Chiang Kai-Shek from leaving Chen Chiung-Ming for seven days. It was only when Canton was occupied and Chen Chiung-Ming thought he had no further use for Chiang so that he could wholly disregard Chiang's operational plans, that Chiang decided to go away. In his farewell letter to the Commander-in-Chief he said that it was time for him to retire when he found he was neither trusted by his superiors nor obeyed by his subordinates.

Regarding Chen's abandonment of his operational plans,

Chiang was bitterly disappointed and hurt: 'You, my Commander-in-Chief, are an expert in strategy and also full of experience; if you had not been ill-advised you would never have done this; if you trusted me, you would never have done this. Even if those who were marching forward with their men at the front had a little common sense, they would not have done this. They should have followed the right direction and corrected the wrong one; that is the way to help and co-operate. I cannot bear those whose minds are full of jealousy and prejudice and those who have no regard for the co-ordination of the whole plan, nor any concern about the success or failure of the entire campaign. I am straightforward and would rather die fighting. I dare not act contrary to my conscience. I came at your call this time really because of the death of Chu Ta-Fu. That made me fight side by side with you against one common enemy. Also because of the eternally unsettled condition of the Province of Kwangtung, I determined to sacrifice my own views to follow those of others. I regarded it as my duty to our party. For the sake of loyalty and public spirit, I came forward without the least selfish thought . . .'

It made him very angry to realise that the best chance of wiping out the enemy had been lost through not following his instructions, on selfish grounds. Therefore he had to act against the wishes of Sun Yat-Sen and go back at once.

When Chiang Kai-Shek arrived at Shanghai he went immediately to call upon Sun Yat-Sen, to explain his failure to comply with his wishes, and to report the latest condition in Kwangtung. Soon he found that he was not the only one to leave Canton for Shanghai. Hsu Chung-Chih had also found it impossible to work with Chen Chiung-Ming and had followed in the wake of Chiang.

Now that the Kwangtung Province was clear of the

hostile army, Sun Yat-Sen soon ended his exile by setting out to Canton to resume his duty at the head of the Military Government. He urged Chiang Kai-Shek and Hsu Chung-Chih to go with him, but in vain. Chiang Kai-Shek went back to his native province, while Hsu Chung-Chih remained for some time in Shanghai.

Chiang Kai-Shek, with his fighting records of the Fukien Campaign and his recent success against the Kwangsi forces, had by now become generally known as the best strategist in the Cantonese Army. His retirement was considered a great loss to the cause of the party, and numerous friends and comrades wrote appealing letters, sent entreating telegrams, and even came in person to his home to beg him to go out again. He was so determined not to compromise that he quarrelled with one of his best friends, Tai Chi-Tao, also a veteran member of the Kuo Min Tang and a devoted follower of Sun Yat-Sen.

In the last days of 1920, Tai Chi-Tao, who had also left Canton and Chen Chiung-Ming because of some difference of opinion, thought that the time was opportune for them both to go back to Canton and help Sun Yat-Sen, and came to Chiang Kai-Shek's home to persuade him to change his mind. No description of the meeting is available, but the correspondence between them following this meeting is most revealing. As the letters are of great interest in more ways than one, they are translated and quoted at length here. The first letter is dated January 5th, 1921. It is a comparatively short apologetic note from Chiang Kai-Shek to Tai Chi-Tao:

"The other day, when the trouble started, you, my Elder Brother, seemed to me to be very stern both in your voice and colour: I could not get a word in edgeways, and so felt it unbearable. You, my Elder Brother, have always had a great affection for me, that I know. Generally, whenever

you have persuaded me to do or dissuaded me from doing something, I have never failed to follow your advice.

'But I have a bad temper and am usually lacking in good manners. When I think that I am over-patient with you, my Elder Brother, after having had enough of your anger, I become unconsciously rude, bursting out all at once. At a time when we are enduring the same hardships, and vowing that we shall face good or bad fortune unflinchingly together, I feel most ashamed of myself after careful reflection. I know myself that I have been ridiculous. When a man has been so lacking in self-control and so rude, how can he have the face to see his good teacher and beneficial friend again? So I enclose a copy of Marquis Tseng's letter to his younger brother, reproaching him about his quarrel with a friend, which I think could be used with great profit as a mirror for both of us. If our friendship is going to be still improved after this, then it is a blessing in disguise. I do hope you will forgive my misbehaviour and never be stingy in giving me your instructions, which I shall consider I am most lucky to receive.'

To this letter Tai Chi-Tao answered as follows:

'My dear Elder Brother Chiang Kai-Shek,

'I have read your kind letter. On that day I do not know myself how it happened that I offended you, my Elder Brother. For you, my Elder Brother, I have nothing except a heart full of sincerity. Even my persuasions for you to go to Canton were prompted half by duty and half by my concern for your personal advantage. When I met with your fury without apparent reason, I felt most dejected. I blamed myself for messing things up, and my heart was still aching when I was sailing home in my boat . . .

'Your sphere of work, my Elder Brother, is active service of a responsible nature. To shut your gates and

live inside your home is to care for nobody but yourself. The other day you said: "To urge me to go out and work is to urge me to shorten my life." When I heard this remark, I felt sore; because I myself was actually worried at the thought. The old proverb says: "Rivers and mountains change, but men's nature doesn't." You, my Elder Brother, are extremely self-willed to an almost incorrigible extent. Whenever you are disappointed at some trifle, you let your anger go unchecked. In dealing with people in that way, you run the grave danger of courting calamity; or at least you will find it most damaging to your career.

'The present day is quite different from ancient times. Where could be found a minister of remonstrance who looks after everything you do from day to day? Even if there was such a man, how could he be certain that you would follow his advice? When a man has left his home ten thousand *li* behind him and is shouldering the responsibility of affairs of State, anything the least expected may happen to him. If you, my Elder Brother, cannot bear things with fortitude and hold firm, setting your mind on the way of the golden mean and peacefulness, and reflecting on these things three times a day, how can I, who am not without affection for you, dare to persuade you to go out and work? During the recent years I have desperately and repeatedly urged you to go to Kwangtung, and I believe I loved you much that I did so. But the other day when I heard what you said, and on which I reflected once and again, the result was that I dare not urge you any longer. That was also because I loved you much. Your letter indicates that I was angry with you. I have nothing but love for you. That love may take the form of heart-ache but never anger. As for my advice to you, patience and fortitude, the way of the golden mean and peacefulness, these are the proper ways of conduct even if you are going to stay at home; to members of your family and your servants, your townsmen and friends, you must all

the more control your temper, never using a harsh word when things happen contrary to your wish . . .

'You, my Elder Brother, must reflect that the work of the Master [meaning Sun Yat-Sen] is going steadily towards success. From the day when he started the Revolution, the progress of the spreading of his principles in China has probably been quicker than that of any revolutionary doctrines of other nations. Now, what is the Master's strong point? Both Chang Ching-Kiang and I, your younger brother, think faithfulness, kindness and peacefulness are his important strong points. We have never seen the Master do to others what he would not like done to himself, nor bear enmity towards someone who has offended him personally. And his dislike of putting people to death cannot be equalled by anybody in the political world in this or any other country. The way of the golden mean and peacefulness are probably in his nature. As for the greatness of his wisdom, knowledge and thought, they are his ways and means of cultivating the greatness of his character: they are not part of his character.

'Many of us spend most of our time with him, but not many can see and appreciate this, and indeed few could follow his example in it. Chu Ta-Fu was an outstanding character among us, but he was fundamentally different from the Master in this. I, your younger brother, can see and appreciate it immensely, but could not attain one tenth of the Master's virtue and fortitude. Not that I do not wish to follow his example; I really have not got it in my nature. But I do wish that I and you, my Elder Brother, will endeavour to follow his example.

'To-day I have received a letter from Chu Cheng to say that the Master has sent yet another telegram to urge you to go to him. Hu Han-Min has written three times to give you his best wishes. That shows great affection for you, not wishing you harm, and you must not neglect nor for-

get it. This letter cannot express adequately my feelings, I only ask you to forgive my simpleness and give heed to what I said.

'Your Younger Brother, Tai Chi-Tao. January 14th.'

On January 20th, Chiang Kai-Shek wrote an equally long letter:

'In your instructions of the 14th, every word is moving and powerful. After reading it, I was on the verge of tears, and didn't know what to think. There are in it one or two phrases which seem to be scolding me, but still they are a good warning to me. I think the best thing about the Master's friendship is his straightforwardness. People respect his dignity and are grateful for his kindness. That of Chang Ching-Kiang is that he never utters a sarcastic word. People who have offended him would thus feel ashamed of themselves.

'You, my Elder Brother, are expecting too much from your friends; also you are too sharp in your reproach and not generous enough; that is where you cannot quite reach the height of the Master and Chang Ching-Kiang. But for me, so great is your love and so deep is your concern that our friendship far surpasses that which the Master or Chang Ching-Kiang has for me. Although I treat you as my fearful friend and beneficial teacher, my respect and fear for you have never reached those I have for the Master and Chang Ching-Kiang. That is because our age is about the same, and we have been too familiar for so long and so I am quite used to your reproaches. Also it is largely due to your marked prejudice and sentimentality and the sharpness of your words.

'In Kwangtung Province there is a trend by itself, and a man like the Master, who treats people with sincerity, could not be found. The complications of the situation there, my Elder Brother, you could not comprehend. As

for their treatment of me, they throw me over when they don't need me and beckon me to go back when they do. How can I bear such kind of treatment? Am I too narrow-minded? Perhaps. Although we shouldn't feel swelled-headed, neither should we consider ourselves as dirt. To be snobbish, so as to frequent the doors of those who are in power? To be greedy for position so as to ask for pity from those heartless acquaintances? Would that be the proper thing for us to do who want all the comrades to hold up their heads?

'You, my Elder Brother, once told me that Chen Chi-Mei was jealous of you, and so you two did not get on well. You would not like to translate Japanese things for him. If someone had forced you to work with Chen Chi-Mei, I know you would have protested and thought it would not do. To-day your forcing me to work with Chen Chiung-Ming is exactly the same. Aren't you strict with others, whilst being generous with yourself? Should we change places, you would hardly know what to think. Therefore I ask you, my Elder Brother, to forgive me as much as you can.

'In your letter it is said that I considered your urging me to go out and work was to urge me to shorten my life. This is a mistake, or a misunderstanding. I only said that I had a bad temper, unsuitable for society; I must leave my friends, to live alone in the mountains or wilderness, in which case perhaps I might live longer. I said this because I, remembering your constant advice, blamed myself for offending people on account of my temper, and not blaming you for urging me. I only feared the consequences of my going. I did not say that I would never go. In short, I do not wish to live selfishly in comfort and ease, nor to separate myself from the world. Though it is true that I fear people's jealous tongues and want to avoid people's enmity, it is not true that I prefer to live cowardly rather than to die courageously. Tasks which lead to a

clear-cut and fundamental solution I will undertake with pleasure; work which lacks reality and will not produce any effect I decline to do.

'The trouble with me in society is that I go to extremes. I have lifelong sworn fast friends but no ordinary boon companions or social acquaintances. The same principle applies to my words as well as to my actions. This nature of mine never changes, as the old proverb says, while rivers and mountains may do so. Instruction from my old pals and advice from my friends are as welcome to me as refreshing songs sung by birds: I am only too anxious to hear them. You help my work and improve my knowledge, for which I value you, but these are of secondary importance to me. To supervise and reproach me frankly and to lead me to the right constantly and forcibly; these are the things for which I could not be without you for a moment. I'm sure you, my Elder Brother, will not be offended by my bad manners, but will wish me to accomplish my work one day. I hope you, my Elder Brother, will never be tired of giving me advice, but be as exacting with me as the Master or Chang Ching-Kiang. Then I may be able to change my nature a little and enter the way of righteousness. A man's strong points and weaknesses are largely formed from his environment; it is not utterly impossible that his nature should change a little.

'My going to Kwangtung is entirely dependent upon a definite date for the mobilisation of the Cantonese Army against the Kwangsi Province. I wonder whether I and you, my Elder Brother, will be travelling together? The fact that I have decided to take this trip to Canton certainly shows that I respect other people's opinions and utterly disregard my own. My words carry so little weight that I am most ashamed of myself. I enclose my reply to the Master's telegram; please glance over it.'

The telegram referred to was an answer to the fourth

telegram sent by Sun Yat-Sen within two months; it reads: 'You, Sir, have arrived at Canton for fifty days, but not a single order has been issued for mobilisation. That is why I am writing. As soon as the day for starting the campaign is fixed I will come to serve you without waiting for your call. Signed, Chiang Kai-Shek.'

It is quite clear that Chiang Kai-Shek would no longer work with Chen Chiung-Ming when he saw that Chen had no wish to put the Kwangsi troops entirely out of action. There is but one deduction from Chen's attitude: he wanted to make use of these troops himself secretly and personally, and therefore he was not really serving Sun Yat-Sen and the Kuo Min Tang. Unless Chen Chiung-Ming agreed to fight the Kwangsi forces earnestly, by which he would show he was not plotting against Sun Yat-Sen, Chiang Kai-Shek would have nothing to do with him.

Whether Sun Yat-Sen and his other followers did not hold Chiang's opinion about Chen Chiung-Ming at that time, or whether they were anxious to compromise in order to get a foothold in Kwangtung first, it is difficult to say. But Sun Yat-Sen and the rest of the Kuo Min Tang men seemed to be too ready to overlook Chen Chiung-Ming's dark intentions and all joined in urging Chiang to co-operate. Had Chiang Kai-Shek refused to work with Chen Chiung-Ming solely because the latter was a potential enemy of the Kuo Min Tang, the issue would have been a fundamental one and nobody would have been able to urge him to compromise. But, as can be seen, Chiang also had a personal dislike for Chen, just as he always had such a dislike for all those whose characters are questionable. As the case stood, those who had set their minds to compromise with Chen Chiung-Ming had ample reason to urge Chiang to forget his personal difference and work for the common cause. They were wrong;

but Chiang Kai-Shek's position made him unable to insist on the others taking his own view. The above exchange of letters between Chiang Kai-Shek and Tai Chi-Tao has made it fairly clear that it is very easy to overshadow a great issue with a personal one.

Strong-willed as he was, Chiang Kai-Shek was finally coaxed and forced to go to Canton. He did not entirely believe that Chen had changed, but he had to go there to find out whether there was a possibility that circumstances could prevent Chen from playing the traitor. At this critical moment, Chen Chiung-Ming sent him a telegram entreating him to go back. Mere words did not matter much, but the message informed him of practical steps already taken, which seemed most reassuring. First it said that preparations for the Kwangsi Campaign were now completed. Secondly, that Hsu Chung-Chih, who had already gone back to Canton, was to be appointed the General Commanding Officer of the Campaign, ranking second only to Chen himself, and the detailed distribution of all the Cantonese forces for the Campaign was given. Lastly, 'the commanding officer of the central column and main force could be entrusted to nobody else but you, my Elder Brother. After we have conquered Kwangsi we will be able to think of the Yangtze Valley. The future of the Revolution is full of hope, and I entreat you earnestly to come to Canton. Please answer me first.' Though this telegram was dated January 15th, 1921, it took several days to reach Chiang Kai-Shek, who replied on the 21st by a telegram as well as a long letter presenting an operational plan for the campaign.

In both messages, Chiang suggested that before plans were made for the Yangtze Valley, Szechuan must be subdued immediately after the conquest of Kwangsi. The entire force should be divided into four equal parts, two for the Kwangsi Campaign, one for defence against possible invasion by Northern troops from Hunan, and

the rest as reserves. He promised to come and help Chen in a private capacity, and would not accept the official position, for which he recommended a sectional commander whom he knew Chen would trust.

Even after he had decided to join Chen Chiung-Ming again, Chiang was most reluctant to go. This attitude is bluntly stated in his letter to his old friend Chang Ching-Kiang, another veteran member of the Kuo Min Tang, for whom he had great respect as described in his second letter to Tai Chi-Tao. Chiang Kai-Shek told Chang Ching-Kiang: '. . . My going to Canton this time is really forced by the Master's orders. It is clearly known that the place is not suitable for me to stay long, that the work is utterly impossible for our party to carry out, yet I am unreasonably made to follow them. This is indeed a most unfortunate thing which preys on my mind incessantly, and so I dare to reveal it frankly to you . . .' He also asked Chang to tell Sun Yat-Sen that he was going there 'on a private and friendly visit, merely to help them to supervise the operations of war, and could not accept any official commission. Please send him a reply telegram on my behalf, and put it in such a nice way as not to hurt his feelings.'

At the same time Chiang Kai-Shek also presented a three-year military plan to Sun Yat-Sen and all his other colleagues. It was a rough scheme for building a foundation to start the long hoped-for Northern Punitive Expedition, and was divided into nine sections. Section One deals with general strategy. First they should attack Kwangsi and next Szechuan. They should proceed from the West and make peace on the East, maintaining friendly relations with Fukien and Chekiang in order to gain their support when marching northwards. Section Two is a project for training and completing a well-prepared force of ten divisions and fourteen 'mixed brigades', besides the standing armed men policing the south-western provinces

which were their base. A division is roughly a little more than ten thousand men, while a 'mixed brigade' is slightly less, but also complete in itself, just like a division with Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, Engineers and Transport troops.

Expeditionary routes are dealt with in Section Three. One force starts from Szechuan towards Shensi; another goes straight northwards via Hupeh along the Peking-Hankow line; a third moves from the south-east to follow the route of the Tientsin-Pukow railway, while a sea route is to be taken by another force to attack Chin-Wan-Tao, a coastal town about two hundred miles from Peking. Section Four is devoted to the problem of Szechuan, and Sections Five, Six and Seven deal with finance, army system and diplomatic policy respectively. Section Eight projects an arsenal which could produce a hundred rifles a day, four field-guns a month, etc., while Section Nine proposes the completion of the Hankow-Canton railway within two years.

Subsequent events proved that this plan had not been adopted. Though the Kwangsi campaign was carried out swiftly and successfully according to the final operational plan which Chiang Kai-Shek was going to Canton to prepare very soon, drastic changes had to be made to meet emergencies created by Chen Chiung-Ming. Not only had the Northern Punitive Expedition to be abandoned for a few years, but also Sun Yat-Sen and most of his loyal followers had to flee to Shanghai, where they lived as exiles once more, waiting for another chance to go back to Canton. Chiang Kai-Shek's disagreement with Chen Chiung-Ming was sadly justified as shown in the next chapter.

V

TRUE to his promise, Chiang Kai-Shek went to Canton to join Sun Yat-Sen and Chen Chiung-Ming in February, 1921, and found the situation there even worse than he had thought. It was in June, 1918, when Sun Yat-Sen had to leave Canton to live in Shanghai as an exile and for two and a half years Chen Chiung-Ming had been acting independently. Chen Chiung-Ming had begun his career as the hard-pressed commander of the newly-formed small Cantonese Force which consisted of a few thousand men, badly trained, badly equipped and badly paid, and had been compelled to fight incessantly between two powerful enemies. Thanks to his friends Teng Keng, Hsu Chung-Chih and Chiang Kai-Shek, this army was successful in both of its campaigns, and by the beginning of 1921 he had become the dominating personality in the South, with a huge army of several divisions under his command. Having been the despotic head of the army for so long, he found the return of Sun Yat-Sen, who came as his overlord, quite unbearable.

Not only had success turned his head, but also his friends and well-wishers—or people who professed to be so—wanted him ‘to assert himself’, as they cleverly put it. The Peking Government wanted to get rid of Sun Yat-Sen and his Kuo Min Tang, and if they could do so by using Chen Chiung-Ming as their instrument they would not concern themselves whether or not Chen Chiung-Ming was actually one of their followers.

For years the Peking Government had had to respect the ‘law of military natural selection’ which was very much practised by the military governors all over the country.

These War Lords were actually independent of the Peking Government, but seldom openly declared their independence. Should any of them become less powerful, or one of their subordinates become more powerful than his master, the master was always driven away by the new War Lord. Obeying this law of military natural selection, the Peking Government instantly conferred upon the usurper titles and honours which his late master had hitherto enjoyed, by issuing an official order praising him and reproaching the defeated Governor. Peking had become so dependable in obliging the latest usurper that he no longer needed to appoint himself Governor or order his henchmen to send to Peking a recommendation or petition.

In the case of Sun Yat-Sen and Chen Chiung-Ming the situation was slightly different. First of all, neither Sun Yat-Sen nor Chen Chiung-Ming had been originally appointed by Peking. But still, since Chen Chiung-Ming had become so powerful, it would be a pity if Peking did not avail themselves of this opportunity to promote the popular law of 'military natural selection' in Kwangtung. After all, Peking was always obliged to confirm what had already been accomplished; it would be very nice for them to be original for once by promoting this natural selective change of the head of the government in Canton.

Such was the position in Kwangtung after the Cantonese Army had driven out the Kwangsi War Lords and when Sun Yat-Sen had re-established his Military Government. During the time when Chen Chiung-Ming was struggling against heavy odds and therefore loyal to Sun Yat-Sen and the Party, Chiang Kai-Shek and his friends helped him with all their strength because they believed they were fighting for a common cause. They had got on fairly well. But when the outlook began to improve, their Commander-in-Chief became more difficult to serve. Naturally those who worked more closely with him felt the gradual change earlier than others, and Chiang Kai-Shek and Hsu Chung-

Chih tried to break away from him. But those who did not feel the change could not be expected to appreciate this, and sooner or later both Chiang Kai-Shek and Hsu Chung-Chih were forced to come back.

In the early days of 1921, Chen Chiung-Ming's attitude was not yet apparent. Chiang Kai-Shek did not like the man but had to hope for the best. He believed that the only chance was in continuing to attack the Kwangsi troops to the bitter end and occupying the whole of the Province of Kwangsi. He told Teng Keng, the Chief of Staff in the Cantonese Army, that 'the only way out is the Kwangsi Campaign. To expand outwards would enable us to unite within ourselves. Our foundation in Kwangtung would thus be firm and solid. The quicker we start, the better for us, whereas a day's delay means a day's harm done.'

But his observation in Canton soon told him that there was already some kind of rupture between Sun Yat-Sen and Chen Chiung-Ming. The Military Government was hard up, and the *Corps Diplomatique* in China, recognising only the Peking Government, refused Sun Yat-Sen's request to deal with him about Customs money. Sun Yat-Sen thought that, in order to put himself on an equal footing with Hsu Shih-Chang, the President of the Peking Government, a formal government should be established so that a President could be elected and installed. Chen Chiung-Ming, having already been influenced by Peking, now indicated that he thought all those supporters of the Peking Government who opposed Sun Yat-Sen's proposal were right.

Chen Chiung-Ming's opposition to Sun Yat-Sen was carried on, however, behind his back, and with friction of such a serious nature between the leader and his most powerful supporter, nobody dared to mention the matter in public. Chiang Kai-Shek alone found it to be too dangerous to keep dark, and on March 5th he wrote a

frank letter to Sun Yat-Sen. First he mentioned his illness which had kept him in bed for a few days, then he told Sun Yat-Sen of his trip to Canton to map out with Chen Chiung-Ming and Hsu Chung-Chih the final detailed plan of the Kwangsi Campaign, to which he was gratified to see that they both had agreed.

'But at present,' Chiang Kai-Shek went on, 'there is something which has made my heart sink heavily. I can hardly bear to speak out and yet I cannot possibly keep silent. It is the question of the election of the President. Formerly, because of the fact that there were so many different opinions, a great deal of misunderstanding was created, and it was only removed after repeated explanations. To-day the time is not yet ripe, and our foundation is far from solid. The Kwangsi enemy is still at large and the South-West unconquered. Not only is Parliament still unratified, but also the members are insufficient to form a quorum. Therefore I think that the election of the President should be postponed so as to give due considerations to opinions from every quarter.'

By the words 'every quarter' he meant the Army of which Chen Chiung-Ming was the head. And to avoid mentioning directly Chen Chiung-Ming, he then named his best friend, Hsu Chung-Chih, who ranked in the army only second to Chen Chiung-Ming and was more devoted to Sun Yat-Sen than to his Commander-in-Chief: 'I have also discussed this very minutely with Hsu Chung-Chih, who said that as a member of the Party he had to obey and could offer no dissension. But considering it in a practical way and weighing its advantages and disadvantages, he thought everything would proceed more easily and steadily if the election of the President could be held after the appointment of the Generalissimo which was to follow the conquest of Kwangsi. This is what Hsu Chung-Chih said to me and for me only, and in turn I say it to you, my Master, and for you only, and I trust

you will not think from these words that Hsu Chung-Chih is also one of those who oppose you.'

After this he pointed out that it would be unwise to think that the prompt election of the President would improve their diplomatic relations and put them on an equal footing with the Peking Government. According to his observation, it would not. Looking back over the history of their Party, he found all the failures were due to paying too much attention to diplomatic relations. In both their risings, against Yuan Shih-Kai in 1913 and against the Kwangsi clique in 1916, they had thought that Japan would help them, but actually she had helped Yuan Shih-Kai and the Kwangsi leader instead. Their party was suppressed and finally defeated. And in 1918, when Sun Yat-Sen came South with the Navy, the situation seemed to be quite good. Again, they depended upon the help of America, which they thought could not fail. But differences arose among themselves, and England helped their enemy while America looked on. Could they still rely upon their diplomatic relations?

Next, he cited the foreign relations of the newly formed Soviet Russia as a good example. He said the Powers were doing their utmost to suppress Soviet Russia. First they used military power; then economic embargo; and lastly the anti-Soviet State of Poland. Why had not Soviet Russia failed? Because she was united within herself and therefore strong enough to withstand all this. If we could follow the good example of Russia, and see to the uniting of ourselves in interior affairs, we could actually afford to forget about our diplomatic relations.

The last part of this long letter is as follows:

'When we are solid within ourselves we can, of course, extend to other territories. After the subduing of the Kwangsi rebels, we could perhaps go forward from the north-east to attack the capital of our enemy. The unifica-

tion of the whole of China is not a difficult task. If differences of opinion are intensified after the election of the President, and we are divided within ourselves, the south-east will desert us rapidly and we shall find ourselves confronted with the same pitfalls as we were in 1918. How, then, could we hope to compete with the Peking Government?

'I have recently heard that Peking is waiting anxiously for the election of the President in the South. They will use this as a pretext to raise the slogan of "Down with Sun Yat-Sen". Though this is not entirely believable, we must bear it in mind; for it is worth while to pay attention to it. As for the present situation in Canton, you, my Master, can only hope for Chen Chiung-Ming not to do things which are outside his authority, and to pursue the same aim as you do yourself. If you hope for him to take your orders at the critical moment, and to respect the Party enough to defend it against its foe, you will find he is not the man. I do pray you to lead him to the right path by some pleasant way. I have ventured to reveal to you my innermost thoughts and beg you to give them your sympathetic observation.'

By the same pitfalls as 1918, Chiang meant the incident when Sun Yat-Sen had to leave Canton and flee to Shanghai in exile. His remark about Chen Chiung-Ming was clear-cut and to the point. Nobody else would have been so outspoken at a time when the parting of the ways between Sun Yat-Sen and Chen Chiung-Ming was only beginning. Only a trusted follower of the former and an intimate associate of the latter could possibly have reached this conclusion and made such an observation. It was a very timely warning, and it is a pity that Sun Yat-Sen did not pay much heed to it. However, Chen Chiung-Ming was still biding his time, and nothing extraordinary happened until after their campaign into Kwangsi.

Neither did Sun Yat-Sen pay much attention to the early part of this letter. Sun Yat-Sen was a man of great determination. When he had set his mind on doing something, no one could possibly dissuade him from doing it. So an extraordinary joint Session of both Houses of Parliament was held in Canton early in April, 1921, when resolutions were passed for forming a proper Government of the Chinese Republic in place of the temporary Military one, and Sun Yat-Sen was elected with a majority of 213 to 9, as the Extraordinary President of this Government. Fireworks immediately broke out following this election: all the Military Governors who supported the Peking Government sent out telegrams denouncing Sun Yat-Sen. Chen Chiung-Ming moved slightly farther away, and Chiang Kai-Shek said nothing.

On May 5th, Sun Yat-Sen took office and formed a new Government. At the end of the month, following the operational plans made by Chiang Kai-Shek in consultation with Chen Chiung-Ming and Hsu Chung-Chih, Sun Yat-Sen ordered the Cantonese Army to march towards Kwangsi by several routes. This was a very short campaign, and it will be dealt with here very briefly: for Chiang Kai-Shek did not personally fight in it as he did in the two previous ones. Though he would have liked to supervise the carrying out of his operational plans, there were several reasons for his absence, most of which the reader can easily see. But the chief one was that on June 14th his mother, Madame Chiang, died at home.

In China the death of one's father or mother requires a mourning period of three years. In Imperial days, a government official had to retire from his office during the entire period in order to enable him to keep company with the coffin. Since the Republic this custom has not been so piously observed. But still, as Chiang Kai-Shek was the only son—of his mother though not of his father—he had to remain at home to see to the funeral and sacri-

fices as required in a good family. The fact that even to this day most people observe the rule that orphans shall not cut their hair or shave their beards from the day of their bereavement until the day of the funeral, or for seven weeks, shows that the period for the orphan to remain at home is still considerable.

Chiang Kai-Shek is well known for his filial piety. From the biographical essay which he wrote at the time of his mother's death, and which has been quoted in full at the beginning of this book, the reader can imagine what a great blow it was to the mourning son. In spite of the urgent need of him by his comrades in the Kwangsi campaign, he could not have the heart to leave the duties of an orphan unattended to. Sun Yat-Sen and many other friends sent numerous telegrams and letters of condolence to him and in each of these there was always a request for him to go to Kwangtung to help them. Though he did not remain at home all the while until the funeral took place in November, his visits to Sun Yat-Sen in Kwangtung and later on in Kwangsi when they had conquered it, were all short and made only when it was thought absolutely necessary.

Madame Chiang's funeral service was attended by a large number of Chiang Kai-Shek's friends. These included Tai Chi-Tao, who, it will be remembered, had only very recently exchanged such long and interesting letters with him, and Chu Cheng, who was the first Commander-in-Chief of the Revolutionary North-East Army in Shantung in 1916. Sun Yat-Sen could not possibly leave his duties at that critical moment, and so he sent, as his deputy, Chen Kuo-Fu, who is the nephew of Chiang Kai-Shek's deceased sworn brother Chen Chi-Mei. Chen Kuo-Fu, on behalf of Sun Yat-Sen, offered a special service to the spirit of Madame Chiang, and during the ceremony the following elegy was read:

孫大總統祭 蔣太夫人文
維中華民國十年十一月二十三日
孫文謹以清酌之儀致祭於
蔣太夫人之靈前曰嗚呼文與郎君
介石遊十餘年共歷險艱出入死生
如身之臂如驂之靳朝夕未嘗離失
因得略識
太夫人之懿行
太夫人早遭凶故恩勤辛苦以撫
孤養之長教之成今皆巖巖嶽嶽為
人倫之表率多士之規模其於介石
也慈愛異常毋督責如嚴師裁其跂
弛以全其昂昂千里之資雖夷險不
測成敗無定而守經達變如江河之
自適山嶽之不移古有九熊畫荻文
聞其語未見其人及遇介石識其根
器之深毓育之靈乃知古之或不如
今幸而見於今復不令其上躋耄耄
長為閨壺之儀型是非特郎君輩所
悼痛亦足令天下聞之而失聲嗚呼

'Alas! I, Sun Yat-Sen, have been associated with your honourable son for over ten years. Together we have endured innumerable hardships. Through matters of life and death we have gone side by side like two arms on the same body, or two horses hitched to the same chariot. From morning till evening we seldom left each other. Thus I have learned a little about Madame's illustrious feminine virtues. In your early years, Madame, you met with much misfortune, but with kindness, diligence and hardship you have brought up the orphans left behind (by your deceased husband). You have cultivated and educated them well, and to-day they have all become models to our scholars and ladies, with remarkable dignity and striking personality.

'To Kai-Shek you gave more care and love than ordinary mothers would have done, and you supervised his studies just like a strict teacher. As if training a steed which could run for a thousand *li* without stopping, you kept him from wasting his energies in useless exertions, so that when he encounters extreme danger and faces great risks where success or failure are touch and go, his presence of mind never forsakes him and is equal to any situation. He passes through any crisis as freely as a flowing river and as steadily as a great mountain.

'In ancient times there was Madame Liu of the Tang Dynasty. She encouraged her son, who later became a great scholar, to study by giving him pills made of bear's gall. There was Madame O-Yang of the Sung Dynasty. She taught her son, who also became a great scholar later on, to read by writing on the ground with a reed-brush. I have only heard about such people but have never seen them. When I at last met Kai-Shek, reflecting on his profound culture and godly breeding, I began to realise that even those people of ancient times might not be comparable with someone who lived in the present day.

Now that we have been lucky enough to see you in the

present day, you have not been spared to live to the age of eighty or ninety, to be an everlasting good model to the feminine world: this is not only a loss for which your honourable children will mourn, but it is also something for which the whole world will sob aloud when they hear of it. Alas, alas! Do partake of my offerings!'

To return to the Kwangsi campaign: following the marching of the Cantonese Army towards the Province, the Kwangsi troops turned back towards Kwangtung once more, and the two armies met and engaged in the middle of June. The Cantonese Army was victorious in all its attacks and by the beginning of July the Commander-in-Chief of the right wing of the Kwangsi troops, a man by the name of Shen Hung-Ying, surrendered to the Cantonese Army with a force of forty-two battalions. He sent out a circular telegram to say that henceforward he was independent of the Kwangsi clique, having joined hands with the Cantonese Army. By the middle of July the leaders of the Kwangsi Army left Nan-Ning, the provincial capital, which was soon occupied by Chen Chiung-Ming. The newly surrendered Shen Hung-Ying and his forces availed themselves of this opportunity to occupy the strategical town of Kwei-Lin, which is an important city on the main road leading from Kwangsi to Hunan. Chen Chiung-Ming did not like Shen Hung-Ying, who seemed to take too much for granted, and at the beginning of August Chen Chiung-Ming ordered two of his subordinate forces to drive away Shen Hung-Ying and his men, who had to flee towards the Hunan border.

With this rapid conquest of Kwangsi, Chen Chiung-Ming felt himself practically the military leader of the two Southern provinces of Kwangtung and Kwangsi. Besides being the Commander-in-Chief of the Cantonese Army, he had been appointed Governor of Kwangtung in November, 1920, when he had fought back into

Canton. In May of the following year, upon taking up the Extraordinary Presidency, Sun Yat-Sen had appointed him the Minister of War and also Minister of Interior Affairs. Soon after his successful entry into Nanning, the capital of Kwangsi, he was also given the post of Director-General for the Reconstruction of Kwangsi. All these posts given to Chen Chiung-Ming were held by him concurrently.

This kind of loading him with honours and positions was in reality to buy Chen Chiung-Ming's loyalty. Evidently Sun Yat-Sen had by now realised that he was not to be trusted, and that Chiang Kai-Shek's advice ought to have been followed. But there was still this important difference between Sun Yat-Sen's opinion and that of Chiang Kai-Shek: while Sun Yat-Sen thought that high position would keep Chen Chiung-Ming quiet, Chiang Kai-Shek wanted to take every precaution, as such a man as Chen Chiung-Ming might do anything.

The Peking Government found this the best time to intensify their rebellion-promoting. Under the nominal presidency of Hsu Shih-Chang, the War Lords in power were Tsao Kun, Military Governor of Chihli, the Metropolitan Province, and Wu Pei-Fu, Inspector of Forces in Hunan and Hupeh. They were the leaders of the Chihli Military clique who had, with the help of the Manchurian Army, defeated Tuan Chi-Jui and his followers in a civil war in North China in July of the previous year (1920). It was Tsao Kun and Wu Pei-Fu's ardent hope to see a civil war break out in Kwangtung between Sun Yat-Sen and Chen Chiung-Ming. Soon after Sun Yat-Sen had assumed the office of Extraordinary President, the Peking Government issued an official order to punish the rebels in the South, but they promised to appoint Chen Chiung-Ming Inspector of Forces in Kwangtung and Kwangsi, a post equivalent to a viceroyship. Such a move by the Peking Government was plain-speaking: it said: 'I know

you do not like Sun Yat-Sen; neither do I, and if you can get rid of him you are my best friend. I give you my blessing in advance.'

The reader may well ask: Why should Chen Chiung-Ming covet the post of Inspector of Forces in those two provinces whilst he was virtually head in this area, already holding concurrently a number of very high-sounding positions? The reason was this: as long as Sun Yat-Sen was there, Chen Chiung-Ming could only play second fiddle. But if he could get rid of Sun Yat-Sen he would actually be the independent head of the South, for the Peking Government existed in name only. That is why he preferred a bird in the bush rather than several in hand.

In China one of the golden rules for an employer is 'never suspect the man you employ and never employ the man you suspect'. Although it is essential that the two clauses should go together, hand-in-hand, Sun Yat-Sen seemed to remember only the first, and Chiang Kai-Shek the second. Rather than to doubt Chen Chiung-Ming's loyalty and take precautionary measures against a possible rebellion, Sun decided to leave Chen Chiung-Ming a free hand in Kwangtung and Kwangsi, he himself going away to start the long hoped-for Northern Punitive Expedition.

By the end of 1921 the situation in Kwangtung and Kwangsi was going from bad to worse. Chiang Kai-Shek, who first saw the menace of Chen Chiung-Ming in Kwangtung but thought that all would be well if the Kwangsi campaign could be conducted successfully, was utterly mistaken. After the conquest of Kwangsi, Chen Chiung-Ming and his followers became more powerful and uncontrollable than ever before. Sun Yat-Sen and those who were very keen on compromising with Chen Chiung-Ming were also entirely mistaken. Their urgent desire to establish a revolutionary base in the extreme south had to be politely abandoned by embarking on the premature Northern Punitive Expedition in order to

leave Chen Chiung-Ming sole leader in Kwangtung and Kwangsi.

Although he was still in the mourning period for his deceased mother, Chiang Kai-Shek became slightly more active towards the end of 1921. In November, when Sun Yat-Sen had decided to start his Northern Punitive Expedition from Kwangsi through Hunan, he sent another telegram to Chiang Kai-Shek to enlist his help. In this telegram Sun Yat-Sen asked him to moderate his mourning for his mother and hurry to Kwangsi 'to help in everything'. And 'help in everything' he did: in Chen Chiung-Ming's fighting back to Canton, in the planning of the Kwangsi Campaign, and later on in the preparation of the Northern Punitive Expedition, Chiang Kai-Shek helped as a free-lance, without asking for any important position either in the army or the government.

Thus, in the early part of 1922, he spent some time in Kweilin with Sun Yat-Sen and Hsu Chung-Chih discussing the grand strategy of the Punitive Expedition. While most of the rest thought Chen Chiung-Ming could be trusted if he was left behind with the run of two provinces to himself, Chiang Kai-Shek was not happy about this arrangement. The portion of the Cantonese Army which remained loyal to Sun Yat-Sen, and which undertook to fight northwards through Hunan from Kweilin, made very little headway. Two reasons for this were given by Sun Yat-Sen: the first was that 'Chen Chiung-Ming induced the authorities in Hunan to put many obstacles in our way, thus preventing us from going forward; most of his telegrams and correspondence referring to this have been captured by me'; the second was that Chen Chiung-Ming, who had promised to supply the Expeditionary force with money and munitions, did not do so. 'Since the marching orders were given,' continued Sun Yat-Sen 'as many as thirteen brigades have taken part. But neither



army expenses nor ammunition have ever been supplied.'

Teng Keng, the Chief of Staff of the Cantonese Army, was acting as liaison officer between Sun Yat-Sen's Expeditionary force and Chen Chiung-Ming's force at the home front. He had to see that supplies of money and ammunition came forward regularly. In March he was assassinated at the railway station in Canton, and it was immediately acclaimed that this was arranged by Chen Chiung-Ming. An Emergency Conference was held at the General Headquarters in Kweilin. When Chiang Kai-Shek, who was still there, proposed that the Expeditionary forces should be withdrawn and sent to Canton to clear up and stabilise the home front, it was agreed that the force was to be moved home secretly and that the Northern Punitive Expedition was to be carried out not through Hunan but through Kiangsi; for this change of route necessitated the army passing Canton.

To move an army of some thirteen brigades in secret is almost impossible. It was quite astonishing that Chen Chiung-Ming only learnt of this when it was too late to stop it. When the Expeditionary force arrived in Kwangtung in April, Sun promptly received Chen Chiung-Ming's telegram of resignation. All Chen Chiung-Ming's forces were still in Kwangsi, so he thought it wise to resign and go to Waichow, a famous stronghold which he kept for several years. Sun Yat-Sen received Chen Chiung-Ming's resignation from his posts of Commander-in-Chief of the Cantonese Army and Governor of Kwangtung with approval. As for his resignation from the post of Minister of War, Sun Yat-Sen refused this, and said that he wanted him to continue to serve. Chen Chiung-Ming, of course, did not agree, and stayed in Waichow. It will be remembered that there are still two posts unaccounted for: those of Minister of Interior Affairs and Director for the Reconstruction of Kwangsi.

What kind of a part Chiang Kai-Shek played in this

change the reader can easily imagine. It is on record that he left Kweilin early in April, and when Sun Yat-Sen arrived at Chaoching, about a hundred and fifty miles due west of Canton, towards the end of that month, Chiang Kai-Shek was there to meet him and to give him a personal report. It was on that day that Chen Chiung-Ming's resignation was accepted. The author of a standard Political History of China said in his text that Chiang Kai-Shek wanted to attack Waichow immediately, to remove Chen Chiung-Ming, after which the army could be turned back to wipe out Chen's forces in Kwangsi, now under the sub-command of Yeh Chu. The Northern Expedition was to be carried out after that. But Sun Yat-Sen thought otherwise, because Chen had not yet openly opposed him and also the forces in Kwangsi were his brothers-in-arms and had fought side by side with him for years, so he wished to keep them. Furthermore, the Manchurian Military clique and the Chihli Military clique had by that time started their civil war in the North. It had been previously arranged that the Northern Punitive Expedition from the South should be timed simultaneously with the Manchurian attack from the North. If this Expedition were to be postponed until Chen's army was put out of action, the opportunity would be lost. Therefore, so long as Chen would renounce his political authority in Kwangtung and be no longer an obstacle to the Northern Punitive Expedition on the home front, he was to be let alone. Chiang Kai-Shek's proposal was thus not adopted.

After Chen Chiung-Ming's resignation, Chiang Kai-Shek and Sun Yat-Sen had two more rendezvous to discuss military matters. The first was held near Canton and the other in Canton, both taking place at the end of April. It has not been recorded what they talked about, nor is it known what was decided, but two important things occurred immediately afterwards. The first was that

Chiang left Canton for home on the very night after the conference at which he 'was so touched by Sun Yat-Sen's words that he shed tears'; and the second was that he wrote a letter to Chen Chiung-Ming when sailing home. This was the last letter which passed between them. As they had worked together for several years through thick and thin, they were quite familiar with each other. 'In cutting up a friendship, a gentleman will not use bad language,' this proverb Chiang Kai-Shek quoted when he wrote about Chen Chiung-Ming's rebellion later on. So in his last appeal to his erring friend he was frank but not harsh. Bearing in mind that it was written at a time when he had proposed to attack him in order to remove him, the reader will find it extremely mild and considerate.

The letter began with an expression of regret at the hopelessness of the situation. He said he had actually called upon Chen, but found he had already left for Waichow. After it had been decided to transfer their army from attacking through Hunan to pass through Canton on their way to invade Kiangsi, he had intended to explain the matter, after which it would not have been too late for Chen to decide whether to resign or not. Even after Chen's resignation, if he had gone to Wu-Chow or Chao-Ching to see Sun Yat-Sen and have a frank discussion, some arrangement could perhaps still have been made. Since Chiang had found on his arrival in Canton that Chen had left, that indicated that all had passed the hope of mediation. That was the parting of their ways: he would go his own way and would not bother to hear any more of the complications of the situation. For the sake of their past friendship, he ardently advised Chen to retire for good, or at least for the time being.

He further said that it was difficult not to mix public affairs with personal feelings, nor former times with later days. 'It was not only for a day or two,' he continued, 'that we shared hardships and calamities. Though we are

a thousand miles from each other, I feel I am only a few feet from you and that we are in each other's presence. Therefore I venture to speak straightforwardly to you, concealing nothing. I think if you tend to be over-egotistical, the future will become darker and darker. No matter what may be the practical result (of this conflict), both parties are bound to suffer heavy damage, and the calamities will simply be unthinkable. Ultimately the outcome will be this: if you are defeated, you are done for, wasting your good name of former days for nothing. And even if you win, people will condemn you as having been severe with your comrades in arms. Your spiritual suffering will be even greater than that of those whom you have defeated.'

His final advice was that Chen 'could ill afford not to declare openly his attitude, nor to disregard Sun Yat-Sen's opinions.' He even offered to come out again, in spite of the fact that the mourning period for his deceased mother had not yet expired, in order to help him and do his bidding if Chen would believe in what he said and follow but one or two parts of his advice. 'Don't listen to the ill words of the mean and don't fall into the traps of the wicked. Obey Sun Yat-Sen, our Master, and help him in his Northern Punitive Expedition.'

To this letter Chen Chiung-Ming made no reply. It would have been foolish of Chiang Kai-Shek to expect a favourable reply. Chen Chiung-Ming's silence and his preparations for civil war did not surprise him, but the neglect of precautions on the part of Sun Yat-Sen did alarm him. His proposal for the change of the expeditionary route was mainly to enable the loyal troops to get back to Canton for the benefit of checking Chen Chiung-Ming's impending rebellion, but after he had gone away, Sun Yat-Sen and his followers thought that since Chen had resigned they could go on with their Punitive Expedition through Kiangsi. In the course of the next

few weeks he sent a number of urgent telegrams and letters to Hsu Chung-Chih and other friends who were with Sun Yat-Sen, urging them to strike first as a preventive measure, but, alas, without avail. Sun Yat-Sen was immovable in his decision to push North first and in his belief that Chen Chiung-Ming would not dare to raise arms against his chief.

Sun Yat-Sen did not want to delay his northward march, because the situation in Peking was developing rapidly. The Manchurian Army which had helped the Chihli Military clique to defeat Tuan Chi-Jui's followers, now quarrelled with their former comrades in arms. General Chang Tso-Lin, who later became Marshal Chang, and father of the young Marshal Chang Hsueh-Liang of the Sian coup, brought his men from Manchuria into China proper to be near the capital to fight Tsao Kun, Military Governor of Chihli, and his lieutenant Wu Pei-Fu, the famous scholar-general. War near Peking started at the end of April, and Sun Yat-Sen, regretting that he had already lost much time in having to change his route, hurried forward with his army towards the Kiangsi border.

Yeh Chu, Chen Chiung-Ming's lieutenant, brought up more than fifty battalions from Kwangsi into Kwangtung. His intentions were obvious. But Hsu Chung-Chih's reply, dated May 3rd, 1922, to Chiang Kai-Shek's telegrams and letters reads as follows: 'My Elder Brother Kai-Shek, your letters and telegrams have been presented to the Master to read. The General Headquarters will arrive at Shiu-Chow on the 6th and I will be there earlier. Two regiments of the first and second divisions will both be in the Northern Punitive Expedition, for which various forces are gradually concentrating. The Navy has been brought over. . . . Chen Chiung-Ming had indicated that he will not resign his post of War Minister; also he has asked us to make arrangements for his troops which are

coming back from the capital of Kwangsi. If we assign them the duty of maintaining peace on the Kwangtung and Kwangsi border, they should be quite safe. The Master and we, your younger brothers, hope very much you will come back soon.' And to Chiang Kai-Shek's despair, Sun Yat-Sen acted exactly as the letter indicated. Chen Chiung-Ming was appointed Director of Military Affairs of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, maintaining his post as War Minister, while all his army, under the command of his lieutenant Yeh Chu, streamed into and around Canton, following the departure of Sun Yat-Sen's loyal men for the Punitive Expedition.

In the North, Chang Tso-Lin's Manchurian Army was defeated by the Chihli troops before Sun Yat-Sen's Expedition started in the South, and then Chen Chiung-Ming decided to demand power. He ordered Yeh Chu and the other officers of his army to petition Sun Yat-Sen to reinstate him as Commander-in-Chief of the Cantonese Army and also as Military Governor of the Kwangtung Province. Such an act could not be tolerated by Chiang Kai-Shek, though Sun Yat-Sen still preferred to concentrate his attention in fighting northwards. By the end of May Chiang Kai-Shek was so bursting with fury that he sent a number of telegrams to various loyal supporters of Sun Yat-Sen, urging an attack on Chen Chiung-Ming's forces under Yeh Chu. Liao Chung-Kai, a most trustworthy follower of Sun Yat-Sen and an intimate friend of Chiang Kai-Shek, replied with a telegram dated May 31st and a letter dated June 1st. Unfortunately none of Chiang Kai-Shek's telegrams can now be found, but Liao's replies clearly indicate what was the original request.

The telegram can be interpreted as follows:—'To my Elder Brother Chiang Kai-Shek: Your telegram received and understood. Unless rebellion actually broke out in Canton, to call back our forces from the front would

never be allowed under any circumstances. Troops under the command of either Liang or Huang positively do not wish to see such a move; and if the Second Army (under Hsu Chung-Chih) does this singly, disregarding the others, it will surely be opposed by all the rest. What we hope for at present is to win our battles against the enemy outside our province and be calm and steady within our own province so that troubles can be avoided without letting them become apparent. There are the Navy and three divisions in the provincial capital; the wretches surely would not dare to rise rashly. You, my Elder Brother, ought to come soon and go to the front immediately to help Hsu Chung-Chih. How can you bear to leave Hsu Chung-Chih and the rest of us to suffer all the hardship? How could you! Liao Chung-Kai. May 31st.'

On the following day he wrote Chiang Kai-Shek a letter which gave a more detailed picture of the conditions at home:

'My Elder Brother Chiang Kai-Shek,

'I have come back from Shiuchow and have read your telegram. I reply as follows:

'1. So-and-So's troops [meaning Yeh Chu's] have come to Canton. Except that he has telegraphed a petition to ask for the reinstatement of So-and-So [meaning Chen Chiung-Ming] as the Chief of the Cantonese Army, no other action has yet been taken.

'2. Chen Chiung-Ming has repeatedly refused to accept any post connected with the Northern Punitive Expedition. When Ma Chun-Wu [Governor of Kwangsi] came to report about the troubles in Kwangsi, he seemed to be willing to take the responsibility. The Master has ordered him, following the example of last year, to suppress the bandits in that province in his capacity as War Minister.

'3. Chen Chiung-Ming has promised to come either to

Canton or Chaoching, and to order So-and-So's troops [meaning Yeh Chu's] to go back to their original stations.

'4. If So-and-So's troops gradually leave Canton, all is well. Otherwise what you suggested in your telegram will be the unavoidable measure to be taken in an emergency. Our foundation is at the front where someone who could look after the whole plan and pay equal attention to both the battlefield and the home front is wanted. I do hope you will set out this very day. Please tarry no more. . . .

Liao Chung-Kai salutes you. June 1st.'

According to these two messages, the situation in Canton seemed to be fairly calm. And to allay the fears and misgivings of the general public, as well as the army, Sun Yat-Sen decided to go back and stay at the President's Residency in Canton with no more than a handful of guards. He arrived in Canton on June 1st, and sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-Shek urging him to come South 'as soon as a boat is available'. However, Chiang Kai-Shek still wanted to remove Chen Chiung-Ming's forces first. Again he sent an urgent letter begging Hsu Chung-Chih to strike at once. He said that even if Chen Chiung-Ming and his followers retreated and compromised, Hsu must bring his army home to solve the fundamental problem in Canton, otherwise peace and safety could not be obtained at any cost. 'When we have fallen into their trap, our party is finished and our army is gone. You must never consider the matter closed when they have compromised a little.' He then worked out the way to tackle the forces in Canton, after which large-scale operations were to be carried out in attacking Waichow, Chen Chiung Ming's stronghold. 'If we could strike before they do so, no matter whether their main force is concentrated in the East or in Canton, it will not be difficult to wipe them out. Otherwise, because of our hesitation,

procrastination or forbearance, we will find our hands tied and it will be too late to save ourselves from destruction. How I wish what I predict would not prove to be right!’

Again and again he explained to Hsu the importance of preserving Kwangtung as the base of the revolution. He would rather sacrifice Kwangsi to keep Kwangtung. The last part of this long letter is as follows: ‘Whatever happens, to act quickly will produce only a little trouble, whereas to tarry will result in great calamity and even in a state of utter hopelessness. On all my suggestions I hope you will act with your excellent decision, and also please give me an answer. Although I, your younger brother, am still observing the period of mourning at home, my mind is greatly disturbed. Even as I am writing this letter to you, I am feeling terribly agitated.’

But Hsu Chung-Chih’s army forged northwards and on June 13th captured the city of Kan-Chow within the border of Kiangsi Province. Some of Sun Yat-Sen’s followers believed that if the Northern Punitive Expedition failed, Chen Chiung-Ming’s men would rebel, but if the Expedition were successful he would be quiet. And three days after this major victory they were proved mistaken, when Chen’s forces attacked the President’s Residency in Canton at three o’clock in the morning.

Of the story describing this sensational incident there are several versions, and a fairly detailed one was written by Chiang Kai-Shek. Beginning from the eve of the outbreak and continuing until after Sun Yat-Sen’s arrival in Shanghai, it covers a period of sixty-two days and is composed of more than 13,500 words. It is too long to be quoted here and, as Chiang Kai-Shek was not with Sun Yat-Sen in the early part of this adventure, a brief summary will suffice.

On June 15th, 1922, at a secret conference, Yeh Chu

showed a telegraphic order from Chen Chiung-Ming to the officers of the Cantonese Army in and near the provincial capital, commanding them to besiege and attack the President's Residency in Canton. Late in the night, loyal supporters of Sun Yat-Sen informed him of this and advised him to escape, as nearly all his troops were then fighting in Kiangsi, hundreds of miles away from him. But he refused to move, saying it was his duty to stick to his post. Early in the morning of the 16th, when it was apparent that his presence there could not stave off the rebellion, he was forced by his staff to escape to the headquarters of the Navy. Such a place could hardly withstand an attack by the large numbers of the rebellious forces, and so he went on board the warship *Chu Yu*, which, together with six other gunboats, made several attacks on the rebellious soldiers on shore from the middle of the river.

On the 18th, Sun Yat-Sen managed to send someone to telegraph Chiang Kai-Shek, who was still in his home town, to come to his rescue. He must have received this message the very next day, for on the 20th he set out for Shanghai and thence for Hongkong. On the 29th he arrived by boat and went on board the warship *Yung Feng* to meet Sun Yat-Sen, who had a few days previously moved from the *Chu Yu* to the *Yung Feng*. And from that time on he kept company with Sun Yat-Sen and helped him for more than forty days in this gunboat. To commemorate this historic event, the *Yung Feng* was later on renamed the *Chung Shan*, because Sun Yat-Sen's other name was Sun Chung-Shan.

On account of their neglect of Chiang Kai-Shek's advice, the situation of Sun Yat-Sen and his followers who were in Canton at the time of the rebellion was deplorable. Some died, some were imprisoned and some escaped. Sun Yat-Sen himself was practically reduced to the state of a refugee with but a handful of loyal sailors in the few

warships which managed to get away from the shore. Before the outbreak of the rebellion he had been determined not to turn back his faithful army from the Northern Punitive Expedition, and now he had to follow Chiang Kai-Shek's advice to recall his men, but, alas, too late. When Chiang Kai-Shek boarded the *Yung Feng* to be with his Master, the two looked at each other and for a short while could find no words to express their mutual feelings. But when at least they started to exchange news, they had so much to tell each other that they conversed until late in the night.

Very soon all the remaining loyal troops on shore were either wiped out or overpowered by Chen Chiung-Ming's forces. Following this, the men in the forts had to surrender, and Chiang Kai-Shek, who had been ordered by Sun Yat-Sen to take command of the small fleet of seven gunboats, decided to move farther up the river for safety. Having left the danger zone near the two main forts, they had to pass through the range of the guns from a third fort called Che Wai. It took twenty minutes to get through, and Chiang Kai-Shek, after having got Sun Yat-Sen to take cover on a lower deck, went to take up his position on the bridge during this fateful voyage. The whole fleet steamed along, attacking the fort furiously, and furiously the guns from the fort answered shot for shot, concentrating their aim on the *Yung Feng*. Six hits were scored on this small gunboat, which was severely shaken but managed to escape serious damage. At the height of the attack Chiang Kai-Shek was advised to take cover, but he would not leave the bridge. As soon as he saw the danger was past he was congratulated by all his comrades.

This temporary escape from danger led them nowhere. Imprisoned in their ships, Sun Yat-Sen and Chiang Kai-Shek waited anxiously for news of the returning army. Not only did this army make very little progress on their

home journey, but also a division among them went over to Chen Chiung-Ming's side. Towards the end of July, the expeditionary force found their position extremely difficult and had to start a fighting retreat, and at the beginning of August even that became impossible as they had nowhere to retreat to. Their bases was lost to Chen Chiung-Ming's men, and their newly-conquered stronghold Kanchow was retaken by their Northern enemy. They had to withdraw towards the border of Fukien, hoping they would not meet with any obstacles there.

On August 7th this bad news reached the gunboats. Chiang Kai-Shek, who acted as military adviser to Sun Yat-Sen, reviewed the situation coolly: Shiuchow, their original military base, was now in the hands of the rebels; Kanchow was lost to the Northerners; a division of their men had just gone over to their enemy; their men could not possibly get to Canton for some time. So it was clear to him that Sun Yat-Sen's staying near Canton could serve no useful purpose. It did keep the morale of the soldiers and civilians very high, but in the present circumstances everything was against them and it was senseless to stay there any longer. They had to get away while there was still a chance of doing so. He therefore advised Sun Yat-Sen to leave the vicinity of Canton and try to find somewhere else for a fresh start. On August 9th, by arrangement with the British Consul-General, H.M.S. *Moorhen* escorted them to Hongkong, and on the following day they boarded the s.s. *Empress of Russia* for Shanghai, where they arrived safely on the 14th.

Although the whole rebellion was conducted by Chen Chiung-Ming, he kept up the pretence, even after its outbreak, that he knew nothing about these doings of his subordinates since he had retired from active service. While Yeh Chu, his lieutenant, after having bombarded the President's Residency, wired the whole country demanding the immediate resignation of Sun Yat-Sen, Chen

Chiung-Ming sent the following telegram to his Master who was imprisoned on the gunboat:

'To Mr President:

'Since the affairs of state have come to this, how my heart aches! Though I have retired, I cannot escape the blame. When I received your Excellency's orders of the 16th, the *coup* in the capital had already started and it was too late for remedy. For several days past I have thought hard and can find no way out. I only realise that I have followed you for over ten years through thick and thin and have never for a moment thought of disloyalty. How could I know that after I had resigned from military responsibility I alone would still be held responsible for this *coup*? When a man is in such a state, pitiable indeed is he! I now only ask for a directive to be followed so as to avoid the troops for the Northern Expedition slaughtering each other—for the sake of humanity and peace. Hardships are ahead of our country, there will be many days for me to render you service to repay your kindness.'

Soon after he had sent Sun Yat-Sen this message he threw off his disguise. Seeing that he had successfully defeated all those who were opposed to him, he went back to Canton and re-assumed the title of Commander-in-Chief of the Cantonese Army. While he was enjoying his triumph to his heart's content, his Master, Sun Yat-Sen, once more became an exile in Shanghai, and wrote:

'I have been leading my comrades in the struggle for the establishment of a Republic for nearly thirty years, during which time we have risked death in our ups and downs on numerous occasions. But not once before have we been so disastrously defeated as this time. In all our former failures there has always been one thing in common, though from different causes: that is, that we were defeated by our enemy. But in this defeat we had already conquered our enemy and in his place came Chen

Chiung-Ming, a man whom I had been protecting and nursing for over ten years, and whose deliberate treachery and ruthlessness even an enemy could not bear to perform. This is not only a calamity to the nation but also a black spot on humanity and morality. . . .’

It must be observed that before this rebellion, the respective positions held by Chen Chiung-Ming and Chiang Kai-Shek were scarcely comparable. Chen Chiung-Ming was one of the few veteran members of the Kuo Min Tang whose revolutionary records dated back to Sun Yat-Sen’s early attempts in Canton. He had been without question the most important military man in the Cantonese Government. Chiang Kai-Shek, on the other hand, had been but a brilliant young strategist whose assistance was always welcomed by the higher-ups of the army. As has been shown, his presence or absence made little difference to the major moves of the Military Government. Now, with this rebellion, it was proved that not only was Chiang Kai-Shek the only man whose decisions they ought to have followed promptly, but also at the critical moment, when everyone had to flee in his own way for dear life, here was the only loyal follower who rushed into the fire, away from security, to be at his Master’s side. In the preface Sun Yat-Sen wrote to Chiang Kai-Shek’s record of the rebellion, he said:

‘When the traitor Chen started his rebellion, Kai-Shek came to Kwangtung to join us in our trouble. He boarded my gunboat and waited upon me every day. Whatever he planned mostly proved right, and he enjoyed sharing his fate with me and the officers and ratings of the Navy. As for this record, it is most probably a true one. And it barely covers the important facts, leaving out details which could hardly be put into writing. I do not attach much importance to the complimentary terms in which it was written, but I hope my countrymen will see the sincerity of the task. I lacked the vision to see through

the man and was too late to nip the treacherous scheme in the bud. In the end it has been proved that I have nursed the rebellion and left behind me this confusion, the flame of which is still burning furiously. Therefore it should be understood that this essay is a record of my blunder. Furthermore, it will show the world the public spirit and self-sacrifice of our Navy and the officers and men of our Northern Punitive Expedition. . . .'

On their arrival at Shanghai, Sun Yat-Sen and Chiang Kai-Shek were greeted by most of their comrades who had come to this port for safety. Many members of Parliament frequented Sun Yat-Sen's private residence, where Chiang Kai-Shek stayed and worked for some time until he was ordered by his doctor to take a rest. He went home for his convalescence but very soon his mind was busy again. He kept up a communication with Sun Yat-Sen and the faithful comrades who were in Shanghai and advised them to try to get into either Fukien or Kwangsi before mustering the Cantonese Army to fight back into Kwangtung. He also proposed some changes in regulations of the Kuo Min Tang. These regulations, he said, 'would, if not changed, make it difficult to improve our party activities. We should avail ourselves of this opportunity to correct our mistakes and try to enlist all those youths who are full of promise. Only this would greatly increase the strength of the Party.' He also paid special attention to public opinion. 'If we had an organisation for publicity, it would strengthen our party to some extent. Now that we have lost our military power, we shall be in an ever more difficult position if we do not pay special attention to public opinion.'

In that he was quite right. Both Chen Chiung-Ming and the Northern War Lords had been creating public opinion against Sun Yat-Sen and his government. They said that Sun Yat-Sen established his government in Canton chiefly because the one in Peking headed by Hsu

Shih-Chang was illegal. In June, 1922, when the Chihli War Lords had defeated the Manchurian forces, they forced Hsu Shih-Chang to resign his Presidency and dragged out Li Yuan-Hung, the Buddha, once more to be the puppet President. Their excuse was that Li, the Buddha, was the legal President but had been unlawfully driven away. Li, the Buddha, immediately recalled the old Parliament, which had been elected in 1913 and dissolved in 1917, and then Chen Chiung-Ming's henchmen and the Northern War Lords demanded Sun Yat-Sen's resignation. Sun Yat-Sen, they said, was no longer justified in keeping in being a second government in Canton, once the President and the Parliament formerly elected according to the constitution were restored in Peking. Since Sun Yat-Sen did not resign, Chen Chiung-Ming found a few people to support him in his rebellion.

But very soon people began to see that Chen Chiung-Ming was doing it merely for personal gain, especially those who were in Kwangtung, for he was a grasping man and a bad ruler. A few weeks after Sun Yat-Sen's fall, the forces around Kwangtung felt their loss and began to send representatives to Shanghai to reassure him of their allegiance. In October the loyal men of the Cantonese forces under Hsu Chung-Chi, who had escaped into Fukien, fighting jointly with a local force, occupied Foochow. With this victory it was found possible to extend and reorganise the Cantonese forces into three armies. Sun Yat-Sen appointed Hsu Chung-Chih to be the Commander-in-Chief. The post of his Chief-of-Staff was of course given to Chiang Kai-Shek, who went to Fukien immediately to take up his duties, for this new Cantonese Army was ready to fight back to Canton.

For the next few months Chiang Kai-Shek was busily engaged in strenuous and difficult work in Fukien. He helped his old friend Hsu Chung-Chih in all kinds of administrative matters in the Army, and drafted the opera-

tional plan which they hoped to put into practice very soon. He prepared the speediest possible routes of supply, which he found 'extremely difficult' owing to the disorganisation of communication between Fukien and Kwantung because of the recent fighting. He gave advanced directions to various company commanders about the impending march. He also went out on behalf of Sun Yat-Sen to see various sections of the Army, to give them the Master's message of thanks and encouragement, especially those who had been wounded in the previous fighting.

At this time he recorded in his diary such an entry as the following: 'This time the responsibility of fighting the rebels and slaughtering the traitors to revenge the treacherous deeds they have done to us I will shoulder myself, single-handed if needs be. Should this inspire jealousy or create misunderstanding, I am willing to take it, no matter how difficult it may be nor how many friends I shall offend. I will not stop until the aim is achieved.' But in spite of this resolution, there occurred some complicated difficulty. In the troublesome work of reorganising the Army, the Commander of the First Army quarrelled with Hsu Chung-Chih. In the end Chiang Kai-Shek found that the only solution was for him to accompany the Commander to Shanghai. That one of the two quarrelling parties should go to maintain peace was quite understandable. But why Chiang Kai-Shek had to escort him it is impossible to find out. Sun Yat-Sen, on hearing of this, immediately sent a wire to him to say that since Hsu Chung-Chih and he had been entrusted with the important responsibility of fighting back to Canton to punish traitors, he must never lay down this burden whatever happened.

Just before he was leaving Foochow for Shanghai with the Commander of the First Army, Sun Yat-Sen's letter arrived, and it is quoted in full here because it not only

explains their position at this time, but also refers to Russia and the Communist party:

‘My dear Elder Brother Kai-Shek,

‘I have just seen your letter to Hu Han-Min and Wang Ching-Wei in which you said “if there is no progress at all within ten days then there is nothing for it . . .” etc. Pooh! What rubbish you talk! Since I could not go to Fukien myself, I have entrusted you with the responsibility of punishing the traitors. How could you so hurriedly think of giving it up like that?

‘Things do not happen as we wish eight or nine times out of ten. To ensure success, it always depends upon your fortitude and persistence, your disregard of jealousy and hard work. If you do not wish to do it when there is no progress within ten days, then you will never succeed in doing anything. As you said in the letter: “Tze Ying [the Commander in question] will come to Shanghai; this trouble is over;” that shows the greatest difficulty has already been solved and this is wonderful progress. What does it matter if there are still some small difficulties?

‘Even though we have made no progress, the enemy is losing ground every day. For instance, his officers and men are beginning to see light; his unification is gradually dissolving; the people in Kwangtung are hating him more and more, and thinking of us more and more. These things are our progress day by day, though we cannot see it. Therefore if we can only hold firm, that is progress. So I do hope you, my Elder Brother, will not give up. We must accomplish our aim of vanquishing Chen.

‘You had hopes for the West. Recently I have felt the same here, and now the thing is well in hand. But it is very complicated, ten or even a hundred times more so than in Fukien. No wonder all the comrades of our country went to their capital in high spirits, to come back dejected. Luckily I have found the way, and we are

coming nearer together every day. But fundamentally we must have a base to rely upon, and then we can make use of it. If we have nothing at all ourselves, we will not be able to do anything, even though we were as agreeable to their principles as the Communist youth of our country. That is why the people in that capital have been urging the Communists to join the Kuo Min Tang. We know we must have a foundation first, and to get that we must recover Kwangtung. After recovering Kwangtung we shall be able to unify all the south-west. With these south-western provinces as our foundation, we could do a great deal.

That was also why the Revolution in Turkey succeeded. And whether your former hope will succeed is entirely dependent upon Foochow. If you could advance and vanquish the traitors in Canton, nothing could be better. Otherwise if you could only hold firm in Foochow, this would also be a step forward. So long as we have Foochow we have a foundation for both diplomatic as well as interior activities. If we haven't this, we are nothing more than exiles in foreign concessions. How could we carry any weight? Therefore the longer you can stay in the Army on my behalf, the higher goes my prestige. I do hope you will stay for my sake, and never quit because of lack of progress.

Don't you, my Elder Brother, remember the days when we were in the gunboat? All day long we could only sleep and eat, hoping to hear good news. What progress could we have at that time? But it proved very important all over the world that we stayed. Now I am moving things outwards, and you and others are in Foochow as my backing. With this backing, my plans are progressing every day. It may turn out that before you can recapture Canton my plan will succeed. You never can tell! So whatever difficulties you meet, whatever hardships you suffer, do stay in the Army as long as I am struggling here.

Only by doing this can we succeed. The progress here cannot be conveyed on paper with ink. Liao Chung-Kai [who brought this letter to Chiang Kai-Shek] will be able to tell you a little. In short, we haven't had such a wonderful opportunity for more than ten years. We must each of us fight in our own way, never to rest for a single minute, so that the sacrifice of our martyrs and the hopes of our countrymen are not in vain. Remember this a thousand and even ten thousand times.'

This letter had the desired effect. Although Chiang Kai-Shek had to go to Shanghai with the outgoing Commander, he soon returned to Foochow. At the end of December Sun Yat-Sen, after having succeeded in getting the Yunnan Army and the Kwangsi Army to operate at the same time, wired Chiang Kai-Shek to move the Cantonese Army southwards to attack Swatow. He said that the Northern War Lords were sending a large army to attack the Cantonese forces from Fukien and Kiangsi. Their only hope of survival depended upon their successful campaign into Kwangtung.

In January, 1923, under the combined pressure of Sun Yat-Sen's supporters, Chen Chiung-Ming was compelled to flee to his old stronghold of Waichow from Canton, into which place the Kwangsi forces entered first. The commander of this section of the Kwangsi Army was Shen Hung-Ying, who, it will be remembered, surrendered to the Cantonese side during the Kwangsi campaign, and had to escape into Hunan because Chen Chiung-Ming pressed on and would not receive his surrender. Because of this he and his men readily fought Chen Chiung-Ming when Sun Yat-Sen sent word to them. The Yunnan Army also did well, as both these two forces were much nearer to Canton than the Cantonese Army was. Besides, the Northern forces had started their Fukien Campaign. Hsu Chung-Chih's men were required to help the new Fukien

Military Governor to defend him against this invasion and so were left far behind. At that time Swatow and the rest of Eastern Kwangtung was still in the hands of Chen Chiung-Ming's men. But the Garrison Commander in Swatow, who had led his men in the bombardment of the President's Residency in the Rebellion, now pretended to declare his independence from Chen Chiung-Ming and to welcome the return of Sun Yat-Sen and Hsu Chung-Chih. It seemed that all was well.

Chiang Kai-Shek thought it was time for him to take a much needed rest. He was suffering from eye trouble and went to Shanghai for treatment. From Shanghai, he returned to his home. Sun Yat-Sen now prepared to go back to Canton, and Chiang Kai-Shek wrote to Liao Chung-Kai a very long letter which he asked Liao to show to the Master if it met with Liao's approval. He predicted that there would be troubles coming in the future, but Sun Yat-Sen might be able to patch things up by promoting co-ordination among the forces from the various provinces. What concerned him most was the Party and its principles. He suggested that in order to strengthen the Party principles it would be better to keep the partisans from occupying administrative posts in the provincial Government. He thought that after having put the Party principles into practice for ten or twenty years, good results would naturally follow.

By the end of January, things began to go wrong. Shen Hung-Ying, one of the commanders of the Kwangsi Army, had no respect for either Sun Yat-Sen or the Kuo Min Tang. He fought for Sun Yat-Sen simply because he had nowhere to go to, and wanted to take his revenge on Chen Chiung-Ming. Now that he was in Canton, he tried to arrest the other commanders and drive away the Kuo Min Tang leaders who had come back to the capital. Chiang Kai-Shek was worried and wrote immediately to Wang Ching-Wei, the veteran party man who was to go

back to Canton with Sun Yat-Sen. He suggested that this Shen Hung-Ying should be punished first, and regretted that he could not come to Shanghai himself, as his eye trouble was now very serious. Wang Ching-Wei replied to say that eye trouble must not be overlooked and that Shanghai was the place for treatment by specialists. If neglected the defect might become a cause of regret for the rest of his life. Although to live in the country was suitable for convalescence, no good doctor could be found there. He urged Chiang Kai-Shek to come to Shanghai. As for an attack on Shen Hung-Ying, the Master had agreed to this. But because of lack of preparation, they had to wait a little before they could start.

In the beginning of February Chiang Kai-Shek received a wire from his old friend Hsu Chung-Chih, who was still in Fukien but was on the point of going into Kwangtung. He asked Chiang Kai-Shek about his eyes and invited him to go to the south of Fukien to discuss their plan of marching to Canton. Chiang Kai-Shek's reply began thus:

'My eye trouble has become more severe and I can scarcely write. The Master planned to start on the 14th for Canton and Wang Ching-Wei left here to-day. I came to Shanghai yesterday, but am going home tomorrow because Shanghai is not the place for convalescence.' Regarding the invitation, he said: 'I, your younger brother, have a bad temper and am not good enough to help you, but more than enough to ruin your work. Always I have been undeservedly loved by my comrades, and also I have presumed to consider myself their life-long friend. Though my late kind mother has left this world, I dare not stay idle by keeping the whole period of mourning, for fear of being ungrateful to my friends. Formerly, because the traitor Chen was not gone, I had to shoulder responsibility. Now since he has gone, I can rest a little. Besides, I have come out several times,

and each time I have failed in everything. It has only led to displaying my shortcomings, and has not helped in the least with our party or our country. If I still do not realise my mistakes and endeavour to conceal my drawbacks, I am afraid I would get you into trouble. That is why I cannot obey your order after careful and repeated consideration.' He then told Hsu Chung-Chih not to trust the commander who was in Swatow and had just left Chen Chiung-Ming's side. He said: 'Whatever be the case, wherever be the place, that man would never have any good will for us. If we do not get at him, he will get at us. That is why I am worried, and I'm sure you'll be prepared.'

As soon as he got back to his home he wired and wrote to Sun Yat-Sen and his friends in Shanghai to dissuade Sun Yat-Sen from going to Canton so soon. By now he was convinced that Shen Hung-Ying could not be trusted any longer. But he was too late. Sun Yat-Sen left Shanghai on the 15th and arrived at Canton on the 21st, and on that day he resumed his authority as Generalissimo, and the headquarters of the Generalissimo was again established. Chiang Kai-Shek was appointed Chief of Staff at the headquarters and was urged to come to Canton to take up his duties immediately.

Chiang Kai-Shek was very reluctant to go to Canton. First, his eyes were still not well, and secondly he would have offended his old friend Hsu Chung-Chih, whose invitation he had just refused, if he now accepted another invitation with alacrity. But he was very much concerned about the situation in Kwangtung as well as about Hsu Chung-Chih's forces on the Fukien border. In the month of March he had sent several long letters to Hsu Chung-Chih giving him advice in detail about military plans for the Cantonese Army's homeward march. He was most anxious to get Hsu Chung-Chih's forces back to Canton

to protect Sun Yat-Sen against Shen Hung-Ying's impending outbreak. He predicted that Chen Chiung-Ming's remaining forces would be on the attack once more, but that would happen a little later. The most urgent call was to prepare for the treacherous outbreak of Shen Hung-Ying, who was a menace on the doorstep.

Li, the Buddha, the nominal President of the Peking Government, issued an order on March 20th appointing Shen Hung-Ying the Military Governor of the Province of Kwangtung. Looking back, the reader will remember that the last Military Governor of Kwangtung appointed by the Northern Government was driven out by the Cantonese Army in October, 1920. At that time the fleeing Governor sent out a circular telegram to say that he was leaving the affairs of Kwangtung to be settled by the Central Government. After a lapse of two and a half years, it is strange that the Peking Government suddenly remembered this request and appointed a new Governor. It was again the doing of the War Lords Wu Pei-Fu and Tsao Kun, who, after their failure in bolstering up Chen Chiung-Ming to oust Sun Yat-Sen, now wanted to use Shen Hung-Ying as their instrument. Li, the Buddha, being a very good-natured man, was a perfect puppet.

By the end of March Hsu Chung-Chih's forces were making their way slowly towards Canton from southern Fukien. He sent a wire to Chiang Kai-Shek, who was still at home, to ask him how his eyes were getting on and to urge him to hurry to Canton, where his presence was greatly needed by Sun Yat-Sen. Chiang Kai-Shek, in reply, sent a long telegram on April 17th to Hsu Chung-Chih, advising him to dash back with his men to Canton, avoiding, as best he could, fighting on the way with Chen Chiung-Ming's followers, who were in Swatow and the surrounding district. He said that the remnants of Chen Chiung-Ming's army in East Kwangtung were but a nuisance on a small scale, but Shen Hung-Ying's men in

and near the capital, who were the confederates of the Northern War Lords, were a fatal malady near the heart. The Peking Government was now depending upon Shen Hung-Ying's and not on Chen Chiung-Ming's troops to make trouble in Kwangtung. He calculated that if they could do away with the menace of Shen Hung-Ying and make Canton a base of safety once more, it was quite possible that East Kwangtung would be subdued in peace. Even if they had to have recourse to military strength, it would then be much easier to accomplish. He added that he would start as soon as he received a confirming wire from Hsu Chung-Chih.

He arrived in Canton on April 20th and found that he had come in the nick of time. Shen Hung-Ying had just assumed his office of Military Governor of Kwangtung appointed by the Peking Government, and started to attack the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of the Yunnan forces, who was loyal to Sun Yat-Sen. This situation was in many respect similar to that ten months ago, except that Sun Yat-Sen had learnt by experience and was fully prepared to meet the emergency. As Generalissimo he had mustered all the loyal forces in and around the city together, and went about superintending personally their counter-attack with the Commander-in-Chief of the Yunnan forces. Chiang Kai-Shek promptly took up his duties as the Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo, and wherever Sun Yat-Sen went, Chiang Kai-Shek was always by his side.

Chen Chiung-Ming's forces found this the best time to revive their trouble-making and started to attack Hsu Chung-Chih's Cantonese forces in East Kwangtung. It was hoped that the Cantonese Army would be in or near Canton before the outbreak, but Shen Hung-Ying would not wait and did not wait. As Chen Chiung-Ming's men were delaying Hsu Chung-Chih's progress, Sun Yat-Sen and Chiang Kai-Shek found themselves in a rather pre-

carious position in and around Canton. They had to do whatever they could with men from the Yunnan forces and also from a small part of the Kwangsi troops under another leader, a rival of Shen Hung-Ying.

From April to July Chiang Kai-Shek was the sole military adviser to Sun Yat-Sen, on whose behalf he went to various conferences with all the generals and commanders who were supporting the Generalissimo and fighting the rebels. During these months there were many ups and downs, and without a single regiment of his own he managed to get Shen Hung-Ying, the nearest of his enemies, out of the vicinity of the capital, and succeeded to a certain extent in co-ordinating the various factors of the very complicated forces now converging in Kwangtung. When Hsu Chung-Chih's forces were getting nearer to Canton and after he had conferred with his old friend on several occasions about the long-drawn-out war, Chiang Kai-Shek was allowed to relinquish his military duties and to be entrusted with an important task, the effects of which have puzzled and are still puzzling the whole world.

VI

TSARIST Russia's policy towards China was most aggressive. Following the Boxer's uprising in Peking in 1900, by far the largest share of the indemnity to be paid by China to the victors was demanded and grabbed by Russia. In fact, her share was bigger than those of France and England put together, and about a third of the total which was divided between a dozen nations. It can be imagined what a pleasant surprise it was to the Chinese people to see that the newly established Soviet Russia extended a friendly hand to them! In July, 1919, while the whole nation was still indignant at the Paris Peace Treaty under which China was ordered to hand over to Japan special rights and territories, Leo Karakhan, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, issued a manifesto to the Chinese people promising to return to China all territories and concessions in Treaty Ports wrongfully taken from her, to restore to her the control of the Chinese Eastern Railway, to waive Russia's share of the Boxer Indemnity, to give up the rights of extra-territoriality of Russians in China, and to surrender all other special privileges contrary to the principle of the equality of nations.

After more than half a century's incessant greedy exploitation of China by Japan and the Western Powers, no wonder the Chinese people began to respect and admire the new Russia, of which the European people spoke with disgust and horror. The younger generation in China, especially the college students in Peking and other cities, started to read and translate anything written by Russians and about Russia. How representative of the people was the Peking Government could easily be

assessed, when Lenin sent his envoy to the Northern Capital and the high officials of cabinet rank considered it hardly respectable to be seen with the Bolshevik messenger. During those days it seemed that, in Peking as well as in other capitals, people wanted to know who was your father before accepting your gift, even though the gift might be your own former property.

Adolph Joffe was probably a very able diplomat, but more probably his father was a nobody. When he was sent to Peking in August, 1922, by Lenin (whose father, if such a person had existed at all, was definitely nobody) to negotiate for a fair treaty between Russia and China on the basis of the Manifesto issued by Karakhan in 1919, the high officials scarcely liked to look at him. It is true that the *Corps Diplomatique* in Peking was disgusted at the arrival of such a comrade and brought pressure to bear on the Chinese authorities, but that only showed them to be the more cowardly. The Powers had good reasons for alienating the 'Bolshies'. By befriending Soviet Russia they had nothing to gain and everything to lose. Besides, the late Tsar was a cousin of most of the monarchs in Europe, and he and his family had been murdered in cold blood by the 'Reds'. But how about China? In accepting the friendship of Soviet Russia, China had nothing to lose and everything to gain. And Nicholas II could not possibly have been related to anyone in China!

Besides, Joffe had arrived at a very bad time. The Chihli War Lords, Tsao Kun and Wu Pei-Fu, had just driven away Hsu Shih-Chang in whose place they had installed Li Yuan-Hung, the Buddha, as their puppet and interim President. As they were very anxious and busily preparing to induce Tsao Kun, who was the leader of the Chihli clique, to take over the Presidency, so they had to be extremely obliging to all the other diplomats in Peking, who openly declared that they were outraged by the arrival of this intruder. Of course these War Lords always

put their personal and private interests above the national interest, and would have received Joffe royally if Lenin's offer had been of special value to the Chihli clique.

The author has often wondered why Soviet Russia should have approached the Peking Government which, in the eyes of a revolutionary, was utterly reactionary, instead of Sun Yat-Sen's revolutionary government. Turning back to September, 1918, the reader will find that Sun Yat-Sen had sent a message of congratulation to Lenin on the success of the Russian Revolution, at a moment when the head of no other government would have soiled his lips with the word 'Bolsheviki'. The general opinion is that the Peking Government was the one recognised by the Powers, was nearer to Siberia and also in control of the Chinese Eastern Railway; but it is difficult to accept that as a sufficient answer.

It would have been extremely interesting, and subsequent events would be entirely unpredictable, if the Peking Government had readily joined hands with Soviet Russia. Where would Sun Yat-Sen and Chiang Kai-Shek have come in? What would have happened to the Kuo Min Tang? Affairs in China, and indeed in the whole Far East, would have been quite different from what they are now if Peking had not treated Joffe coldly. But in the Autumn of 1922, when he was knocking at the doors of the Peking Government with a gift parcel under his arm, he knocked in vain. Those doors were shut in his face. The only people who welcomed him cordially were the college students and other intellectuals. The Chancellor of Peking University thanked him in public for the generous offer from Russia to help China to expel foreign Imperialism out of China, and the Chancellor was a veteran member of the Kuo Min Tang. It was obvious to Joffe where he should go after having his offer turned down by the Peking Government.

* * *

a state of isolation by not trying to resume good relationship with these two countries? As for keeping this matter a secret, that is but the accepted practice in international diplomacy. Furthermore, this letter of the President was merely a proposal still in the stage of consultation between two comrades. How could it be used to accuse and malign the President?

‘Since the publication of this letter, all intelligent people in China and abroad are agreed that this policy would be a necessary move, and foreigners have even thought that the President’s diplomacy was more far-sighted than that of others. They expressed admiration, rather than a feeling of jealousy that China should possess such a great statesman. Indeed, the publication of the letter has added to the many crimes committed by Chen Chiung-Ming, trying to murder the President, yet another one, that of trying to ingratiate foreign countries by betraying his own country . . .’

Chiang Kai-Shek’s argument was sound, but his remarks about public opinion both in China and abroad were more instructive than reliable. The fact that Sun Yat-Sen had to keep secret his meeting with Joffe, and that on most occasions negotiations were carried on indirectly, indicated that he was afraid of provoking blind censure by the general public. It was after very careful discussion and consideration that mutual agreement between Soviet Russia, represented by Adolph Joffe, and the Chinese Revolutionary Government, represented by Sun Yat-Sen, was finally reached. And on January 26th, 1923, the Sun-Joffe Manifesto was issued. In order to give the lie to those who said that Sun Yat-Sen had sold his Party to the Communists, the most important part of the document may be quoted as follows:

‘Dr Sun Yat-Sen holds that the Communistic order, or even the Soviet system, cannot actually be introduced into China because there do not exist the conditions for

大元帥令

第 號

特任蔣中正為陸軍
軍官學校校長此令

孫文

中華民國二十一年五月二日

SUN YAT-SEN'S ORDER TO CHIANG KAI-SHEK, DATED MAY 2ND,
1924, APPOINTING HIM TO BE THE PRESIDENT OF THE MILITARY
ACADEMY



A RECENT PORTRAIT (1)

the successful establishment of either Communism or Sovietism. This view is entirely shared by Mr Joffe, who is further of opinion that China's paramount and most pressing problem is to achieve national unification and to attain full national independence; and regarding this great task he has assured Dr Sun Yat-Sen that China has the warmest sympathy of the Russian people and can count on the support of Russia.'

The other points in this manifesto are Joffe's confirmation of Russia's offer to give up all the rights and privileges obtained by Tsarist Russia by unfair treaties (the original term is 'unequal treaties'); and proposals for a conference about the return of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and the promise by Russia not to encourage secession of Outer Mongolia from China. On the other hand, Sun Yat-Sen consented that to prevent White Russians from attacking Soviet Russia the Red Army could stay in Outer Mongolia while the Peking Government was unable to prevent it.

Nobody could say that this arrangement was not advantageous to China. It was in fact the nucleus of the first fair treaty—or equal treaty, as it is called by most people—China had ever been offered. It is sheer prejudice to say that Sun Yat-Sen, on the advice of Chiang Kai-Shek, sold himself to Communism when he was driven away by Chen Chiung-Ming. It was through Chen Chiung-Ming's own efforts that the world learnt that Sun Yat-Sen had been planning to resume diplomatic relations with Russia and Germany, and the final agreement was reached after Chen Chiung-Ming had been driven out of Canton. And it was put down in black and white that 'the Communistic order or even the Soviet system cannot actually be introduced into China'.

It was on this kind of understanding that Chiang Kai-Shek was sent to Russia at the head of a delegation called 'Dr Sun Yat-Sen's Mission to Soviet Russia'. Its aim was

‘to pay a goodwill call and study the political conditions and party organisation of Soviet Russia.’ The delegation started from Shanghai in August by a boat going north, and crossed the frontier into Siberia at the station of Man-Chou-Li, or Lupin as it is now called, towards the end of that month. At that time, it is interesting to note, there were only a thousand families inhabiting the place, roughly half of them Chinese and half Russian. An inspection was carried out of every train arriving here, and all had to change as the coaches did not pass through. Chiang Kai-Shek and the rest of the delegation were conducted to see the actual frontier, and they were surprised to find that it was a long and narrow strip of road with no sentinels on either side to guard it, which anyone could cross and recross with entire freedom.

Chiang Kai-Shek and his companions continued their travels without incident until six days prior to their arrival at Moscow, when a thorough examination of their luggage was made. It was noticed that the landscape, streets, shops and houses began to look European only when within an hour and a half of Moscow. Chiang Kai-Shek arrived at Moscow at the beginning of September, and except for paying a short visit to Leningrad (still called Petrograd at that time) he spent three months almost entirely in Moscow, attending various organisations to study them and calling on a number of people who were connected with China. His greatest regret was that Lenin, being very ill, could not see him.

The first important man he met in Russia was Chicherin, the People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs. Besides the discussion of Communist Party and Kuo Min Tang matters, Chiang Kai-Shek tried very hard to impress upon him that the Chinese people were very much concerned about Russian activities in Outer Mongolia. He also met and talked with Kalinin, Zinoviev, Trotsky and other prominent leaders of Soviet Russia at that time. Of

Kalinin, the Chairman of the Soviet, he recorded in his diary: 'An honest and sincere peasant who, when asked about important affairs outside Russia, did not know how to answer. What a parliamentarian for a country ruled by peasants!' The entry about Trotsky in his diary was: 'The essential qualifications of a revolutionary are patience and activity; the lack of either would never do. This was also his farewell advice to me.' As Trotsky was still an important man in Russia then, he also wrote to him about the importance of restoring Outer Mongolia to China.

He had an interview with the Secretary-in-Chief of the Communist Party, which lasted more than two hours. The things he jotted down after this interview were: 'Three reasons for the success of the Russian Revolution: 1. The workers knew the necessity of the Revolution; 2, the peasants wanted to have a share in the land; and 3, the hundred and fifty different races in Russia were given the right of self-government and to join the Soviet Union. Also three drawbacks: 1, after the confiscation of factories, no managers could be found; 2, when all small factories were taken over by the State, the effect of the monopoly was too severe; 3, the distribution of profit was difficult.' Another entry reads as follows: 'Latest condition of reconstruction: 1, extensive compulsory education for children; 2, military training for all workers; 3, small factories on lease to private persons.'

The next person he went to see was the Director-General of Military Training. From him Chiang Kai-Shek learned a great deal about the formation of the Red Army and the political side of it run by representatives from the Party. And for a practical demonstration, he went to study the working of the Party men in the Army. He found that in the 144th Regiment of Infantry of the Red Army the Commanding Officer was in charge of only military direction. As for political and spiritual training and lectures on general knowledge, etc., this was entirely

done by Party representatives. The respective duty and authority of the officer and the Party representative was clearly divided, and the system worked very well. His meeting with the People's Commissar of Education gave him these notes: 'The tendency of Russian Education: 1, Uniformity of educational system; 2, increase of technical schools; 3, getting near to real life; 4, paying special attention to workers' schools; 5, abolition of religion; 6, co-education; and 7, students administer schools.'

Besides studying the Red Army, Navy and Air Force, he also went around to see various places in order to gain some knowledge of the social services, and the activities and organisation of the Communist Party. During his stay in Russia he saw several typical mass meetings, in one of which there were no less than two hundred and twenty thousand people taking part. He also attended a number of small committee meetings and discussion groups, as well as official receptions and banquets followed by theatrical performances. He also examined the industrial and agricultural organisations and visited several villages outside Moscow. And he read Karl Marx's *Das Kapital* while he was in the Red capital. He remarked that the first half of this work seemed heavy and made him wish to give it up, but the second half was both profound and entrancing.

He had a very pleasant surprise and two most unpleasant shocks in Russia. He saw at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs three letters written by Sun Yat-Sen, one to Lenin, one to Trotsky and one to Chicherin. In all of them Sun Yat-Sen mentioned him and spoke of him very highly. As for shocks, the first was on the day following his speech on the History of the Chinese Revolutionary Party on October 10th, the national day of the Chinese Republic, when some Chinese students criticised his speech as hero-worship. When he heard this he felt very sorry for these young men who did not know the import-

ance of respecting the leader of their own country. The other shock was when he read the Resolution about the Kuo Min Tang passed by the Third International. After he had read it over, he exclaimed angrily: 'Pooh! Look at what it says! To be so ignorant of a friendly Party! How could it be the centre of world revolution?'

He left Moscow on November 29th, 1923, the next day after he had read the Resolution. When he was on board a steamer, three days before his arrival at Shanghai, he read a document to be presented to Sun Yat-Sen and prepared by the Chinese students in Russia. He found in it the sentence: 'There are many loyal ministers around you, but very few real comrades.' This remark made him more angry than before, and he predicted that since the younger generation had been so much misled by prejudice, it was most probable that there would be trouble for the party in the days ahead.

He reached Shanghai on December 15th and hurried home to offer a religious ceremony to his late mother. Before the end of the year he received a telegram from Sun Yat-Sen urging him to return to Canton at once, which he did very soon. This read: .

'To my Elder Brother Kai-Shek,

'You have on your shoulders an extremely heavy responsibility from this trip. Please come to Canton immediately to report all matters, and plan in detail the scheme for Sino-Russian co-operation. Your opinion, which we respect, about the political situation and your proposals we want to discuss with you in person. Also, please get my two Elder Brothers Chang Ching-Kiang and Tai Chi-Tao to come together with you. There is important business to be discussed.

'Sun Yat-Sen, Dec. 24th, 1923.'

Before Chiang Kai-Shek went abroad there had been a

radical change in Peking which must be recorded. In June, 1923, the Chihli Military clique, having no further use for the interim Government, made rapid arrangements to drive away their puppet President Li Yuan-Hung, the Buddha. Soldiers and policemen were ordered to hold a mass meeting, after which they were told to go to the Presidential Residence to ask the President for the back pay which the Government owed them. Furthermore, a large number of loafers and ruffians were engaged to demonstrate against the President. To everybody's surprise, Li the Buddha was not easily intimidated into giving up his job. He held firm for a while and had, at last, to be got rid of by force.

After he was gone, the politicians who supported the Chihli Military clique began their preparations for electing Tsao Kun to be the President. In July many Members of Parliament who did not wish to collaborate with the Chihli clique left Peking for Shanghai, where more than a hundred of them held a meeting to denounce these War Lords. But in September over four hundred Members who had remained in Peking tried to elect Tsao Kun as President. At first, however, they quarrelled, and the election was not carried through. But finally, on October 5th, Tsao Kun was elected to the office he coveted by a majority of 480 against Sun Yat-Sen's 33 votes. Tsao Kun had paid five thousand dollars for each vote, and quite a few Members had been lured back by this bribe. It was interesting to find that Sun Yat-Sen was so popular as to get 33 votes from such a Parliament. Other runners-up included Tuan Chi-Jui who got three votes; Chen Chiung-Ming, two votes; Wang Ching-Wei and Chang Tso-Lin, one vote each. A notorious bandit leader whose name was very much in the news got one vote, and there was also a ballot paper on which the figure of five thousand dollars was written instead of the name of the candidate.

This bribing of Members of Parliament to vote for Tsao

Kun was an open secret. Several days before the election a member had reported this criminal proceeding to the local Public Prosecutor of Peking, demanding a trial. He not only provided the Prosecutor with the necessary proofs, but also reproduced by photography a cheque used for bribery and other documents, and had them published in the newspapers. In spite of this the election went off smoothly. Furthermore, these bribed members passed, three days after the election, a hurriedly drafted new Constitution for the Chinese Republic. Needless to say, both the Members of Parliament in Shanghai and the Government in Canton telegraphed the whole country to condemn such actions in Peking as illegal and outrageous.

On account of his bad health, Joffe had been recalled in July, 1923, and Leo Karakhan was sent to Peking as the Representative-in-Chief of Soviet Russia in the Far East. Soviet Russia did not want to miss anything. Whilst they were negotiating with Sun Yat-Sen and his government in Canton, they also wanted to get the Peking Government to accept Karakhan as the Soviet Envoy accredited to China. Through the deft diplomacy of Wellington Koo, who was Foreign Minister in the Peking Government at that time, Karakhan was later on accepted as the first Ambassador to China, and arrangements for returning the Chinese Eastern Railways to China, as well as the giving up by Soviet Russia of her special privileges in China were completed.

While Chiang Kai-Shek was still in Moscow, Soviet Russia sent another man to Canton. Though this man did not come as an official envoy from Russia, his work in China was at least equally important, if not more so to that of Karakhan. He was Michael Borodin, whose original name was Grusenbergh, or Berg as he was known in America where he received his education. Before coming to China he had been sent by the Third Inter-

national, first to Mexico, and then to Scotland, to promote revolution, and lastly to Turkey, where he acted as adviser to Mustapha Kemal Pasha. Sun Yat-Sen made him his adviser in December, 1923.

Since Tsao Kun had become President in Peking by bribery, Sun Yat-Sen had redoubled his efforts to consolidate his foundations in order to expand northwards. People began to realise that the so-called Republican Government in Peking was going from bad to worse, and that the only hope rested with Sun Yat-Sen and his party. There was, therefore, an urgent demand to rejuvenate this party, and it was decided that Russia could be used to a large extent as a good example. Their advice and help were welcomed, and the policy of allowing Communists to become members of the Kuo Min Tang was decided upon.

The First Congress of the Kuo Min Tang was held in Canton in January, 1924, a few days after Chiang Kai-Shek's arrival, and it was on this important occasion when the resolution that a Kuo Min Tang Army should be organised and a Military Academy established was passed. On January 24th, Chiang Kai-Shek was appointed chairman of the Preparation Committee of this Academy. On February 3rd he was also appointed a member of the Military Council of the Headquarters of the Kuo Min Tang. And on May 3rd, when the School was established, he was appointed President of the Military Academy.

The original name of this institution was 'The Military Cadets' School' and as it was situated on the Island of Wham-Poa, it was later known as the Whampoa Military Academy. The island of Whampoa is only forty *li* (or fourteen miles) from Canton, and can easily be reached in an hour by steam-launch. On this island is the Chang-Chow Fort, and later on Chiang Kai-Shek was also appointed Commander of the Fort. Formerly there had

been two schools, the buildings of which were still standing. They were the Kwangtung Provincial Military School and the Kwantung Provincial Naval School. By using these two buildings it was possible to start the new academy almost instantly.

Chiang Kai-Shek was given a free hand in planning, starting and running the Academy. At first he intended to take about 320 students, and these were distributed in the following proportions: 15 young officers to be selected from each of the five armies of Kwangtung, Yunnan, Kwangsi, Hunan and Honan; 10 or 12 from each province, and 20 from among the children of the martyrs of the Kuo Min Tang. But when the examination took place it was found that there were far more candidates than were expected. For instance, for the Province of Kwangtung only 12 students were to be enrolled, but there came more than 1,200. So it was decided to enrol 500 students in all. As most of the candidates were well educated young men, the competitive entrance examination they took was pretty stiff. The papers they had to do included Chinese essay writing, arithmetic, algebra, geometry, trigonometry, etc.

The Government in Canton at that time was very hard up, but they managed to spare 186,600 Chinese silver dollars for the initial expenses to start the Academy. Towards the regular monthly allowance several organisations besides the Provincial Treasury were called upon to contribute, and for the first few months the grant the Academy received was 30,000 dollars monthly. At that time a Chinese dollar was worth about two shillings, but its purchasing power in China was much greater than two shillings in England, and though these figures do not sound very impressive, it was actually very generous on the part of the Government. When later on the Treasury was in a better position the allowance was increased accordingly.

There is convincing evidence that Chiang Kai-Shek planned the Academy entirely by himself. In a letter he wrote during his absence to the other member of the Preparation Committee he said: ' . . . As for the regulations, etc., which I, your younger brother, had formerly drafted, such as the length of time for graduation, curriculum, salaries for teachers and officers, and pay and rations for the cadets, and also the selection and examination of the officers, please go ahead exactly as they were planned. There is no need to change them. If you think some of them are unsuitable it will not be too late to alter them as may be necessary from time to time when the School is started. In our work we must have a fixed idea; and once it is fixed, we must not alter it at random: there may be some small points not exactly as anticipated, but we must follow the fixed plan. For instance, the length of time allowed for graduation is a vital point—very important to the future of the student. Once it is fixed at six months, to alter it into a year would upset all our plans, including the curriculum and budgets, etc. How could we do this lightly?'

He then went on to assign the various members of the committee to their specific duties and concluded: ' . . . I hope all my Elder Brothers will attend to their duties more and make suggestions less. Otherwise it will hamper our progress. When I am in Canton, we can discuss your suggestions; but during my absence, though you could propose and discuss them, important alterations adopted would be criticised by others as unauthorised. As we are no mere acquaintances it is only right that I should speak plainly to you. In our work we suffer from lack of experience and knowledge. So we have to think over and consider everything before we do it. We must not follow free advice too readily and discard our decided plans. We should not be moved even by the force of the tumbling mountain or upheaval of the ocean, once our plan has

been reached by careful consideration. We, who are young and inexperienced, should be more careful than others. If we change our decided plans whenever we see something new, we will be falling into the mistake of embracing misleading advice. As I know we are not such irresponsible people, we should watch and encourage each other and hope to achieve success.'

It can be deduced from the above letter that the Academy was planned and run by Chiang Kai-Shek single-handed: those who helped him in his work had to take his orders. He engaged a number of Red Army officers to be instructors at the Academy and among them was General Bluecher, who later became the commander-in-chief of the Far East Red Army. When General Bluecher was in China, his name was Galens and he served as Chiang Kai-Shek's Chief-of-Staff. The period of training in his school was short, being only six months, but it was extremely intensive. The curriculum was more than full. Besides all kinds of military science, the student had to study a number of subjects on political science, in addition to most strenuous daily physical and military drilling. And, above all, lectures on the history and principles of the Kuo Min Tang were given by veteran members of the Party. That was because the primary aim of this institute was not only to train good soldiers but also to cultivate staunch supporters of the Party.

On May 5th, 1924, the first set of 500 students entered the School, and on June 16th the formal opening ceremony took place, when Sun Yat-Sen, accompanied by all the leading figures of the Government, the Army and the Party, attended. On this important occasion the Party Leader said to the cadets: 'The foundation for our Republic scarcely exists. The reason is a simple one: our Revolution has been carried on by the struggles of a revolutionary party but not by a revolutionary army. Because of the lack of a revolutionary army, the Republic has been

mismanaged by War Lords and Bureaucrats. Our Revolution will never succeed if this continues. With the establishment of this School a new hope is born to us to-day. From now onwards a new era has begun for our Revolution. This School is the basis of the Revolutionary Army, of which you students form the nucleus.'

That, indeed, marked the turning point of the Kuo Min Tang and also of Chiang Kai-Shek's life. It was noticeable that hitherto he had not figured too prominently in the Party, though his position in the Army had risen to certain heights. But even in this sphere there were certain commanders-in-chief whose importance the Party had to respect. And in years to come, so long as the Party had to depend upon any kind of support from commanders-in-chief with huge armies behind them—many of whom were no better than soldiers of fortune who might one day choose to make use of and humour the Kuo Min Tang—both the Party and Chiang Kai-Shek never knew where they actually stood. This little body of 500 cadets was the first stone in building the foundations of a mighty power. Since only six months were required to complete this training, numerous cadets could be prepared for active service in a comparatively short time to form a Party Army. That is why within a few years the new Revolutionary Army, with Chiang Kai-Shek as Commander-in-Chief, was able to start its ultimately successful Northern Punitive Expedition.

As has been mentioned a few pages back, the Kuo Min Tang held its first National Congress in January, 1924, when Chiang Kai-Shek had just returned to Canton from Moscow. The Congress was attended by 165 delegates from various branches of the Party all over the country, including some from abroad. Formally, the meeting was called to announce, ratify and carry out of the reformation of the Kuo Min Tang. In reality it was to pull the

Party together by making it a public political organisation, also to be as democratic as possible, and to admit those members of the Chinese Communist Party who wished to join. It was only after this Congress that the principles of the Kuo Min Tang were made public and accessible to all those who were interested.

From January, 1924, onwards, Sun Yat-Sen began a series of lectures on his Three Principles of the People, of which Chiang Kai-Shek has been the most powerful supporter. Lincoln's words: 'Government of the people, for the people and by the people' when rendered into Chinese became: 'The People are to have, the People are to control, and the People are to enjoy.' Basing his ideas on this, Sun Yat-Sen expounded them in the form known in China as 'San Min Chu I', or 'The Three Principles of the People'. The first is Min Tsu, literally People's Race, and can be roughly translated as National Solidarity; the second, Min Ch'üan, literally People's Rights, means practically Democracy; the third, Min Shêng, literally People's Livelihood, has been translated as Social Welfare or Socialism, and Sun Yat-Sen himself went so far as to say it was nothing short of Communism.

These lectures were taken down by stenographers as they were delivered and after having been revised by Sun Yat-Sen were subsequently published. And it was high time that this should be done. First of all, a political programme was urgently needed for the Kuo Min Tang, now that the Communists had come out into the open and many of them had also joined the Kuo Min Tang. Secondly, Sun Yat-Sen's health was failing rapidly. He had a serious breakdown in May after he had finished speaking on his second Principle. In August he was sufficiently recovered to go on with his third and last Principle. But by the end of that month, when he had only finished four of his six lectures on the subject, unexpected trouble was started by the Merchants' Corps of

Canton and he had to give up his talks to look after military affairs. After that important matters developed rapidly, and he had to go to Peking, hoping to call his long-hoped-for People's Convention. But in March, 1925, he died in the Northern Capital, leaving his work not entirely finished.

The part which Chiang Kai-Shek played in this re-organisation of the Kuo Min Tang was undoubtedly important. He was one of the few supporters of the approach to Soviet Russia and he defended Sun Yat-Sen's diplomatic move when others attacked it. He headed the Sun Yat-Sen Mission to Russia, and co-ordinated the newly-engaged Russian advisers and staff-officers with their Cantonese opposite numbers. But it cannot be too emphatically stressed that Chiang Kai-Shek never has been, nor ever will be, a purely 'Party man'. His activities have always been chiefly with military affairs. And, as the condition of the various armies in Kwangtung was extremely complicated, a man without a large body of troops under his command would have found it very difficult to do anything. Therefore Chiang Kai-Shek was given the unique job of founding a new Revolutionary Army, a force that would fight not for any individual leader but for the ideas of the Kuo Min Tang. Hence the establishment of the Whampoa Military Academy.

For many years past Sun Yat-Sen had always assigned work connected with the Party to three close followers. One was Liao Chung-Kai, with whom Chiang Kai-Shek had communicated on a number of occasions and who had gone to Japan not long before this to spend a month there with Joffe, to discuss the co-operation of China with Russia. The other two were Wang Ching-Wei and Hu Han-Min, and it is necessary to introduce these men properly here.

Wang Ching-Wei's name can be remembered in connection with the Japanese sponsored government in Nanking

established during the Sino-Japanese war of 1937-1945. He was the first puppet President. To give the devil his due, he had been until then an ardent revolutionary, ever since 1910, when he attempted to assassinate the Manchu Prince Regent in Peking. He was sentenced to life imprisonment, but thanks to the success of the 1911 Revolution, he was freed and instantly became a national figure to follow Sun Yat-Sen and later acted as a kind of private secretary to the Leader. In 1925, when Sun Yat-Sen died in Peking, it was Wang Ching-Wei, who drafted and copied the Leader's famous Will, because both Hu Han-Min and Liao Chung-Kai were in the South. Since Wang Ching-Wei's betrayal of his country, many patriotic members of the Party have suggested that this Will should be discarded. As, however, it embodied the idea of Sun Yat-Sen's life-long work, it had already become an important historical document and could not be cast away and forgotten.

Wang Ching-Wei was the junior member of this trio. He had so far represented, together with Liao Chung-Kai who was his senior in age as well as in his standing in the Party, the more radical and advanced elements of the Kuo Min Tang. On the other hand, Hu Han-Min was a veteran member of the Party and also a classical scholar. His revolutionary record dated back to the days when Sun Yat-Sen and his followers were still trying to collect supporters everywhere for a rising. As editor of a newspaper in Hongkong he did much for the Revolution, and was elected Military Governor of the Kwangtung Province soon after Canton had declared its independence from the Manchu Government in 1911 and the original Governor of the old regime had fled.

When Chiang Kai-Shek and Chen Chi-Mei were fighting against Yuan Shih-Kai's forces in Shanghai, Hu Han-Min promptly announced his opposition to the Peking Government. Like Chiang Kai-Shek and Chen Chi-Mei, he was defeated by Yuan Shih-Kai's men and had to leave

Canton, where he joined Sun Yat-Sen again when they went back in 1917, and he was then re-installed as the Provincial Governor. He had followed Sun Yat-Sen through thick and thin, and very few followers were as loyal as he was. By attending on the Master for many years, he became his most intimate and trusted disciple and acted as his confidential secretary. He generally associated himself with the older members of the Party and represented the moderate and even the conservative elements of the Kuo Min Tang.

That both Liao Chung-Kai and Chiang Kai-Shek enjoyed Sun Yat-Sen's confidence in his earlier secret negotiations with Soviet Russia there is ample evidence. When the policy was finally decided and made public there was little or no opposition from within the Party at first. What was the attitude of Wang Ching-Wei and Hu Han-Min can be guessed from their usual inclinations: Wang Ching-Wei was fairly warm and Hu Han-Min rather cold. That was why Chiang Kai-Shek, who was very enthusiastic, had been let into the inner circle and entrusted with the Mission to Russia. His venture into party politics marked an important turning-point in his life; for party politics is party politics all the world over, no matter whether there is only one party, or two or several, and he was primarily a soldier.

When Sun Yat-Sen met Joffe and they issued their manifesto, it was only an overture. Chiang Kai-Shek's mission to Moscow also was not a decisive step either. In reality it was Great Britain who drove the Kuo Min Tang into the arms of Soviet Russia.

After his return to Canton, Sun Yat-Sen found his Government was in greater need of money than ever before. Chen Chiung-Ming had left him penniless, and now with several large mercenary armies which had fought to reinstall him in Canton, to be rewarded and paid

regularly, Sun Yat-Sen was in a desperate position. One of the sources of finance was the Customs in Canton, but owing to the Republic's faithful observance of treaties made by the Manchu regime with Foreign Powers, all the Customs were controlled by the Creditor-Powers of China. Under the Peace Treaties signed after the Boxers' War, China was to pay an indemnity of £900,000,000. This debt, and later on other debts incurred by the Peking Government, was to be paid chiefly through China's customs revenue, and any surplus from the fixed rate was to be handed over to the Chinese Government in Peking.

Thus the surplus from the Canton Customs House had hitherto been sent to the Peking Government, and it was now a rather ironical situation that the Peking Government should be using the money from Canton to pay the soldiers who were trying to turn out Sun Yat-Sen's Government, while Sun Yat-Sen himself was in urgent need of money to pay the armies which were serving him and his Government. It was natural that Sun Yat-Sen should think it fair to approach the diplomatic bodies and ask them to pass through the usual channels what was due to be paid on the Boxers' Indemnity debt, but to hand over the surplus from Canton Customs' to his Government instead of sending it to his enemies. He first made this request in the Spring of 1923, and having been flatly refused he declared in December that he would seize and keep the Canton surplus by force.

On December 7th, 1923, the Powers, headed by Great Britain gathered an international naval force of seventeen warships along the shores of Canton to intimidate Sun Yat-Sen. The Commander-in-Chief of the British Fleet, China Station, the late Admiral Leveson, went to Canton to superintend the demonstration personally and the occasion was truly international, as the flags of many countries were flying on these ships: British, American, French,

Japanese, and even a Portuguese flag were seen on a vessel which should rightly belong to the British Museum.

Immediately after the demonstration, Sun Yat-Sen ordered his Foreign Minister to bring to him representatives of Reuters and other members of the Press, and openly declared to them that since his repeated requests to Britain and America for sympathy had failed, as shown by this display of naval force, he would turn to Russia for help.

But that was only a threat. He was still hoping that he could do business with Britain and America. Firstly, if he had really been proceeding to obtain help from Russia, he need not have shouted so loudly. He would certainly have set about it as quietly as possible, as was shown later. Secondly, in January, 1924, when the First National Congress was sitting, the Labour Party was victorious in the general election in Britain. Sun Yat-Sen, on behalf of Kuo Min Tang, sent his congratulations to Ramsay MacDonald. If he had not wished to promote good relations with Britain, why should he have risked being snubbed, which indeed proved to be the case? His congratulatory telegram was not even acknowledged by a secretary of the new Prime Minister of Great Britain.

On the very next day news came that Lenin was dead. The Congress was adjourned for five minutes to indicate its respect for the deceased revolutionary leader and its sympathy with the Russian people. Soon a telegram was received, sent by M. Chicherin, the Russian Foreign Commissar, to express how much the Russians had appreciated this gesture. These two little incidents helped Sun Yat-Sen and his followers very much to decide which way to turn.

Since the Kuo Min Tang had decided to go 'left' and approach Soviet Russia, Sun Yat-Sen wanted to start with a clean slate, by enlisting the services of a large number

of new people with 'left' tendencies, and by dropping old members of the Party who leaned towards the 'right'. There were sweeping changes, and early in March, 1924, Chiang Kai-Shek wrote a very long letter to Sun Yat-Sen criticising many of Sun's false steps. He thought Sun Yat-Sen had been rather rash and said that 'this is only a period of transition in which not all the old members and personalities should be wiped out, even though the new influence will be greatly extended and increased in the near future. At present the new influence has not yet increased. What is more, it is not quite certain whether it will be a success or a failure. How then can we have no regard whatever for the old measures and personalities?'

He further told Sun Yat-Sen candidly that there were few followers who were really loyal to their common cause. Most of them were unreliable flatterers and opportunists. But, he asked, wasn't there anyone who was straight and who had a good character? After he had related many past histories of their association, he recommended Hu Han-Min, the conservative partisan, whom Sun Yat-Sen wanted to drop because of the change of Party policy.

'I often reflect that among the comrades of our Party there are only a few who possess both learning and courage as well as good character. We could not find many like Hu Han-Min, a man knowing thoroughly the history of our Party and able to co-ordinate all the factions within it. Why don't you, my Master, let him follow you and be at your side to assist you? Do you, my Master, really think that he is a bookworm and consequently useless? But is there in our Party a man of letters who is not somewhat of a bookworm? Do you think that he has been responsible for the Party affairs for so long and has been so high-handed that he may rebel as did the traitor Chen? Then I must ask you, my Master, to remember what I used to say: the traitor Chen was sure to betray you, and

you will believe that I am right to-day when I say that Hu Han-Min can be trusted. If you, my Master, fear that his brother may hinder him both in public and private affairs, surely his brother could be asked to go far away from him.'

Chiang Kai-Shek's remark about Hu Han-Min's brother was prophetic: for in the following year Hu Han-Min was implicated in a criminal case when his brother was found to be one of the promoters of the assassination of Liao Chung-Kai, the extreme 'leftist' in the Party. In other ways this letter served its purpose, and Hu Han-Min, though Sun Yat-Sen no longer entrusted him with Party affairs concerning the new measures of the reorganised Kuo Min Tang, remained an important figure around the Leader.

In October, when the Merchants' Corps of Canton was about to strike a death-blow to Sun Yat-Sen, it was decided that with the advice of Borodin a Revolutionary Council should be formed to deal with important matters in an emergency. Chiang Kai-Shek wrote the following letter to Sun Yat-Sen:

'To my Master:

'To-day adviser Borodin came to the Academy to discuss with me the possible members of the Revolutionary Council, and indicated that he very much did not want Hu Han-Min and Wang Ching-Wei to be included. To have such an idea he really cannot know our Party. I think that Hu Han-Min, because of his strong prejudice, would be difficult to work with, and so could be excluded. But to wish to exclude Wang Ching-Wei as well is impossible to understand. I hesitate to agree to this. Not only would such a step put obstacles in our way, but it would invite trouble immediately. He thought that the exclusion of Hu and Wang would avoid complication, but in reality it would increase complications. There is no need to fear that they would dissent from our resolutions and hamper

their execution: for you, my Master, have the final decision which cannot be vetoed by any member. Then why should we oust these two people? I think it would be better to include the names of Hu Han-Min and Wang Ching-Wei in the Council. If they withdraw voluntarily, that would be a different matter. But Hu and Wang must be on our list, otherwise we had better postpone the organisation of it. I wait anxiously for your clear judgment and reply. Chiang Kai-Shek.'

Sun Yat-Sen, however, remained firm in his reply:

'The Revolutionary Council must be organised at once to meet all kinds of emergencies. To exclude Hu Han-Min and Wang Ching-Wei is quite in order. We must follow the Russian pattern in our Revolution to-day. Hu Han-Min has lost confidence in this, and his non-participation will help us, whilst his participation would create many obstacles. It hurts both ways, and we must not be polite. Neither is Wang Ching-Wei a revolutionary of the Russian style. We can do without him. From now on if our Party doesn't follow the Russian model we will never succeed, and both Hu Han-Min and Wang Ching-Wei will not condescend to follow it. Besides, they are both good at compromise, but no good at drastic change. To maintain the present insipid condition, with these two people, is easy. If we want to create a new order, they are not the men for it. To use people according to their specialities brings advantage to both the men and their work. If we mix the men, both will suffer.

'We have left Hu Han-Min and Wang Ching-Wei to maintain and co-ordinate the present conditions. When today such conditions can no longer be maintained, and the whole order is about to collapse, we must "use a sharp knife and chop the confused hemp": to succeed or to fail we do not care. The Revolutionary Council is the organisation for such a measure. It would not suit Hu

Han-Min and Wang Ching-Wei. We must take separate roads to do our work and must not make do with mud and water. This is my reply.'

The forming of the Revolutionary Council was announced on the following day, with Sun Yat-Sen as the President, who appointed six plenipotentiary commissars. They appeared in the list in this order: 1, Hsu Chung-Chih, Commander-in-Chief of the Cantonese Army; 2, Liao Chung-Kai, the Leftist; 3, Wang Ching-Wei (!); 4, Chiang Kai-Shek; 5, Eugene Chen, the Diplomat; 5, Tan Ping-Shan, representing the Communists.

So Sun Yat-sen had to yield to Chiang Kai-Shek and Wang Ching-Wei was included in this authoritative organisation. Later events proved that Wang Ching-Wei had for a considerable length of time served the new cause quite well. As for Hu Han-Min, although he was not a commissar in this new Council, he continued to hold a very high position at the Headquarters of the Generalissimo.

Whether Chiang Kai-Shek's dabbling in party politics has done him good or harm it is difficult to say. Although it is perfectly true that during the nine months from January to October, 1924, his prestige had greatly increased, it must be remembered that this was largely due to his founding and running the Military Academy. By that time the second batch of cadets, which numbered over 1,000, was under training. The staff officer of former days was now the most reliable supporter of the Party, with a solid force behind him. He was no longer a man to be trifled with. Those who were loyal to the Party looked up to him as the only possible saviour of the Kuo Min Tang, and those soldiers of fortune who had no love for the Party considered him as the sole obstacle in their way. All eyes were turned on him.

As all kinds of responsibilities began to be heaped upon

his shoulders, Chiang Kai-Shek, besides doing all he could to build up the Whampoa Military Academy into the most important institution in the new Government, went all out to co-ordinate the various mercenary forces which had driven away Chen Chiung-Ming and were now stationed in and around Canton. At the moment the two outstanding trouble-makers were the Yunnanese Army under the command of General Yang Hsi-Min and the Kwangsi Army under the command of General Liu Chen-Huan. Being the first to enter the Provincial Capital in their expedition against Chen Chiung-Ming, they considered themselves the greatest benefactors to Sun Yat-Sen and his followers and entitled to reap as rich a reward as they could lay their hand on. And as a rule people who consider themselves benefactors are idle and greedy.

In May, 1924, in a circular telegram to all the officers of the Cantonese Army, Chiang Kai-Shek said: ' . . . It is now a year and a half since the return to Canton of our Generalissimo (Sun Yat-Sen). We have, under the direct control of our Central Government (the Cantonese Government), no less than 100,000 soldiers. But the traitor Chen is still at bay, just as bad as before; and the people in Kwangtung are suffering more and more. Is it because our friendly forces are tired and weak that they cannot wipe out a small army of 30,000 rebels with their 100,000 men? No. It is really because suspicion and jealousy are rife and there is no co-ordination among them. When various forces are not united even in spirit, not only can they never defeat their enemy, but also they will be defeated by him . . . '

With tens of thousands of idle and greedy benefactors about, the Province of Kwangtung suffered greatly during the years 1923 and 1924 when every financial resource was thoroughly squeezed. The commanders of the above-mentioned armies appointed numerous revenue collectors and district governors to extract money from

the people, and Sun Yat-Sen's Government was left in a poverty-stricken state. That was why Sun Yat-Sen wanted to keep the Customs surplus. As the Powers were most ruthless in dealing with his threat to take over the Customs by force, Sun Yat-Sen had to turn to Soviet Russia, who was most anxious to help him.

In those early days Sun Yat-Sen's policy of 'co-operating with Soviet Russia and tolerating the Communists' was naturally not at all popular. The word 'Bolsheviki' inspired instant horror in China, just as it did elsewhere. Sun Yat-Sen had to declaim over and over again that Communism was not suitable for China and that his own doctrine of the People's Livelihood was as good as any fashionable 'ism'.

Chiang Kai-Shek, his trusted lieutenant in their secret negotiations with Soviet Russia as well as his personal representative in China's first goodwill mission to Soviet Russia, was assigned yet another thankless job, that of co-operating all the so-called friendly armies who rivalled each other in grabbing for money. Whereas the former undertaking was bound to receive criticism from all quarters except a very few, the latter was an attempt to achieve the impossible. Yet untiringly Chiang Kai-Shek worked on, and it can be said that he accomplished what no other person could possibly have done: he kept them from quarrelling openly with each other, from rebelling against the Government, and, when such a rebellion was no longer preventable, he cut the Gordian knot in the nick of time. Soon after the death of Sun Yat-Sen in the Spring of 1926, when he found that both the Yunnanese and Kwangsi armies were communicating with Chen Chiung-Ming, he attacked them with his Students' Army, aided by Hsu Chung-Chih's Cantonese Army.

His dealing with the Communists was a much more complicated job, and what he did with them was more open to controversy. As later chapters will be greatly

concerned with this subject, suffice it here to deal with the matter very briefly, merely to maintain a record of the main events in their chronological order.

The announcement of the admission of Chinese Communists into the Kuo Min Tang was made in January, 1924, and on June 1st the Central Executive Committee received the first petition for an order of censure on the Communist members. The petition was sent in by a few prominent men who were on the Executive Committee of the Cantonese City Branch of the Kuo Min Tang. Eighteen days after this, three of the five members of the Central Supervisory Committee, the highest supervising body of the Party, proposed such a vote of censure.

Chiang Kai-Shek was one of the very few who realised that at this critical moment their ranks must be closed and that members of the Kuo Min Tang must fight hand-in-hand with Communists against their common enemy. On June 29th, eleven days after the proposal for a vote of censure was made, in a public speech he made at his Military Academy, he praised loudly the Russian Communist Party and their members. He said: ' . . . Members of the Russian Communist Party are willing to work under any kind of hardship, whilst members of our Kuo Min Tang are not. Russian Communists are willing to work for the welfare of their country and the common people, not solely for their own private interest. They let others have power and advantage whilst they themselves do their duty. Those who formerly were opposed to this Party are now no longer so. Not only do they support this Party but also they want to join it . . . '

Later, he allowed his cadets who were Communists to form a Union of Military Youth, and non-Communists to form the Sun Yat-Sen Society. The primary purpose of these two organisations was to discuss and exchange revolutionary ideas of the respective parties. It was also hoped that they would promote mutual understanding

and goodwill. It was only when, much later on, he considered that the Communists were trying to undermine the Kuo-Min Tang, that he ordered the Communists to withdraw from the Army and to disband their Union. In the meantime the Society was also ordered to be dissolved.

As he was getting to be more and more important, and was a stout supporter of Sun Yat-Sen's policy regarding the Communists, Chiang Kai-Shek gradually became Sun Yat-Sen's most reliable man in dealing with all the anti-Communistic forces in Canton. It is ironical to observe that the merchants of the Kwangtung Province, and those in Canton particularly, who suffered the heaviest on account of the greed of the mercenary armies of Yunnan and Kwangsi, should join hands with their oppressors in their anti-Communistic and, in a larger sense, anti-Sun Yat-Sen Government movement.

In May, 1924, the Merchants of Canton threatened to call a general strike should the hard-up Government levy a new tax on them, who considered themselves already over-taxed. The fact that their burden had largely been imposed upon them by the Yunnanese and Kwangsi Armies made no difference to their strong anti-Government attitude. On top of this business people hated Communists like poison, and Sun Yat-Sen and his followers were the patrons of the Communists in China.

In August and September, with the help of the leaders of the Yunnanese Army, and, as accused by the Kuo Min Tang, abetted by Chen Chiung-Ming and representatives of British Imperialism in Hongkong, the Merchants' Corps planned to arm their men with nine thousand rifles which they intended to smuggle into Canton for a rising against the Government. When Sun Yat-Sen learned that such a plot was afoot, and furthermore that a licence allowing a Norwegian vessel to ship the arms into Canton had already

been obtained under some false pretence by the Merchants' Corps, he had to turn to Chiang Kai-Shek for immediate action.

He had chosen the right man. Chiang Kai-Shek did not like the mercenary forces, neither did he approve any anti-Communistic measures. Furthermore, he was already known for his integrity and would never compromise, so he could be trusted with those precious arms, and once they were in his keeping nothing would induce him to let them go again. With swift measures he seized the Norwegian vessel and had the dangerous cargo unloaded, storing them in the Military Academy.

The Merchants' Corps wailed and proclaimed this an outrage, whilst the Yunnanese Commander-in-Chief tried his best to negotiate for their release. Strong measures and soft means were used alternately by the conspirators, but Chiang Kai-Shek was unmoved. The Merchants' threat to call a general strike was at last carried out, but it only met with his order declaring martial law to ensure public safety.

While this trouble was going on in Canton, the Northern Government in Peking was also shaking. The Military Governor in Chekiang had started to fight against forces around him sent by Peking. Chang Tso-Lin, the War Lord in Manchuria, was also preparing his forces for an attack on the Peking Government. Sun Yat-Sen, who had already denounced Tsao Kun, the President in Peking who had secured his position by bribing the Members of Parliament, wanted very much to join in the general uprising by starting his long waited-for Northern Punitive Expedition. So it was arranged, through the mediation of the Yunnanese Commander-in-Chief, that the Government was to release the arms to the Merchants on condition that they paid a fine of a million dollars to help the Government to start the Punitive Expedition. Later the million dollars was reduced to half

a million, and still later a further reduction of three hundred thousand was allowed.

Chiang Kai-Shek stood firm. He would not trust the Merchants. Neither did Sun Yat-Sen trust them, but he had his reasons for compromise. The Government had received a letter from the British Consulate-General in Canton saying that if the Chinese Army fired on the Merchants, the British Navy would bombard the Chinese Army, and so on September 9th Sun Yat-Sen wrote to Chiang Kai-Shek:

'Kwangtung is now a place of death, the causes of which are three. The first is the pressure of the British. If the strike is to go on, disorder is sure to take place, and the target of the British warships is my Headquarters, also our gunboat *Yung Feng* and the Whampoa Military Academy. Within a few score of minutes they'll be ashes. We have no power whatever to resist. We might luckily avoid it this time, but it may occur again any time. This is the first point. The second is the counter-offensive by our enemy in the East River [Chen Chiung-Ming]. Now he is starting. If this develops we don't know what will be the result. The third is the disobedience and greed of our friendly armies [of Yunnan and Kwangsi]. They have committed all sorts of crimes and laid the blame on us. It also will mean our death.

'With these three causes we could not stay here for a moment longer. We must discard everything to find a new way of life. Now the best way is the Northern Punitive Expedition. Besides, the Army from Manchuria is planning to come inside the Great Wall. The army in Chekiang can maintain its own ground and the people want to overthrow Tsao. Near Wu-Chang and Han-Kow there are armies who will support us. For these reasons we must resolve to fight forward on our long trail. To use battlefields as our training school will yield wonderful results. Comrades of our Party must not hesitate.'

Chiang Kai-Shek did not hesitate. On the contrary, he decided at once to keep Canton at all costs. Sun Yat-Sen was also obstinate and moved his headquarters from Canton to Shiuchow, leading away his own Guards, the small Air Force, a Kiangsi Army, a Hunanese Army, a new Yunnanese Army and a Honanese Army. Chiang Kai-Shek and his students were left behind in the island of Whampoa, actually surrounded by the unfriendly forces of Kwangsi and Yunnan. Hu Han-Min, the conservative comrade, was ordered to be the acting Generalissimo during Sun Yat-Sen's absence, and he and Chiang Kai-Shek were to deal with the Merchants and other opposition elements in Canton.

After Sun Yat-Sen's departure with his forces, the situation in Canton rapidly became worse. By October Chiang Kai-Shek realised that danger was imminent and urged Sun Yat-Sen again and again to send him reinforcements. On October 9th, the eve of the Merchants' outbreak, Sun Yat-Sen answered his repeated calls with this telegram in secret code:

'I have received both your letters. According to my calculation, it may not be so critical. But since my coming to Shiuchow I have decided to break my kettles and sink my boats, concentrating on the Northern Punitive Expedition. Now that you feel the dangers in Canton so much, I hope you'll leave the isolated island of Whampoa and come at once to Shiuchow with all the arms and ammunition, together with the students, to risk everything on this Punitive Expedition. Act immediately when this telegram reaches you, and you must not be reluctant to go. I will never go back to relieve Canton. Decide instantly and hesitate no more.'

Once more Chiang Kai-Shek refused to leave. His reply insisted on Sun Yat-Sen's early return:

'Your instructions received. The rebel army and the

treacherous Merchants are united and more outrageous than before. Danger will come upon our Academy in Whampoa any moment. I have determined to defend this isolated island till death, and now await your early return with your army to relieve us. We would never give up our base, without which our Party would lose its foundation forever. If we hold it for a few days, or if the rebels do not dare to attack us in a day or two, then our army ought to be ready to launch a counter-offensive. If we can pass through this crisis, it will be plain sailing ahead. With the arms we now possess, we could train a good brigade in three months' time. They will be our foundation, with which we can wipe out all our enemies and make Canton a safe and solid base for the Revolution. I will not go away a step from here, and I earnestly entreat you to return soon. To-day is the key to our success or failure.'

Regarding the arms confiscated from the Merchants' Corps, Chiang Kai-Shek stated in this message that it would be best to give them to Hsu Chung-Chih. He did not want to bargain with the Merchants, who now only offered two hundred thousand dollars as a loan instead of a million as a fine for their release. Neither did he agree to distribute them to various armies, which was bound to create jealousy. As he had new arms for the training of a revolutionary army, he did not want to keep those inferior ones in his Academy to render it a target to those greedy commanders.

But both Sun Yat-Sen and Hu Han-Min, who was acting for the Leader in Canton, agreed to the Merchants' terms. As part of the two hundred thousand dollars loan was paid, an order from Sun Yat-Sen and a letter from Hu Han-Min were given to Chiang Kai-Shek to release the arms. Chiang Kai-Shek had to obey, though reluctantly. As soon as some arms were handed over to the Merchants, they started a quarrel with the soldiers. On the occasion

of the Republic Festival (which is on October 10th, or the Double Tenth as October is the tenth month of the year), several soldiers were shot and killed by the Merchants. Therefore the Revolutionary Committee was formed the next day and there was no further chance for compromise. Sun Yat-Sen finally decided to back Chiang Kai-Shek's method for dealing with the Merchants.

On the 13th, Chiang Kai-Shek was appointed Head of the Training Department in the Headquarters of the Cantonese Army, and on the following day all the loyal forces, including part of the Guards in the Generalissimo's Headquarters, Voluntary Troops, Workers' Corps, Peasants' Corps, a detachment of Armoured Cars, were placed under Chiang Kai-Shek's command. With this rather haphazard mixed force, which was given the high-sounding name of the Allied Army, combined with his Cadets, a part of the Cantonese Army and a further force of three thousand reinforcements from Shiuchow, he started his attack on the Merchants' Corps.

Chen Chiung-Ming's forces were lurking near the City. But when they started what they thought to be their well-timed offensive, they found Chiang Kai-Shek had taken every precaution. So the trouble with the Merchants Corps was speedily settled, and after two days' street fighting the Corps capitulated and were disarmed. On October 17th the strike in Canton ended and on the following day peace came back to the Provincial Capital. This was Chiang Kai-Shek's first decisive victory over enemy forces as well as over internal opposition.

In the North the Peking Government won a first round victory by defeating the Chekiang forces in a fortnight. In fact, the Chihli Military Machine under the scholar-general Wu Pei-Fu was so effective that the Chekiang rising was subdued a few days after the Manchurian Army started its march South. Because of the Merchants' Corps

incident and lack of money, Sun Yat-Sen's Northern Expedition was very much delayed. Before the armies from Kwangtung could really start on their way North, Wu Pei-Fu had sent several formidable divisions of chosen men to counter-attack the Manchurian Army, which was still on the first stage of its way.

But towards the end of October Feng Yu-Hsiang, later well known as the Christian General, who was then a divisional commander under Wu Pei-Fu and was to fight against the Manchurian Army, suddenly turned back to march into Peking. He said he was thoroughly tired of being instrumental in endless civil wars and now wanted to 'maintain peace in full armour'. He ordered Tsao Kun, the bribing President, to go, and also drove out the ex-Emperor Henry Pu-Yi, who, it was rumoured, was trying to promote a second Restoration. Tuan Chi-Jui, the powerful War Lord who had been Prime Minister in Peking on several occasions, was invited by all the minor War Lords to take over the Government.

At the beginning of the *coup d'état*, Feng Yu-Hsiang wanted to get all the political leaders to co-operate. Besides Tuan Chi-Jui, he had also invited Chang Tso-Lin from Manchuria and Sun Yat-Sen from Kwangtung before establishing himself firmly in Peking. Tuan Chi-Jui also joined in the invitation. Sun Yat-Sen, who realised that his Northern Expedition had a long way to go, went back to Canton on October 30th and held a conference with his followers at his headquarters. It was decided that he, as the leader of the most progressive political party in China, should go to Peking to probe the possibility of forming a real democratic government. On November 3rd he went to the Whampoa Military Academy to bid farewell to the students and, after having appointed Hu Han-Min his Deputy to stay in Canton and General Tan Yen-Kai, a classical scholar and commander-in-chief of the Hunanese Army, as the over-all Commander-in-Chief of

the Northern Punitive Expeditionary Force, he left Canton with Wang Ching-Wei and about twenty others for Peking.

The aim of Sun Yat-Sen and his Kuo Min Tang can now be boiled down to two points: first, to sweep away all the War Lords, and second, to cancel all the unfair treaties forced upon China by the Powers. As he was now invited to join other political leaders to work out a national plan, his latest proposal was to call a National Assembly, to which representatives of every organisation, political or otherwise, should be invited. As Tuan Chi-Jui was the greatest of all the War Lords and of a dictatorial disposition, he was the last man in the world to welcome Sun Yat-Sen and his political programme. He would not wait for Sun Yat-Sen, and went to Peking to take up his post on the same day that Sun Yat-Sen left Shanghai for Tientsin.

By this time members of the Kuo Min Tang and of the Chinese Communist Party were spread all over the country, and Sun Yat-Sen's stock among the younger generation, especially the students and intellectuals, was extremely high. Tuan Chi-Jui and other politicians might dislike him, but the reception he had at all the places he passed was overwhelming. When he reached Tientsin he was refused admittance into the French Concession by the French authorities there. After his meeting with Chang Tso-Lin, the Manchurian War Lord, this Northern soldier aid frankly to Wang Ching-Wei:

'I thought Mr Sun was a very difficult man, but to-day found him to be a very kind gentleman. But all the Ministers accredited to Peking do not like him, probably because he co-operates with Russia. Could you tell him that if he would give up his co-operation with Russia, I, Chang Tso-Lin, would guarantee that all the Ministers would be nice to him?'

Sun Yat-Sen's health was failing, and he took to his bed

whilst in Tientsin. With undespairing determination he struggled to leave his sick-bed for Peking on New Year's Eve, hoping he could achieve something. But while Sun Yat-Sen was claiming the abolition of unfair treaties, Tuan Chi-Jui, in order to induce the *Corps Diplomatique* to recognise his position, had already accepted their memorandum to respect those very unfair treaties. After lingering in bed for over two months, while realising that he had travelled North in vain, he died on March 12th, 1925, to the sorrow of practically the whole nation.

VII

IN years to come there will be historians who will say that Chiang Kai-Shek was extremely successful in dealing with military affairs, while others will hold the opposite view. The argument for the former is that he conquered each and all those who fought against him and his cause; whilst that for the latter is that to have to fight against one's subordinates or associates is not the hall-mark of a military leader. In his political activities the position is exactly the same. After his dabbling in party politics he soon turned into a fully-fledged statesman, before the Kuo Min Tang and the Chinese Communist Party started to cut each other's throats, and for the past decade he can be rightly considered as the most important statesman in China or even in the Far East.

To begin from the early days of the Kuo Min Tang-Communist conflict, the reader will find that Chiang Kai-Shek was always on the side of the Communists. Or to be exact, he was only 'not on the side of the anti-Communists'. He was one of the promoters of Chinese-Soviet good relations, and was even an ardent supporter of Sun Yat-Sen's co-operation with Soviet Russian policy. To do him justice, he admired the Soviet system from afar but never liked Communism, especially when some *tovarich* wanted to apply it to China. To co-operate with Soviet Russia is one thing, and to like the Communist Party or the Communists is altogether another thing.

In leading the Sun Yat-Sen good-will mission to Russia, he went there not as a converted believer in Communism

but as an interested observer. His stay there was to have been much longer than it was, but he cut it short for a number of reasons, among which his disappointment with some of the things he saw and met was an important one. On March 14th, 1924, which was barely three months after his return from Russia and before he had done anything practical in the way of fostering the newly established good-relationship between the two countries, he wrote a very long letter to his best friend Liao Chung-Kai, who, it will be remembered, was the most ardent supporter of the policy of co-operation with Soviet Russia. The later part of this letter records his innermost feelings about the Communists he met in Russia. A faithful word-for-word translation will throw much light on the subject, as it is believed that this is the first time it has appeared in English and not many people have seen or read the original. In place of a footnote, it may be here pointed out that at the time when Chiang Kai-Shek was in Russia, Trotsky, and not Stalin, was at the head of the Party machine, Lenin being seriously ill and a dying man. The following is the last part of the letter:

. . . There is another matter which I want to tell you, my Elder Brother, frankly: that is the question of our attitude towards the Russian Party. In this question we must separate the practical from the theoretical. We cannot disregard the practical side of it simply because we can believe it theoretically. From my observation, the Russian Party is lacking in sincerity. Even when I told you, my Elder Brother, that only thirty per cent of what the Russians said was believable, it was said only because you, my Elder Brother, were so enthusiastic in believing the Russians that I had not the heart to disappoint you altogether. Regarding their respect for Mr Sun personally, they are not Russian Communists but international partisans. As for those of our country who are

in Russia, they have nothing except slander and suspicion for Mr Sun.

'The sole aim of the Russian Party is to make the Chinese Communist Party its legitimate heir. They do not believe that our Party could co-operate with them to the last, helping each other to achieve success. As regards their policy in China, they want to make Manchuria, Mongolia, the Mohamedan Province and Tibet each a part of their Soviet, and even as to China Proper they are not without the wish to put their fingers in.

'It is not reasonable to expect success by depending on others whilst you are unable to stand up for yourself. Those countrymen of ours have been insufficiently educated and are hoping for such success. They hope other people will act for them in executing the will of Heaven, and they obey other people as if obeying their God. Is that reasonable?

'What they call "Internationalism" and "World Revolution" are nothing but Kaiser Imperialism. They have only given it a new name and made it puzzling to distinguish one from the other. Russians, as well as the English, French, Americans and Japanese, it seems to me, all have it in their minds to promote the interest of their own respective countries at the cost of other nations. One of them ridiculing the others about this is, as Mencius said, just like a man who had run only fifty paces ridiculing those who had run a hundred paces for having run at all.

'You, my Elder Brother, mentioned that our Chinese representative was always unlucky, and cited a certain Mr Chang as an example. This is far from the case and quite incomparable. The reason is that those Chinese worship only foreigners and have no regard for the great character of our own people. For instance, some of our Chinese Communists who are in Russia always scold other people as slaves of America, of England and of Japan, never realis-

ing that they themselves have already completely become slaves of Russia. If you, my Elder Brother, still do not believe my words, and will not examine things carefully at all, you will perhaps some day fall.

'Our Party sent me to Russia; I have spent half a year of my time and more than ten thousand dollars in money there. It cannot be said that the matter has been treated lightly. But to my report on this trip, as to what I saw and heard, not the slightest attention has been paid. At this I should feel ashamed of myself: people have completely lost their faith in me and my reputation is now sweeping the ground. I really ought to lay the blame on myself.

'But I feel my conduct in Russia was impeccable. Neither did I do anything injurious to our Party. Once when I was being forced to join the Communist Party and I refused by saying I must obtain Mr Sun's permission first, I was ridiculed as being loyal to an individual. I know such is my nature and cannot avoid being ridiculed by others. But a man who is loyal to his master has the virtue of loving his compatriots and serving his country well, whereas a traitor to China and a slave to foreigners is betraying his country and ruining his compatriots. I'd rather be looked down upon as a loyal subject than honoured as a slave of foreigners, and hope you, my Elder Brother, will join me in maintaining such an aspiration.

'I used to blame my comrades for hesitating to speak out candidly, in consequence of which a hundred mistakes came out and thus no remedy could be effected. In my observation of things, I think I do not look at them subjectively. Neither do I try to be polite, nor view them with prejudice. But one doesn't know oneself. In the eyes of others I may be wrong in my observations and not fair in my judgments. This I do not know. Whether I am right or wrong, whether my observation is good or bad, I entirely trust you, my Elder Brother, whose view is final. All I want is to clear my conscience. Though this

letter is extremely long, it has not exhausted what is in my mind. Though I am not dead, I really want you, my Elder Brother, to consider this letter as the posthumous words of a dead friend.'

The reader is asked to bear this letter in mind when he reads later on of Chiang Kai-Shek's actions concerning the Communists. When the Chinese Communists were first allowed to join the Kuo Min Tang, the membership of the Communist Party was extremely small and they did not carry great weight anywhere. They did not have any part of China as their territory, nor an independent army of their own. No doubt people at that time thought that to allow a very small party to join a much larger party was somewhat like France allowing Monaco to join the Republic. Mao Tse-Tung, the powerful Communist leader in China to-day, was made only a Reserve Member of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuo Min Tang, that is, he had at least twenty-four Full Members of this Committee as his seniors. And among the seventeen Reserve Members his name appeared eleventh. Among the twenty-four Full Members only three were Communists; later on one left the Communist Party after much drastic activity and the other was sentenced and hanged in Peking by Chang Tso-Lin, the War Lord from Manchuria. Chou En-Lai, the Communist representative in Chungking and Nanking, was much later recommended by Chiang Kai-Shek to be appointed a military judge in his army. He was not on any of the Central Committees.

In spite of repeated opposition by various influential people in the Party and the Government, the Communists were given vital work in the army, the reason for this being that the new army to be formed by Chiang Kai-Shek with his cadets was to be modelled after the Red Army. Russian staff officers, advisers and instructors were engaged and much had to be learnt from them.

The trouble over the arms secretly bought by the Merchants' Corps in Canton before a licence was obtained, was the very first concrete anti-Communist measure taken by the combined forces of various haters of Communism. It is alleged that the British Imperialists in Hongkong were the chief string-pullers. In view of the naval demonstration of December 5th, 1923, and the letter to the Government in Canton sent by the British Consul-General on August 27th, 1924, such an accusation cannot easily be denied. But within the rank and file of the Cantonese Regime there were the Yunnanese and Kwangsi Commanders who were only too ready to fish in troubled waters, and also those die-hard conservatives who from the very first had hated the Communists more than poison. Though the rising would mean the overthrow of the complete Cantonese regime, those who only wanted to get rid of the Communists thought it advisable to join in as a protest against the Government's erring policy.

Chiang Kai-Shek played the most important part in handling this difficult situation, and, for good or evil, was afterwards considered the chief enemy of all the anti-Communist forces. Luckily such a situation suited his purposes, for in the later part of 1924 he was busily engaged in organising the Revolutionary Army or the Party Army with his graduated cadets as officers, and the Communists and pro-Communists represented the most enterprising and energetic elements of the time. They all flocked together under him and he had the pick of them in his service.

This new army started as a Training Corps, and besides ordinary military officers, such as corporals and lieutenants, captains and majors, there was in each unit a Party Representative, and in larger units there were Political Departments, each with a head and a small staff. These officials looked after the social welfare of the soldiers and imparted to them political knowledge. They

also acted temporarily in the absence of commanding officers or when the commanding officers were killed or disabled in battle.

At the beginning a considerable number of such posts in Chiang Kai-Shek's Army were filled by Kuo Min Tang members who were also Communists, for the simple reason that their political knowledge was, on the average, greater than most others', and it was necessary for them to know a little about international affairs. It seemed to work very smoothly this way, and the reader will be interested to learn that Chou En-Lai, who was a military judge at first, was later on, in September, 1925, recommended by Chiang Kai-Shek for the appointment of head of the Political Department attached to the First Army, that is, Chiang Kai-Shek's original Revolutionary Army.

The speedy conquest of the Merchants' Corps in Canton was the first test of the efficiency of Chiang Kai-Shek's cadets, and the Government and Chiang Kai-Shek had good cause to be satisfied with them. At that time the second batch of cadets was already in training, and very soon the third and fourth batches, each much larger in numbers than the previous ones, were admitted before their predecessors had finished their course of training. By January, 1926, some 5,540 cadets had matriculated, and they formed the Spartan wall for the Kuo Min Tang.

Four months after this first test, Chiang Kai-Shek decided that it was time for his cadets to tackle something bigger. Chen Chiung-Ming's rebellious forces had been a constant menace to Canton, and Chiang Kai-Shek had always been anxious to wipe them out. Hitherto he had had no troops of his own and now that there was the Training Corps he considered it best to strike as early as possible. So on February 1st, 1925, while Sun Yat-Sen was still ill in bed in Peking, he led his Training Corps, which

at that moment comprised only two regiments, about three thousand men, including the five hundred first batch cadets, to join the East River Expedition.

This expedition was launched at the time the bigger one, the Northern Punitive Expedition under the command of Tan Yen-Kai, was suffering local defeats and could not spare its men to be sent home to help. Hsu Chung-Chih, Commander of the Cantonese Army, who held a much higher position than that of Chiang Kai-Shek, was nominally conducting the campaign. The two 'friendly' armies, those of Yunnan and Kwangsi, were also partially mobilised. As only a part of Hsu Chung-Chih's Cantonese Army was joining this Expedition, the Training Corps had to bear the brunt of the fighting.

On February 15th a decisive battle was fought in the strategical town of Tam-Shui, which is about twenty miles south of Waichow, the enemy's headquarters. Brisk fighting took place for a day and a night when the two regiments of the Training Corps stormed and occupied the city. On the following day Chiang Kai-Shek, who was directing the engagement, said in a speech to his officers and men:

' . . . The defeat of the enemy at Tamshui was due to your brave forward rush. With but two thousand Revolutionary soldiers we have defeated five or six thousand of the enemy. We have captured more than two thousand officers and men as our prisoners. We have captured more than a thousand rifles. Such a good report, when it reaches our Generalissimo, will certainly make him overjoyed . . . '

Hu Han-Min, the acting Generalissimo, sent him the following telegram:

'To my Elder Brother Kai-Shek,

'I have received Commander-in-Chief Hsu's victorious report and your telegram to the Master dated the 16th, and am extremely glad to know that owing to the loyalty and courage of our officers and men our army has defeated

the powerful enemy, of whom many were killed or captured. Above all, the discipline and bravery of the Training Corps have filled everybody with astonishment. As their period of training has not been long and has yet yielded such good results, it all shows that the doctrine of our Party has been greatly helpful, and also proves that you, my Elder Brother, have trained them well. Now that the strength of the rebels has been reduced by half, we can count the days before the East River is cleared of them. I venture to congratulate our Party in advance. The Master is pleased with the victorious news of the past few days and his spirits are high. He specially asks me to convey to you his approval and appreciation. Han-Min, 19th.'

In the middle of March another fierce battle was fought in which a little over a thousand men of the Training Corps routed more than ten thousand of the enemy. But a heavy price had to be paid for this victory. Chiang Kai-Shek later wrote: 'Soldiers who fell in battle or were totally disabled amounted to more than six hundred. Of the five hundred students of the first batch who went to the campaign with me, and the three hundred comrades of the Training Corps, almost a third have died or been wounded. When I speak or think of this, how my heart hurts me!'

Though battles had been won, and though many districts had been reoccupied, the campaign was not completely successful. The enemy was only half-broken when news of the death of Sun Yat-Sen reached them. It was now realised that their victories had been so costly because the 'friendly' armies of Yunnan and Kwangsi were not really friendly. In fact, these forces were almost as friendly to the enemy as to the Government. With the death of the great Leader, the Military Governor of the Province of Yunnan, who had once been appointed by Sun Yat-Sen as the Deputy Generalissimo, wanted to pro-

mote himself to be the Generalissimo. This proposal intensified the confusion in the Cantonese Government and the Commanders of the Yunnanese and Kwangsi Armies thought it was time for them to rebel against the Southern Regime openly.

Chiang Kai-Shek was always the first to make drastic moves. At a conference with Hsu Chung-Chih, while Chiang Kai-Shek was anxious to plan the building of a bigger Revolutionary Army to deal with those opposing the Government, Hsu Chung-Chih was nagging him in order to secure favourable positions for his own followers. Chiang Kai-Shek's temper could hardly be checked and Hsu Chung-Chih realised his mistake, saying: 'This campaign against the rebels has been entirely dependent on the determined action of your Military Academy. Without you, my Elder Brother, how could the Regime in Canton have been saved?' He immediately promised to let Chiang Kai-Shek train six more regiments.

It was late in May when Wang Ching-Wei returned to Canton from Peking. He and Liao Chung-Kai came to Chiang Kai-Shek's headquarters of this campaign, and they finally decided to give up the present undertaking in order to stamp out troubles brewing in Canton. In this important Conference a new Yunnanese military leader, General Chu Pei-Teh, who later on became Chiang Kai-Shek's lifelong friend and supporter, and the Russian Chief-of-Staff General Galens, who had just come from Canton with General Chu Pei-Teh, both supported Chiang Kai-Shek's proposal to fight back to Canton as warmly as did Wang Ching-Wei and Liao Chung-Kai. They discussed the homeward campaign in detail from early evening until one o'clock in the morning. Chiang Kai-Shek was nominated to be the chief Commanding Officer of the campaign. Though he was worried by his new responsibility and could not sleep at all, he said cheerfully when he was seeing his friends off on the following

afternoon: 'All I want is 8,000 rifles, with which I undertake to wipe out all the reactionary forces in Canton. The rest of the Army may remain at their stations.'

On May 20th, 1925, at a dinner-party given to all the officers of the Revolutionary Army and the Guards, Chiang Kai-Shek said: 'Our Master struggled for forty years for the liberty of all the Chinese people, indeed all the people in the world, and all he got was the little place of Canton. With this place as a base, he hoped, revolutionary work could be done in co-operation with all the oppressed people in the world. If this base of the Revolutionary Government is occupied by reactionary forces, all the work done during the lifetime of our Master will have been in vain. And all our deceased comrades will have sacrificed their lives in vain. So, if we want to go on with the work left to us by our Master, we must first of all protect the base of the Revolutionary Government. This homeward campaign is more serious than that of the East River. But no matter how powerful is our enemy, we cannot call ourselves revolutionaries if we cannot take back our base. After we have reached Canton we will re-form our policy, bring the control of finance under one Government, reorganise our army and put our revolutionary doctrine into practice. . . .'

At the beginning of June Chiang Kai-Shek led his troops on the march towards Canton. The workers on the railways in and near Canton went on strike in sympathy with the returning army and the Yunnanese and Kwangsi Commanders, being unable to move their forces rapidly enough to meet the emergency, were utterly at a loss to know what to do. On June 12th, Chiang Kai-Shek entered Canton with his men and was appointed Commander of the Safe Guards around Canton. As only a part of the defeated armies surrendered and a smaller part were killed, the majority had to run away. Some were scattered about near the Capital, and

the Commander of the Safe Guards was kept busy in mopping them up.

With the successful conclusion of this homecoming campaign the authorities in Canton now felt safe, and decided to organise the Government in a more stately and solid form. The Central Executive Committee was made the highest body in the Government, and the Generalissimo's headquarters, which used to be the Revolutionary Government, was reorganised into a formal National Government. The various armies under different names were to be called the National Revolutionary Army. Plans for reorganising the army and for managing finance were all made. On July 1st, 1925, a State Council of sixteen members was elected, and also a new Military Council. Wang Ching-Wei was the chairman of both, whilst Chiang Kai-Shek remained a member of the latter. It was then that a complete military plan, including the forming of seven armies for the purpose of the long-cherished Northern Punitive Expedition, a Navy and an Air Force, the establishment of arsenals and the development of heavy industries, was presented to the State Council by Chiang Kai-Shek. It had been drafted some time previously, but because of the Sha-Kee Massacre, or so-called incident (as the British did not like the word massacre), which happened on June 23rd, he examined the financial aspects, and, finding that Kwangtung could have an income for forty million dollars a year, he asked that his plan be adopted. It would cost roughly half of the possible income.

The Shakee Massacre was a sequel to the Nanking Road Massacre (or 'incident' as again preferred by the British) which happened in Shanghai on May 30th, 1925. After Communism came into China, strikes began in a number of places. One broke out among the workers on the Peking-Hankow Railway, and Wu Pei-Fu ordered his

soldiers to shoot the demonstrators. Another broke out in Shanghai among the workers in the cotton mills, and when during their parade on the main road of the International Settlement trouble started between the demonstrators and the British police, the policemen shot into the crowd and killed many people.

The Shakee Massacre resulted directly from a demonstration in Canton to register public opinion against the Shanghai tragedy. While a procession of sixty thousand people was passing near Sha-Meen (the British Concession separated only by a narrow canal from Shakee, part of the mainland of Canton) intensive shooting started. Both sides accused the other as being the one who opened fire first. It is not for the humble author to judge the case here, but at least three things clearly indicate who was the guilty party. Firstly, only one Frenchman was killed, one Englishman and three or four foreigners were wounded on the Shameen side, whereas about sixty workers, ordinary people and cadets were killed and nearly two hundred Chinese were wounded on the Shakee side. Secondly, a French gunboat moored near the place bombarded the crowd and British machine-gun fire continued for some time. Lastly, while the Chinese called it a massacre, the British said it was a mere incident.

That the Communists and the Kuo Min Tang people hated the British in Canton and Hongkong, and that the British in those two places returned the compliment, with compound interest, there is no doubt. The naval demonstration in 1923 was only a beginning, to be followed later by several real bombardments on the innocent masses, which shows that the Europeans in China considered the lives of the Chinese, whom they called 'the natives', as dirt cheap, and the life of one European as worth more than a hundred of the Chinese. It was lucky for the Chinese that the British Consul-General did not carry out his ultimatum of August, 1924, when he told the Canton

authorities that the British Navy would bombard the Chinese Army. It was lucky for the Europeans that only one Frenchman was killed when serious hostilities started after so many innocent Chinese had been massacred. It was not a miracle that the Chinese, with more than eight hundred fully-equipped cadets and many thousand well-seasoned soldiers in the parade, did not choose to answer shot with shot. It was because they had no intention of starting a war if they could possibly avoid it, however great the provocation might be. It clearly showed that one side was touchy and nervous and wanted to teach the other side a lesson, knowing full well that no matter how many people they might kill, the other side was not in a position to risk a war; whereas the other side, conscious of their inferior military strength, could still control themselves. If a demonstration in Liverpool resulted in an exchange of fire between a foreign warship in the harbour and the British demonstrators, and if one foreigner on board was killed where about sixty Englishmen were killed and some two hundred people on shore were wounded, what would be the consequences?

These tragedies in Shanghai and Shakee, though no English lives were lost, did harm to the English people in the East. They made almost every Chinese begin to see how cold-bloodedly cruel these people could be. Large-scale strikes started in the British concessions of Canton and Shanghai and also in Hongkong. This was a golden opportunity for Communist propaganda, and the recruiting commission of the Communist Party had a very busy time. Naturally people accused the Russians in China and said that they created these regrettable tragedies. Borodin, the Russian political adviser in Canton, said very wittily: 'We did not make May 30th, it was made for us.'

Chiang Kai-Shek was in his Academy at Whampoa at the time of the Shakee Massacre, and when he heard the

report over the telephone tears rolled down his face. He went into conference with all the other leaders of the Government until one o'clock the next morning, and in the evening he harangued all the soldiers in the city. He explained to them the situation and ordered them to bear this with unprecedented fortitude, as they must not fall into the trap the British had set for them. They must go on with their revolutionary programme. But this tragedy no doubt made him believe all the more that China must co-operate with Soviet Russia even at a very high cost. Consequently for a long time after this he did his best to accommodate the Russians and the Chinese Communists, though he never liked them much. It is quite true to say that had there been no Shanghai Massacre nor a Shakee Massacre, Chiang Kai-Shek would have broken off relations with his Russian advisers and Chinese Communists much earlier. And had they been persecuted much earlier, the Chinese Communists might not have been able to wield such a big influence in China to-day. In the spirit of Comrade Borodin, the Third International should decorate the British Police Inspector of Shanghai and the Commander of the British force at Canton, for their excellent service to Communism.

Many writers in China said that after the death of Sun Yat-Sen, Borodin was left as dictator in Canton. Such was far from being the case. In fact, when the formal National Government was established in place of the Generalissimo's Headquarters in Canton, the right wing of the Kuo Min Tang was having a much bigger say in everything and everywhere than before. First of all, no Communist was elected to the State Council, which was composed of sixteen members of the Kuo Min Tang, and of the five members of the Standing Committee Wang Ching-Wei was the only one with leftist tendencies at that time. Hu Han-Min, the extreme right-wing leader,

was an important member of the Standing Committee of the State Council, as well as of the newly re-organised Military Council. Besides holding these two high positions, he was made the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

It was mentioned in the last chapter that there were three party men who had followed Sun Yat-Sen very long and closely: Hu Han-Min, Wang Ching-Wei and Liao Chung-Kai. Besides these three there was Chiang Kai-Shek. After Chen Chiung-Ming's rebellion, Chiang Kai-Shek's relations with his Party Leader became much more intimate, and when the important decision to co-operate with Soviet Russia was to be made, Chiang Kai-Shek was one of the very few whom Sun Yat-Sen trusted. The establishing of the Whampoa Military Academy, and later on the forming of a Party Army from the Training Corps, greatly increased Chiang Kai-Shek's prestige. After the death of Sun Yat-Sen it was very difficult to choose a man to step into the shoes of the deceased Leader.

Wang Ching-Wei, though he was younger than either Hu Han-Min or Liao Chung-Kai, was chosen as the chairman of the State Council and of the Military Council because on the one hand he could be accepted by the conservatives, and on the other he himself was leaning towards the left, much more so since he had gone to Peking with Sun Yat-Sen, having been at his side nearly all the time until the Leader passed away. If it had not been that Hu Han-Min was too much to the right and Liao Chung-Kai too much to the left, Wang Ching-Wei would not have been put forward. Besides these people, there was also a very much respected veteran member of the Party: Chang Ching-Kiang, who, however, would not and actually could not accept any responsible position because of his health.

Putting these Party men aside, let us examine the military men. Soldiers of fortune who had to be humoured in the days when Sun Yat-Sen was depending upon their

support were gone. Chiang Kai-Shek was now the most staunch supporter of the Government and had been for the past few years closely connected with the inner circle of the Party and the Government. But he was very young, still in his late thirties, and he had Hsu Chung-Chih above him. In the army rank is very important, and whatever happened, Hsu Chung-Chih would always be higher in rank than Chiang Kai-Shek.

The new Military Council was composed of eight members. Four civilians from the Government headed the list, appearing in this order: Wang Ching-Wei, Hu Han-Min, Liao Chung-Kai and C. C. Wu, formerly Minister of Foreign Affairs. The four soldiers were Chu Pei-Teh, the new Commander-in-Chief of the Yunnanese Army, Tan Yen-Kai, Commander-in-Chief of the Hunanese Army, Hsu Chung-Chih, Commander-in-Chief of the Cantonese Army, and Chiang Kai-Shek. The inclusion of the four civilians in the Military Council is quite understandable. The first three were the most important figures of the day, and they could not possibly be excluded from any responsible organisation. The fourth, C. C. Wu, was the able and learned son of the late Wu Ting-Fang, Sun Yat-Sen's old friend and colleague. He had studied law in America and England and was called to the Bar before he went back to China to enter the Diplomatic Service. It was evident that, following the Shakee Massacre, it would be better to have on the Military Council a diplomat who could understand English law.

It is not very far wide of the mark to say that the eight members of the Military Council were all that mattered in the new Government. And among these eight people C. C. Wu was the least important because he had been included only as a legal adviser. Chu Pei-Teh and Tan Yen-Kai, Commanders-in-Chief of the Yunnanese and Hunanese Armies respectively, were fairly newcomers

and they were honoured with such high positions simply because of their armies. Actually the remaining five, with their long association with Sun Yat-Sen and the Party, were the ruling power of the Southern regime. Although Chiang Kai-Shek was the youngest of the five, the other four could not do without him.

With the supreme Leader gone, friction soon became serious between the left and right wings. Liao Chung-Kai, the extreme leftist, was misunderstood by the conservatives, who suspected him of being a Communist. As his influence and power became greater and greater, his enemies plotted to assassinate him. This they carried out on August 20th, 1925. He was shot when he went to attend the Central Executive Committee meeting and died of his wounds at the Medical College of Canton University shortly afterwards on the same day.

On one of the assassins a licence allowing the bearer to carry firearms was found, and from this licence the plotters were easily traced. They were very important men, one a high-ranking officer in the Cantonese Army and another none other than the brother of Hu Han-Min about whom Chiang Kai-Shek had written in his letter to Sun Yat-Sen. But there were still bigger names connected with this plot and they were in touch with the British Imperialists in Hongkong. In view of the importance of the matter, a combined meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuo Min Tang, the State Council and the Military Council was held and a Special Committee with a Big Three was formed to meet the emergency. The Big Three were Wang Ching-Wei, Hsu Chung-Chih and Chiang Kai-Shek, and they were to have unlimited power in dealing with political and military matters.

In his capacity as Commander of the Safe Guards around Canton, Chiang Kai-Shek sent out part of the

Fourth and Fifth Regiments of the Training Corps to arrest the plotters and disarm their forces. In the headquarters of the Cantonese Army documents revealing a conspiracy to overthrow the present Government and appoint the plotters to be Commander-in-Chief, Civil Governor and to other high posts, were captured.

As Liao Chung-Kai had been the Party Representative of both the Whampoa Military Academy and the Revolutionary Army, which for a time was also called the Party Army and was formed from the Training Corps, a memorial service was held by the men and officers of this army. At this service Chiang Kai-Shek said: 'The death of our Party Representative Liao was entirely due to a plot hatched jointly by the Imperialists and the Reactionaries. We must know that those who struck at our Party Representative Liao did not aim at him alone. They really wanted to annihilate us, the Party Army. . . .'

On September 1st, 1925, the Special Committee met for the eighth time within twelve days and at the meeting it was resolved that the finance of the Province was to be brought under a single united control, for which a supervisory committee was to be formed to see that revenue and other income was handed over to the Government, if necessary by force; that the East River Expedition was to be resumed, and that Hu Han-Min was to be sent abroad.

A few words of explanation are needed regarding these three resolutions of the Special Committee. Firstly, the finances of the Government had always been a headache. For years military authorities had been in the habit of collecting revenue for the Government and keeping it for their own expenses. Liao Chung-Kai had been the Minister of Finance for the past few years, and he had tried very hard to unite the control of finance under this Ministry. Chiang Kai-Shek had been his most ardent supporter. Indeed, he criticised Liao Chung-Kai very

severely when, earlier, Liao had had to compromise because the mercenary commanders were utterly uncontrollable. The adoption of the first resolution was mainly due to Chiang Kai-Shek's urging.

As for the second resolution, this was a point on which Hsu Chung-Chih and Chiang Kai-Shek had quarrelled. Earlier in the year, when they had found out that the Yunnanese and Kwangsi Armies were playing false, it had been decided to suspend the East River Expedition in order to clear the traitors out of Canton. In the meantime Hsu Chung-Chih had concluded a temporary truce with Chen Chiung-Ming's lieutenants, to the utter astonishment of Chiang Kai-Shek. He had frankly advised Hsu Chung-Chih not to do this, but without success. Only a little over a month before this he had written a long letter to Hsu Chung-Chih proposing a number of reforms for the Army and at the end of it he said:

'... Yet I have another thing to say: Chen Chiung-Ming and his company are rebels against the Party and the country. Their sins are well known. As they have no intention of repenting they will be our undoing in the future if we forgive them and if they pretend to submit to us. Since they could betray our Master, why could not they betray you? At the very beginning of our reform of the Army we must clearly cut off all the bad things so as not to leave them to spread into an uncontrollable state. . . .'

Unfortunately Hsu Chung-Chih had ignored this advice. Now that a political crisis had arisen in Canton, Chen Chiung-Ming's men were getting ready to make trouble once more: hence this resolution.

The third resolution does not require much explanation. Since Hu Han-Min's brother was one of the plotters and had made good his escape before measures could be taken against him, it had been suspected that Hu Han-Min was in sympathy with his brother. Besides, it was

well known that he belonged to the extreme right wing, and it was thought that his absence for a little while from Canton would do much good both to himself and the Government. Moreover, he was a very hot-tempered man and had recently quarrelled with Hsu Chung-Chih. They were scarcely on speaking terms. It was finally decided that Hu Han-Min was to be appointed a Special Envoy to Russia, and for this he sailed in a Russian ship from Canton towards the end of September.

About the same time the Government found out that Hsu Chung-Chih's Army had become thoroughly inefficient. With the East River Expedition soon to be resumed, the Government could ill afford to feed a large army of some fifteen thousand men who did not want to help. Not only had some of its officers been in the plot against the Government and for the assassination of Liao Chung-Kai, but also, some of them were still communicating with Chen Chiung-Ming. So, on September 21st, 1925, Hsu Chung-Chih was dismissed from his office of Minister of War and relieved of his command of the Cantonese Army.

With the departure of Hu Han-Min and Hsu Chung-Chih and the death of Liao Chung-Kai, the Government and the Party had to depend upon the two younger men: Wang Ching-Wei who was then forty-one, and Chiang Kai-Shek who was thirty-eight.

The resumed East River Expedition started early in October, 1925. By that time the forces in Kwangtung had been reorganised into five armies. The Revolutionary Party Army was to be the First Revolutionary Army, with Chiang Kai-Shek as the Commander. The Hunanese Army was the Second, and its Commander was Tan Yen-Kai. The newly-reorganised Yunnanese Army was the Third, and Chu Pei-Teh was the Commander. The reorganised Cantonese Army was the Fourth, and Li Chi-

Shen was the new Commander. The Volunteer Army was the Fifth, with Li Fu-Lin as its Commander. Besides these five armies, there were some miscellaneous troops which remained independent under separate commands but under the supreme control of the Military Council.

Part of the First Army, the Fourth Army and some of the miscellaneous troops took part in this Expedition, and Chiang Kai-Shek was appointed the Chief Commander. Since all the undesirable forces had been weeded out, the progress of this campaign was extraordinarily rapid. Within ten days Waichow, the enemy's stronghold, was stormed and taken and on November 6th, 1925, Chiang Kai-Shek sent out a circular telegram to announce his complete victory:

'When I received the order to fight eastwards, I had the good fortune to have under me a united force of officers and men and the support and co-operation of the common people. It is now only a month since we started on the 6th of last month, but we have captured from the enemy over six thousand rifles, seven field guns, more than thirty machine-guns and over six thousand prisoners. All the famous cities along the East River have been recaptured one by one, and our forces have reached as far as Chaochow and Kaying. To-day we are in Swatow, having covered a distance of over six hundred *li* from our starting-point. The common people from all four directions have come out in crowds to see us and welcome us with food and drink. . . .'

In conducting this campaign, full use had been made of the Party Representatives and members of the Political Department in the Army. Not only had they looked after the welfare of their soldiers but they had also served as a kind of liaison office between the troops and the people. Chiang Kai-Shek had this report announced:

'In this Expedition there have been Party Representatives and political officers attached to every group of the

forces. They have supervised the commanders and their men, and have explained to them our Party principles, so the men have fought very bravely. Wherever they went they have arranged social meetings, attended by both the troops and the people. Entertainments have been provided, the aims of the campaign announced and slogans given to the public. As the purpose of our revolution has been made known to them, all the people have been willing to co-operate with us. On the eve of our arrival at a place, rice has always been prepared, pigs killed, and vegetables unearthed from their own gardens to be presented to us. All along the route of the campaign chairs have been provided for us to sit on and rest and tea offered to quench our thirst. Such things are entirely due to our publicity work and the good conduct and discipline of our men. They have never employed forced labour nor driven hard bargains when buying from the people.'

But Chiang Kai-Shek was a very exacting commander. In spite of this good report and satisfactory results, he considered the Party Representatives and political officers of his Army had not done their duty well. It was his first big unhampered expedition, and the forces taking part had been chosen by himself; so he looked for perfection. After the successful conclusion of this campaign, he wrote a letter to Chou En-Lai, the Communist, who had been appointed at the beginning of the Expedition as Deputy Representative for the First Division of the First Army. This is quoted here because it indirectly explains the work of a Party Representative and political officer:

'The Party office in all regiments exists in name only. Party activities are lacking in spirit. Recently numerous complaints have been received from the soldiers and a number of the cases I saw myself. The worst was that of a sergeant putting filth into a soldier's mouth. There have been many cases of severe beating and excessive scolding. Soldiers suffering from cold and hunger are a

common occurrence. The barracks are badly managed and public health is entirely overlooked. There are captains who squeeze the pay of dismissed soldiers. Such bad things are happening quite often. Fundamentally it is because the regimental Party Officers are not active. They have had insufficient training and organisation and spent most of their time in the battlefield. I do not blame them.

‘But Party work should go on at full speed during the war just as in peace time. Now that there is no fighting, start to reform the regimental Party Offices of the First Division. Let the soldiers express their views with complete freedom and report their hardships. Their superior officers must not victimise them. If this is done the soldiers, though hard up and uncomfortable, will have a slightly better life and higher spirits. This is the responsibility of the Party Representatives of all ranks. Should the Army officers prevent the Party Representatives from doing their duty this should be reported frankly, otherwise the Party Representatives themselves are to blame. We are working for a Revolution. If we do not start it by improving the life of the soldiers, all slogans of reforming and improving society are but empty words. No good results can be expected. Intensive work must be done about the small committee meetings in the regiments and companies of the First Division. You must supervise the work to see it is put into practice. We hope the First Division will set a good example to all the other divisions. Only then will the name of the Revolutionary Party Army be true and the Revolution succeed. . . .’

What was worrying Chiang Kai-Shek was but the general practice in the armies of all the War Lords. Nobody had ever worried themselves about such trifles. They seemed to be quite all right. They fought each other for their own interest; some won while others lost

these wars, with soldiers leading this kind of wretched life. To win or lose depended chiefly upon how strong was your army. When both sides were equally strong it was a matter of chance. Why should they bother? But Chiang Kai-Shek had learnt his lesson from the Red Army. Sun Yat-Sen's very words were that a single soldier of the Revolutionary Army was as good as ten of the War Lords. Such a remark was no exaggeration. In this campaign Chiang Kai-Shek found that in several engagements he was victorious with a single battalion, fighting against four or five thousand enemies. With such fine soldiers fighting under him no wonder he was always victorious and no wonder he took the greatest care to improve their life in barracks.

Another thing of which he was proud was the good conduct of his soldiers. He said to his men: 'In this war, all the men in the various regiments of the First Division, no matter whether they are officers or soldiers, have borne extreme hardship admirably. Sometimes, because the movement of our army has been so rapid, food supplies from behind the lines have not followed as quickly as was expected, and bedding has not been prepared in time. But all our brethren bore it with fortitude. They would rather suffer hunger and cold themselves than trouble the people for a bit of straw or a block of wood. That was why wherever our army went, it was heartily welcomed by all the people. This achievement of our army is much better than all the victories we have won. I, as the head of the First Army, am extremely satisfied with officers and men of all ranks, and I have the greatest respect and love for them for this. . . .'

Credit must be given to the commander who knows, on the one hand, how to encourage his men for their good conduct, and on the other hand tries his best to redress their sufferings and prevent their recurrence. This East River Expedition was a dress-rehearsal for the whole

Northern Punitive Expedition, so Chiang Kai-Shek wanted to go all out to make it perfect.

The general situation in the North since Sun Yat-Sen's trip to Peking must occupy a little space here. Tuan Chi-Jui, having been made Chief Executive to take over the Government of Tsao Kun, had no use for Sun Yat-Sen or his Kuo Min Tang. Being the greatest living War Lord, he acted true to tradition. Any minor War Lord who would offer him lip-service was his man and would be rewarded with any position he could grasp for himself by military force. To Sun Yat-Sen's proposal for calling a National Assembly he agreed, merely to humour him and his immense following. He modified it into a utterly undemocratic gathering, all the participants being appointed by himself. Sun Yat-Sen on his death-bed asked his followers not to attend such an Assembly and his dying wish was readily respected by all the Kuo Min Tang members, even those of the right wing.

Tuan Chi-Jui's government could be nothing but another failure. War Lords in most parts of the country redoubled their efforts and fought each other to grasp positions which they knew the Central Government in Peking would immediately ratify and approve. Feng Yu-Hsiang, the Christian General, who imprisoned Tsao Kun and promoted the said new Government, was disappointed, and soon had to retire whilst the man whom he had helped to become the Chief Executive remained in office much longer, to be finally driven away in April, 1926, by Chang Tso-Lin, the War Lord from Manchuria. During this period of confused fighting, Wu Pei-Fu lost his foothold in the North and tried to establish himself in Central China, where the minor War Lords had great respect for him.

The fighting between the various forces in East China produced a new major War Lord. Sun Chuan-Fang, a

general originally belonging to the Manchurian Army, now became fully fledged and established himself as the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces of the Five South-eastern Provinces by defeating several minor War Lords of that neighbourhood. The five provinces are Kiangsu, Anhwei, Kiangsi, Chekiang and Fukien. This meant that the National Government in Canton now had to face a new hostile neighbour on its north-east.

It was Chiang Kai-Shek's firm belief that the enemy outside, however strong, was easy to defeat, but a traitor inside, or even disunity among comrades, was much more dangerous. His consistent policy had been to deal with trouble inside first. When Sun Yat-Sen wanted to start the Northern Punitive Expeditions, Chiang Kai-Shek wanted to wipe out the treacherous enemies in or near Canton first. That was why, instead of joining Sun Yat-Sen's Northern Expedition, he was always for turning back to attack the trouble-makers at home first. Now that the last of these, Chen Chiung-Ming, had been swept away from the East River, he was ready to go on the war-path for the North.

But disunity within the Party had already started. The most serious break after the assassination of Liao Chung-Kai was cooked up in Peking whilst Chiang Kai-Shek was fighting Chen Chiung-Ming's remaining forces in the eastern part of Kwangtung. On November 3rd, 1925, a number of 'old comrades'—such being the collective name of some veteran members of the Kuo Min Tang—held a secret conference in a temple in the Western Hills outside Peking. They had chosen this place because Sun Yat-Sen's coffin was temporarily resting there, and a conference in front of the remains of their deceased Leader indicated its solemnity and also their loyalty.

Those who attended this meeting were extreme right-wing members of the Central Committees of the Kuo Min Tang who were in Peking, and afterwards they

were known as 'Western Hills Conference Members'. In this conference the following resolutions were passed:

1. That the highest political organisation existing and functioning in Canton be abolished;
2. That all the Communists who are in the Kuo Min Tang be expelled;
3. That Borodin, the political adviser, and all the other Russian military advisers be dismissed;
4. That there should be sweeping changes regarding the regulations for the next National Congress of the Kuo Ming Tang; and
5. That the seat of the Central Committees office be moved from Canton to Shanghai.

Such a move was not to be compared with the assassination of a pro-Communist comrade. It was the formal beginning of a split inside the Party. But the number of members who attended this meeting was not enough to form a quorum for a legal committee meeting and so was denounced by the Members in Canton. However, this splitting movement spread rapidly, and all the right-wing members in Canton began to get together for collective anti-Communist activities. Chiang Kai-Shek, who considered such a movement most injurious to the Party, was disconcerted to find that even within his Military Academy, and also among his own troops, the First Revolutionary Army, partisans started to accuse each other, one saying the other was disloyal, whilst the other said his accuser was reactionary.

Since his plunge into Party politics, Chiang Kai-Shek had been trying his best to co-ordinate the right and left wings of the Kuo Min Tang. In those early days the Communists and their sympathisers were in the minority. Chiang Kai-Shek supported them because they needed support badly. At the time of the assassination of Liao Chung-Kai the left-wing members were disheartened. Some prepared to flee, because they heard one of the re-

actionary generals had declared openly that all those who were pro-Communist should be done away with just as they had done away with Liao Chung-Kai. At the time, without Chiang Kai-Shek's prompt and stern action, the left wing would have ceased to exist.

There are authors who have said that when in January, 1924, the Communists were first allowed to join the Kuo Min Tang, some of them became heads of Ministries in the Canton Government. That was a translation blunder. The Chinese word 'pu' is used to denote a Ministry in the sense of a State Department, as well as a Bureau or a Department of any organisation. There were only three Ministries in the National Government during the first few years. The Minister of War was Hsu Chung-Chih until he left Canton in 1925. The Minister of Finance was Liao Chung-Kai until he was killed in 1925; and later T. V. Soong, Madame Sun Yat-Sen's brother, was appointed to this post. The post of Minister of Foreign Affairs had been held by Hu Han-Min, Wang Ching-Wei, Eugen Chen, and C. C. Wu. No Communist was ever appointed to any of these posts.

But there are many departments or bureaus belonging to the Headquarters of the Kuo Min Tang. In 1924 several departments had Communists as heads. Tan Ping-Shan, representing the Communists at the Revolutionary Council, was given the post of Head of the Organisation Department. Another department looks after publicity and should be translated Propaganda Department. Though it is known in London as the Chinese Ministry of Information, the translator was merely using an English stock-name of a Government Ministry for a Party organisation, because the word Propaganda had become associated with Goebbels. Mao Tse-Tung, now the Communist leader in China, was the acting head of this department for a time. Besides these two, four other departments, Labour, Peasants, Youth and Women's, were


headed by Communists. It was in 1946 when two departments, those of Propaganda and Social Affairs, were moved over from the Party organisation into the Cabinet: one became a Ministry and the other a Bureau.

The Communist influence in the Kuo Min Tang can be easily assessed by quoting this passage from Chiang Kai-Shek's answer to the Western Hills Conference, of which he greatly disapproved: 'They announced that four members of the Central Executive Committee who were Communists should be expelled. There are twenty-four members in the Central Executive Committee, and only four of them belong to the Communist Party. That shows a ratio of six to one. If we still fear that the Communists will slowly gobble us up, we indeed have no self-respect and no confidence in ourselves!'

The Second National Congress of the Kuo Min Tang was held in Canton in January, 1926. Wang Ching-Wei made a political report to the Assembly and Chiang Kai-Shek was asked to give a military report. This he gave to the Assembly in full detail. Towards the end of his speech he told them what was their actual military strength and what it could do. He said:

'At present the Revolutionary Army completely under the Government consists of eighty-five thousand men. They have among them sixty thousand rifles. They could be mobilised by a single order from the Government. Their pay is provided for in the Budget. Their treatment has been improved. Besides these men there are six thousand military students in several schools. They are as good as a division. If we exert ourselves a little more and organise them carefully, we will find that it is not difficult to use the strength of our Party to unite China . . .'

When he said this he knew that the long-awaited Northern Punitive Expedition was in sight, but little did he think that it would be ready to start within six months.



A RECENT PORTRAIT (2)



WITH MADAME CHIANG KAI-SHEK AND GENERAL STILWELL
AT H.Q. MAYMYO, BURMA

In a proposal for a further improvement of the soldiers' treatment he said: 'The foundation of Revolution is getting firmer and firmer. We are soon going to feed our horses and sharpen our weapons to unite the whole country. The encouragement of the idea that a Revolutionary soldier is willing to die for his cause on the battlefield entirely depends on what this Congress is going to do.' He said that a soldier's pay was from nine to eleven dollars a month, while an officer received from a hundred and sixty to four or even five hundred. The difference was too great. It was hardly fair. He proposed an increase of several dollars to the soldier's monthly pay, and also paying them in silver dollars or notes instead of in dimes or double dimes, as the latter suffered a discount of nearly twenty per cent.

In a formal plan which he submitted to the Military Council a few days later, he proposed not only (1) a rise in their pay, but also (2) to provide them with a sufficiency of winter clothes, (3) adequate health and medical supplies, (4) better and healthier barracks, (5) entertainments and handicraft workshops to pass their spare time, (6) to reduce the mechanised physical training, and (7) to decrease the required number of years of their service.

It was at the Second Congress that he was elected a member of the Central Executive Committee. This consisted of thirty-six members, twelve more than before, and included several Communists as well as a few ardent anti-Communist 'old comrades'. At the first meeting of the Committee he was elected a member of the Standing Committee, which consisted of nine members, including Wang Ching-Wei, who was the chairman, Hu Han-Min, Tan Yen-Kai, Commander of the Second Revolutionary Army, Tan Ping-Shan and Lin Chu-Han, both of whom were Communists. It must be mentioned here that at this time a sixth Revolutionary Army was formed under the com-

mand of Cheng Chien, and on the same day Chiang Kai-Shek was allowed to resign his command of the First Revolutionary Army. Ho Yin-Ching, who was the commander of the First Division, was promoted to succeed Chiang Kai-Shek as Commander of the First Revolutionary Army. On February 1st, 1926, that is, the following day, Chiang Kai-Shek was appointed Superintendent-General of all the Revolutionary Armies.

As Chiang Kai-Shek became more important in the Party, he found his position also more difficult than before and had to be more careful in telling people what he thought of them. Before he was elected a member of the Central Executive Committee he told the 'Old Comrades' frankly what harm they were doing to their cause. Now it was entirely his work to conciliate those right-wing members who came to Canton to rake up trouble, and those Leftists and Communists who would have liked to quarrel with the 'old comrades'. It was a thankless job, and in the long run a fruitless job. How much he liked it could be seen when later on he wrote: 'Political life makes a man lead a dog's life. To be in such circumstances one would never have thought possible! Where is morality? Where is friendship?'

Soon after the conclusion of the Second National Congress, Borodin, the Russian adviser, went North to see Feng Yu-Hsiang, the Christian General, in order to bring him over to the side of the Kuo Min Tang. His departure from Canton led to more misunderstandings between the Communists and the anti-Communists. Two Russian advisers whom Chiang Kai-Shek had to meet very frequently after Borodin's absence constantly proposed things which made him unhappy. An early entry in his diary about these two advisers reads: 'I offer them sincerity. They return deceit. It is impossible to work together with them.' A later one reads: 'My Russian

colleagues suspect me, fool me. They might have done it without intention, but then, what made them do it? I can only return sincerity.'

By the middle of February, 1926, in order to avoid general censure, Chiang Kai-Shek wanted to reorganise the advisory board by disengaging all those Russians who held administrative positions in Canton. In this proposal he had in mind the friendly forces he hoped to make use of in the neighbouring provinces of Kwangsi and Hunan. The military leaders were not yet members of the Kuo Min Tang and might object to the inclusion of Russians in Chinese political organisations. For at this time Kwangsi was moving to join hands with Kwangtung, and Chiang Kai-Shek reckoned that two armies could be formed with Kwangsi troops. Later on it proved that that hope was to be realised. Kwangsi joined in, but only one army was formed, namely the Seventh Revolutionary Army under the command of the Kwangsi leader, Li Tsung-Jen.

With more than nine thousand men ready to be mobilised, and with the belief that to keep all these men idle was unwise, whereas a Northern Punitive Expedition might probably close the ranks of the Party, Chiang Kai-Shek proposed that plans for an early expedition should be speedily prepared. Here it will be interesting to mention two items in Chiang Kai-Shek's diary. On February 22nd he went to a dinner-party given by the Russian advisers, and recorded that in the discussion after the dinner most people proposed to postpone the Northern Punitive Expedition. Next day, in his diary there is this entry: "Mou-Jü said there were people slandering me. Last night I also noticed people who showed their dislike of me in their faces and I was most annoyed. On second thoughts, those who like flattery and dislike criticism are always mean people who only grasp after position. Why have I been so foolish as that? I must never be so again!"

Three days after this he dismissed and arrested a divi-

sional commander, and recorded that 'the Chief Russian Adviser and his companions were shocked because they were using this commander as their tool to commit an outrage and to upset the revolutionary influence of the Party, but failed to do so.' On the following morning he went to see Wang Ching-Wei, who was the Chairman of the Central Executive Committee as well as of the Political Council and the Military Council, to report important business. He also discussed with Wang Ching-Wei what he thought right to be done with the chief Russian adviser. He thought the adviser was 'high-handed and contradictory' in his political advice. 'If he was not dismissed, not only would he do harm to the Party and the country, but also he would have a bad influence on the relationship between China and Russia.' However, he presumed that what the adviser did was 'this man's personal action, and could never be the intention of the authorities of Soviet Russia.'

On February 28th he recorded that he had 'a slightly calmer day' and for the first time for many days he had a restful night. 'But,' he continued, 'an unexpected thing suddenly happened and there was no way out.' He said to himself that he 'had to do it by force, otherwise unthinkable damage would be done to the Party and the country.' At the beginning of March his position was worse. He said: 'With a single spear on a solitary horse, with a tiger coming in front and a wolf behind, I'm in a critical position to-day. My Master and the Martyrs of the Party in Heaven, have pity on me and protect me. Prevent me from falling into a hopeless doom.' By the middle of that month he recorded that 'the hardships he had suffered he could not and would not describe', and that 'they were such that one would never dream of them. They were not different from what Buddha suffered in Hell.'

On March 20th, 1926, he said: 'If I had no resolution

to-day, how could I save our Party and show my gratitude to our Master?' At dawn martial law was declared in Canton, and he arrested the acting Chief of the Navy Office, who was also the captain of the gunboat *Chung Shan*, the historical vessel originally called the *Yung Feng*, when Sun Yat-Sen and Chiang Kai-Shek had stayed on board for many days during the rebellion of Chen Chiung-Ming. He also arrested many Party Representatives of the various armies and besieged the office of the Strike Committee, disarming the guards of this organisation.

Regarding the Russians, he disarmed the guards and kept watch over their residence, but they were free to move about. For on the same evening, some came to him to protest against such treatment and he disarmed their anger by 'apologising to them with an amiable countenance'. On the 22nd, a Russian counsellor came to ask him whether these actions were taken against individuals or against Russia. His reply 'against individuals' softened the Russian, who said: 'Just that sentence has set my mind greatly at ease. I will order the adviser to leave Canton for Russia.'

A meeting of the Political Council was held on that day and it was resolved at this meeting that the Russian advisers were to be disengaged, and that undisciplined officers in the army were to be court-martialled. In the afternoon Chiang Kai-Shek discussed with the various Commanders of the Army the stern measures taken against these Russian advisers and Communists, and they all heartily supported what he had done. He exclaimed: 'Those who had been opposed to such actions of mine before the event regarded my words as gospel after the event. How quickly people's minds change!'

This is what is known as 'the March 20th Incident' or 'The Gunboat *Chung Shan* Case'. At a farewell dinner-party given to the retired Party Representatives and Com-

munists who were officers in the First Army, Chiang Kai-Shek tried his best to explain what had happened on that critical day. But he candidly said that the political complications could only be borne out by various documents which would be made public after his death. As these revealing documents have not yet been made public, it can only be presumed that Chiang Kai-Shek arrested these Communists promptly as a precautionary measure, and it is believed that he acted in the nick of time, for he said it was rumoured that the gunboat *Chung Shan* was waiting to capture him and ship him off to Russia at the orders of some Russian advisers.

What kind of a part Wang Ching-Wei played in this can only be guessed. On March 8th, that is twelve days before the incident, Chiang Kai-Shek decided to discuss the important directive of revolution with him and told him that 'The actual authority of revolution must not fall into the hands of foreigners. Even in the co-operation with the Third International, certain lines must be drawn. Independence must not be sacrificed.' And to this Wang Ching-Wei agreed entirely. On the 14th, that is only six days before the incident, Chiang Kai-Shek recorded that 'from Wang Ching-Wei's words I gathered that he had hinted to me to leave Canton. He must have heard things said against me to such an extent that it is now impossible to change his mind.'

He went to see Wang Ching-Wei on March 19th and 20th; but on the day following the incident, he wanted to draft a letter to Wang Ching-Wei and could not do so; he said: 'As I do not want to be hypocritical to my friend, nor can I empty my sincere mind to him, I have thought hard and found it difficult to put it down with my pen.' Towards evening he went to call upon his sick friend—for Wang Ching-Wei was suffering from diabetes—and found that his anger had not yet abated. Two days later he heard that Wang Ching-Wei was preparing to go away

for medical treatment, and he said: 'Yesterday all the resolutions passed at the Political Council were done according to his wishes. He ought to raise no objection. Why should he still act thus?'

On March 25th, Wang Ching-Wei's whereabouts were unknown. Later on Chiang Kai-Shek read a letter written to Chang Ching-Kiang by Wang Ching-Wei, in which he said that I have been suspected and disliked, so I will never bear political responsibility any more.' In May, soon after Hu Han-Min's return from Russia, Wang Ching-Wei left China for France, where he stayed for some time. Although Chiang Kai-Shek did not bear him malice, Wang Ching-Wei felt greatly hurt. When later on Chiang Kai-Shek, directly and indirectly, entreated him to come back and share the responsibility of the Government with him, he remained unconciliated.

If the reader thinks that the measures taken against the Russians and the Communists on March 20th would at once conciliate Chiang Kai-Shek with Hu Han-Min and the extreme right-wing, he is mistaken. Chiang Kai-Shek emphasised that he did it against certain individuals—though a very large number of individuals—and the incident must not be interpreted as a break with Soviet Russia nor a departure from the policy of 'tolerating the Communists'. He repeatedly told his students and soldiers that they must not show any disrespect for the retired comrades, and also warned the right-wing members that the Western Hills Conference was still a mistake. But alas, these words fell on deaf ears! Enmity between the two sections continued to mount higher and higher, until at last they did not hesitate to cut each other's throats.

In a letter of advice addressed to his students after the incident, Chiang Kai-Shek said: 'Our Master thought that to accommodate the Communists was one of the principles of our Revolution. I also think that the Revolutionary front will not be united if we do not accommodate the

Communists.' He added that was why he had never failed to exert all his energy to support and help the Communists and consolidate the revolutionary foundation of his Military Academy, and to obviate the differences between Communists and non-Communists.

Furthermore, he said: 'I venture to tell my school-fellows frankly; I do not wish to cause any difficulty to those of them who have retired from the Army and I cannot bear to cause a permanent split between school-fellows of my Military Academy.' And on the other hand, he said to them these very stern words: 'I hope that my school-fellows who have left the Army will slander our Master no more, but that they will work for the realisation of the Three Principles of the People. Bear in mind the motto of our school: Don't bear malice; don't seek for revenge; don't despair. With love and sincerity forget your former differences and become loving school-fellows again . . .' He then warned them: 'If you feel that from henceforth you are in a position comparable to riding on a tiger, and that you cannot get down without being killed, then one side would think of nothing but how to be revenged, and the other side of how to prevent revenge, and one side becomes water whilst the other side becomes fire, or one side is ice whilst the other is coal. You will never bear the existence of each other again and in the end both will be extinguished.'

Early in April he made a detailed proposal to the Government to start the Northern Punitive Expedition within three months, to reorganise the Army and the Party, in which precautionary measures were suggested to prevent the Communists from over-ruling the wishes of the pure Kuo Min Tang members. On May 14th, when Borodin had come back from Russia, he discussed with him the new agreement between the Communists and the Kuo Min Tang. Borodin made objections to his proposals and he explained carefully, adding: 'Though these measures are

harsh, a large party must prevent itself from being ruined by allowing a smaller one to undermine it from inside. Since the late Master's policy was to unite people of all classes in a common struggle, I do not wish to disobey his orders by splitting the Party, and I have borne the pain in my heart until to-day.'

On the following day he took the chair at an emergency meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuo Min Tang, and it was resolved that (1) the Communist Party must order its members not to attack Sun Yat-Sen and his Three Principles of the People, that (2) the Communist Party must give the chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuo Min Tang the list of Communist members who were in the Kuo Min Tang, and (3) that those who held membership of both Parties were not eligible to be heads of departments of the Kuo Min Tang; that (4) pure members of Kuo Min Tang must not organise meetings other than those allowed by the Party; that (5) members of Kuo Min Tang must not promote political activities without the order of the Highest Authority of the Party; that (6) the Chinese Communist Party and the Third International must inform a joint committee, to be composed of Communists and Kuo Min Tang members, of their orders to Chinese Communists who were also members of Kuo Min Tang; that (7) members of Kuo Min Tang must not join the Communist Party without obtaining permission to withdraw first from Kuo Min Tang; and that (8) members who disobeyed these rules would be expelled from the Party.

After this decisive meeting, complicated quarrels temporarily abated. Preparations for the Northern Punitive Expedition, which had been so much opposed by the Soviet advisers, went ahead in full swing. Tan Ping-Shan, the head of the Organisation Department, handed over his office to Chiang Kai-Shek, and Mao Tse-Tung, the acting Head of the Propaganda Department, handed his to Ku

Meng-Yu. Many Soviet advisers had already been sent away with a farewell banquet, and Communists withdrawn from the Army were given other jobs. The two conflicting parties and wings abode by an armed truce, and on June 5th, 1926, Chiang Kai-Shek was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Punitive Expedition, with eight armies under his command, the latest addition being the forces of Tang Sheng-Chih, a military leader in Hunan with a large army of his own. Tang Sheng-Chih was made Commander of the Eighth Army.

The departure of Wang Ching-Wei and Hu Han-Min, who stayed in Canton only for a few days and went away to Shanghai, left Chiang Kai-Shek the sole leader in the field. He was elected a member of the State Council, Chairman of the Central Executive Committee and Chairman of the Military Council. He was also the head of the Organisation Department and of the Military People's Department of the headquarters of Kuo Min Tang. So by the time the Northern Punitive Expedition started he was not only at the head of the Revolutionary Army, but also head and shoulders over all the rest in all the political and Party organisations in Canton.

VIII

WHEN Chiang Kai-Shek was sworn in as the Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Punitive Expedition on the Parade Ground in Canton on July 9th, 1926, the ceremony was attended by all the dignitaries of the Government and of the Party and a crowd of fifty thousand people. However, such a big crowd would be quite insignificant compared with the soldiers now under his command. He had under him eight armies which consisted of more than twenty divisions, and the number of officers and men who took orders from him was roughly a hundred thousand. But such a formidable force had a much more formidable task ahead waiting to be accomplished: to unite China by defeating the War Lords all over the country. The total number of soldiers under these War Lords was over a million. They outnumbered Chiang Kai-Shek's Revolutionary Army by more than ten to one.

The three major War Lords in China at this time were Chang Tso-Lin of North China, Wu Pei-Fu of Central China, and Sun Chuan-Fang of the Five South-Eastern Provinces. Marshal Chang Tso-Lin had recently come to Tientsin and Peking from Manchuria to take over the Central Government from Tuan Chi-Jui, the Chief Executive. He did not like either the title of President or Chief Executive, so he was soon to be installed as the Marshal of the An Kuo Chun, or the Peaceful National Army, which consisted of about 300,000 men.

Wu Pei-Fu, the Scholar-General, had by now become reconciled with the Manchurian War Lord. So his master, the bribing President Tsao Kun, was released by Chang

Tso-Lin's men on the simple condition that he renounced his illegal Presidency. Wu Pei-Fu gathered his forces in Central China and had under his control Honan, Hupeh and the Northern part of Hunan which was fighting against the Southern part. He also had about 300,000 men under his command, whilst Sun Chuan-Fang, the Commander of the Allied Forces of the Five South-Eastern Provinces, could muster a little more than 200,000. Besides these forces, there were about 300,000 men scattered all over the country, mostly in border provinces such as Yunnan, Szechuan and other places.

Chiang Kai-Shek's successful campaign starting from July, 1927, will be treated very briefly here, as this book must not turn into a history of Kuo Min Tang's Northern Punitive Expedition. Between July 1st, when he mobilised his armies, and July 27th, when he left Canton himself with his staff officers and a few Russian advisers for the North, he made public a number of messages, declarations, and telegrams addressed to his officers, his men, the Chinese who were overseas, the people of the Province of Kwangtung and of the whole nation.

He told his officers and men that they were now fighting for the people, to unite China so that a strong nation could be established, strong enough to defend herself against aggressors. They were the people's army, and so they must not cause inconvenience to the common people. In his manifesto to the people of the whole nation he said that he was fighting to relieve them from their distress and would never cease until he had driven away the Imperialists and their tools—that is, the War Lords—and that he hoped the people would co-operate with his soldiers in their common task of fighting against foreign aggressors.

To fight against the whole country and almost against the whole world, Chiang Kai-Shek's army of a hundred thousand men was indeed a very small one. Putting the

rest aside, he decided first what was to be done with the three major War Lords. A classical strategist has said: 'Befriend those afar and attack those near.' So Chiang Kai-Shek adopted this strategy: 'Attack Wu Pei-Fu, humour Sun Chuan-Fang, and forget Chang Tso-Lin.' But while he was marshalling his forces to enter Hunan to fight Wu Pei-Fu's men, Sun Chuan-Fang started to raid the branch offices and arrest members of the Kuo Min Tang in his Provinces. Chiang Kai-Shek had to pretend that he did not know about these events, and continued to exchange polite telegrams in classical style with Sun Chuan-Fang, both assuring each other that if one did not attack the other first, the other would never do anything to mar their excellent friendship.

The progress of Chiang Kai-Shek's Expedition was extremely rapid. The newly re-organised Eighth Army, with fresh reinforcements from Kwangtung and Kwangsi, part of the Fourth and Seventh Armies, started a counter-offensive and recaptured Chang-Sha, the capital of Hunan, on July 12th, 1926, a fortnight before Chiang Kai-Shek left Canton. Before the end of August the entire Province of Hunan was almost clear of the enemy and brisk fighting was going on for Hupeh. A decisive battle was fought between Wu Pei-Fu's crack divisions and the pick of the Revolutionary Army in the last days of August, when the Northern Forces were severely beaten. By this time Chiang Kai-Shek had moved his headquarters to Yo-Chow, a town on the northern border of Hunan and only some sixty miles from the place where this big battle was raging and a little over a hundred miles from the triple city of Wu-Han, which is composed of Han-Kow, Han-Yang and Wu-Chang.

Wu Pei-Fu was supervising this important battle himself. He and his generals were directing operations from Hsien-Ning, only a few miles north of the battlefield. After four days and four nights of intensive fighting in

which both sides suffered heavy losses, the Northerners withdrew hurriedly into Wuchang, the capital of Hupeh Province. Chiang Kai-Shek's Revolutionary Army followed them in hot pursuit and took the city of Hanyang on September 7th. After occupying this city, they crossed the river to take Hankow, whilst a part of their men besieged the more than twenty thousand Northerners in Wuchang. On the following day Chiang Kai-Shek came near to the city of Wuchang and demanded that the besieged generals should surrender within twenty-four hours. But the Northerners fought on obstinately and the city was besieged for more than a month before it was taken.

As victory after victory was won by the Revolutionary Army, Chiang Kai-Shek had a busy time receiving the surrenders of the enemy and also offers of co-operation from neutral generals. When he started his Expedition he had, as will be remembered, about a hundred thousand men in eight armies. Within five months he had under him 264,000 men in two hundred regiments. As many of the newly-surrendered military leaders had to be rewarded with the rank of a general and the title of commander of an army though they might only have a few regiments under them, the number of so-called Revolutionary Armies was more than thirty. When representatives from the War Lords of Szechuan came to him to ask for appointments, he exclaimed: 'Everywhere they want to surrender to me. Their only fear is that I may not permit them to capitulate. They are willing either to become satellites or to play fast and loose with both sides merely to save their skins. All of them are opportunists.'

A few words should be said here about what was believed to be the invincibility of Chiang Kai-Shek's Revolutionary Army. As the reader will have seen, they

were mainly improvised forces with not very long training, having been only recently reorganised. Not many of them were experienced fighters, and most of them were leaving their warmer homes for a much colder zone. How was it that they fought so well, won so many victories and advanced so rapidly? There are several reasons.

The chief reason is that whilst the enemy was fighting for his personal interest, Chiang Kai-Shek was fighting for the political programme of the Kuo Min Tang. Since the Chinese Republic was established in 1911 the country had suffered from civil wars for fifteen years and the result was that a number of War Lords had been created. That all the Chinese people, including their own soldiers, hated these War Lords is beyond doubt. Sun Yat-Sen, with his Kuo Ming Tang, had offered to the people a political programme which, if opportunity were given for it to be put into practice, would give peace and prosperity to all. It was for this idea that the Revolutionary soldiers were willing to give their lives and the common people are willing to render any help necessary.

Another reason is that Chiang Kai-Shek's armies were staffed by specially-trained officers, all of them members of Kuo Min Tang—though there were still some Communists whose political beliefs had not been made known to the authorities—and they were the first officers to see that the common people were not inconvenienced by their arrival.

With the troops of the War Lords, three things happened wherever they went when they were good enough not to loot their town. First they would summon the heads of the local Chamber of Commerce, that is, the richest people of the place, and demand that they should give 'voluntarily' two or three months' pay for all the soldiers they had under their command. They had merely to say that in order to keep them from looting the soldiers must be paid at once and what they asked was always

forthcoming. The second blessing the people enjoyed on the arrival of the troops was that a large number of big private houses would have to be vacated for them to occupy. If you did not pack up at once, they would pack up for you and they would do it on the principle that packers were keepers. The third was that the troops always depended upon the civilians for their transport. They generally asked the local authorities to provide them with a certain number of labourers—who had to be paid by the local authorities—and in return they promised not to conscript forced labour by arresting any able-bodied men they saw in the streets.

But on arrival at each city, Chiang Kai-Shek's army officers—Party Representatives and members of the political departments attached to the Army—announced that they would not ask for the soldiers' pay from the local people, that they would not occupy any private buildings and that they would not conscript forced labour. The Cantonese Government had budgeted for all these things and the soldiers always crowded into temples and empty public buildings rather than cause the civilians any inconvenience. Such conduct touched the hearts of the people who had suffered so much during the past fifteen years. They often gave generously towards the soldiers' comforts.

The work done by the political workers of the Revolutionary Army was modelled on that done in the Red Army. Chiang Kai-Shek himself said candidly that he had copied the Russian system very extensively, and he still had a small number of Russian advisers with him. So as soon as the political workers arrived, public meetings were organised and held, in which publicity for the Revolutionary Army was spread between entertainments. People in China had never had such an experience before and wherever the men of the Revolutionary Army came, they were always welcomed and loved.

There was another factor in the success of the Revolutionary Army. Since Sun Yat-Sen's trip to Peking, and later his death there, nearly all the younger people throughout the country had looked up to him as the saviour of China. The Communists in those early days, it must be frankly recorded, worked hand-in-hand with the members of the Kuo Ming Tang. They made people realise that unless the Revolutionary cause, for which Chiang Kai-Shek and his men were fighting, was supported by all so that it prevailed, their beloved country would soon be ruined by the War Lords.

Though Chiang Kai-Shek had started to take very stern measures against the Communists in March, 1928, the reaction of the Communists could not come into effect during the first few months of the Northern Punitive Expedition. First of all, Chiang Kai-Shek declared his action was not a break with the Communists as a body, but was taken against a number of individuals. How true this was had still to be seen. The Communists among members of the Kuo Min Tang were a minority, and when they started to work against the Kuo Min Tang they worked against heavy odds. After all they had praised and co-operated with the Kuo Min Tang for over two years, and now they found it difficult to undo what had been done. It was not easy to convince the general public, when they had to take back everything they had been saying for the past two years.

If the Communists were undermining the Kuo Min Tang—and certainly they thought they had good reason for doing so after Chiang Kai-Shek had openly suppressed them—they were doing it on the sly and had to be very cautious. All the measures recommended and taken by Chiang Kai-Shek against the Communists were declared openly. They might sound cruel and unjust but they had the advantage of having official sanction. Even if such actions did sow the seeds of enmity and bloodshed,

the result could not come out at once. What they were reaping now was still mostly the good work done by the co-operation of the Communists.

Moreover, Chiang Kai-Shek was an ideal idol for the common people. Since the death of Sun Yat-Sen, people had been wondering whom they could now worship. Hu Han-Min was a rather narrow-minded politician, caring very little what others thought of him. Wang Ching-Wei was much better but could not be compared with a soldier whose fight against Chen Chiung-Ming and other reactionary generals had won him many laurels. And he was a model general. He dressed very simply, wearing nothing ostentatious as the War Lords liked to do. People could see him any day, walking among his men in an ordinary cotton uniform and straw sandals. He did not drink, he did not smoke—he doesn't even to this day. And he always had nice things to say to the common people. That is why, wherever he went, thousands of people lined the streets, waiting hours for a glimpse of him and to cheer him. What a contrast to the War Lords, who had to clear the streets and place sentinels there to keep the people away hours before making their rare appearance.

. After Chiang Kai-Shek had consolidated his position in Hunan and Hupeh, and when Wu Pei-Fu had fled further north to try to get Chang Tso-Lin's Manchurian Army to help him, Chiang Kai-Shek's friendship with Sun Chuan-Fang, the Commander-in-Chief of the Five South-Eastern Provinces, began to deteriorate rapidly. Formerly they had addressed each other by their first names and called each other 'my dear Elder brother'. Now their language had to be quite different. The old policy of humouring Sun Chuan-Fang was no longer practicable.

In the beginning of September, 1926, Sun Chuan-Fang, after sending an ultimatum demanding Chiang Kai-Shek's withdrawal with all his men into Kwangtung within

twenty-four hours, said in a circular telegram addressed to the whole country: 'Chiang Kai-Shek, a nobody from some remote water-side, has no right to impose himself on the ranks of the army. Falsely flying the flag of Sun Yat-Sen, he is really acting according to the policy of Lenin.' After accusing him of having spread Bolshevism and started aggression in his defence lines, Sun Chuan-Fang ranted on: 'Such actions indicate that he does not realise his own shortcomings nor his weakness. He has dared to be the aggressor, the destroyer of peace. His sin is so great as to have no limit and incurs the anger of both God and men.'

Chiang Kai-Shek, after answering back by saying that Sun Chuan-Fang's 'plan to do harm to Hunan and Kwangtung is as clear as if it were transparent in his lungs and heart', and that he was deceiving himself as well as cheating others, said also in a circular telegram addressed to the whole country: 'This man Sun had taken a mean advantage in occupying Kiangsu and Chekiang during the past year and still will not check his ambition. Falsely saying he is protecting his regions and maintaining peace for his people, he is actually aggressive and causing trouble to the people.'

The gage having been thrown, Chiang Kai-Shek supervised personally his attack into Kiangsi. Sun Chuan-Fang had had a little more time to prepare than had Wu Pei-Fu, and had probably learned a good deal during the past few months. He stood the onslaught better than Wu Pei-Fu, though by now Chiang Kai-Shek's Revolutionary Armies had increased greatly in numbers. Perhaps as their quantity increased, the quality decreased. From the beginning of September they fought on, until two and a half months later the Province of Kiangsi was clear of Sun Chuan-Fang's troops.

The attack on Fukien began in the early part of October, and by the end of November that Province was

occupied by Chiang Kai-Shek's men. As for Chekiang, Chiang Kai-Shek's native Province, prolonged fighting took place there, and Sun Chuan-Fang had several minor successes. But in the middle of February, 1927, it also became the property of the Revolutionary Army. With three sides in the south surrounded by the enemy, the Province of Anhwei fell in March, when the Military Governor, formerly under Sun Chuan-Fang, decided to throw in his lot with Chiang Kai-Shek and become the Commander of the Thirty-Seventh Revolutionary Army. Nanking and Shanghai, the two important cities of the Province of Kiangsu, the last of Sun Chuan-Fang's Five South-Eastern Provinces, fell to Chiang Kai-Shek's men towards the end of March, and the Commander-in-Chief War Lord had to fly northwards with his routed armies.

Before these five South-Eastern Provinces came into Chiang Kai-Shek's hands, Chang Tso-Lin had begun to realise that the Revolutionaries had little love for him. His predecessor, the foremost War Lord Tuan Chi-Jui, was actually driven away by the combined subterranean forces of the Communists and the Kuo Min Tang. In order to consolidate his position inside the Great Wall, he marshalled all his forces in the North and undertook to help both Wu Pei-Fu and Sun Chuan-Fang in their common fight against the 'Bolsheviks'. On December 1st, 1926, when he assumed his duty as Marshal of the An Kuo Chun, he tried to secure the support of the people by appealing to their patriotism.

In a manifesto to the people denouncing the Revolution he said: 'We have in our country some ambitious and crafty bandits, who pick up what other people have already spat out, and spread Bolshevism. They agitate the young students and rash scoundrels, to ruin our country by preaching the unsuitable doctrine of Communism. They use as their instruments the numerous poverty-stricken people, and they appeal to the mob-psychology

of the rabble of society. They shout "Down with the War Lords" and "Down with the Imperialists" but their deeds are just as bad. What they write on their banners is a hypocritical mask. How can they do anything to benefit our people and nation? Formerly there was the traitor Shih Ching-Tang, who joined a foreign race to ruin his own country. He called himself the foreigner's son and was condemned through the ages. Feng Yu-Hsiang and Chiang Kai-Shek are invading their own country by obtaining foreign help. What is the difference between them and the traitor Shih Ching-Tang? As for Chiang Kai-Shek, who submitted meekly to the directions of Borodin, he is even worse than the traitor Shih Ching-Tang.'

And so Chiang Kai-Shek's policy of 'Forget Chang Tso-Lin' didn't last long. Manchurian soldiers were sent to the south-east to help Sun Chuan-Fang, and after their defeat he started to march straight to the South by way of Honan to tackle the 'Bolsheviks'. But the generals under Wu Pei-Fu would not trust him, and so the Manchurian and Chihli forces had to fight it out in Northern Honan first. By the time Chang Tso-Lin's forces had defeated the Chihli generals and were in contact with the Revolutionary Army, the Northerners were far away from their base and fairly tired from their strenuous and incessant fighting.

Chang Tso-Lin had ample proof for denouncing the Southerners as Bolsheviks. The reader will remember that when Sun Yat-Sen went North, this Manchurian War Lord met him in Tientsin and wanted him to give up his policy of co-operating with Soviet Russia. Sun Yat-Sen died in Peking in 1925, and that was the time when the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuo Min Tang were most popular in the North. In a memorial service to the dead leader of the Kuo Min Tang, attended by a large

mass of people in the Central Park, Tuan Chi-Jui, as head of the Government, had to be present. But the people knew him to be the enemy of Sun Yat-Sen who wanted to get rid of the influence of the Western Powers in China, and Tuan Chi-Jui had submitted to their demand readily. They wanted to attack him when he came to the service. His secret police reported what was waiting for him and he saved his skin at the eleventh hour.

Historians could hardly ask for more interesting material about this service. Tuan Chi-Jui had announced that he was coming, and was actually taking a special bath as required according to our tradition. It was when he was dressing that he decided to stay away. His official excuse was that after the bath his feet had swollen and his boots become too small for him. Of course he could not come barefooted.

Tuan Chi-Jui's alleged swollen feet saved him from the angry mob in Peking, but political mobs started to figure prominently in China from henceforth. As described in the previous chapter, in May there was the Nanking Road Massacre in Shanghai, when scores of innocent people were killed by British policemen. In June there was the Shakee Massacre, when scores of innocent people were killed by British soldiers and French marines. In March, 1926, an angry crowd organised by the Communists and Kuo Min Tang in Peking was fired on by the Guards of Tuan Chi-Jui. As the chairman of this mass meeting was Hsu Chien, President of the Sino-Russian University, a fiery pro-Communist member of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuo Min Tang, it is believed that the Communists were the instigators of this massacre.

In March, 1926, whilst the Communists and members of the Kuo Min Tang had started to quarrel seriously, and Chiang Kai-Shek had taken decisive steps against those Communists whom he believed to be working against him or his Party, the members of both parties were still diffi-

cult to distinguish from each other. As both parties were subject to suppression in the North where the War Lords ruled, they had to work in secret and help each other like people in the same boat during a storm. Such conditions continued until the two parties were officially separated in August, 1927.

When Chang Tso-Lin came into Peking he was more severe than Tuan Chi-Jui towards the Communists and Kuo Min Tang members, whom he called in general 'the Party people', as to him they were not different from each other. After he had issued his manifesto denouncing Chiang Kai-Shek and Feng Yu-Hsiang as Bolsheviks, he ordered the police to search for the Party people. They found that there were ten thousand Kuo Min Tang members and between six and seven hundred Communists among the students in Peking. On March 20th, 1927, they started to arrest them, and on April 4th, they went into the Russian Embassy, their barracks, their bank and the offices of the Chinese Eastern Railways to arrest Professor Li Ta-Chao, the head of the Communists in North China, and sixty others. Fire then broke out in the rooms of the Soviet Military Attaché, but the Chinese police were quick to put it out. They captured a great quantity of documents, arms and banners, which all went to prove that the Russians in Peking were promoting rebellion against the Peking Government.

At this time the Minister of Foreign Affairs under Chang Tso-Lin was Wellington Koo, who was also acting as Prime Minister. Being a very able and distinguished diplomat, he answered the angry protests from the Soviet Government with perfect calm. He merely announced that since the Russians had abused their diplomatic privilege by using their Embassy to harbour rebellion, the Chinese Government was to sever diplomatic relations with the Soviet at once, and he ignored any protests from the Russian *chargé-d'affaires* and from Moscow. The

Party people who had been arrested were committed for trial, and twenty of them, including Li Ta-Chao, who was, by the way, also a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuo Min Tang, were condemned and hung for high treason on April 28th, 1927.

To return to Chiang Kai-Shek in the South and bring the reader back to the end of August, 1926, when Chiang Kai-Shek was still fighting Wu Pei-Fu in Hunan. Whilst all their enemies regarded the Kuo Min Tang and the Communist Party as one body, Chiang Kai-Shek sent the following telegram to the Central Committee of his Party in Canton:

'I have just read, in No. 161 of the *Guide* (the Communist Weekly) an article by Chen Tu-Hsiu on Our Government's Northern Punitive Expedition. He has opposed our Party's Expedition and tried to hinder our National Revolution. Chen Tu-Hsiu is the head of the Chinese Communist Party. The *Guide Weekly* is the official organ of their Party. The Communist Party should be responsible for what is said in this article. Such an opinion is plainly meant to destroy the spirit of co-operation between the two parties at this critical hour. It has far-reaching influence. I dare not remain silent any longer. We must ask the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to give a responsible reply in order to avoid misunderstanding.'

An entry on the last day of August, 1926, in his diary, was about a telegram sent to Borodin which he had just read. He said: 'Borodin and those people try to stop the progress of our Revolutionary Army. They never relax for a moment in their endeavour to prevent our Northern Punitive Expedition from becoming a success. Alas! Our Master died suddenly and left his work behind to those of us who did not die and who find it full of difficulties and thorns.'

In the middle of September Feng Yu-Hsiang, the Christian General, came back from Russia and took up his duties as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Kuo Ming Chun, or National People's Army. In his declaration he said he had come back from Russia to answer the call of Sun Yat-Sen's Principles. He started to attack troops in the North-west of China which belonged to generals who were supporting Wu Pei-Fu. Chiang Kai-Shek was very glad to have a brother-in-arms at last. That was why Chang Tso-Lin put the names of Chiang Kai-Shek and Feng Yu-Hsiang together.

At the end of this month Chiang Kai-Shek received a letter from Wang Ching-Wei to say that there was no difference between them about what happened in March. Chiang Kai-Shek was even more ready than his friend to let bygones be bygones and answered the letter at once. He asked Wang Ching-Wei to come out of his retirement to take charge of Party affairs. He said: 'My strength is little and my ability is thin. I cannot look after political affairs as well [as the army]. All I care for is the interests of our country and our Party. If anything will benefit our Revolution, I am all for it, even if I do not like it, or if I think it wrong.'

On October 3rd, 1926, he sent this telegram to Wang Ching-Wei: 'I, your younger brother, am not educated and have no manners, so have offended you. I have just received your instructions, which are full of self-suppression and sincerity, and when I read them, I perspired all the more with shame. To achieve the ultimate aim of our Party there is no hope if you, my Elder Brother, and I, your younger brother, do not co-operate to the end without any differences.

'You, my Elder Brother, left everything behind without even casting a look at me, your younger brother, and the result has been that I have gone through all these difficulties single-handed. You, my Elder Brother, could

throw away honours and positions, but could you shrink from responsibility? And friendship? I have borne it all this time, and now you surely can see my foolish devotion to you and know that I have nothing but friendship for you. I have specially asked my two Elder Brothers, Chang Ching-Kiang and Li Shih-Tseng, to try to persuade you to come home and also to tell you personally what is in my mind. I entreat you to return with them and to shoulder with us this most great and difficult responsibility, so that I, your younger brother, can follow your directions and will not commit blunders to harm our Party and our country. I pray for your return most earnestly.'

But Wang Ching-Wei remained abroad for six months more. When he came back in April, 1927, he started almost immediately to attack Chiang Kai-Shek. The first few words he wrote and which were reproduced everywhere were: 'The Revolution will never succeed without striking down Chiang Kai-Shek first.'

The anti-Chiang Kai-Shek movement was probably started by the Communists, but more than probably it was largely carried out by members of the Kuo Min Tang who considered themselves more revolutionary than their comrades, and also by those whom he thought to be his friends and followers. Had he not been thinking that Wang Ching-Wei was his friend, he would certainly not have sent two old comrades to France with the letter quoted above to urge him to come back. Had he known only a part of the things Wang Ching-Wei was going to do to him and to the country, he would, instead of welcoming him, have shot him, and that, whether 'constitutional' or 'dictatorial', would have been a good job, too—very good for himself and for the country. As the reader knows, Wang Ching-Wei not only promoted several civil wars against Chiang Kai-Shek, but also became the Chinese

Quisling—indeed, a forerunner of the actual Quisling—and died a Japanese puppet.

Two other ardent pioneers of the anti-Chiang Kai-Shek movement were also non-Communists in the beginning. One was Hsu Chien, President of the Sino-Russian University, of whom more anon, and the other was Teng Yen-Ta, whom Chiang Kai-Shek considered as his protégé. He took Teng Yen-Ta under him in the early days of the establishment of the Whampoa Military Academy, and since then he had always had him doing some important and confidential work for him. At the time of the Northern Punitive Expedition, he was in charge of the General Political Department of the Revolutionary Army. While Chiang Kai-Shek was with the army in the fighting areas, Teng Yen-Ta stayed in Wuchang and acted actually as his agent.

In November, 1926, Chiang Kai-Shek asked the authorities in Canton to move their headquarters to Wuchang, a more desirable seat for the Government than Canton. Before the more important members of the Government moved to this city, a number of pro-Communist members, together with Borodin, were there to organise a combined Committee of the State Council and the Central Executive Committee. On December 13th, 1926, the organisation held its first meeting in Wuchang and voted themselves to be the temporary highest authority of the Party and the Government. Borodin and several Communists were present and Hsu Chien was elected chairman. After that, Wuchang became the centre of the anti-Chiang Kai-Shek movement.

On December 22nd, Chiang Kai-Shek sent to Teng Yen-Ta this telegram, which is of great interest in more ways than one:

‘Recently printed matter issued by the General Political Department must have escaped your attention because you have been over-busy with work. Such adverse pub-

licity does harm to our Army, to myself and to our Whampoa Military Academy. But that is nothing compared with the harm it does to the future of the Revolution. I hope you'll dismiss the acting head of the Publicity Section and never employ him in any of our Revolutionary Armies. . . .'

This message shows that official organs in Wuchang had already started their anti-Chiang Kai-Shek publicity, and also that Chiang Kai-Shek was very generous to Teng Yen-Ta. But Teng Yen-Ta continued his work in attacking Chiang Kai-Shek, who, strange to observe, continued to forgive him for several more months, until at last Teng Yen-Ta formally joined the new Government in Wuchang, which ordered the dismissal of Chiang Kai-Shek from all his offices and expelled him from the Party. Moreover, a price of two hundred and fifty thousand taels of silver was offered by this Government for the capture of Chiang Kai-Shek, or one hundred thousand for his assassination. As later events revealed, Chiang Kai-Shek was neither captured nor killed by the Wuchang people, but Teng Yen-Ta was arrested by Chiang Kai-Shek and imprisoned for some time, being at last shot after a court-martial.

This combined Committee, with Hsu Chien as chairman and a number of Communists and pro-Communists, intensified their anti-Chiang Kai-Shek movement in Wuchang, Hankow and Hanyang, which now went by the name of Wuhan. From December, 1926, to March, 1927, whilst Chiang Kai-Shek was busily occupied in fighting against the War Lords, he found that most of the younger members of his Party who were under the influence of Wuhan began to call him War Lord, Dictator, and other much worse names. His portrait, which used to decorate walls and banners as the saviour of the people, now had two companions: they invariably put the Kaiser on one side and Mussolini on the other. It must be re-

membered that in 1926 and 1927 the name of Hitler was still unheard of in China, otherwise the Kaiser would not have been so honoured.

The members of the Central Committee in Wuhan were gradually reinforced by more Communist and pro-Communist members and Reserve members. They were preparing to hold a general meeting there and those who did not like their policy of pro-Communism and anti-Chiang Kai-Shek did not want to join. When the meeting was held in the early days of March, not only the Conservative members but also Chiang Kai-Shek himself refused to attend.

Such being the case, the result can easily be conjectured. They re-organised the State Council, the Political Council and the Military Council, and needless to say the combined forces of pro-Communists and Communists secured a majority in all of them. Chiang Kai-Shek had been a member of the first and chairman of both the second and the last Council. Now he was pushed out of the first and the second altogether and was only a member of the Presidium of the last. Suffice it to say that Teng Yen-Ta was a member of almost every committee or council, and of several presidiums or standing committees, whilst Hsu Chien had his finger in every important pie.

Chiang Kai-Shek had been deprived of every position except that of Commander-in-Chief, but the power of this had been greatly reduced. One of the few resolutions passed was that 'the Commander-in-Chief is just a member of the Military Council. Orders for mobilisation must first be passed by a majority vote at the Military Council and further sanctioned by the Central Executive Committee before being put into the hands of the Commander-in-Chief, who may then issue the orders.'

An order issued to all the Members of the Kuo Min Tang by this meeting said that '... Since the Northern Punitive Expedition has started, all the military, political

and party affairs have been concentrated in the hands of an individual. This has meant all the more that the political administration could not be directed by the Party but only by military organisations. Such a system has many defects. Not only does it protect all those useless and rotten elements of the Party, but it also leads into the Party all the bureaucrats, crafty merchants and other opportunists. So it has produced an individual dictator and military autocracy. . . .’

The above quotation sounds rather strange. But that is exactly how it is in the original Chinese. It was written in the most fashionable style of the period and all the so-called ‘political writing’ was done in that way. In translating it into English, the humble author is utterly unable to preserve its original style.

While the non-combatants were busily engaged in intrigues in Wuhan, heavy fighting was taking place in the East. Chiang Kai-Shek had his headquarters in Nanchang, and when Nanking and Shanghai fell into the hands of his troops he hurried to Shanghai. At the time of the occupation of Nanking by the Revolutionary Army, a few foreigners were killed, some say by the fleeing and looting soldiers of the North, and some say by Communists who wanted to create chaos for the Kuo Min Tang. Before order was restored, British and American warships moored in the river outside Nanking bombarded the city and killed many innocent people as a reprisal. It sounds horrible and almost unbelievable today, but it happened at the time when Chinese cities constantly suffered such treatment from foreign warships which enjoyed freedom to sail into any part of China, according to the treaties China was made to sign after she was defeated during the last days of the Manchu Dynasty. Happily the commanders of the Revolutionary Army arrived on the scene in Nanking promptly. They shot

the looters and escorted the remaining foreigners to the warships. Later on the matter was settled amicably between China and the Powers concerned.

Rushing to Shanghai at the end of March, Chiang Kai-Shek took every precaution to avoid unnecessary bloodshed. But it was a difficult time. Tension was high. Slogans of 'Down with Imperialists' and 'Drive away all Foreigners' had been shouted too often and too loudly to be checked easily. Whilst the Communists and their organised labour bodies were very anxious to have a go at the Imperialists and their compradors in the International Settlement, foreign forces were guarding the Concessions jealously with machine-guns behind sandbags and barbed wire.

Such was the situation which confronted Chiang Kai-Shek when he arrived at Shanghai. Looking around, what could he see elsewhere? In Wuhan, where the new Government was, there were people who had by now put everything aside in order to concentrate their energy in finishing him. In the North the three War Lords, Chang Tso-Lin, Sun Chuan-Fang and Wu Pei-Fu were moving heaven and earth to wipe him and his forces out. From among his loyal supporters, many were slipping away, some of their own free will, some, no doubt, from intimidation by the Communists.


The reader will remember that six months before this Chiang Kai-Shek had written a letter and sent two of his best friends to Wang Ching-Wei to entreat him to come back and take Party affairs off his hands. Wang Ching-Wei now arrived at Shanghai from France on April 1st, 1927. How eagerly everybody was waiting for him! History sometimes so completely repeats itself. In 1911 when the Wuchang Government and the Shanghai-Nanking Government could not get together, the arrival of Sun Yat-Sen from Europe was just as eagerly awaited.

However, Wang Ching-Wei was not such an unselfish

man as was Sun Yat-Sen. Although Chiang Kai-Shek regarded him as a godsend, and readily agreed with all the other members of the Central Executive and Supervisory Committee to hand over to him all the affairs of the Party, Wang Ching-Wei played them false. After having issued a joint manifesto with Chen Tu-Hsui, the head of the Chinese Communist Party, in which they said that 'what China needs is the establishment of a democratic dictatorship to deal with the reactionaries: this is a dictatorship of all the suppressed classes combined together and not a proletarian dictatorship', he told his Kuo Min Tang comrades in Shanghai who wanted to hold a meeting of the Central Committee in Nanking on April 15th that he would be there. But he slipped away to Wuhan and the next they heard of him was when he shouted aloud: 'Down with Chiang Kai-Shek the Dictator.'

He was not the only man shouting. Both Hsu Chien and Teng Yen-Ta had been shouting the same thing. And at numerous mass meetings large crowds were led to shout it by these two and many other revolutionary leaders. When the humble author uses the word 'shout', not only does he mean shouting as a figure of speech, but he is also recording literally what was happening in those days. These leaders actually led the masses in shouting at the tops of their voices at public meetings until they were hoarse. It was said that was the proper thing to do, as the revolutionaries did it in Russia! Certainly it was one of the most democratic rights the people enjoyed in those days: all they needed was to have a leader on the platform to direct them.

On April 12th, 1927, three days before the Central Committee met in Nanking, Chiang Kai-Shek started to disarm the Communists and their labour organisations. They had been restive and it was touch and go. The side which struck first would be open to criticism, but practical



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THREE-POWER CONFERENCE IN NORTH AFRICA, NOVEMBER 1943
THE GENERALISSIMO, PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND MR WINSTON CHURCHILL



CHIANG KAI-SHEK ON HIS FAMOUS WHITE HORSE, INSPECTING TROOPS

people preferred to be criticised rather than be stricken. In Shanghai and in the East, it was Chiang Kai-Shek and his followers who won the day. But in Wuhan and then Changsha it was the Communists and their associates who had the upper hand. On April 25th, the first big official anti-Chiang Kai-Shek mass meeting took place in Wuchang, and it was reported that about three hundred thousand people attended. It was a fiery meeting in which feelings ran high. But nevertheless it was harmless. As the attack of three hundred thousand people was concentrated on one man who was far away from them, all they could do was to shout themselves hoarse. But in Shanghai and Foochow, Chiang Kai-Shek and his supporters did not do much shouting. They were more practical. They arrested those whom they thought dangerous and had them tried and shot. After that Wuhan and Nanking became deadly enemies and were at war with each other.

After Wang Ching-Wei's departure from Shanghai for Wuhan, the anti-Communist members of Kuo Min Tang, including Hu Han-Min, gathered around Chiang Kai-Shek and organised a National Government in Nanking on April 18th, 1927. An Army and Navy Conference—for the Chinese Navy had by now declared its allegiance to the Kuo Min Tang—was held six days later, on April 24th, and it was decided to continue the Northern Punitive Expedition. Large armies continued to push forward towards the north of Kiangsu, and in June some of Chiang Kai-Shek's supporters occupied Hsu-Chow, an important junction where the North-South Railway (the Tientsin-Pukow line) and the East-West Railway (the Lung-Hai line) cross each other.

In the meantime generals supporting the Wuhan Government also occupied Cheng-Chow, a railway junction in Honan. As both the Wuhan and Nanking

Governments were fighting North, both of them were open to the attack of their interior enemy. Supporters of Chiang Kai-Shek in Szechuan could not fight the Northerners, so they marched eastwards to attack Wuhan. Wuhan had to withdraw its forces from Honan to ward off the attack. In the east, some of the supporters of Wuhan were marching fast eastwards, ready to attack Nanking. Chiang Kai-Shek had to shift a part of his Expeditionary Army from the North to defend his capital. So by June the Northern Punitive Expedition was practically at a standstill, and civil war between two factions of the Kuo Min Tang was on its way.

It was then that Feng Yu-Hsiang intervened. Because of the occupation of Chengchow and Hsuehchow by the Southerners, he called two meetings separately. First he met Wang Ching-Wei and all the Wuhan leaders on June 10th at Chengchow. These people had sadly discovered, only ten days previously, that the Third International wanted the Kuo Min Tang to submit to the Chinese Communist Party. Another envoy from Moscow, the Indian Communist M. N. Roy, had arrived at Wuhan, and he, unlike the crafty Borodin, showed a telegram to Wang Ching-Wei telling him that the Third International wanted to take the Chinese Revolution into their own hands. They had no further use for the Kuo Min Tang. At the Conference at Chengchow, Wang Ching-Wei and his friends readily agreed to Feng Yu-Hsiang's mediation and decided to expel the Communists. It was very late, but not too late.

Nine days later Feng Yu-Hsiang met Chiang Kai-Shek, Hu Han-Min and other Nanking members at Hanchow. Here again all agreed to Feng Yu-Hsiang's mediation, and declared that their unchanging aim was to wipe away the War Lords who were the instruments of the Imperialists. So Feng Yu-Hsiang had Borodin, who had been the power behind the Government in Wuhan, conducted back to

Russia, and the Wuhan Government started to expel the Communists on July 15th.

At this exit of Borodin a few words about him and his work in China will be allowed. He was far from being a monster, as many gossipers said he was. Quiet, self-possessed and intelligent, he was a most agreeable companion. In the early days of the reorganisation of the Kuo Min Tang, his advice had been of great service. It was only when orders from Moscow became totally unpalatable to the Kuo Min Tang that people found him difficult. About Chiang Kai-Shek he said to a journalist, when everyone in Wuhan was wanting to kill Chiang Kai-Shek: 'He and I were friends from the very first day we met at Canton, four years ago, and I am not going to abuse him in any way. I am convinced that he is honest in his fight for the nationalist cause, but he is not enough of a personality to carry his work through alone, to take upon himself the gigantic task of liberating and reconstructing China and the Chinese Constitution, and he is surrounded by men whose interests are altogether selfish; they are just wanting to further their own personal plans.'

To do him justice, this passage is considerably to his credit. Few people in Wuhan at that time would have owned that Chiang Kai-Shek was honest, nor would they have called him their friend and refrained from abusing him. Even his remark about the selfish people who were surrounding Chiang Kai-Shek is true to this day.

By this time the Chinese Communists felt themselves to be in a very bad way. From the early days when they were welcomed to Canton, their sponsors and friends left them one by one as time passed. They had now to take matters into their own hands, and they started drastic activities in Hunan and Kwangtung. On July 31st, after they had been driven out of Hupeh and Hunan, they took Nanchang, the capital of Kiangsi, and established a

Revolutionary Council, but had to flee almost at once when the Kuo Min Tang armies came to attack them. From henceforth the Kuo Min Tang and the Communist Party were at war with each other, and killed each other whenever they had a chance to do so. The Chinese had never suffered religious massacres as did the Europeans in centuries past. But now, in the twentieth century, they were, since the split between these two parties, subjected to many wholesale political massacres.

It is rather strange to observe that though the Wuhan Government had realised their mistake in putting themselves into the hands of the Communists and acting as their tool for several months, they did not now rush into the arms of Nanking and be reconciled at once. But political differences are difficult to define and heal up. The Eastern Punitive Expedition continued to push forward, threatening Nanking. People in Wuhan, under the leadership of Wang Ching-Wei, continued to shout: 'Down with the Dictator Chiang Kai-Shek!' It was Wang Ching-Wei's saying at that time that they were 'struggling between two enemies'. By the two enemies he meant the Communists and Chiang Kai-Shek. Evidently he must have been too much occupied with these two enemies of his to remember his chief enemy, the War Lords, whom he now left unchecked in the North. Luckily the Manchurian Army in Honan, as was pointed out earlier, had been engaged in fighting Wu Pei-Fu's men, who had no use for their so-called collaboration, and so people in Wuhan began to forget about them.

But in Nanking the situation was slightly different. Here they had to fight the Communists; they had to fight the once pro-Communist but now anti-Communist left-wing forces; and in the North their enemy Sun Chuan-fang, who did not fight the Manchurian Army as did Wu Pei-Fu's generals, availed himself of this opportunity to

stage a counter-offensive with the help of Chang Tso-Lin's men. Finding that, after he had withdrawn from the Northern front part of his forces in order to check the Eastern Punitive Expedition, he was now left with insufficient strength to ward off this powerful counter-offensive, Chiang Kai-Shek had to beat a quick retreat. In a short time he had to give up nearly all the ground he had won on the northern side of the Yangtze River.

Feng Yu-Hsiang, the Christian General, who had been very active as a go-between trying to bring Wuhan and Nanking together by having a conference with the Wuhan leaders in Chengchow and another with Chiang Kai-Shek in Hsuehchow, now proposed a third conference in An-King so that the two parties could meet each other half-way, because Wuhan members refused to go anywhere under the rule of Nanking, and Nanking members would not think of going to anywhere within the influence of Wuhan.

Let the reader put himself in the place of Chiang Kai-Shek and reflect for a moment on what had been happening during these past few months and what he ought to do under the present circumstances. Was it not ridiculous that they still had to meet each other on neutral ground to discuss possible co-operation, or more probably non-co-operation? They had no further quarrel about the Communists, whom even Wuhan now realised to be their common enemy. What then was it that they had been quarrelling about? It all boiled down to this: that there was one man who was in the way, and that was he himself. If he went into retirement there would not be any further need for the people to shout 'Down with Chiang Kai-Shek'. Putting aside the question of who was right and who was wrong, the simple fact remained that whilst he was the Commander-in-Chief there was no hope for the success of the Northern Punitive Expedition; for the forces under Wuhan would not fight the Northerners as

they were marching eastwards against him, and his own forces couldn't, as they had to ward off the attack from Wuhan. It was plain what he ought to do.

On August 13th, 1927, Chiang Kai-Shek announced his resignation and issued a long declaration to air his feelings, which he had had in mind for a long time. He gave an historical review of his work up to the time of the formation of the Wuhan regime, and then said:

'The Communists hiding in our Party became jealous of the progress of our Revolution. Following the instructions of Borodin at a time when our comrades in Wuhan and in Nanchang were temporarily separated, they made up all sorts of malignant lies, saying I was a "War Lord" and "Dictator". They wanted to defeat me directly and defeat our Revolution indirectly. . . . At the time when our comrades in uniform were fighting hard in Chekiang and Kiangsu, our Party organisation in Wuhan was seized by Communists. Pay for the soldiers was stopped, and also munitions for the war. We were endangered in a hundred ways. I had to bear them all in silence. Not that I did not think of resigning; I did, and repeatedly. But I could not bear to leave my men of the front line in the lurch. Overcoming every hardship, I struggled on to consolidate our position in Kiangsu and Anhwei.

'After my capture of Nanking and Shanghai, the Communists, finding their tricks didn't work, proceeded to incite the mob to create diplomatic trouble and misled the workers to organise disturbances behind the fighting lines. As their outrageous deeds became more apparent, public anger became more acute. Loyal comrades rose to protect our Party by clearing it of the Communists. Following the resolutions of our Central Supervisory Committee, a Central Government was established in Nanking as desired by our late Master. It was hoped that our comrades who had been delayed in Wuhan would come and join us as they had promised, and unite once

more to go on with our great task. But such an opportunity did not arrive and we waited for their presence in vain.

'Since then our Party and our Army have been virtually divided, and the doomed life of the War Lords has been allowed to linger on temporarily. The eyes and ears of the common people have begun to lose their clearness and sharpness. For three or four months the advance of the Northern Expedition has merely reached the border of Shantung. Why is it that we had pushed forward so quickly? And why is it that we now go forward so slowly? Think quietly and reflect carefully, the reason is easy to understand.

'I have been constantly thinking of resigning my duties by finding as my reason one of my many blunders. But in looking back I wonder what would have happened if I had given up my command at the time when Shanghai and Nanking had just been taken and slanders and abuse had been heaped upon me? The outrageous acts of the Communists in Hunan, Kwangtung and Kiangsi during the past few months are clear indications of what would have happened. Putting aside the question of what would have become of our military, financial and diplomatic policies, our Party would have suffered in the following order. First, our soul would have been lost, merely our corpse would have been left behind. Then stars would have moved their positions and things would have been exchanged with each other. I am afraid that even the name of the Kuo Min Tang would long have ceased to exist. Then there would have been no opportunity left for the people in Wuhan to rise leisurely to drive away the Communists . . .'

In this declaration he had three wishes: 1, that the comrades in Wuhan should join those in Nanking and work together; 2, that the uniformed comrades in Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi should resume their Northern Puni-

tive Expedition in order to complete the Revolution; 3, that the Communists in Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi should be thoroughly got rid of. Although he had resigned all his official posts, he, as a member of the Kuo Min Tang and as a citizen of China, would still do all his duty towards his Party and country, and 'as long as I have a single breath left, I will never relax in this determination of mine'.

Chiang Kai-Shek's resignation was the best and only solution. When the situation had reached such a deadlock, his move was a very wise step. The Wuhan people could not possibly find another excuse for bickering any more. There were critics of Chiang Kai-Shek who said that in view of his coming back again a few months later his resignation was only 'a retreat in order to advance'. But the humble author holds the view that in such a case it was an even wiser step to take. The Northern Expedition had to be finished, and nobody knew more clearly than Chiang Kai-Shek that among the generals of the South it was impossible to find another man to step into his shoes. The longest way round is often the shortest way home.

After Chiang Kai-Shek's resignation, Feng Yu-Hsiang's proposed conference in Anking became immediately superfluous. But Hu Han-Min and the other leaders in Nanking who had been in negotiation with Wuhan, now being fed up with the whole situation, aired their previously concealed feelings by sending the following telegram to the go-between. It is one of the best specimens of the Chinese ironical essay, and the ridiculous situation had inspired the writer to compose a little masterpiece. No doubt much of its biting wit will be lost through translation, but it is well worth quoting in full. A little footnote is needed here to say that the word 'Conference' in Chinese is made of two verbs, 'to meet' and 'to discuss', or two nouns, 'meeting' and 'discussion'. It was most

probably drafted by Wu Chih-Hui, a witty and humorous scholar. Here is the telegram:

'To Commander-in-Chief Feng, Chengchow.

'When we received your telegram dated August 11th, asking us to meet in Anking, we agreed gladly. When we sent you the reply on the evening of the 12th, our Elder Brother Kai-Shek was getting into his train for Shanghai. We showed him the draft of the reply and he smiled and signed his name at once. Who would have thought that the news of our Elder Brother Kai-Shek's resignation would be announced on the morning of the 13th? We went to Shanghai to get him back; but when we reached there, he had gone to Ningpo. In the Spring of last year Li Shih-Tseng and Wu Chih-Hui went to the North to get you back and you had left for Mongolia. They missed you only by a few hours. The Sun moves exactly as fast as it always does. In a moment it has disappeared. We are unhappy now exactly as we were last year.

'Some friends showed us the Declaration, and also told us that our Elder Brother Kai-Shek had been working on it for days past. Even at the time when he went into the train he had showed it to all his uniformed subordinates, the only people to whom he didn't show it were his friends in long gowns. Since we have read it, we feel extremely happy. When we must have recourse to "discussions" and they must be done at "meetings", and furthermore these "meetings" must take place at Anking which doesn't belong to either of the parties, it means obviously there are still numerous small incomprehensible misunderstandings between both parties. To achieve unity, both parties have to yield eventually to each other. Since we had, the one sooner and the other later, been regretting and weeping over our blunder of accommodating the Communists, we should race each other this time to make personal self-sacrifice. Though we are confident that we will yield to

the other party at the conference table, how much better is our Elder Brother Kai-Shek, who has yielded so easily and so fundamentally!

'Ever since the Communists started their troubles, we cannot deny that we both have been very weak in our restraint. On the walls of Nanking tattered posters for attacking Wang Ching-Wei can still be seen; and from Wuhan fresh telegrams denouncing Chiang Kai-Shek are still coming. That shows the authorities of both sides were unable to control their followers. Even when we were preparing to maintain our amiable countenance and bow respectfully to each other to reveal our innermost feelings, one side could not help stopping its Northern Punitive Expedition, whilst the other side was unable to refrain from raising banners to go on with its Eastern Punitive Expedition. Jade and silk—offerings of peace, together with swords and spears—instruments of war, are to be used alternately and simultaneously. Isn't this to be a laughing-stock for the whole world?

'And so he who is riding a horse has no need to look for a horse, but he who wants the water to cool can easily pull out the faggots from under the boiler. If whichever side is to be sacrificed, then there is no need to "meet" and there is nothing to "discuss". Everything is completely solved. We your younger brothers, had not comprehended this in the first instance, and we therefore are far behind our Elder Brother Kai-Shek. That is why we instantly decided to turn back from our trip to Anking and are going back each to his own home. One is finished, a hundred are finished!

'To be pro-Communist or anti-Communist, both sides have learnt their lesson by costly experience. Neither side is choosing the good from the bad, but considering those who follow them as praiseworthy. There are signs that their separate policies are already drifting farther apart from each other. If they pretend to be united in appear-

ance but are actually disunited in spirit, concentrating solely on grasping for leadership and on defending their own crafty doctrine, and if they continue to fight each other in secret on account of their unwilling union, then the damage done to the Party and to the country will be far heavier than before. "At ease" is the order of the day; won't you kindly forgive us and not think of us as "deserters"? A single pillar is strong enough to support the heavens. Our hope rests upon you.

'Your younger brothers, Hu Han-Min, Chang Ching-Kiang, Tsai Yuan-Pei, Li Shih-Tseng and Wu Chih-Hui salute you. August 14th, 1927.'

As Chiang Kai-Shek went to his home in Feng Hua from Ningpo and then sailed for Japan in October, events in Nanking and Wuhan continued to worsen. As can easily be seen from the above telegram, discord rang loudly among the Kuo Min Tang leaders. Neither Wang Ching-Wei nor Hu Han-Min would shoulder the responsibility of the Government in Nanking at this critical hour and a special Council had to be formed as the temporary highest organ to direct the affairs of the State.

Chiang Kai-Shek left Nanking on August 12th. After the Commander-in-Chief's resignation, the Revolutionary Army in the north of Kiangsu was left without a leader. They retreated under the pressure of Sun Chuan-Fang's reinforced army to Pu-Kow, which is on the north bank of the Yangtze River opposite Nanking. The following week saw the repeated defeat of the Revolutionary Army near this capital. Luckily the First Army under Ho Ying-Ching—Chiang Kai-Shek's original army—and the Seventh Army under the Kwangsi leader Li Tsung-Jen, staged a counter-offensive in the last days of August and successfully drove away the Northern Army, which suffered very heavy losses.

Though Nanking was by now fairly safe, the new

generals in the Revolutionary Army, knowing there was no strong man above, began to do whatever they liked. Their behaviour differed little from that of the Northern War Lords, for indeed many were War Lords only recently reorganised as commanders in the Revolutionary Army. Some commanders originally from Canton also followed suit, and in the later part of 1927, while Chiang Kai-Shek was not in power in Nanking, civil war broke out in many places. First there was the Hunanese Army trying to attack Nanking in October and November, and then there was the Cantonese Army attacking the Kwangsi Army in Canton in November.

On top of these troubles, the Communists broke out in Canton in December. A Soviet Government was formed in this provincial capital of Kwangtung where numerous people were killed and more than a dozen fires raged. They occupied the city only for a few days. When the Kuo Min Tang Army fought back with reinforcements, many more people were killed. It is believed that within these few days several thousand lives were lost.

Towards the end of December, fighting again broke out around Canton when one Cantonese general did not like another. Spasmodic fighting went on for over a month when the Communists rose again and occupied the two seaside towns of Hai-Fung and Luk-Fung. Burning and killing were even more extensive than before and the Kuo Min Tang Army dealt with them also very ruthlessly this time.

Chiang Kai-Shek could not be spared. People all over the country cried aloud for his return. He came back from Japan in November, 1927, and was married to Soong Mei-Ling, sister of Madame Sun Yat-Sen and T. V. Soong the Minister of Finance, in December. On the New Year's Day of 1928, the National Government in Nanking sent him a telegram requesting him to resume his duties as Commander-in-Chief of the Revolutionary Army and

to continue his Northern Punitive Expedition. Two days later he was elected a member of the State Council and went to Nanking on January 4th, 1928. His return to office pulled the Government together, and it was reorganised in February during a combined conference of the Central Executive and Supervisory Committees. All the Communist members were expelled from these committees at this conference and China since then has been governed by a system called one-party tutelage until a constitution should be adopted. This was done in 1947.

IX

OUR sage Mencius said that it would be better to have no history at all than to believe it entirely. Such a remark may be applied to quite a number of books, especially those written about debatable events by authors who are directly or indirectly connected with them.

Numerous books, pamphlets and periodical articles have been written about Chinese politics in which Chiang Kai-Shek figures prominently. Most of those written by Europeans and Americans often present a rather superficial view, as the Chinese political background is always too complicated and difficult for outsiders to understand. Those written by participants of our internal struggles are seldom free from prejudice. Chiang Kai-Shek might easily claim to be the man who has the largest amount of adulatory as well as abusive literature written about him.

In dealing with subsequent events an independent biographer of Chiang Kai-Shek could not possibly sift his available material too carefully. The humble author has to crave the indulgence of his readers if they find him over-stressing the virtue of brevity when writing about the latest years of this biography. Apart from material which is not yet available but which is indispensable in making a full and true picture of Chiang Kai-Shek's life, those writings already published by his followers as well as by his enemies have to be examined and compared dispassionately. Much of this material has to be modified from time to time and some has to be discarded altogether.

Chiang Kai-Shek's drastic measures taken against the Chinese Communists, which were to be much more intensi-

fied as time went on and as the counter-measures adopted by the Communists became more desperate, have been severely condemned by writers with left tendencies, or even by those of liberal mind. Whilst on the other hand, right-wing authors have always been loud in their praise for his timely action to save civilisation from the Bolsheviks. It is unnecessary to advise a sagacious reader to accept views from either extreme with reserve. But biased writings have never ceased to flow from the two sides and an innocent reader constantly runs the risk of being misinformed.

A good example is his second marriage, which his enemies declared was one of convenience. At first this seemed to be plausible and even convincing; and for a number of years many people were made to believe it to be the truth. At the time of this marriage Chiang Kai-Shek was but a newly self-made man, while the Soong family had good, established connections: Madame Sun Yat-Sen's prestige was very high; H. H. Kung and T. V. Soong were both very influential among the members of the Government. Moreover, circumstances favoured the rumour-mongers. Chiang Kai-Shek had two sons before he married Soong Mei-Ling, but no child came from his second marriage. Further argument for such a rumour was that he scarcely spent any time with his newly-wedded wife before he left her to lead a vigorous military life once more. It seemed quite logical to think that he married her in order to resume his position as the Commander-in-Chief of the army.

From 1927 onwards such a rumour was persistent. It would have gone on for ever had it not happened that in 1936 Madame Chiang Kai-Shek flew to Sian to join her husband, who had been imprisoned by pro-Communist generals. The fact that she was willing to sacrifice everything she had to be with him gave the lie to those who professed it was a loveless match. However, this episode will

be dealt with in its proper place later on. Suffice it to say here that many falsehoods have been refuted by time.

On December 1st, 1927, when Chiang Kai-Shek and Soong Mei-Ling were married, he made a public declaration that after their wedding they would dedicate their united strength to the work of the Revolution. Though it is rather unusual to have such a public announcement at one's wedding, subsequent events proved that it was not merely an empty promise. Chiang Kai-Shek went to Nanking to take up his duties almost immediately and in February, 1928, at the combined conference of the Central Executive and Supervisory Committees of the Kuo Min Tang, he was re-elected a member of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Kuo Min Tang and the Chairman of the Military Council. It is interesting to note that the first preparatory meeting for this combined conference had been held at his private residence in Shanghai on December 3rd, 1927, two days after his wedding.

He presided over most sessions of this combined conference when Mao Tse-Tung, among other Communists, was officially expelled from the Kuo Min Tang. But the most important business of this meeting was the resolution for the continuance of the war against the North and it was carried unanimously. It read: 'Concentrate all the strength of the Revolution and accomplish the Northern Punitive Expedition at the given time.' On February 9th, two days after the close of the meeting, Chiang Kai-Shek went to Hsuechow to review the troops and hold military conferences.

All the revolutionary forces were now reorganised and they comprised four army groups each consisting of seven to fifteen armies. Besides being the over-all commander-in-chief of the total forces, Chiang Kai-Shek also led the First Army Group, whilst Feng Yu-Hsiang, the Christian General, led the Second, and Yen Hsi-Shan, the Military

Governor of the Northern Province of Shansi ever since the Revolution in 1911, led the Third. A Fourth Group led by Chiang Kai-Shek's Kwangsi comrade Li Tsung-Jen served as reserves.

After this reorganisation of the forces, Chiang Kai-Shek gave the order for a general offensive in the beginning of April. The grand strategy was to attack Shantung from Kiangsu with Chiang Kai-Shek's First Army Group, whilst Chihli was to be attacked from the south by Feng Yu-Hsiang's Second Group in Honan and from the west by Yen Hsi-Shan's Third Group in Shansi. The biggest and strongest group was that led by Chiang Kai-Shek. It fought northwards against Sun Chuan-Fang's forces and reached and occupied Tsi-Nan, the capital of Shantung, at the end of April, which was twenty-one days from the time of beginning this renewed campaign.

Chiang Kai-Shek made haste and was in the city of Tsinan on May 1st, but two days later the Japanese, who had marshalled a large force near the provincial capital on the pretext that they had to protect their nationals, started to attack the Revolutionary Army.

It will be remembered that in 1919 Japan was given the privileged rights which Germany, before the war, had enjoyed in Shantung. Though China refused to sign the Peace Treaty which gave this little present to Japan, Japan always regarded Shantung as her sphere of influence. As foreign powers could station their armies in all the treaty ports of China, Japan took advantage of this and tried to stop the Revolutionary Army from passing through Tsinan. That is why Chiang Kai-Shek suddenly found his men attacked by the Japanese within Chinese territory. Japanese atrocities, with which the whole world later on became well acquainted, were committed unashamedly in this place. The Chinese diplomatic official Tsai Kung-Shih who represented the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Nanking, and sixteen members of his staff, were murdered

in cold blood in their office in Tsinan after having had their noses and ears cut off by Japanese soldiers. When later on Chiang Kai-Shek asked Huang Fu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to meet the Japanese commanding officer in this city to negotiate for a peaceful settlement, the Minister was arrested and forced to sign a paper saying that it was the Chinese and not the Japanese who started this 'Tsinan Incident'.

For several days Japanese machine-guns and cannons were kept bombarding the Chinese soldiers and civilians in the city, whilst Chiang Kai-Shek was trying his best to avoid a serious clash with Japan. He had, at last, to order the evacuation of the city and its adjoining district. He realised that he was not prepared to meet so formidable a foe. His forces had been deployed to finish the Northern Punitive Expedition. This provocative diversion, if not speedily and amicably avoided, would bring his work to ruin. As the Japanese utterly refused to parley with him, he withdrew his men from this route and hurried on to the other one himself to direct operations from Honan.

Towards the end of May he went from Hsuechow to Chengchow to meet Feng Yu-Hsiang, the Christian General, and in the last days of the same month he went to Shih-Chia-Chuan to meet Yen Hsi-Shan as the Third Army Group was entering the Province of Chihli from Shansi at this important railway junction. By this time Chiang Kai-Shek's prestige in the army was extremely high. His mere name was enough to inspire his men to win decisive victories. Soldiers who had been retreating at uncontrollable speed the previous evening would advance courageously the very next day after they had surrendered to him and been reorganised into the Revolutionary Army. As the numbers of the War Lords' soldiers decreased rapidly, those of Chiang Kai-Shek increased by leaps and bounds. By the beginning of June his two strong enemies, Wu Pei-Fu and Sun Chuan-Fang,

had practically lost every inch of ground which they had hitherto occupied, and his last and most powerful foe, the Manchurian War Lord Chang Tso-Lin, was hurriedly preparing to evacuate Peking peacefully.

Japan, who intended to stop Chiang Kai-Shek from marching northwards into Peking by creating the 'Tsinan Incident', was utterly disappointed to find the War Lords could not hold their positions in spite of her undisguised interference. She began to lose her confidence in these War Lords and to take matters into her own hands. This her commanders did in their own way. Marshal Chang Tso-Lin with almost all his staff left Peking on June 3rd, 1928, after he had sent out a circular telegram to announce the withdrawal of his forces from inside the Great Wall. When his train reached a point where the Peking-Moukden line crosses the Southern Manchuria line and where the Japanese had their troops stationed, well placed and controlled bombs exploded on the bridge of the Southern Manchuria line above the coach in which was Chang Tso-Lin. Being less than a mile from the city of Moukden, he was immediately taken to his headquarters though already mortally wounded. Knowing what the Japanese intended to do, his staff, together with his son Chang Hsueh-Liang, later known as the Young Marshal who figured prominently in the Sian coup of December, 1936, decided not to announce the old Marshal's death until every precaution had been taken in their quarters to defend them against a possible Japanese attack.

It is pointed out by observers that Marshal Chang Tso-Lin's death at the hands of the Japanese was a case of reaping what he had sown. He was very friendly with Japan, partly because he had to be, as Manchuria was half overrun with Japanese, and partly because he had been depending upon her for military and material help. It is also quite true that the Japanese intervention in Tsinan was through

his diplomatic manoeuvre: for Japan later on declared that she had been urged to intervene by Chang Tso-Lin's representative.

However, his son, the Young Marshal, could now plainly see that they had been playing with fire. Instead of allying himself with Japan to fight against Chiang Kai-Shek, he decided to reverse his father's policy by resisting Japan and making overtures to the Nanking Government. For this purpose he sent four representatives to Peking to negotiate with Chiang Kai-Shek, and on July 1st, 1928, he issued a declaration to say that he had given orders to all his troops to withdraw to Manchuria and he hoped that his friends who were in power would also conclude their military affairs.

By this time it could be said that the Northern Punitive Expedition had come to its successful end: all the War Lords had been vanquished and almost the entire country, except for the far remote regions, had been conquered. Chiang Kai-Shek, when he arrived triumphantly in Peking, felt that he had achieved what his late master Sun Yat-Sen had started but not finished. It was then that Peking, which means Northern Capital, was made to resume its ancient name of Peiping, which means Northern Peace. Moreover, the Province of Chihli, which means Metropolitan Province, was renamed Hopeh, which means North of the Yellow River. Nanking, which means the Southern Capital, is the place where Sun Yat-Sen originally established the Central Government.

When Sun Yat-Sen died in Peking in 1925, his coffin was taken to the Temple of Green Cloud on the West Hill just outside the city, and there the remains of the Father of the Chinese Republic had reposed for more than three years. The first thing Chiang Kai-Shek did when he came to Peking was to perform the solemn ceremony of visiting the coffin. When he and the three other military leaders, Feng Yu-Hsiang, Yen Hsi-Shen and Li Tsung-

Jen, made this sacred pilgrimage to the West Hill and stood with their uncovered heads bowed in front of the coffin, Chiang Kai-Shek's tears rained down his cheeks and soon he broke into uncontrollable sobs. He had so many things about which he wished he could talk with his deceased Master. And, furthermore, so many difficulties had already sprung up at this moment when he thought he had accomplished the almost impossible task of conquering and unifying the whole country.

After the Communists had been expelled from the Party and the Government, and after the War Lords had been conquered, the very first troubles which Chiang Kai-Shek had to face were those presented by the military leaders who had helped him in performing the two above-mentioned tasks. When Chang Hsueh-Liang, the Young Marshal, approached him for a peaceful settlement about Manchuria, Chiang Kai-Shek found that some of his brothers-at-arms immediately became very jealous. To avoid a direct clash, he returned to Nanking and laid the matter before the next combined Conference of the Central Executive and Supervisory Committee of the Kuo Min Tang which was held in August, 1928. As neither Feng Yu-Hsiang nor Yen Hsi-Shan were yet members of these committees, their presence at this conference was more or less a gesture of courtesy graciously granted to them by the Party. Chiang Kai-Shek was the one who had the biggest say in it.

Besides the military leaders whom Chiang Kai-Shek had to humour as Sun Yat-Sen had done in the days of the Cantonese Government, the 'Party men' of the extreme left and the extreme right continued to worry him with their violent clashes with each other. Within the Kuo Min Tang there were always some leftists who sympathised with the Communists and maintained that their leader Sun Yat-Sen wanted to collaborate with Russia

and tolerate the Communists. Also there were some right-wing members who considered anyone a traitor to the Party if he did not hate the Communists as blindly as they did. It was between these two extremes that Chiang Kai-Shek had to choose a middle way. In October, 1928, whilst the two extremes were still intriguing against each other, he was nominated and installed as the Chairman of the State Council of the Government.

Wang Ching-Wei had been for years leading the leftists of the Kuo Min Tang, constantly heckling Chiang Kai-Shek. As he was using the Communists as his political instrument he often got himself into trouble. In the Summer of 1927, when the Communists under the Wu-Han Government became uncontrollable, he had, to use his own words, 'to fight between two attacks', those of the Communists and of Chiang Kai-Shek. At the end of the same year and in January, 1929, when the Communists in Canton nearly broke out in open revolt after he had been shielding his pro-Communist followers, he was singled out for abuse by the Communists and condemned by all those who did not like the Communists.

Chiang Kai-Shek courted his support when early in 1927 Wu-Han and Nanking were starting to fight each other. He betrayed Chiang Kai-Shek by promising to parley but secretly going over to Wu-Han to lead the anti-Chiang Kai-Shek movement. When Chiang Kai-Shek approached him a second time after the Wu-Han Government had joined Nanking, Wang Ching-Wei began to be unpopular and unable to co-operate. He sailed for Europe. That was in the last days of 1927.

The leader of the right wing of the Kuo Min Tang, Hu Han-Min, since the Northern Punitive Expedition had revealed that Chiang Kai-Shek had become the chief enemy of the Communists, had forgotten his differences with Chiang Kai-Shek and done his best to support the Nanking régime. Except for a short trip abroad in the

early part of 1928, he had been Chiang Kai-Shek's chief supporter during those troublesome years. In 1929 and 1930, when Chiang Kai-Shek was the Chairman of the State Council of the National Government, a large number of Party men, with the help of various disappointed military leaders, joined forces in secret to oust Chiang Kai-Shek. The support of Hu Han-Min and his followers was very useful.

Wang Ching-Wei restarted the anti-Chiang Kai-Shek campaign by sending a long telegram to denounce the Third National Congress of the Kuo Min Tang, which was held in Nanking in March, 1929; and in April and July Feng Yu-Hsiang and Yen Hsi-Shan respectively resigned their duties and announced their retirement. In the following October Wang Ching-Wei came back from France to intensify the new anti-Chiang Kai-Shek movement and a number of active generals started to fight against the Central Government forces.

The Third National Congress of the Kuo Min Tang was a stormy one. Although it was Chiang Kai-Shek's intention to bring the right and left together, the result was that the two extremes became farther apart. The resolution to reinstate the membership of the expelled 'Old Comrades' was most unwelcome to the leftists. And a mere vote of censure on Wang Ching-Wei without expelling him was considered too compromising by the right wing. A number of radical members walked out during the session. Those who tried to please everybody seldom pleased anybody.

But Chiang Kai-Shek, with the support of Hu Han-Min, managed to bring the Congress into as satisfactory a state as seemed possible. They thought that Wang Ching-Wei, Feng Yu-Hsiang and Yen Hsi-Shan could be placated by making them members of the Central Executive Committee. But, as mentioned before, none of them was at all placated. One after another they all declared

that they would have nothing to do with the Nanking Government of which Chiang Kai-Shek was elected the Chairman.

Wang Ching-Wei's telegram sent in March, though it did not point out the name of Chiang Kai-Shek, was a direct attack on him and his régime. It was written in carefully chosen words but nobody could fail to understand what and whom it attacked. It is true that Feng Yu-Hsiang, when he announced his retirement in April, was more outspoken, and that Yen Hsi-Shan, when he resigned all his posts following his conference with Feng Yu-Hsiang in June, exchanged many long telegrams with Chiang Kai-Shek denouncing his actions and policies; but these telegrams produced little effect. Chiang Kai-Shek is a man who prefers actions to words, and has accomplished much by swift action. With Feng Yu-Hsiang and Yen Hsi-Shan, however, Chiang Kai-Shek made many exceptions. In February, 1930, some twenty long telegrams were exchanged between Yen Hsi-Shan and Chiang Kai-Shek. The use of the classical style in Chinese telegrams usually meant a great saving of words; but in such cases it was the reverse. They were, of course, drafted by their literary secretaries, who must have had the time of their lives.

Wang Ching-Wei's telegram in March was the most important of its kind, and also the forerunner of many more fierce ones. In September, 1929, he came back from abroad and started to denounce Chiang Kai-Shek as a traitor. As Wang Ching-Wei proved himself to be the arch-traitor of the country by going over to Japan when she invaded China, it will not be considered objectionable to quote the telegram which he circulated on September 24th, 1929, upon his return from Europe. It runs as follows:

'The leader of our Party, Sun Yat-Sen, on seeing the rapid decline of our country and the increasing troubles

falling on our people, promoted the principles of saving our country on the basis of revolutionary policies. To put these policies and principles into practice, we must do our utmost to sweep away obstacles. Therefore, in the Declaration of the Northern Punitive Expedition it was said that our aim was not only to destroy Tsao Kun and Wu Pei-Fu, but also to see that never would any successors to these War Lords spring up again. It certainly does not allow an ambitious and crafty fellow going under the faked name of Revolution to grasp power for his personal gain.

'But Chiang Kai-Shek, since the establishment of the Central Government in Nanking, thought he could pursue his private interest now that the highest authority was in his hands. His despotic ambition became unchecked. He went on to rebel against the Revolution, to forsake the common people, to break the Party Regulations and to fake the Congress. His wicked relatives and personal friends were given all the important official posts. He levied heavy and unreasonable taxes on the people, who consequently starved and died whilst wandering the roads. All his doings were aimed at his personal interest. He considered the nation as his private property. To spare your life or kill you, this entirely depended upon his pleasure or displeasure. The life of a human being was as light to him as a feather.

'Moreover, pretending that it was for the maintenance of the nation's honesty, he gave away many sovereign rights of our country. He called it by the high-sounding name of "construction" whilst he squandered huge sums of money from the national treasury. He betrayed his country in settling the tragic case of Tsinan, thus making the Province of Shantung another Southern Manchuria. He promised the Japanese to pay them back the debts which the War Lords contracted: a thing even the worst of our politicians refused to do. To recount all his sins

and wickedness is impossible. Any one of these misdeeds is sufficient to ruin a nation.

'Our comrades in arms, some of whom had been following our late Leader for years and many of whom are firm believers in his doctrines, vowing to sacrifice their lives for the Party and the country, have long been regarding Chiang Kai-Shek as the common enemy and are determined to deal with him sternly. As soon as this declaration reaches them, they ought to raise arms to wipe away this rebel. To save our country from annihilation and help people from drowning and burning, both our Party and country are depending upon these comrades.'

This telegram was signed by Wang Ching-Wei together with eleven of his followers who were all members of the Central Executive Committee elected at the Second National Congress. It was to give sanction to a fiery general who had been Wang Ching-Wei's ardent follower and was now rebelling against Chiang Kai-Shek for the third time.

With the agitation of the politicians and generals who had failed to obtain favourable positions in the Nanking Government, the anti-Chiang Kai-Shek movement was extensively revived. He who used to receive telegrams from various generals all over the country begging him to accept their surrender, now received nearly as many messages, some from those very people, demanding his resignation if not his life. The only difference—and a most important one—was that whilst the surrenders came almost all at the same time, the rebellions breaking out against him took place at quite convenient intervals: convenient in allowing him to devote his whole time to dealing with them one by one. Modern historians have said that had all those who wanted to oust Chiang Kai-Shek struck at the same time, they could easily have knocked out twenty Chiang Kai-Sheks. But each waited to start at his own time and Chiang Kai-Shek, whilst dealing sternly with

one of them, always did his best to humour all the others.

It is a common saying in China that after a man has been in charge of his family affairs for three years, even his dog will hate him. Though many partisans and generals started to revolt against Chiang Kai-Shek long before he had been Chairman of the State Council for three years, he had been the actual head of the whole régime since very shortly after the death of Sun Yat-Sen. The drastic measures he took against the other military leaders whom he believed to be obstacles against the Northern Punitive Expedition, and the things he did against the Communists and their sympathisers, created so many enemies for him that attacks rained on him whenever there could be found a pretext and someone to give a lead. Fortunately for him, most of these attacks were nothing but empty words.

An interesting example was the telegram sent to him in December, 1929, by his old friend General Hsu Chung-Chih, under whom he had fought in earlier days, and whom he disarmed and forced to retire just before he started to push northwards. Having been silent for four years and seeing that so many people were now condemning Chiang Kai-Shek, he sent his old colleague the following sugar-coated bitter pill:

'My dear Younger Brother,

'I recollect that more than ten years ago I, your Elder Brother, and you, my Younger Brother, followed our Master working for the Revolution. We risked our lives and were prepared to die for it. Because of our indomitable spirit, we endeavoured to achieve success to a certain point. Unfortunately our Master died, and we wept and with tears in our eyes had to redirect our army to come back to quell the disturbance in Kwangtung, thus establishing the National Government in Canton.

'From henceforth I could take a little rest, and so I

handed over the whole army to you, my Younger Brother. You led the forces to start the Northern Punitive Expedition and thanks to the blessing of our Master who is in Heaven and also to the help given by the common people and our comrades all over the country, the unification of our country was at last achieved. It could not be said that you, my Younger Brother, had no merit in its achievement.

'But during the past years Party affairs have become confused and split, administration has become corrupt and bad. You, my Younger Brother, thus made yourself the target of all the arrows. Those who used to call themselves your subordinates and supporters have changed as one man to oppose you, my Younger Brother. According to the theory of censure as laid down by Confucius in his book *Spring and Autumn Chronicles* in which the worthy man alone was blamed, you, my Younger Brother, cannot really be excused from this responsibility.

'Reflect yourself, my Younger Brother, in the quietness of night, the proper course to take is to confess your mistakes and censure yourself in order to maintain peace in the country. For yourself, my Younger Brother, this will be an honourable way out: and for the people all over the country it will be a great blessing. Ask yourself, my Younger Brother, could you at this time get out of the difficulties which are surrounding you from the four directions? Rather than put yourself into danger it is far better to clear yourself and give peace to the country. Which course is advantageous and which harmful? Which is important and which slight? I do hope you, my Younger Brother, will consider and reconsider it calmly and dispassionately.

'Hsu Chung-Chih. December 6.'

The generals whom he had offended had always been the most powerful elements of the continuous anti-Chiang

Kai-Shek movement, because the dissatisfied politicians he could easily disregard as they had no military strength. Even the Communists, before they formed their independent army, had been much more barkers than biters. Among the generals, those who had retired and no longer maintained relationship with their men were also fairly easy to deal with. It was only those who could not be dismissed, or those who remained the leaders of their men though saying they had gone into retirement, that Chiang Kai-Shek had to fight or humour as best he could. And these amounted to quite a number, especially after the Demobilisation Conference in 1929.

After the death of Marshal Chang Tso-Lin in Manchuria, his son, the Young Marshal Chang Hsueh-Liang, became a most powerful man in the North. As the co-operation of the other powerful generals in the North seemed to be doubtful, Chiang Kai-Shek decided to appease the Young Marshal rather than condemn him as the new War Lord of Manchuria and fight to finish him. The argument for such a step was that Chiang Kai-Shek wanted to avoid unnecessary bloodshed if the unification of the country could possibly be bought in peace. But those who were against him exclaimed that it was outrageous to make the Young Marshal a member of the State Council of the National Government, which was done in October, 1928, not very long after the Old Marshal had put so many members of the Kuo Min Tang to death.

But Chiang Kai-Shek acted as he did swiftly. And he was well satisfied with the results. In spite of no uncertain pressure from Japan brought to bear against his going over to the side of Kuo Min Tang, the Young Marshal, together with his satellite War Lords in the Four North-Eastern Provinces, that is Manchuria and Jehol, formally declared their conversion to the Three Principles of the People and allegiance to the National Government in Nanking in the

last days of 1928. The old national flag of five colours was pulled down and the new flag of a white sun against a blue sky with a red background was hoisted up. On the New Year's Day of 1929, Kuo Min Tang branch offices were established in Moukden.

The successful conclusion of the Northern Punitive Expedition made the Demobilisation Conference a necessity. Few generals wanted to decrease their men and consequently their power, but they had no excuse. On January 1st, 1929, when the Conference held its inaugural meeting in Nanking, it was attended by a host of military and Party leaders, including Chiang Kai-Shek, Feng Yu-Hsiang, Yen Hsi-Shen and Li Tsung-Jen. Chiang Kai-Shek was elected the Chairman of the Council and each Commander-in-Chief was assigned a specific duty to perform. The Conference lasted a little over three weeks and on August 1st of the same year a meeting was called to put the demobilisation into execution. It is interesting to note that on this occasion, except for Chiang Kai-Shek himself, none of the Commanders-in-Chief were present. It had been resolved that out of several million soldiers only a standing army of sixty-five divisions was to be maintained, each division to be cut down to eleven thousand officers and men. Besides the generals who were all directly concerned with the cut, T. V. Soong, the Minister of Finance at that time, was also highly dissatisfied. He resigned his post saying that he could not provide the money needed for the demobilisation.

A few of the most important resolutions passed at this meeting are worthy of recording. During the period of demobilisation all the civil service workers were to receive only eighty per cent of their pay, the remaining twenty per cent being contributed to the demobilisation expenses. Chairmen of Provincial Governments were not allowed to hold their military commands concurrently. Divisional Commanders were not allowed to take up civil

posts. Revenues and taxes hitherto held up by the army should be handed over to the Central Government. Such measures made Chiang Kai-Shek most unpopular. The conference was not a failure: it was a disaster!

Those were the most troublesome years for him. Now the Province of Hunan revolted, then the Province of Hupeh rebelled against him, and shortly afterwards the Province of Kwangsi declared its independence from the Central Government. One province rose soon after the other had been conquered. There were also clashes with the Russians in the North and, furthermore, the Communists broke loose in the city of Changsha. They occupied this provincial seat for several days whilst numerous people were killed. There were mutinies and minor outbreaks by similar groups, too, some taking place quite near the new capital of Nanking. A hundred and one things unpleasant to him occurred around him, and everybody said that if he would go everything would be all right. But he would not go. He attended to them one by one without losing heart. To be the Chairman of the State Council, in other words the Head of the Government, was not a very enviable job. As General Hsu Chung-Chih said, he had become the target of all the arrows in the country. Luckily for him, the arrows were not discharged at him all at the same time. That afforded him the necessary breathing-space.

But in the latter part of 1930 quite a number of arrows, and very strong ones, too, combined their forces to point at him. This was the so-called 'Enlarged Conference of the Kuo Min Tang' held in Peiping, with Wang Ching-Wei as the chairman, and with two commanders-in-chief, Feng Yu-Hsiang and Yen Hsi-Shan, as its military supporters. It was the most formidable threat to Chiang Kai-Shek's authority, for it consisted of the largest number of dissatisfied politicians and soldiers gathered together in one place and at one time, and the area under the control of

the soldiers concerned extended to several provinces along the valley of the Yellow River—Shansi, Hopeh, Honan and Shantung.

Whilst dispatching his forces to fight the followers of Feng Yu-Hsiang in Honan and Shantung, Chiang Kai-Shek sent agents to the North to urge the Young Marshal to prove his allegiance which had been given to the Central Government. If Chang Hsueh-Liang could attack the 'Enlarged Conference' forces from the North, the success would be as sure as 'catching a turtle in an urn'. However, the other side was not unaware of this. They too sent their envoys with money and promises to angle for the Young Marshal, whose stock shot up like a bolt. He was at that time only thirty years old.

That the Young Marshal would prefer to throw in his lot with Chiang Kai-Shek rather than with the other side was easy to understand. Two years previously, when the Young Marshal was approaching Nanking to be appeased, most of the other generals had been jealous. The Party men were scandalised when they were made to agree to nominate him a member of the State Council. But they had to put up with it, for Chiang Kai-Shek was his backer. Now he did not need to think twice before he decided which side he should help. The fact that Chiang Kai-Shek's presents and promises were better than those of the other side did not matter much.

Thus the new anti-Chiang Kai-Shek Government was established at nine o'clock on the morning of the 9th of September, which is the 9th month of the year, in 1930, which was the 19th year of the Chinese Republic, only to be dissolved within ten days when the Young Marshal telegraphed his support for Chiang Kai-Shek and moved his forces inside the Great Wall once more. It was a pity that, in spite of the new Government having chosen the auspicious hour when the figure nine occurred four times in order to wish it to be long-lasting, it should be so short-

lived. The word nine in Chinese reads the same as the word long-lasting.

The Young Marshal had no need to fight. He occupied Peiping peacefully, as the forces of Yen Hsi-Shan saw it was useless to resist. By doing a good turn to the man who had made him a member of the State Council, the Young Marshal had added another province—Hopeh—to his territory and another high office to those he already held—the Vice-Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Army, Navy and Air Force.

If we look at Chiang Kai-Shek's balance-sheet at this stage, we find he was not doing so well but had managed to recover some of his heavy losses. Wang Ching-Wei was by now an outspoken enemy, and as substitute for him, Hu Han-Min was holding the Party together in Nanking. The Communists were all against him, but nearly all the anti-Communists, including some of the 'Old Comrades' who belonged to the 'West Hill Conference', were supporting him. Feng Yu-Hsiang, the Christian General, and Yen Hsi-Shan had openly fought against him, but for the loss of these two great military leaders he now had the co-operation of the Young Marshal with all his satellite generals in Manchuria.

There was another general who gained an exalted position during this campaign against Feng Yu-Hsiang and Yen Hsi-Shan. He was the other leading character in the Sian *coup*, General Yang Hu-Cheng. Although Yen Hsi-Shan's forces beat a quick retreat when they heard of the Young Marshal's marching-orders, Feng Yu-Hsiang's army was still resisting the troops in Honan sent by the Central Government. After some fierce fighting the rebels slowly gave way, and Yang Hu-Cheng, who had taken the important junction of Lo-Yang, was made the Commander-in-Chief of the Shensi Relief Campaign. He fought westwards and occupied Sian, the capital of the

province of Shensi. He was thus appointed the Chairman of this Provincial Government, and this post was later renamed Pacification Commissioner of Shensi. At that time neither he nor the Young Marshal had the slightest communistic aspirations.

With the failure of the 'Enlarged Conference', the country entered into a very brief period of peace, and Chiang Kai-Shek thought it suitable to call the long-promised People's Convention and to adopt the Provisional Constitution. Regarding this, Hu Han-Min could not see eye to eye with him and before the People's Convention was called, Hu Han-Min resigned all his government and Party posts and stayed in the capital not doing anything. As it was said that Hu Han-Min was held by Chiang Kai-Shek under house arrest, so an official statement was issued. It said that theoretically no member of the Revolutionary Party might enjoy absolute freedom of personal movement. As responsible political leaders, once they had resigned, invariably went to foreign settlements at Shanghai or Tientsin or to Hongkong to incite and fan disorders, China had been having incessant civil strife. 'For the sake of the public and in his own interest, therefore, we are devising measures to preserve him from ruin. In the opinion of the Government and of Hu Han-Min himself, it is best that he should not leave Nanking.'

The People's Convention was held in Nanking on March 5th, 1931, and was attended by more than four hundred delegates coming from every province and over forty members of the Central Executive and Supervisory Committees of the Kuo Min Tang. Chiang Kai-Shek made the opening speech and presented the meeting with the Provisional Constitution. It could not be denied that that was a considerable achievement for Chiang Kai-Shek, but he must have missed some of his old and good friends. Neither Wang Ching-Wei nor Hu Han-Min was there and the two other Commanders-in-Chief, Feng Yu-Hsiang

and Yen Hsi-Shan were in the black books. Chang Hsueh-Liang, the Young Marshal, who had hurried South specially for this important convention, was a poor substitute. His prestige might be very high in Manchuria and his authority unquestionable in the North, where his satellites were, but Chiang Kai-Shek seemed to be his only supporter in the South.

The dismissal or retirement of the two generals, Feng Yu-Hsiang and Yen Hsi-Shan, and the two Party leaders, Wang Ching-Wei and Hu Han-Min, created great unrest among the other generals and politicians. Anti-Chiang Kai-Shek movements spread secretly, and in Central and South China revolt broke out. In Canton, where Chiang Kai-Shek had started his career, a number of Party men, with the support of the local general, openly demanded his resignation. They repeated what many people had said before: that Chiang Kai-Shek was the man responsible for all the confusion in the country and that his retirement would bring peace on earth immediately. Among the many things of which he had been accused were his having given authority to various Communists, his employing in the Government enemies of the Party and his imprisoning of Hu Han-Min. As usual, Wang Ching-Wei was one of the chief string-pullers, and the demand was counter-signed, curiously enough by some leftists as well as by right-wing members of the Central Committee.

Whilst asking the Young Marshal to help him in defeating quickly the uprising by a follower of Feng Yu-Hsiang in Central China, Chiang Kai-Shek told the rebels in Canton that he was willing to discuss with them what was best to be done. The rebellion in Central China was put down in a few days, but the Cantonese revolt became more serious when some of the troops of its neighbouring province of Kwangsi joined it. In the meantime the Chinese Communists were establishing themselves in the

interior parts of Kiangsi where they had engaged a large number of Chiang Kai-Shek's crack troops. Nothing pleased the Communists more than the Cantonese revolt.

It was at this critical time, whilst both sides thought fighting was inevitable, that Japan invaded Manchuria. On September 18, 1931, exactly a year after Chang Hsueh-Liang, the Young Marshal, had moved his troops inside the Great Wall to help Chiang Kai-Shek in spite of Japanese opposition, Japan created the 'Moukden Incident' by starting to attack the Chinese garrison in the city and to occupy the whole Province. Chang Hsueh-Liang was in Tientsin, and most of his troops were in Hopeh. Being unprepared for such a large-scale attack, the local garrison could scarcely do anything to stop the enemy.

Chiang Kai-Shek received the news calmly. He immediately issued a message to the nation. In this message he urged every man and woman, and every political group without exception, to rally to the Central Government. There was but one China, he said, and it could have only one national representation. In the meantime, knowing better than anyone else that China was too weak to fight her powerful neighbour, he appealed to the League of Nations, the old international organisation which was established after the First World War to prevent a second world war. He believed that justice could be done and asked the Chinese people to wait for action by the League of Nations. Little did he realise that the League of Nations was about as good as Westminster Abbey—merely a resting-place for great statesmen. Nobody there would like or was able to do anything, even should the Heavens fall. People in China believe that the inactivity of the League of Nations towards Japan's aggression in China was an encouragement for Italy and for Germany.

His call to end internal dissension also fell upon deaf ears. The South continued to bicker and the Communists in the interior showed no signs of co-operation. Ambi-

tious politicians still proclaimed that Chiang Kai-Shek must go. But he would leave no stone unturned before he gave up. He got Hu Han-Min to negotiate with the Southerners, and Wang Ching-Wei and his followers came to Shanghai for a peace conference. However, peace was far off. Nothing could be agreed between Chiang Kai-Shek and his opposers. It was after the failure of this peace conference in Shanghai that the Fourth National Congress was called to reorganise the Government. Even this party meeting was a chaotic one. Instead of one Congress three were held. One was held at Nanking; where most of the members attended. A second was held in Canton, to which Chiang Kai-Shek's enemies had hoped that both Hu Han-Min and Wang Ching-Wei would come: but they hoped in vain. Soon some of them left Canton for Shanghai to hold a third Congress.

In the meantime, the students all over the country began to feel restless. They journeyed to Nanking from various cities to petition in person to the Government demanding the declaration of war on Japan. Knowing better than anyone else that China could not meet Japan in arms at that time, Chiang Kai-Shek had to reassure the students that he would do everything he could for his country and to command them to go back to their studies instead of creating trouble for the Government. By that time the actions of those patriotic youths had become quite uncontrollable. He had to be very stern in dealing with them and it was an extremely unpopular action at that critical hour. Of course his political enemies supported the students' actions and made capital out of the incident.

On December 15th, 1931, Chiang Kai-Shek announced his resignation from all his official posts. As was expected, his resignation was accepted with alacrity. Immediately following this a large number of Cabinet Ministers also tendered their resignations, all of which, except two, were

rejected. Lin Sen, an elderly member of the Central Supervisory Committee, was elected the Acting Chairman of the State Council, and later on he was made Chairman, a post which he held for more than ten years with continued success till he died in 1943.

After having led a busy life for some years, Chiang Kai-Shek found this sudden relief most enjoyable. He went back to his native district of Feng Hua and took a most desired rest among the beautiful hills near his home. As he was lingering there in appreciation of the scenic beauty of this secluded spot, great difficulties began to descend upon the shoulders of the new office-holders. Whilst Nanking was still in confusion following the un-co-operative Congresses of the Party, the Japanese consolidated their gains in the North and prepared a further assault in the South by reinforcing their troops in Shanghai. It was soon apparent that not only was foreign aggression insufficient to incite the quarrelsome military leaders and politicians to be patriotic enough to cease attacking each other, but also that the resignation of their chief enemy, Chiang Kai-Shek, would not satisfy their endless demands. On top of this hopeless situation, the Communists in the interior continued to fight against the government troops.

It was in the early days of 1932 when the Government thought that they could not manage without the guidance of their old leader. At an emergency meeting in Nanking the new members of the Government decided that Lin Sen, the Chairman of the State Council, and Sun Fo, son of Sun Yat-Sen and President of the Executive Yuan, should petition Chiang Kai-Shek to come out of retirement at once. Wang Ching-Wei, who was not a member of the Government, also realised that Chiang Kai-Shek was the man to steer China through her present trouble. He was convalescing in a Shanghai hospital, but he decided to disregard the advice of his doctors and go to Hangchow

to meet the man with whom he had quarrelled for many years.

Wang Ching-Wei's giving up of his personal differences encouraged Chiang Kai-Shek, and their co-operation heartened those who were already in despair. For several days they talked things over in the beautiful city of West Lake, and towards the end of January, 1932, when Japan was pouring men and arms into the International Settlement of Shanghai, a part of which was controlled by her, the two leaders of the Kuo Min Tang made their way to Nanking. Besides his military duties which he consented to resume because of Japanese invasion, Chiang Kai-Shek took up no administrative post. Wang Ching-Wei, however, was made President of the Executive Yuan, the equivalent of the premiership, which Sun Fo gave up in his favour.

This time, Chiang Kai-Shek found the general situation of the country much worse than it had been in 1927 after his first resignation. In 1928 he had no difficulty in leading his victorious army to unify China. But now Japan had already started her 'disguised war', as Lord Lytton very tactfully called it, in Manchuria, and was on the point of starting her undisguised war in Shanghai. With a part of his troops to check rebellious generals, another part to keep the Communists from extending their area, he had to find a third to meet the Japanese invasion in the South. Knowing that with so many generals opposing him he could not muster enough military strength to ward off the Japanese onslaught, he still had to proclaim to the country that he would not compromise.

On January 28th, 1932, a few days after his return to Nanking, Japan attacked the Chinese garrison in Shanghai without the slightest provocation. The 19th Route Army which was stationed there defended its position heroically, and the 87th and 88th Divisions of the Central Fifth Army were also sent by Chiang Kai-Shek to the front to help

the defence. The Government, under the threat of Japanese gunfire, had to be moved to Lo-Yang where an emergency conference was held, and it is tragic to record that in the debate on the Japanese question, the civilian delegates voted for war whilst the military men voted for a truce. The soldiers knew where they were.

After a month's magnificent resistance the Chinese troops had to be withdrawn, and a tolerable truce was signed on March 4th. That such a truce was most unpopular with the Chinese people is perfectly understandable; in fact Quo Tai-Chi, the Chinese delegate who signed the truce, was mobbed by the students and had to be detained in hospital. Chiang Kai-Shek, Commander-in-Chief and Chairman of the Military Council, did not receive any physical attack on this matter. But the reader can readily imagine what those days had meant to him.

Alas, that was not the end, but only the beginning! Whilst the whole country was still furious at this truce, Japan ordered her puppet, Henry Pu-Yi, who had abdicated after the 1911 Revolution, to be installed as Emperor of Manchuria, which she renamed 'Manchukuo' and declared it an independent state. It can easily be imagined what a state of mind Chiang Kai-Shek was in at that time. Was it possible for the successful Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Punitive Expedition to bear this with fortitude and wait until the country was prepared? Or should he disregard reality and declare a hopeless war on Japan? It required super-human strength to swallow this great insult whilst the whole country was crying out for war. But he chose to act against popular sentiment and took the whole responsibility upon his own broad shoulders. Protesting loudly that China would never recognise the bogus 'Manchukuo', he ignored its existence and went on with his preparations. In December, 1932, when he was satisfied that Japan was concentrating her activities in the

North, he moved the Government back to Nanking.

But Japan would not stop in Manchuria. Early in 1933 she marched southwards, threatened Peiping and Tientsin and invaded Jehol. Chiang Kai-Shek had to hurry North to Paoting, where, it will be remembered, he attended his first military school when a boy, and direct a defensive war with a certain degree of success. After a local victory when the Japanese believed that the roads southwards were well fortified, he quickly agreed to another truce—the Tangku truce—in May, to buy a further lease of time. Again it was obvious that this was not a popular move; his personal prestige suffered severely, but he did not care. He felt he must do what was best for the country.

Perhaps the greatest Commander-in-Chief and Prime Minister in Chinese history was Chu-Ke Liang of the Three Kingdoms, who lived from 181 to 234 A.D. His most important and urgent task was a Northern Punitive Expedition against his chief enemy the Kingdom of Wei, but he decided to conquer a barbarian chieftain in the South within his own territory before he embarked on his main undertaking. This chieftain had a large following of barbarian tribesmen who would fight on until the last one fell. Chu-Ke Liang had to spend a fairly long time on his southern campaign and to capture the chieftain seven times before the barbarian finally acknowledged defeat and vowed that he would not revolt again.

'Peace at home before fighting invaders' was Chiang Kai-Shek's slogan when he marshalled his forces to suppress the Communists in the Yangtze Valley. During the past few years there had been several serious uprisings in the interior provinces. With the coming of the Japanese invasion of Chinese territories, to which part of her crack troops had to be sent, the Chinese Soviet regions had extended to the four provinces of Fukien, Kiangsi, Hunan and Hupeh with its capital in Jui-Kin, a secluded city on

the mountainous south-eastern border of Kiangsi. Taking the ancient Prime Minister as his model, Chiang Kai-Shek concluded those truces with Japan as best he could, in order to concentrate on wiping away hindrances to his later work. But the Communists proved to be much more unconquerable than the barbarian chieftain.

His long-drawn-out anti-Communist campaign was a very costly one in more senses than one. Money, manpower and prestige suffered as the campaign went on year after year without much apparent success: whilst he was engaged with the Communists in a tight grip, ambitious generals and politicians availed themselves of the opportunity to intrigue and revolt, with high-sounding declarations saying that they wanted to fight the Japanese invaders but had been kept from doing so by Chiang Kai-Shek. These revolts could always count upon the support of a small fraction of the people who were either simple enough to believe them or else had crafty schemes of their own. To both of these Chiang Kai-Shek was the stumbling-block to the highway of patriotism.

Receiving such insults with forbearance and shouldering a heavy responsibility, Chiang Kai-Shek made his headquarters more or less in the Province of Kiangsi to conduct his anti-Communist campaign. To emphasise the fact that the Communists were behaving savagely in the area they occupied, the campaign was officially called 'Red Bandits Suppression', and members or followers of the Chinese Communist party were called Red or Communist Bandits. Formerly it had been the Communists who used the foulest terms in attacking him, but now the tables were turned on them. Anti-Communist literature was encouraged and even sponsored by the Government, and violent attacks on the Reds could be found in all kinds of publications. The anti-Red publicity might not be so thorough as that of the anti-Chiang Kai-Shek, but it was much more extensive.

During the years of the anti-Red campaign there was one thing which is most interesting to note: that was the resumption of diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia in 1933. It will be remembered that after the discovery of the fact that the Soviet Consulate had helped the Communist uprisings in Canton in 1927-28, China broke off diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia. A few years later the forces of both countries clashed on the Northern Manchurian border and relations became more strained. It was a great surprise to most people that Chiang Kai-Shek should choose to resume relations with Soviet Russia, whilst doing his utmost to wipe out the Communists in Kiangsi.

Because of the announcement of the retirement from public life of the Christian General Feng Yu-Hsiang, and later the establishment of a 'People's Government' in Fukien by some ambitious generals and politicians, Chiang Kai-Shek did not make much headway in his anti-Red Campaign in the year 1933. But in the following year there was much to record. The 'People's Government' in Fukien was speedily defeated and he went to Chekiang in February to see that the Provincial Government was in good order. He then went to Nanchang, the capital of Kiangsi, in which province he spent most of his time in 1934. He was there when he declared, in a proclamation to the people of the Communist-infested province, that 'for the past year, because of raising armies to suppress several revolts, the Communist-bandits have availed themselves of this opportunity to extend the confusion and the trouble has been infected into three provinces. For the last few months their ferocious flame has become higher than ever. Having forced more people to join them, they invaded cities and occupied districts. The villages they passed through became flooded with blood. Male or female, old or young, they massacred them all. The damage they did through burning or plundering amounts to thousands of

millions. They committed what human beings could not bear to commit. For two hundred years never have things as atrocious as this happened. To mention it makes my heart ache and to think of it makes my hair stand up.'

In the Autumn he was gratified to see the capture of the Chinese Soviet capital, Juikin. The Reds retreated to Fukien and elsewhere. Kiangsi was almost cleared of Communists. Though this was but a partial success as there were still large numbers of Communists scattered about, it was a good occasion to celebrate a much needed victory. It was said that by taking up arms to attack their opponents the Communists believed that 'might is right.' Their defeat by Chiang Kai-Shek's campaign was therefore used to illustrate to the public that 'right is might'. Whilst he fully realised that there was a long way to go in getting rid of the Communists, he gave the widest publicity to this early celebration of his triumph.

As has been mentioned before, there were critics who attacked him for his policy of fighting the Communists who were his own countrymen whilst patching-up a temporary peace with foreign invaders, and his prestige suffered a little on account of this plausible attack. To show that the people were all on his side, Chiang Kai-Shek said in a public statement on this occasion that in his opinion, instead of celebrating the anti-Red victory, the celebration should be for the victory of the Chinese people. He maintained that it was through the co-operation of the people and soldiers that the suppression of the Red Bandits had been a success. If the people would support the Government whole-heartedly in domestic and diplomatic issues, he was sure that the national programme would be a complete success. To say that the victory belonged to the people was not sheer modesty: it was good statesmanship.

There was another thing which he did in 1934 worth

mentioning here. Whilst he was in the Province of Fukien he happened to meet with a boy scarcely ten years old with a cigarette in his mouth, walking in the street of a small town. This little incident had greatly disturbed him. He went to seek out the boy's parents and asked them to pay a little more attention to this child. Because he had seen quite a lot of things like this among the people, he thought the only way to awaken them was to initiate the New Life Movement. This he did in the Spring of 1934 in Nanchang, the provincial seat of Kiangsi, when the inaugural meeting was attended by thousands of students and others. Subsequent meetings to popularise the Movement were held in all the chief cities of China and soon it became a national affair. Many people hailed it as if it were a new religion and regarded it as the only means to deliver the masses from the bad ways into which they had fallen during the past twenty or thirty years.

Though the New Life Movement was meant to rejuvenate China, it was a revival of ancient tradition. The teachings of Confucius are the rudiments of Chiang Kai-Shek's Movement. The four important commandments are '*li*, *i*, *lien* and *ch'ih*', which mean literally good manners, right conduct, honesty and pride. As there is an essay on the Movement published by Chiang Kai-Shek, of which later on an official translation was made by Madame Chiang Kai-Shek, suffice it here to say that the Movement was organised to remind the people that the old virtues were as good as, if not better than, the new. Since the Revolution had practically preached the doctrine of knocking down all the old institutions, it was high time to point out to the misled masses that there were certain fundamentals which remained untouchable. As this essay is not too long, and preaches these virtues in a very clear and practical way, it is included in this volume as Appendix I.

The reader who has time to glance over Appendix I will find it interesting to learn that there were some people

in China who could even criticise Chiang Kai-Shek for his endeavour to lead the masses to practise those simple virtues. Their reasons were that he had overdone it; in some cases the supporters of this Movement had been doing so in an ostentatious manner; and that the social conditions in China needed improvement, which should be carried out by the governing rather than the governed classes. They said that the first thing to be done was for the Government to enable all the people to earn their living; the next thing was to increase their chances of living a slightly better life; and only the last thing was to preach to them how to live a new life. It was also attacked as being a political movement: it had been organised and spread through political machinery. The critics, some of whom were educationists, maintained that it should be conducted as an educational movement.

In point of fact, China would have fared better during the war and in the year immediately after the war if the preachings of the New Life Movement could have been thoroughly and extensively put into practice. As punctuality, frugality and industry were among its teachings, nothing could be more urgently needed for the recovery of the wounded and bleeding country. Some of the traditional virtues had been misrepresented and abused, and they were easily turned into red-tape and hypocrisy. The New Life Movement gave them an overhaul. When they were re-examined and re-affirmed the efficiency of the whole country would increase greatly.

Somewhat similar to the New Life Movement was the Society of Moral Endeavour which Chiang Kai-Shek established for his soldiers. Members of this society lived on much more puritan principles. They must not smoke, drink intoxicants nor indulge in any luxurious habits. In China, the institution known as The Young Men's Christian Association holds more or less these same principles. The new society founded by Chiang Kai-Shek for

his soldiers was extremely broad-minded in its religious aspects and so could include all men no matter what their beliefs were. As soldiering has always been associated with loose living, the Society of Moral Endeavour was an original and praiseworthy organisation.

Whilst the Communists in the interior were only partially subdued, the Mongolians, prompted by Japan, started a revolt in the North, making the situation in the provinces of Hopeh and Shansi very critical. In order to strengthen the defensive power of these places, Chiang Kai-Shek toured the border regions of the north-west in 1934. In a vast country like China to go from the south-east to the north-west would require a fairly lengthy period of time if it were done by land and river. As his presence could not be long spared from the capital and other parts where the anti-Red Campaign was still going on, he embarked on a series of long-distance flights.

In 1935 the Communists moved hurriedly westwards, and Chiang Kai-Shek, now used to long flights, toured the south-west by air. The provinces in this remote part had for years been somewhat out of touch with the Central Government. He inspected most of the public services and reorganised some of the important local governments and introduced a number of reforms. The great provinces of Yunnan and Szechuan had always been neglected by the rest of the country, but he at once saw the potential part which they could play in the case of an emergency. It was to these provinces that he paid most of his attention. The land, especially in Szechuan, is rich and the scenery beautiful, and he established on the picturesque O-Mei mountain the training camps for officials whom he wanted trained to meet any emergency.

The Communists had by now been driven out of the south-west Province of Kwei-Chow. During the course of the following year, that is in 1936, they began to move

further and further north, flying across the large pasture lands and deserted plains after having suffered severe losses. By the later part of 1936, their numbers had been greatly reduced and they could hardly manage to live in the newly-found hide-outs in the Province of Shensi when they had to escape from Shansi. The much-criticised anti-Red Campaign had been going on for many years, and it was at last drawing near to its successful conclusion. Now the dangerous Communist forces had been brought to bay in an isolated corner. They were watched by General Yang Hu-Cheng, the Pacification Commissioner of Shensi, and the Young Marshal Chang Hsueh-Liang, the combined forces of these two generals greatly outnumbering those of the Communists.

Towards the end of 1936, Chiang Kai-Shek was again touring the north-west by air. He was inspecting those regions for two reasons: firstly, he was co-ordinating the Government forces in the neighbouring provinces for a final onslaught against the Communists, and secondly, he had to see about the defence against the Japanese, who had invaded the Province of Char-Har in the previous year and were now spreading their influence in the whole of North China.

On October 31st of that year it was his forty-ninth birthday. According to Chinese custom this was an important occasion because it marked the entry into his fiftieth year. The whole country was preparing a nationwide celebration. On account of his great interest in air-power, all his well-wishers, who were numerous, subscribed voluntarily to buy a number of aircraft to be presented to the State to commemorate his birthday. Whilst Lin Sen, the President, and some two hundred thousand people were watching the sixty-eight presentation aeroplanes soaring into the air to form two characters representing his name, he was far away in Lo-Yang seeing to the defence of North China against Japanese attacks

and to the preparation of the final offensive against the Communists. He was, however, deeply touched by the good wishes of his friends. He issued a general message to thank all those who had contributed to the subscription for buying the aeroplanes and also circulated a touching tribute to his mother entitled 'Some Reflections on my Fiftieth Birthday'. As this essay gives the reader many glimpses into his life and thought, and as there is an official translation, it is included in this book as Appendix II.

A very brief perusal of this essay will convince the reader that Chiang Kai-Shek is a very patriotic citizen as well as a filial son. Instead of recounting his achievements on the threshold of fifty, he modestly relates what his mother had hoped he would do and what difficult times he, his mother and the country had had and would be having. He says, between the lines, that to drive away the Japanese invaders would be his sole aim: a thing which he owed to himself, his mother and his fellow-countrymen who had been so overwhelmingly kind to him. With Japan's foot of invasion virtually inside our door, he could not speak more plainly than he had done. The fact that a small foundation for a National Air Force was formed on this convenient occasion alone shows what was the most urgent need at that time and how carefully he had to go about it in order not to give the enemy an excuse to start a full-scale war at once. As the whole world knows, Japan threw off all her disguises and invaded China Proper about eight months after this.

X

CHIANG KAI-SHEK's anti-Communist campaign was a prelude to the defensive war against Japanese aggression. His 'home front first' policy had not been so popular as he thought. As soon as the Communist troubles in the interior seemed to decrease, arm-chair strategists in China began to clamour for a reversal of the policy and they were much more critical of Chiang Kai-Shek than those who attacked Churchill when they had urged in vain for an early Second Front in Europe in the last World War. Looking at the issue without bias, one could understand their passionate demand for converging all the nation's strength on the important task of recovering the nation's sovereignty. The Communist disturbances had always been local and only those who suffered knew what they meant. On the other hand, a foreign invasion is always *the* thing to stir up the whole country no matter how remote one may live from the territory of aggression; and Japan had been adding injury to insult in China ever since 1894.

By the end of 1936, with Japanese forces spreading over a wide area in North China, the feeling of the country had reached boiling-point. Patriotic people, especially the intelligent class, were determined rather to fight and vanquish with honour than to submit to the enemy without a struggle. The Communists' threat had diminished almost to zero and it was the opinion of some people that if Japan was not resisted now it would never be done. But Chiang Kai-Shek seemed to be still of a different opinion. A year previously, at the Fifth National Con-

gress of the Kuo Min Tang which was called in November, 1935, the statement on his foreign policy was like this:

'Whilst the hope of peace has not entirely gone, we will not abandon our hope of peace. Whilst the last stage calling for sacrifice has not yet arrived, we will not lightly talk about sacrifice. However, to maintain peace we have to draw the line somewhere; and as for sacrifice, we have resolved to do that to the bitter end. With the resolution of sacrifice to the bitter end in mind, we will still do our best to work for peace.'

Though this statement given by the responsible head of the Chinese Army could scarcely be criticised in face of the delicate condition of Sino-Japanese relations, the militant patriots read it as a sign of compromise without honour. At first it had been almost entirely civilians who wanted war with Japan at any cost, but by now quite a number of soldiers of all ranks, getting tired of the endless anti-Communist campaign, began to feel the same. Chiang Kai-Shek's political enemies found it a good chance to marshal their strength at this moment, and there was organised in China the People's United Front, the slogan of which was the uniting of people of 'left' tendencies in an effort to resist Japan. The consequence of starting a new political party in a country under one-party rule can easily be imagined, apart from the fact that the new party's aim was to oppose the existing one. There were mass meetings followed by arrests of ringleaders, and finally general suppression of the new party and widespread discontent. Most people called Chiang Kai-Shek a dictator.

In the year 1936 all the dictators were doing well, not, of course, counting Stalin as one. The first requirement of a dictator is that he must be the absolute head of a totalitarian State, which we have always been assured that Stalin is not. Furthermore, the term dictator is now associated with reactionaries, and we all know that whatever Stalin opposes becomes automatically reactionary. But

Hitler, head of Nazi Germany, and Mussolini, head of Fascist Italy, could find for themselves no excuses. However, they cared little what people called them as long as they could dictate to their heart's content. Hitler's demand for *lebensraum* extended to the territories of most of his neighbours, and Mussolini's claim for readjustment of colonies took the shape of the invasion of Abyssinia. The dictators had been so successful that they seemed to be the vogue of the day.

As the left-wing politicians, who were the implacable enemies of Hitler at that time, were forming their united front in Europe, those in China also began to be active. They made use of the patriotic feelings of some of the leading generals, who had been ordered by Chiang Kai-Shek to fight the Communists instead of the Japanese. Yang Hu-Cheng, Pacification Commissioner of Shensi, became an ardent supporter of the Chinese People's United Front, which attacked Chiang Kai-Shek's policy, and Chang Hsueh-Liang, the Young Marshal, with his Manchurian officers and men were even more ready to join the new movement. As was revealed later, he thought they might make him the new leader and national hero. So numerous supporters of the People's United Front flocked to where he was. This led to the *coup* of Sian in December, 1936.

For this incident of world-wide interest the only documentary material available is two publications: one written by Chiang Kai-Shek himself, and the other by Madame Chiang Kai-Shek, both published soon after Chiang Kai-Shek's release by the pro-Communist generals. These two generals themselves, however, left us no written record. Chiang Kai-Shek's publication is called *A Fortnight in Sian*, and consists of extracts from his diary with a few words of introduction and a longish epilogue in the form of a disciplinary lecture on the two

rebels. Madame Chiang Kai-Shek's piece is called 'Sian: *A Coup d'Etat*, being a supplemental explanation of her husband's record. As can be easily understood, these were widely circulated in China: so many people wanted to know about the happenings in Sian at first-hand, and a great number of copies of the English version, which was quite faithfully and carefully done, found their way into the hands of the English-reading public. Suffice it here, therefore, to give a brief outline and a few quotations.

In November, 1936, Mongolian troops, prompted by the Japanese, invaded the Province of Suiyan. Chiang Kai-Shek flew to Loyang, and later visited Tai-Yuan, the capital of Shansi Province, and Tsinan, the capital of Shantung Province, to confer with military leaders about the defence of North China. On December 3rd Chang Hsueh-Liang, the Young Marshal, flew to Loyang to see Chiang Kai-Shek and to ask him to go to Sian, saying that the military situation there needed his personal attention. On the following day Chiang Kai-Shek flew to Sian with only a handful of his followers and stayed at his temporary headquarters called Hua Tsing Chih, which means the Flower Purity Pond, a royal pleasure-garden built at the foot of Li Shan or the Black Horse Mountain when Sian was the capital in ancient times. It is just over ten miles to the east of Sian and, except for a few shops outside its surrounding wall, the place is utterly isolated.

Knowing that some officers and men of both the Manchurian Army and the Shensi Army were not keen on fighting the Communists, whose propaganda had been very effective because of Japanese aggressive actions in the North, Chiang Kai-Shek did his best to impress upon them that the Red Bandits must be wiped out first. Outwardly they dare not show any sign of disobedience, and he thought all was well. But on the 12th, at half-past five in the morning, when he was, as usual, getting up and dressing after his physical exercises in bed, he heard a gun

go off, the sound coming from outside the gate of his headquarters. A second shot was followed by heavy firing as he sent his men to see what was the matter, and soon he was told that mutinous soldiers were trying to storm his headquarters, but had been temporarily driven back by his few bodyguards. As they were greatly outnumbered, he was urged to leave at once. The back of the building was not being attacked, according to telephone reports, so he was requested to go up the Black Horse Mountain through the back gate.

'What do the mutinous soldiers look like?' he asked.

'Wearing fur hats, they are all Manchurian officers and men,' was the reply.

At that time Chiang Kai-Shek still thought it was only a small part of the soldiers who had mutinied. If he could get over to the other side of the mountain and wait until daybreak, the trouble would quieten down. The back gate was locked and in getting over the wall in the dark he fell into the moat and could scarcely walk. When he managed to reach a small temple, some guards who were waiting there helped him to climb up the mountain for half an hour until they were near the top of the ridge. Then shots rained upon them from all sides and all the guards were killed. Chiang Kai-Shek now realised that it was not a local mutiny, but that the entire Manchurian Army was revolting against him. He decided to go back to his headquarters to see what could be done. As he hurried down the mountain, he fell into a small cave. He tried once and again to get up, but his efforts were in vain. By then the day had begun to break, and he could see from where he was concealed that troops were everywhere below the Black Horse Mountain.

His personal guards were still defending his headquarters, and machine-guns, hand-grenades and even artillery were being used by the rebels to attack them. This lasted for about half an hour, then all became silent

again; evidently all the defenders had been killed or overpowered. That was about half-past nine in the morning. Rebelling soldiers were about looking for him, and he saw them pass by his cave twice without finding him. Then suddenly he heard soldiers arguing, and one of them said: 'There is a man in civilian dress. Perhaps he is the Generalissimo.' Another said: 'Give him a shot first and see what happens,' and a third shouted to stop him, saying: 'Stop your nonsense!' Chiang Kai-Shek raised his voice and said:

'I am Generalissimo Chiang, you must not be disrespectful. If you regard me as your prisoner you had better shoot me at once, but don't subject me to the slightest indignity!'

The rebelling soldiers said they would not dare to do such a thing, and fired into the air three times, shouting at the top of their voices: 'Generalissimo Chiang is here!'

Their commander soon came; kneeling down and with tears in his eyes, he respectfully requested Chiang Kai-Shek to go down the hill where a car was waiting to take him into the city of Sian, his headquarters being in a state of confusion. He was conducted to the New City Building, the office of General Yang Hu-Cheng, the Pacification Commissioner of Shensi. Yang Hu-Cheng was not there, but soon Chang Hsueh-Liang came, standing with his hands at his sides and very respectful to Chiang Kai-Shek who, however, did not return his courtesies but asked:

'Did you know beforehand about to-day's affair?'

'No,' was the reply.

'Since you did not know about this affair, you should see that I return to Nanking or Loyang at once. Then it may not be difficult to settle this.'

'Though I did not know about the developments, I have some proposals which I wish to lay before your Excellency the Generalissimo.'

Hearing that he was still addressed as the Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-Shek told Chang Hsueh-Liang that the orders of the Generalissimo must be obeyed. After some fruitless arguments Chang Hsueh-Liang said:

'I am not the only one who is responsible for affairs here: there are many people who are in it. What I have just initiated and done should be referred to the people for their verdict. If the people support what we propose, it proves we are representing the common will of the people and your Excellency will realise that our action is not wrong. We'll request your Excellency to retire and let us do the work. If public opinion does not approve it, then I shall admit my mistake and request your Excellency to resume your work. From first to last I believe I have not acted against your Excellency's teachings. Please, your Excellency, don't be angry, and consider the matter carefully.'

These words clearly indicated that the Young Marshal was hoping that with the support of the People's United Front he would be made the leader of the new movement and head of a coalition government. Chiang Kai-Shek would not hear of this and determined to die rather than give consent. He simply refused to hear what proposals the rebels were making. But Chang Hsueh-Liang and Yang Hu-Cheng, together with their subordinate generals and commanders, sent out a circular telegram to Nanking and all the public offices and newspapers throughout the whole country, announcing that they had been viewing the Government's policy with misgivings, that it was high time to start a national campaign of resistance, that they could no longer sit idle, being compelled to give their last advice to the Generalissimo, for whose safety, however, they would assume responsibility, and that they hoped this eight-point programme would be adopted. These are the eight points:

1. Reorganise the Government to admit people of every party and clique to save the country;
2. Stop all the civil wars;
3. Release at once patriotic leaders arrested in Shanghai;
4. Release all political prisoners;
5. Safeguard the people's liberty to hold meetings and organise associations;
6. Give a free hand to people's patriotic movements;
7. Carry out Sun Yat-Sen's political will;
8. Convocate at once the National Salvation Conference.

And in order to make their demands more impressive, they included the names of a large number of Chiang Kai-Shek's followers whom they had captured in Sian as signatories to this telegram.

While their chief prisoner remained obstinate, the whole country was bewildered and horrified. Instead of unanimous support, for which they had hoped, demands to set the Generalissimo free came from everywhere. The Central Government refused to parley just as Chiang Kai-Shek himself did. Some of his commanders even started to march towards Sian without orders. General Kwei Yun-Chin, who was the head of the Chinese Military Mission in London during 1945-1946, risked being court-martialled for disobedience by gathering his troops for an immediate expedition against the rebels in Sian.

Chang Hsueh-Liang and Yang Hu-Cheng began to see that they had got more than they had bargained for. Their motive was patriotic, but they were too ambitious and certainly they were extremely rash. After seeing the results of what they had done, they thought it would not be too late to watch their step hereafter. On the third day of the *coup d'état*, Chang Hsueh-Liang said to Chiang Kai-Shek:

'We have read your diary and all your important documents and from them we have now learned the greatness of your character. Your loyalty to the Revolution and your determination to bear the responsibility of saving the country far exceed anything we could have imagined. Haven't you in your diary scolded me for having no character? When I reflect on it to-day, I really feel that I have no character. But you have been too silent with your subordinates. If I had known but ten or twenty per cent of what you have said in the diary, never would this rash act have happened. Now I sincerely realise that my own views were mistaken. Since I know the greatness of your leadership, I feel I would be disloyal to our countrymen if I did not do my utmost to protect you.'

Yang Hu-Cheng said: 'At first our idea was not like this. Later on it all went in a very bad way. Indeed, we are very sorry. Now we will obey whatever orders you care to give.' But when Chiang Kai-Shek asked him how it did happen. Yang Hu-Cheng only replied that it was very simple at first and would not give a clear answer. When he was told to send the Generalissimo back to Nanking, Yang Hu-Cheng said that he would retire to consult with all the rest, and went away.

Though they realised that what they had done was a mistake, they still wanted to 'save face' by getting Chiang Kai-Shek to accept at least some of the proposals. The Young Marshal later suggested that the last four points could be ignored if the first four were agreed to. But Chiang Kai-Shek maintained that he must be sent back to Nanking first. In one of their arguments about these eight points, Chiang Kai-Shek promised to put them before the Government upon his return, but added that he himself could not support such proposals. Chang Hsueh-Liang was silent for a long while after he heard this and then remarked:

'You, the Generalissimo, certainly have a very high

character, but there is one defect, namely, that the Generalissimo's thinking is too old and too much inclined to the right.'

'What do you mean by the right? What do you mean by old? And what do you mean by too much to the right?'

Chang Hsueh-Liang was vague and did not know what to reply. Later he said:

'The books you, the Generalissimo, read are mostly the philosophic works of Han Fei-tze and Moti. Weren't they too old?'

'I don't know how many new books you have read,' Chiang Kai-Shek replied, 'nor what you consider as new books. If you consider Karl Marx's *Das Kapital* or books on Communism as new, then you may question me about them as you choose and I'll discuss them with you in detail. You must know that one's spirit is not new or old according to the books one reads. Don't you know what you consider as new books I had already read many times some fifteen years ago?'

Whilst negotiations were at a deadlock and fighting between the forces under Chang Hsueh-Liang and Yang Hu-Cheng and those of the Central Government were starting, it was agreed that one of the captured generals should be allowed to fly to Nanking with a letter from Chiang Kai-Shek ordering a truce of three days during which they hoped to free Chiang Kai-Shek. At the end of this period T. V. Soong came to Sian. As he had been on very familiar terms with the Young Marshal, the situation improved. Through him it was arranged for his sister, Madame Chiang Kai-Shek, to come as she also knew the Young Marshal quite well. She was as clever as she was brave and put everybody at ease by greeting her husband's captor, who 'looked very tired, very embarrassed and somewhat ashamed', as if nothing whatever had happened. About her meeting with Yang Hu-Cheng she said: 'I shook

hands with him as though I were just arriving on a casual visit. Yang was obviously very nervous and just as obviously very relieved at my calm attitude.'

Of the part Madame Chiang Kai-Shek played in getting her husband back to Nanking there is no record. In her own story of this incident, *Sian: a Coup d'Etat*, she was very modest about herself. It merely implied that she flew to join her husband in his distress: to give him moral support and to see to his personal comfort. But there is much more behind this. Neither the Central Government nor Chiang Kai-Shek would consent to bargain with the captors and the captors dared not let him go without some kind of safeguard for their own skin. Madame Chiang Kai-Shek is a person upon whom both sides could depend. Before she went to Sian, her husband had spent ten days in captivity without hope of getting away; three days after her arrival they flew back with colours flying. No explanation is needed.

On December 22nd, Chiang Kai-Shek happened to read the 31st chapters of Jeremiah, when he was as usual studying his Bible. The Chinese version reads as follows: 'Jehovah will now do a new thing, He will make a woman protect a man.' In the afternoon Madame Chiang Kai-Shek arrived. She had several conferences with the Young Marshal, who tried to justify his actions by saying: 'But this would never have happened at all had you been here, Madame. We did wrong in seizing the Generalissimo, but we tried to do something which we thought was for the good of the country.' She also talked to other people, particularly to 'one man' who was said to have influence with the rest. She spent two hours talking with him, but much of the time he did the talking. 'He seemed to find great relief in letting off steam.' After they had finished talking, he asked to see her again the next day. On December 25th, the Young Marshal personally escorted the Chiangs out of Sian. They stayed the night in Loyang

and reached Nanking the following day, when fire-crackers were let off all over the country to celebrate the unexpected happy ending.

Chang Hsueh-Liang, the Young Marshal, did not shrink from bearing the entire responsibility for the *coup d'état*. He faced the court-martial unflinchingly and was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment and deprivation of civil rights for five years. Chiang Kai-Shek, in his capacity as Generalissimo, recommended clemency on the ground of the prisoner's prompt repentance and the part he played in avoiding a civil war. Later on the sentence was rescinded by two special Mandates, and he has since lived quietly.

But Yang Hu-Cheng was still in Sian with his own men and Chang Hsueh-Liang's Manchurian Army. Chiang Kai-Shek had to appeal to him again for a peaceful settlement and at last he consented to resign his post and went abroad. He was in England in 1937 and also visited Spain and other places on the Continent. It would be interesting to conclude this episode with his comic adventures among the leftist associations in Europe. He was a soldier risen from the ranks and his well-wishers in England at once realised that his speeches could not be honestly interpreted into English for his educated admirers. He was told to say whatever he liked, and a certain Chinese from Java by the name of Liem, who could neither write nor speak his mother-tongue but spoke English with a strong Javanese accent which could be satisfactorily passed as a Chinese accent, was given a series of English texts carefully prepared by his left-wing friends. Mr Liem, who looked a hundred per cent Chinese and certainly spoke with a rich oriental accent, recited passages from his manuscript, between Yang Hu-Cheng's pauses during his most impressive harangues. Everybody was happy and nobody the wiser: his lecture tour was a great success.

* * * * *

On December 29th, 1936, Chiang Kai-Shek petitioned the Government to relieve him from all his duties. He wanted to take at least a portion of the responsibility for the Sian revolt upon his own shoulders. He said: 'I sincerely hope that the Central Executive Committee will censure me for my negligence of duty.' He concluded: 'I further request the Central Executive Committee immediately to appoint some other competent man to take over my duties, so that I may retire from active service and await disciplinary punishment. In that case the discipline of the State will be upheld and my conscience may be set at ease.'

His resignation was unanimously rejected, but he presented it a second time and was met with the same answer. At last he was granted a month's sick-leave, as he had to see doctors about the wounds he had received in his falls on the day of the *coup*. On January 2nd, 1937, he left Nanking for his native district, where he stayed for some time until later he had to go to Hangchow and Shanghai to be X-rayed and to consult a bone specialist. But in the middle of February he flew to Nanking to reaffirm his resignation to the combined meeting of the Central Executive and Supervisory Committees, when again it was rejected. Later on he was granted a further leave of two months.

The *coup d'état* in Sian, though during it he suffered for fourteen days under custody, greatly enhanced his prestige. The whole country seemed to show great concern for his safety. His admirers now held him dearer than before and even many of his political enemies changed sides and joined him. They had learned, as the Young Marshal had, through reading his diary, that he was the greatest patriot of them all. Those who accused him of being a traitor ready to co-operate with Japan found they had been wrong. Those who remained his enemies after this incident were mostly 'die-hard Communists', for

'liberal Communists' were quite ready to support his leadership to build up national strength for the inevitable Sino-Japanese war.

It should have been mentioned slightly earlier that in the last days of November, 1936, just before Chiang Kai-Shek was captured in Sian, news was published that Japan had signed the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany and that the relations between Japan and Italy were also extremely intimate, leading eventually to their mutual recognition of each other's conquests: Abyssinia and Manchuria. For years Japan had been urging Chiang Kai-Shek to give her special rights to assist China in the suppression of the Communists in Chinese territory, and Chiang Kai-Shek had vigorously rejected such a request. The Anti-Comintern Pact was announced at a time when Chiang Kai-Shek was hoping to finish the Chinese Communists in the very near future, and naturally his political enemies made haste to spread the rumour that Chiang Kai-Shek was contemplating joining the anti-Red block. Chiang Kai-Shek promptly announced that the suppression of the remnant of the Communists in the North-West was exclusively China's domestic affair and would never be affected, or its process hampered, by outside influence or international politics.

In February, 1937, a telegram was sent to Nanking from the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Communist Party pledging:

1. That the Communist Party will discontinue its efforts to overthrow the Central Government by force;
2. that the Soviet Government in China will be abolished and a special Area Government be established by themselves;
3. that the Red Army be organised into the National Revolutionary Army and be under the direct

control of the Military Council of the Central Government;

4. that they will carry out Sun Yat-Sen's Three Principles of the People throughout this Special Area; and
5. that they will give up their policy of confiscation of people's land.

In return, they asked the Central Executive Committee of the Kuo Min Tang:


1. to stop all civil wars;
2. to guarantee freedom of speech;
3. to release all political offenders;
4. to convene a national salvation conference to be participated in by every party, faction and military clique;
5. to complete at once all preparations to defeat Japan; and
6. to improve the living conditions of the people.

The Kuo Min Tang considered these proposals too vague to be worked out and many of the demands had to be dropped. It will be noticed that the Communists did not ask for the reorganisation of the Government as did the Young Marshal. Chiang Kai-Shek, though he was still on sick-leave at the time, studied these points carefully with his colleagues and finally came to the conclusion that the time was not yet ripe to accept the proposals of the Chinese Communists. But fighting between the Central Government forces and the Communists ceased. Seeing China was going to be unified, Japan decided not to wait any longer. Just over a month after Chiang Kai-Shek's announcement of his resumption of office, which took place on May 27th in Kuling on the Lu Mountain, Japan started the Marco Polo Bridge incident and occupied Peiping. A few months later the Chinese Communists, finding that they were losing the sympathy of the people,



Keystone

WITH PRESIDENT LIN SEN AND GENERAL CHANG CHIH-CHUNG
AT YOUTH CORPS LEADERS' CONFERENCE, MAY 1943



issued a manifesto to announce (1) their giving up of their former policy of Communistic Revolution by force, and (2) their co-operation with the Central Government to defend their native land against invaders. That brought Chiang Kai-Shek's anti-Communist Campaign to a temporary stop. The Red Army, which used to fight against him, henceforth fought under him for several years.

At the end of May, 1937, when Chiang Kai-Shek arrived at Kuling and announced his resumption of office, he immediately established various training corps, especially for those who could only attend them during the long summer holidays. He also invited all the known leaders of the intellectual circles from every part of the country to hold a conference in this beautiful summer resort in Kiangsi, where he discussed with them important questions of State. He knew that the war was quite near at hand and that the country was not yet prepared for it: the Sian *coup d'état* had hindered his work of preparation for at least several months if not much more.

The Marco Polo Bridge incident was followed by a large-scale unprovoked attack on Shanghai on August 13th. Having returned to Nanking, Chiang Kai-Shek told his officers and men to hold fast the following five points:

1. to determine to sacrifice to the end;
2. to believe firmly that victory would be ours in the long run;
3. to fight with wisdom and initiative;
4. to co-operate with the people; and
5. to maintain their ground, to advance and never retreat.

His own determination to fight to the end was clearly indicated in the interview he granted to a German correspondent in Nanking. He said:

'As long as Japanese military invasion within Chinese territory goes on, the Chinese defensive war will never

stop. Until the day when Japan gives up her aggressive policy China will fight steadily even if there is only one bullet in one rifle left.'

In spite of his open declaration to fight the Japanese to the end as long as the Japanese invasion went on, his political enemies constantly spread the rumour that Chiang Kai-Shek had secretly negotiated for capitulation. This attack was not fair. He had said at the very beginning of hostilities: 'We hope for peace, but we do not seek an easy path to peace. We prepare for war, but we do not want war . . . once the battle is joined, there can be no distinction between north and south, or between old and young.' His actions had borne out these words.

Mr Joseph C. Grew, the American Ambassador to Japan from 1932 to 1941, had written about Chiang Kai-Shek's peace efforts in his published memoirs and he spoke very highly of Chiang Kai-Shek: 'A brave and far-sighted man, is still the legitimate head of the Chinese Government, is still fighting the ruthless aggression against his country.' Chiang Kai-Shek would certainly have liked to postpone the outbreak of war as long as possible, and also would certainly have preferred peace if it was honourable for China to accept. But to fight he was determined, and so he did under most unfavourable conditions for nine long and hard years when Japan had set her mind on war, as subsequent events have shown to the world.

In common with all the powers, Japan enjoyed the rights to station her Army and sail her warships in Chinese territory according to the treaties imposed upon China during the previous few decades. With a good Army, a formidable Navy and a brand-new Air Force, she chose to make hay while the sun shone. On the other hand, Chiang Kai-Shek had never had a year of peace since he came into power in 1927. Besides the many ambitious generals who wanted to force him away, the Communists had been waging war upon him for ten years. His anti-

Communist Campaign had been a costly one and everyone was overjoyed to hear that the Chinese Communists had at last decided to co-operate with the Government. But in August the whole country was overwhelmed to hear that a non-aggressive pact had been secretly negotiated and successfully concluded between China and Russia.

The first year of war was a most difficult one. It was barely eight months since that a small number of aircraft had been added to the infant Air Force on the pretext of celebrating Chiang Kai-Shek's fiftieth birthday. As was revealed later, China had only a few hundred aircraft, including training machines, against Japan's several thousand first-line fighters and bombers. China had no bombers at all, and had to improvise the fighters with whatever bombing devices they could take. As for a Navy, China was very badly off in this respect, whilst Japan was one of the three biggest naval powers in the world. This left the Chinese Army, of which Chiang Kai-Shek was the head—for he was primarily an army man—to resist practically single-handed a combined force of three services which were much superior to those of the defenders.

It was a most trying time for Chiang Kai-Shek when Shanghai had to be evacuated after three months' hard fighting. In another month, Nanking, the capital, fell. Luckily he had prepared for that. During his air tour of the South-West a few years previously he had located Chungking, a port with rocky mountains behind it on the Yangtze River in the Province of Szechuan, and now the capital was moved there. The place was comparatively safe for the Government to continue to conduct the war, but he himself stayed in Wuhan to be nearer to the areas of actual fighting, so as to direct military operations.

In Wuhan an emergency National Congress of the Kuo

Min Tang was held in March, 1938, and ten days later Chiang Kai-Shek was elected by a large majority the Director-General of the Party, a post somewhat similar to that held by Sun Yat-Sen, the founder, who had exercised supreme power over his followers. Now there had formerly been three most important leaders in the Party: Hu Han-Min, the right-wing supporter, Wang Ching-Wei, the left-wing supporter, and Chiang Kai-Shek, who once said of himself that he was always ready to support the side which deserved support and prosecute the side which had become overbearing. These three had been at the top of the list of the Kuo Min Tang since the death of Sun Yat-Sen. Hu Han-Min died in the South shortly after he left Nanking. There now remained only Wang Ching-Wei, who thought he had been out-manceuvred by Chiang Kai-Shek.

Though Wang Ching-Wei had been welcomed back to join the Government soon after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, and though he had been entrusted with the important office of President of the Executive Yuan, he left it after a brief period and became as carefree, if not irresponsible, as he always had been. He was an excellent critic but not very good in other respects. But he, no doubt, had quite a different opinion of himself. Being one of the oldest followers of the late founder of the Kuo Min Tang, and having seen the rise of Chiang Kai-Shek into power so rapidly, he naturally nursed very strong jealousy over this in secret.

But there were many things he did not take into account. First, he had rebelled against the Central Government several times, joining with almost anyone who was dissatisfied with Chiang Kai-Shek. Whilst Chiang Kai-Shek had done everything he could to hold the country together, sacrificing his personal friends and reputation, Wang Ching-Wei had always chosen the easier and more high-sounding ways for the sake of

publicity. After the outbreak of war, when the people began to realise what Chiang Kai-Shek had been planning in secret and what wrongs he had suffered without grumbling, his prestige soared much higher than before. Not only members of the Kuo Min Tang but almost the whole population of China, except those who had special backgrounds, considered Chiang Kai-Shek the indisputable leader of the nation. Wang Ching-Wei had scarcely any place in the heart of the common people.

As the Director-General of the Party, Chiang Kai-Shek initiated in June, 1938, the organisation of San Min Chu I Youth Group, 'San Min Chu I' meaning the Three Principles of the People originated by Sun Yat-Sen. This is an organisation founded on the amalgamated principles of the New Life Movement, the Society of Moral Endeavour, and the Young Men's Christian Association, together with the Kuo Min Tang as an overall boundary. It can be easily imagined that Wang Ching-Wei and his personal followers considered this as a move to establish a smaller party within the Party and that such a move would make him and his supporters lose their importance in the Party.

But Chiang Kai-Shek was not trying to build up his personal power. On the contrary, with the whole country facing a formidable foe he wanted to get together every ounce of the nation's strength to fight and save China. The Chinese Communists, who had done their utmost against him, he readily welcomed to Wuhan to participate in the People's Political Council which he had convened in July, on the first anniversary of Japan's invasion of China Proper. Not only were the Communists' representatives given seats in this war-time Parliament, but people of every political tendency and leaders of every society and all walks of life. This was the first time in the history of the Kuo Min Tang that it had such a gathering of people with different or even opposite political beliefs express-

ing their opinions openly. In countries where one party rules this is something unheard of.

Towards the end of October the situation became much worse. Canton, the important city in the South, and Wuhan which had been used as the centre of resistance, fell into enemy hands one after the other. Chiang Kai-Shek was one of the last to leave the burning city of Wuhan, which had been ordered to be destroyed so that the Japanese could not make use of it. The city was a tragic sight to see from the air as it was burning, and Chiang Kai-Shek declared upon the fall of Wuhan that the war was to go on and that he was more confident than before that Japan would be defeated in the end. But whilst he was doing his utmost to stiffen the people for the difficult time ahead, Wang Ching-Wei was losing heart. In December he secretly left Chungking, the war-time capital which Chiang Kai-Shek had chosen and where he stayed until final victory came.

The early part of 1939 revealed Wang Ching-Wei's treacherous intentions. He went to live, not in Chinese territory, but in the Honoi, Annam, where he could get in touch with the enemy without being stoned by his countrymen. When his dealings with Japan became known, he was expelled from the Kuo Min Tang. He soon cast off his mask of virtue and went over to Japan, to be their puppet. This was at approximately the same time as the Japanese invaded and occupied Hainan, the big island on the south tip of China. Whilst Wang Ching-Wei believed Japan could be appeased, Chiang Kai-Shek at once saw the real ambition of the enemy. He pointed out to England and America that this step by Japan meant a prelude to a full-scale invasion of the whole of the Pacific: the aggressor's ambition always grew greater after appeasement.

But in 1939 Europe was soon to be a battlefield, and the

preoccupied England and America refused to be forewarned. It is ironical to observe that, though the people in England had sympathy with China, it was a famous British statesman who helped Japan to defend her cause in Geneva, and the British Government dared not help China in the least for fear of annoying Japan, who was still England's ally. In America public opinion was almost entirely on the side of China, but even then Japan was depending upon that country for petrol and other vital war materials. Up to the very time of the attack on Pearl Harbour some American merchants had been continuously supplying Japan with scrap-iron and other things which would obviously be used to make war on America.

It must also be mentioned here that though the Anti-Comintern Pact had been signed by the Axis and Japan and that the relations between those three countries were intimate, Chiang Kai-Shek never allowed his sentiment to blind his reason. In fighting against Japan he would not refuse the help offered to him by Japan's allies. Italy had supplied him with aircraft and materials, and Germany gave him a number of military and technical advisers. He used them to their full advantage, just as he did the things he got from Russia after the non-aggression pact and later the barter agreement. It was only after the opening of hostilities in Europe that these people began to be repatriated.

In 1939, hard pressed though China was, Chiang Kai-Shek considered it important not to let the enemy rest. He marshalled his forces and launched four quite large-scale general counter-offensives. They were costly but they did much good. The first offensive took place in April, the second in July, and the third in September, while the last one took place in the Winter. As the enemy could not make much progress on the ground, he started from the month of May to intensify his bombing of Chungking. When the Japanese aircraft came to the war-

time capital day after day and night after night to pour down explosives, people who had to take shelter in the huge caves of the rocky mountains outside the city began to see Chiang Kai-Shek's foresight in selecting this place to house the Government. When he came to see what destruction the enemy had done after the raid, people invariably cheered him in spite of the heavy losses they had sustained.

It was also in 1939 that he first organised the Central Training Corps in the suburban district of Chungking. All the Government officials and teachers were given a short course of military and political training. The training went on for years until all the officials and teachers in the whole country had attended.

The year 1940 was a year of set-backs and grave news, except for a successful counter-attack in February. In March news came to Free China that Wang Ching-Wei, formerly the ardent follower of Sun Yat-Sen and prominent leader of the Kuo Min Tang, had been installed by the Japanese as the puppet head of a bogus state with its capital in Nanking. Those who had supported him and joined him in his repeated attacks on Chiang Kai-Shek now learned their lesson. Chiang Kai-Shek became the sole representative of the indomitable spirit of the Chinese people.

In June, Japan advanced as far as I-Chang, and here Chiang Kai-Shek made his last firm stand. From henceforth he made continuous attacks on this very long Japanese supply line so that no further progress could be made by the enemy on this route. Whilst China was having a very difficult time, the democracies in Europe were also in dire distress. Holland and Belgium had been invaded, and France capitulated soon after Italy entered the war on the side of Germany. England, after Dunkirk, was in daily danger of being invaded. At that time

Germany, Italy and Japan were feared by everybody. In an effort to appease Japan, England agreed to close the Burma Road, which was China's life-line, and this made it even harder for Chiang Kai-Shek to carry on his fight. It looked as if there were no justice in the world: those who were powerful could dictate and those who were weak had to obey. Fortunately, the mistake was soon corrected. After three months England reopened the Burma Road.

The following year, 1941, brought more grim news. The Chinese Communists, who had promised to fight under the Central Government, had begun to act independently. Chiang Kai-Shek disarmed and disbanded the New Fourth Army, a part of the Communist troops. That was the beginning of a rift between the Chinese Government and the Communists. In the second war-time Parliament, the Second People's Political Council, all the Communists refused to join. After that, in spite of everybody's urging and pleading, the internal strife in China became worse as the days went by.

But Chiang Kai-Shek's stern action in dealing with Chinese Communists did not in the least influence his diplomatic policy. In the same year the Sino-Russian Barter Agreement was concluded, by which China was to supply Russia with tea and other products in exchange for her war materials. But in July Germany betrayed the non-aggression pact she had recently signed with Russia and invaded Soviet occupied territory. This naturally made Russia keep for herself some of the supplies which would otherwise have been sent to China. Nevertheless this unexpected German attack did a great service to the Allies: it bound Russia together with England and America. And when Japan attacked Pearl Harbour and Hongkong in December of the same year, and Hitler and Mussolini declared war on America, Chiang Kai-Shek immediately declared war on Germany, Italy and Japan,

thus creating the 'A.B.C.' block: America, Britain and China.

Just before Japan's treacherous attack on Pearl Harbour, America seemed to be very anxious to appease Japan, whilst China was struggling desperately against Japan's onslaught, and it was not very heartening to the defender to hear that special conversations were going on in Washington between Admiral Nomura, Japanese Ambassador, and the American authorities. Later a special Japanese envoy, Kuroso, was welcomed in America to help the admiral. Japan announced in her papers that suggestions for the stoppage of all military and economic aid to Chungking, leaving China alone to deal with Japan, were to be discussed. Chiang Kai-Shek bore these things with the same fortitude as he had done the closing of the Burma Road. However, he was deservedly rewarded in the following year by the joint British and American announcement that the special rights and privileges Britain and America had enjoyed in China under the 'unequal' treaties would be relinquished. New and fair treaties on an equal footing were negotiated in 1942 and signed in the first days of 1943. Following the signature of these new treaties, Chiang Kai-Shek told the people in a broadcast that the injustice which had been done to China for the past hundred years was now wiped away and that such a magnificent act on the part of the American and British Governments reflected the greatest honour and credit on the people of their nations. He further reminded his own people that with the new treaties came new responsibilities. The official English version of this important speech is included in this book as Appendix III.

To go back to the Spring of 1942, now that the Burma Road had been reopened and that England had become our ally, Chiang Kai-Shek paid a visit to India, at that time the most important link between China and the outside world. Much good was done by that trip and he was

enthusiastically received by the Indian people. At that particular moment the Indian leaders were not co-operating with the British authorities, and Chiang Kai-Shek, who had great love and respect for a people who were fighting for their independence, handled the delicate situation with admirable tact. He left India beloved and respected by all.

Since China, Britain and America were fighting against a common foe in Asia, Chiang Kai-Shek sent out some of his best troops to Burma to form the Chinese Expeditionary Force, and to facilitate co-operation he had Lieutenant-General Joseph W. Stilwell, who had had long experience in China, appointed Commander of the Force. This, unfortunately, led to very unpleasant happenings two years later. Japan, after taking Singapore, Java and Corregidor, invaded and occupied Burma. Though Stilwell, as Commander of the Chinese forces in Burma, could not be blamed for withdrawing into India, many Chinese strategists found it difficult not to criticise the American general who lost his battle so rapidly and ran away so swiftly. This was one of the causes for the recall of Stilwell requested by Chiang Kai-Shek. The other important cause was the differences these two men had regarding Chinese Communists.

The co-operation between the Kuo Min Tang and the Chinese Communist Party since 1937 had been an emergency measure. The feelings between these two political parties, who had been killing each other whenever they had a chance, were comparable to those between the Arabs and Jews in Palestine, or to those between the Moslems and Hindus in India. That they had, are having, and will continue to have, great suspicion of each other is beyond the least doubt. The Kuo Min Tang, being in power, could not tolerate an opposition party with an independent army and a practically autonomous government in Yenan.

At the beginning of the war in China the Communists were hard pressed, and had to compromise—of course, temporarily. As the years went by, their military and economic strength having increased, they naturally wanted to extend their power. On the other hand, the Central Government had suffered severe set-backs on account of the war, and if they did not make a determined stand against the expansion of the Communists it was possible that one day they would find their relative positions exchanged.

A civil war, however, would not have been popular, and the Kuo Min Tang had to be as tolerant as they could but always to be cautious in not giving away too much ground and so endangering their own position. This being the situation, the Communists could not help realising that if they had less military strength their position would be worse. They were not without political ambition and they had to make the most of their advantages. They went on recruiting while the war lasted and no one dared to blame them for that. After the disarming and disbanding of their New Fourth Army they had to take every precaution to protect themselves against the forces of the Government. Thus the two sides drifted further and further apart.

By the year 1943, the troops of the Chinese Communist Party and those of the Government were, so to speak, not on speaking terms. Guarding themselves against a possible siege, the Communists had been consolidating their stations in the North and had created a no-man's-land between themselves and the Government area. The Government, on the other hand, had fortified a frontier against the Communists, and some of their best troops were thus used. And the situation between the Communists and the Government continued to worsen.

In the meantime Chiang Kai-Shek's star rose high. He published his *China's Destiny* in which he reviewed the recent past and discussed the immediate future of China.

It was hailed as the most important book written during the war and statesmen in every country were most anxious to read what he had to say. The book was commented upon in numerous papers and periodicals all over the world. Next he was installed as Chairman of the State Council, which is equivalent to the Presidency of China, on the 10th of October, because the former President, Lin Sen, had died a few months previously. The official English translation of the speech he made on his assumption of office is included in this book as Appendix IV. In it he expresses very strongly his democratic views. It is true that he had held this office once before—from 1928 to 1931—but this time there had been practically no dissent when he was nominated and elected. And to crown all, as head of the state he went to Egypt to attend the Cairo Conference, meeting there for the first time Churchill and Roosevelt, and was hailed all over the world as one of the greatest statesmen of his age.

To live up to his splendid reputation, Chiang Kai-Shek did everything possible to appease the Communists. The *Hsin Hua Daily News*, a Communist paper, had quite a free hand in its publication in Chungking, though not a single leaflet edited by the Kuo Min Tang was allowed to circulate in the Red capital of Yenan. Moreover, representatives of the Chinese Communists had their offices in Chungking and enjoyed the same freedom as did other citizens of Free China, but the Kuo Min Tang people could not expect such treatment in the Communist area. The last party which went to visit Yenan was a small group of liberal-minded journalists and correspondents of independent newspapers, and they made their trip in 1944. This party was as heavily 'conducted' as would be an organised tour into any country behind 'the iron curtain'.

In spite of all this, criticism of the Government and Kuo Min Tang spread, and eventually also of Chiang Kai-Shek

himself, who, it is interesting to note, was not touched in the early years of the war. The right-wing members of the Kuo Min Tang, who never had liked the Communists, urged the application of strong measures towards them once more; but Chiang Kai-Shek wanted to preserve a united nation even at a very high cost, and continued to tolerate the Communists for several years. The effort was in vain: civil war was in the making, and when it broke out, Chiang Kai-Shek once again became the blackest figure in all the Communist publications. It is not possible that the same man could be a butcher from 1927 to 1938, a saint from 1938 to 1945, and turn back into a murderer after 1945: it is obvious that the policy of the party took a new turn at each of these specific times.

The Cairo Conference, which took place during the last week of November, 1943, was 'Chiang Kai-Shek's Conference', as Roosevelt so aptly put it. On December 2nd it was officially announced in the three capitals that Mr Churchill, President Roosevelt and Marshal Chiang Kai-Shek had held a five-day conference in North Africa. Agreement had been reached regarding further military operations against Japan. A declaration was made that Manchuria, the Island of Formosa and the Pescadores Islands would be restored to China; that Korea would be made an independent state; and that Japan would be stripped of all the territories she had seized and occupied by force since 1914.

China being the senior member of the three countries who were resisting Japanese aggression, it was Chiang Kai-Shek's responsibility to propose what territorial and other charges they should impose on the guilty nation. This was an extremely successful and smooth meeting, because Chiang Kai-Shek was a far-sighted statesman who did not seek for territorial gains on account of losses sustained during the war. Churchill and Roosevelt realised

that if all the other conferences could be like this, political and diplomatic life would be much happier.

Regarding the treatment of Japan after the war, Chiang Kai-Shek said to Roosevelt that, so long as the Japanese military caste could be prevented from coming into power again, it would be better to allow the common people in Japan to have a free hand in deciding what kind of government they should have. This statement met with complete agreement.

Chiang Kai-Shek knew it was a foregone conclusion that Japan would be defeated if the resources of the three great countries were put together to pursue the war against her. The tide of war had just begun to turn in favour of the Allies. In Europe, Italy had surrendered and Germany was on the defensive. In Asia, if the combined forces of the three countries could be effectively co-ordinated and offensive bases steadily built up, our victory would be but a matter of time. But first he must put his house in order. He had tried hard to accommodate the Chinese Communists, but had tried in vain. The most serious criticism his Communist and left-wing opponents had against him was the one-party rule or tutelage of the Kuo Min Tang of China. The urgent need, therefore, was the Constitution, without which the country could hardly be regarded as a democratic one.

The year 1944 was marked by little improvement in the relations between the Chinese Government and the Communists. Chiang Kai-Shek announced that the Kuo Min Tang was preparing to 'Huan Cheng Yu Min', or to 'return the Government to the people'. The draft Constitution was discussed and its early adoption was indicated. In the meantime, the Communist Army in the North became more and more alienated, and as by now only a very small amount of American supplies were given to China, the Red Army cried aloud demanding a bigger share. General Stilwell, who had not been very popular

among the Chinese Government troops, thought that the Communists ought to receive much more than was given to them. He was an outspoken man and expressed his opinion freely, to the effect that a radical change in the Chinese Government was urgently needed. He went so far as to suggest that all the Chinese troops should be reorganised and that Communist and Government troops should receive American supplies equally; and moreover, that all of them should be put under the supreme control of an American Commander-in-Chief.

Though this was pressed by an American Mission sent to China to advise on China's military measures, it was an open secret who was the true author of the demand. Moreover, it was inevitable that the over-all American Commander-in-Chief would be none other than Stilwell himself. Neither Chiang Kai-Shek, as head of the State and Generalissimo, nor the Chinese Army could tolerate this. General Stilwell's unpopularity among the Chinese Army was difficult to understand by Americans and Europeans. From the Chinese point of view he had had a very unlucky start. He was given command of the Chinese Forces in Burma towards the end of March, 1942, and early in May the British forces, quite unprepared, withdrew safely into India. Stilwell joined them, whilst the Chinese troops were fighting as rearguards. Later it was widely circulated in Chinese Army circles that Stilwell had wired to Chungking to ask where the Chinese troops were—the troops of which he was in command!

Another story equally widely circulated was that at the very beginning, when Stilwell was given one of the best buildings in Chungking for his office, he had exclaimed that it was unfit for him, and that aircraft loads of timber, for parquet flooring, and Indian carpets, had arrived over the Himalayas to furnish his headquarters. These stories went deep into the minds of many, and no doubt they eventually created a lot of mischief. Now, with his

staunch support of the Communist forces, which had been hostile to the Government for some time, and his bid to become over-all commander, Chiang Kai-Shek found it impossible to retain his services. In October, 1944, Roosevelt announced General Stilwell's recall and said that it had resulted from differences in the personalities of General Stilwell and General Chiang Kai-Shek. He added that they had had differences of opinion 'quite a while ago'. Subsequently General Chiang Kai-Shek had asked that General Stilwell be displaced. Of course, Roosevelt did not like it. He said the reason for the recall was 'just one of those things'. Sometimes you hated someone, he added, and just could not help it. It was a thunderbolt from the blue.

Chiang Kai-Shek had been one of the most popular figures in the American Press. After that day his fall was sharp and rapid. Public opinion easily went to the other extreme. People began to conclude that Stilwell was the symbol of virtue and efficiency, and that Chiang Kai-Shek was an accumulation of reaction and corruption, and that they hated each other like poison from the very day they met. This is far from being the case. In point of fact, though they both had fiery tempers they had been on good terms for a quite a while. That was why Stilwell was first appointed Chiang Kai-Shek's Chief-of-Staff. But people forget this.

Besides the Communist issue and the adverse opinion the Chinese Army had of Stilwell, a third cause was advanced by a British war chronicler, Mr Peter Graves. He said that the real reason for Stilwell's dispute with Chiang Kai-Shek, apart from a profound incompatibility of temper, was his insistence that some of the best trained and best equipped Chinese divisions should be transferred to the Yunan-Burma front, whereas the Generalissimo wished to employ them in the defence of the airfields in Southern

China and also of the Chinese section of the Burma Road. He regarded the Communist question as a side-issue.

But in 1944, for anyone to dare to say anything against the Communists would have been unpardonable. Chiang Kai-Shek's quarrel with Stilwell was singled out for publicity because the Communist issue would arrest general attention. In China the attitude of the Communists stiffened and co-operation between the two political parties became impossible. Chiang Kai-Shek's position became more difficult when the Japanese offensive made rapid gains from Hunan towards the West. For a time Chungking seemed to be unsafe and the South-West was partially overrun by the enemy. Had Chiang Kai-Shek transferred all his best troops to the Burma border, it would have been impossible to stop the Japanese assault and to save the critical situation. In the winter Chinese counter-attacks were pressed home and the Japanese had to retreat once again.

Chiang Kai-Shek and Roosevelt had to make up their differences quickly. Major-General A. C. Wedemeyer, Stilwell's successor, and Major-General Patrick Hurley, who succeeded Mr C. Gauss as American Ambassador in China, were cordially welcomed by Chiang Kai-Shek. Mr Donald Nelson's return to China was also requested by Chiang Kai-Shek, and, accompanied by thirteen experts, Mr Nelson was sent by the White House to China almost immediately. As the grand strategy developed, counter offensives in all theatres of war against the aggressors were successful. By the end of 1944, after such heart-breaking set-backs, Chinese forces from both ends of the Burma Road met at last, and it was soon reopened for traffic.

On New Year's Day, 1945, Chiang Kai-Shek announced that the National Assembly would be convened and the Constitution adopted, not at the end of the war, but as soon as the military situation improved. But events raced

on, and victory in Europe was in sight less than a year after the Allied landing in France. To the San Francisco Conference Chiang Kai-Shek sent a national delegation comprising men from every party, some Communists, some Young China Party members, some Democratic League leaders, and some non-partisans. And immediately following the San Francisco Conference, Chiang Kai-Shek sent T. V. Soong, the Prime Minister, and Wang Shih-Chieh, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to conclude the new Sino-Russian treaty which had been in negotiation for some time.

The Sino-Russian Treaty was finally signed in August, 1945, almost at the same time as the Japanese surrender. It is not the intention of the humble author to comment on the advantages or disadvantages of this particular treaty. It served for the time being as a solution of various knotty problems between China and Russia regarding Manchuria, Mongolia and the Chinese Communists.

With the surrender of the Germans in Europe, followed by that of Japan in Asia immediately after the dropping of the two atomic bombs, China hastened to rebuild herself. Chiang Kai-Shek invited Mao Tse-Tung from Yenan, the Red capital, to Chungking so that they could have a direct talk to bring the two parties together. For several months past, because of the outbreak of severe criticisms of the Kuo Min Tang all over the world, the Chinese Communist Party had been hoping that a separate and independent Soviet Government could be recognised by some of the pro-Communist countries. It was also hoped that America would arm the Chinese Communists. But Major-General Hurley, the American Ambassador, said when he visited Washington:

'The Communists were simply an armed political party and there was no possibility that America would arm them. The Government's view was that to furnish arms to any political party would be tantamount to a recognition of

another belligerent, and the United States recognised and supported the National Government of China.'

At that moment civil war in China was already brewing. Any arms supplied to armed political parties would be used to strengthen their power, and it was very fortunate that though most of the Press had been in support of arming the Communists in China, this had not been done. This state of things led to the Kuo Min Tang-Communist Conference in Chungking, which started at the end of August, 1945, after Mao Tse-Tung's arrival.

Chiang Kai-Shek was sincere in hoping for a reconciliation with the Communists. His reluctant agreement to the Russian terms of the Sino-Russian treaty was the first indication of this, and his efforts in getting Mao Tse-Tung, who had abused him to an intolerable extent, to have direct negotiations with him was another. For more than a month, representatives of both parties discussed conditions for co-operation, while in the meantime hostilities between the armed forces of both sides started. By October certain agreements had been reached to effect a resumption of communication and a cease fire, but they could not really be put into practice. By the end of November, Hurley's work of mediation had failed and he was succeeded by General Marshall, who came to China in December as a special envoy to try to bring the two parties together. And later, Leighton Stuart, who had been in China for a very long time, was appointed Ambassador and did everything he could to promote peace. Chiang Kai-Shek responded to their efforts warmly and sincerely. In January, 1946, Chiang Kai-Shek called a Political Consultation Conference, to which people of every party were invited.

Unfortunately this Conference was a success only on paper. Its thirty-eight members consisted of eight from the Kuo Min Tang, seven from the Communist Party, five from the Young China Party, two from the Democratic

League, five from various other parties and nine non-partisans. The best work they did was the passing of agreed resolutions on the following five questions:

1. The reorganisation of the Government,
2. the outline of political policy,
3. the question of Military affairs,
4. the People's Assembly, and
5. the Constitution.

Everything would have gone well if the differences between the Kuo Min Tang and the Communist Party could have been solved. But this was never to be. To expect the Kuo Min Tang to give up its exalted position is wishful thinking; and to induce the Communists not to have recourse to their armed strength is daylight dreaming. In April, 1946, the Communist representative, Chou En-Lai, announced an 'all-out' state of hostility in Manchuria, where the Soviet troops were asked to withdraw. But before the complete withdrawal of Russian forces, the Chinese Communists marched forward and announced their 'capture' of Chang-Chun, the capital of Manchuria.

This was the first serious blow to the peace talks. Chiang Kai-Shek had to postpone the convening of the National Assembly, which was to have been held on May 5th, because the Communists, feeling that they were doing well in Manchuria, became more difficult than before. In May the Government officially moved back to the old capital, Nanking, and peace talks were continued whilst the Communists extended their territory in the North. It was claimed by the Communists that they had control over seventy per cent of Manchuria, with local régimes established in most districts.

General Marshall did not despair. He found Chiang Kai-Shek quite willing to compromise. He urged the Communists to hand over Changchun to the Government and then discuss terms. This, of course, the Communists refused

to do. By the end of May the Government troops re-took Changchun and other important cities in Manchuria from the Communists. Although negotiations for peace were still going on in Nanking, and local truces had been agreed in many places, it became plain that these negotiations were useless as long as the two armed forces were facing each other on the battlefield. But even after General Marshall had left China to take up his new post in Washington in January, 1947, Leighton Stuart, the American Ambassador, still went on with the good work of mediation. It was of no avail. Soon the Communist spokesman, Wang Ping-Nan, officially announced Yen-an's decision to impose its political demands on the Chinese Government by force of arms and continued to harass communications. Chiang Kai-Shek's appeal to the whole nation for reconstruction, which was such an urgent need for post-war China, was shattered and in 1947, when he announced general mobilisation to check the Communists, full-scale civil war was officially started.

The National Assembly was convened in the last days of 1946, and after a forty-one day open session presented to the country a new permanent constitution which was adopted and announced to be effective as from December 25th, 1947. But the Communists did not send their representatives to this Assembly, though the seats allotted to them were kept vacant in case they changed their minds at the last minute. Communists seldom change their minds. The Civil War went on. Yen-an, the capital of 'Red China', was captured by Government troops in May, 1947, and this time there was no celebration, as had been the case after the capture of Juikin in 1934. Chiang Kai-Shek realised that this was no time for celebration.

The formation of China's first 'Multi-Party' Government in April, 1947, with Chiang Kai-Shek as President, was far from a final settlement of China's political troubles.

The unco-operative Communist Party and Democratic League did not join in and China's internal strife was redoubled. Civil wars are never popular in China, any more than any other country. The one who wins gains nothing except administrative power: he suffers in every other respect.

Political struggle in China is clearly reflected in international affairs. Immediately after the war the world Powers began to be at variance with each other and two opposing camps were formed. Peace-lovers all over the world were alarmed and great efforts have been made in trying to bring them together. Both sides professed they did not want another war, but both sides were suspicious and had to prepare in case the other side should strike first. To-day Europe—and even the whole world—is virtually divided into two groups and so far all efforts for their reconciliation have not been successful. Whilst one side considers the Marshall Plan to be nothing but humanitarian, it has been attacked by the other side as an instrument of aggression.

Chiang Kai-Shek's role in China has never varied ever since the Chinese Communists became a potential political power. The worst that can be said of him is that he could not see eye to eye with the Communists. But then neither could the Communists see eye to eye with him, or indeed with anybody else. The world at large has misunderstood him. For a time, before the Communists attacked him, he could do no wrong: he was the hero of the age for a few years. And then suddenly all kinds of unbelievable lies were poured upon him. Everything that was not to the liking of his critics was attributed to him and condemned as his crime. Any mistake committed by his subordinates was listed against him. Although the head of the State is responsible for the general conduct of his administration, it is hardly fair to blame him for everything his followers do. But in party politics, it is very convenient

for his enemies to take advantage of that in order merely to discredit him.

No doubt the Kuo Min Tang has done wonderful things for the Chinese people. But that does not rule out the fact that many of its members, regarding themselves as of a privileged class, have acted in a manner which brings no credit to their party. Since the Revolutionary Army's North Punitive Expedition, when members of the Kuo Min Tang and the Communist Party got in touch with the common people, there has been a saying that the Revolutionary soldiers are as admirable as the Revolutionary partisans are abominable. Chiang Kai-Shek, who was responsible for the first half of this sentence, will also become responsible for the second half if he does not give the Kuo Min Tang an overhaul now that he is the Director-General of the Party. To meet the overwhelmingly difficult conditions of post-war China he must be open-minded and open-armed to welcome people of every political belief and to co-operate with them in the administration which the Kuo Min Tang has monopolised for so long. As the head of a Constitutional Government he must see to the prevention of the partisans being maintained as a privileged class. He is not unaware of the hardships China is facing, nor of the criticisms that have been levelled at him. In his Christmas broadcast of 1947 he said:

‘When we look at the present world situation through the lens of the Christian faith, much which is confused and obscure becomes clearer. We realise that even suffering has its part in the slow process of national self-realisation. In the midst of all the privations and discouragements which China is suffering to-day, we are strengthened by the knowledge that these trials, if manfully faced, will lead to an ultimate self-renewal. Such faith will not fail to lead us to our goal, be it world peace, national unity or the welfare of our people.

‘Certainly no one has ever known sorrow on this earth as did He whose birth we honour at Christmas. His life was an ordeal of persecution. He was despised and rejected of men. By any human everyday success-standard, Jesus’ career on earth was a career of failure and unrelieved disaster. And yet, how tremendous was His ultimate success, how total His final triumph! We know now that His strength was born of the purification which He gained from His sacrifice and affliction.

‘In China, during the last few years we have known, to the dregs of the bitter cup, the meaning of national sorrow. We have suffered inestimable losses due to war and internal rebellion. We have known misrepresentation and cruel slander in its blackest form. Our motives have been misinterpreted; our faults have been distorted beyond all semblance of reality. It has not been a pleasing experience, but it does not daunt us. We know that these unhappinesses are the price which must be paid for our ideal of a democratic China.’

In his inaugural address when he was installed as President, he also expressed his democratic principles by quoting Confucian maxims. He is a Confucian at heart and knows the importance of the common people to the State. But to change a system of one-party rule into a democracy, drastic steps are required. Those who have been entrusted with the government of the country must make great sacrifices and tremendous efforts. Since the 1911 Revolution which overthrew the Monarchy, China has seen many new rulers. Most of them have tried to do their best for the country and invariably have failed. Chiang Kai-Shek has held such a position longest of them all, and has certainly passed through the most difficult time of all. He has had many and great achievements and naturally some failures. He has received the greatest amount of adulation and also suffered the bitterest and most numerous attacks. There are still greater tasks ahead for him to do and they

will require greater efforts and sacrifice on his part. To-day hundreds of millions of people in China are pinning their only hope on him: he is the indisputable leader of the entire nation. His name has already a prominent place in History, but what future historians will say of him will be the final verdict, which can only be reached after he has completed his work on this earth.

THE END

APPENDIX I

THE NEW LIFE MOVEMENT

THE struggle of China to emerge from the Revolution which in 1911 began successfully by overthrowing the Manchu Dynasty has been hampered by the unpreparedness of the people for the responsibilities of public life, and by the age-long influence of apparently sanctified customs.

For hundreds of years the people of China were discouraged from interesting themselves in the affairs of government and were taught, even with the executioner's sword, that the administration of the country was the exclusive concern of the official class.

The people consequently, through the centuries, gradually ceased to have any interest in government and lapsed, as the rulers desired, into complete disregard of national affairs, confining themselves to seeking the welfare of the family and the clan, and knowing nothing, and caring nothing, about the responsibilities of citizenship, the requirements of patriotism, or the urge of loyalty to the country or its flag.

In forced conditions such as these, the habits of the great population of China developed along lines quite contrary to those characterising the peoples of other countries, with the result that when the political window opened they were, in a sense, blinded by the light that suddenly and unexpectedly poured in upon them. They found themselves without understanding of political life, bewildered owing to lack of universal education, and hampered by age-long aloofness and habits that are of little consequence to a small country which may be confined and self-contained within its own boundaries, but which have a tremendously suffocating effect upon a great country flung, willy-nilly, into the wide-sweeping economic and political currents of the world.

The march of events is inexorable and cannot wait for the sluggards to catch up, and therefore it became incumbent upon those who know the problem of China to take strong action to break down the demoralising influence which centuries of suppression of national sentiment and feelings have had.

A new national consciousness and mass psychology have to be created and developed, and with that intention what is called 'The New Life Movement' has been launched.

Peoples of the outer world may not at first be able to understand the necessity for such a movement, but they will do so if they realise that they have grown up with national consciousness fully developed around and about them, whereas the Chinese people have been deliberately and forcibly bereft of it, and, therefore, know nothing of those sentiments and impulses that so quickly move the Occidental peoples when matters concerning their country come forward for consideration or action. It is to correct the evil consequences arising from this serious state of affairs that action is now being taken along a psychological and educational line.

I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEW LIFE MOVEMENT

To correct, or to revolutionise, an age-old habit is a difficult thing, but by using the simplest and, therefore, the most efficient means it is hoped that, in time, the outlook of the people will be entirely changed and they will be able with spirit and competency to meet the requirements of the new time and the new life. The aim of the New Life Movement is, therefore, the social regeneration of China.

It is to this end that their thoughts are now being directed to the ancient high virtues of the nation for guidance, namely, etiquette, justice, integrity and conscientiousness, expressed in *li*, *i*, *lien* and *ch'ih*. These four virtues were highly respected by the Chinese people in the past, and they are vitally necessary now if the rejuvenation of the nation is to be effected.

China has had a cultural history of some five thousand years with fine standards to guide the daily life of the people, and yet, owing to oppression and disregard, these have disappeared, and rudeness and vulgarity have supervened.

China, with a territory of 1,896,500 square miles, possesses abundant natural resources, and the only reason to account for the present degeneration and lack of development is that public virtues have been neglected.

We have a population of over four hundred millions, yet, because we have neglected to cultivate our virtues, social disorder reigns and most of the people lead a life far below that which they should enjoy.

We have, therefore, to learn that, to correct personal and

national failings, we must fall back upon the influence of the old teachings. Rudeness and vulgar manners can be corrected by cultural and artistic training, and degeneration can be overcome by developing good personal character. It is difficult, however, to succeed merely through the ordinary processes of education and governance. If we are determined to reform we must start with the most fundamental question—we must reform our habits first. This, therefore, is why the New Life Movement is regarded as the key to the salvation of our nation.

II. THE INTERPRETATION OF THE NEW LIFE MOVEMENT

A. *What is Life?*

Dr Sun Yat-Sen said: 'Life of the people comprises the livelihood of the people, the existence of society, the welfare of the nation, and the life of the masses.' Although the people's life is thus divided into four phases, yet livelihood is the general manifestation of the other three. Existence depends upon protection; welfare needs development; and life demands propagation. To satisfy all these needs, we have to resort to activities. And life is nothing more than the continuation of activities.

B. *What is New Life?*

All activities to satisfy the desire for the propagation of life, the protection of human existence, and the development of national welfare, are bound to change with changing conditions. Time does not stand still, and environment changes with time. Therefore, only those who re-adapt themselves to new conditions, day by day, can live properly. When the life of a people is going through this process of re-adaptation, it has to remedy its own defects, and get rid of those elements which become useless. Then we call it New Life.

C. *What is the New Life Movement?*

In order to satisfy the requirements of a new life for a people, we have, to a certain extent, to depend upon the Government, especially its system of education, its economic policies, and its measures to insure the protection of all. Whether the policies of a government can be successfully carried out, however, depends greatly upon the customs and habits of the people at the time. When an old order collapses and a new order is about

to arise, the new policies are frequently handicapped if the new system does not base its foundation on the social customs of the time. It is, therefore, necessary to start a movement first, to teach the people to adapt themselves to new conditions, before any ardent support for the new policies can be expected from the people. 'Water always flows over a wet surface, while fire goes wherever it is dry.' The function of any social movement is to prepare the wet surface for water and the dry place for fire. This accounts for the fact that every nation, during its period of transition, pays more attention to the change of customs and habits than to the new policies themselves. The success of these social movements virtually means the success of the new policies of the Government. This illustrates very well the necessity of our New Life Movement. This movement must start with those well aware of its necessity, and gradually expand to others—from the near to the more distant, and from its simpler phase to the more complex. If a man can cultivate new habits himself, it is possible that the members of his family will be influenced; and a family can, by turn, influence the whole community. A social movement goes hand in hand with policies and education; it is not dependent.

III. THE OBJECT OF THE NEW LIFE MOVEMENT

A. *Why is New Life needed?*

The general psychology of our people to-day can be described in one word—spiritlessness. What manifests itself in behaviour is this: no discrimination between the good and the evil, no difference between what is public and what is private, and no distinction between the fundamental and the expedient. Because there is no discrimination between the good and the evil, it follows that right and wrong are confused; because there is no difference between public and private, there lacks proper guidance for taking and giving; and because there is no distinction between the fundamental and expedient, there is misplacement of the first and the last. As a result, officials tend to be dishonest and avaricious; the masses are undisciplined and callous; the adults are ignorant and corrupt; the youth becomes degraded and intemperate; the rich become extravagant and luxurious; and the poor become mean and disorderly. Naturally it resulted in the complete disorganisation of social order and national life. Consequently, we are not in a position either to prevent or to remedy natural calamities or disasters caused

from within or invasions from without. The individual, society, and the whole country are now suffering. It would be impossible even to continue living under such miserable conditions. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary to get rid of these backward conditions and to start to lead a new and rational life.

B. *Why is a New Life Movement needed?*

In order to raise the standard of the people's livelihood and to create a new society, it is indispensable to rely both on the Government and on education. Unfortunately, both the Government and education were inefficient in the past, because those who conducted them were not sufficiently sincere. As a result, the law lost its function; technical knowledge had little practical use; and even machinery did not work efficiently. Why is it that men in the same position worked differently, and that the same technique and the same machinery did not bring the same results? Obviously, in order to make the law or the machine work, it does not depend so much upon the law or the machinery themselves as it does upon the personnel. The key lies in the human element. Social movement is the one way which will influence personal character to a large extent in a short time. No other method, political or educational, can be compared with it. Of course, politics and education have their roles to play. It is not our object to explain them here. In such a national crisis, if we are not willing to bind our hands waiting for death, we ought to reconstruct our society with extraordinary means instead of merely sitting down and waiting for the process of natural evolution. In other words, it is a gigantic task for the New Life Movement to wipe out the backward conditions of society by a wild storm and to supply the community with vitality and the right spirit by a gentle breeze.

IV. THE CONTENTS OF THE NEW LIFE MOVEMENT

A. *The Principles of the New Life Movement*

The New Life Movement aims at the promotion of a regular life guided by the four virtues (*li, i, lien and ch'ih*). These virtues must be applied to ordinary matters, such as food, clothing, shelter and action. The four virtues are the essential principles for the promotion of morality. From these rules, one learns how to deal with men and matters, how to cultivate oneself, and how to adjust oneself to surroundings. Whoever

violates these rules is bound to fail ; and a nation which neglects them will not survive.

There are two kinds of sceptics :

First, some hold the view that the four virtues are simply rules of good conduct. No matter how good they may be, no benefit to the nation can be derived from them if the knowledge and technique used by that nation are inferior to others.

Those who hold this view do not seem to understand the difference between matters of primary and secondary importance. From the social and national point of view, only those who are virtuous can best use their knowledge and technique for the salvation of the country. Otherwise, ability may be abused for dishonourable purposes. *Li, i, lien* and *ch'ih* are the principal rules alike for a community, a group, or the entire nation. Those who do not observe these rules will probably utilise their knowledge and ability to the disadvantage of society. Therefore, these virtues may be considered as matters of primary importance upon which the foundation of a nation can be solidly built.

Secondly, there is another group of people who argue that these virtues are merely refined formalities, which have nothing to do with the actual necessities of daily life. For instance, if one is hungry, can these formalities feed him? This is probably due to some misunderstanding of the famous teachings of Kuantze, who said : 'When one does not have to worry about his food and clothing, then he cares for personal honour ; when the granary is full, then people learn good manners.' The sceptic fails to realise that the four virtues teach one how to be a man. If one does not know those, what is the use of having abundance of food and clothing? Moreover, Kuantze did not intend to make a general statement, merely referring to a particular subject at a particular time. When he was making broad statements, he said : '*Li, i, lien* and *ch'ih* are the four pillars of the nation.' When these virtues prevail, even if food and clothing are temporarily insufficient, they can be produced by man-power : or if the granary is empty, it can be filled through human effort. On the other hand, when these virtues are not observed, there will be robbery and beggary in time of need ; and from a social point of view robbery and beggary can never achieve anything. Social order is based on these virtues. When there is order, then everything can be done properly, but when everything is in confusion, very little can be achieved. To-day robbers are usually most numerous in the wealthiest cities



March 1944

OFFICES OF MORAL ENDEAVOUR AT NANKING HEADQUARTERS



A RECENT PORTRAIT (1946)

of the world. This is an obvious illustration of confusion caused by non-observance of virtues. The fact that our country has traitors and Communists, as well as corrupt officials, shows that we, too, have neglected the cultivation of virtues, and, if we are to recover, these virtues must be adopted as the principles of a new life.

B. *The Meaning of Li, I, Lien and Ch'ih*

Although *li*, *i*, *lien* and *ch'ih* have always been regarded as the foundations of the nation, yet the changing times and circumstances may require that these principles be given a new interpretation. From the pragmatic point of view to-day, we may interpret the four virtues as follows:

Li means regulated attitude (mind as well as heart).

I means right conduct (in all things).

Lien means clear discrimination (honesty, in personal, public and official life).

Ch'ih means real self-consciousness (integrity and honour).

The word *li* means 'reason'. It becomes a natural law when applied to nature; it becomes a rule, when applied to social affairs; and it signifies discipline, when used in reference to national affairs. These three phases of one's life are all regulated by reason. Therefore, *li* can be interpreted as regulated attitude of mind and heart.

The word *i* means 'proper'. Any conduct which is in accordance with natural law, social rule, or national discipline must be considered as proper. When an act is not proper, or when one thinks it proper but does not act accordingly, the act is naturally not right and therefore cannot be called *i*.

The word *lien* means 'clear'. It denotes distinction between right and wrong. What agrees with *li* and *i* is right, and what does not so agree is wrong. To take what we recognise as right and to forgo what we recognise as wrong, constitutes clear discrimination. This is *lien*.

The word *ch'ih* means 'consciousness'. When one is conscious of the fact that his own actions are not in accordance with *li*, *i* and *lien*, he feels ashamed. When he is conscious of the fact that others are wrong, he feels disgusted. But the consciousness must be real and thorough, so that he will strive to improve the good and endeavour to get rid of the evil. Then we call it *ch'ih*.

From the explanations given above, it is clear that *ch'ih*

governs the motive of action, that *lien* gives the guidance for it, that *i* relates to an action actually being carried out, and that *li* regulates the outward form of that particular action. The four are inter-related. They are inter-dependent upon one another in order to make a virtue perfect. Otherwise, *li* without *i* becomes dishonest; *li* without *lien* becomes extravagant; and *li* without *ch'ih* becomes flattering. All these may appear like *li* but really they are not. Similarly, *i* without *li* turns to be offensive; *i* without *lien* lavish, and *i* without *ch'ih* fantastic. All these are not really *i*. Again, *lien* without *li* is false; *lien* without *i* is niggard; and *lien* without *ch'ih* is corrupt. They are not *lien*. In like manner, *ch'ih* without *li* will be chaotic; *ch'ih* without *i*, violent; and *ch'ih* without *lien* ugly. They are no longer *ch'ih*.

It would be a golden opportunity for traitors and sinners if the four virtues were perverted.

C. *The Meaning of Food, Clothing, Shelter and Action*

There are two necessary elements in our daily life. One refers to the material side of our food, clothing, shelter, and communications, and the other to the manner in which the material is used to serve our daily purposes. The first belongs to the practical side; and the second may be called the manifestation of the spiritual side of human life.

The Chinese word *hsin* may be interpreted broadly or narrowly. Narrowly, it simply means 'walk'; but broadly it means 'action'. All kinds of human behaviour in connection with daily life may be included in this word *hsin*. While Dr Sun Yat-Sen referred to food, clothing, shelter, and communications in 'The Three Principles of the People', he used the same word *hsin* to denote communications only (the extended sense of walk). In his 'Principles of National Reconstruction' he said: 'The Government should co-operate with the people in developing agriculture in order to provide the people with sufficient food; in developing the textile industry in order to provide them with sufficient clothes, in building all kinds of houses in order to improve their shelter, and in constructing roads and canals in order to provide means of communication for them.' He used the same word *hsin* for communications, apparently, in the narrower sense.

But in this monograph, I intend to use the same word *hsin* both in its broad and in its narrow sense. My own 'Philosophy

of *hsin'* also includes both. This is also true of the previous chapters.

D. *The Application of Li, I, Lien and Ch'ih to Food, Clothing, Shelter and Action*

What I want to develop now, is how to apply these four virtues to food, clothing, shelter and action.

The means of maintaining our livelihood may be divided into three phases: first, the obtaining of materials; second, the selection of quality; and third, the manner in which these materials are used. Let me put them separately.

1. The obtaining of materials should be governed by the principle of *lien*. Clear discrimination should be exercised between what is ours and what is not. If they do not belong to us, we should not take them. In other words, the materials for our daily life should be acquired through our own labour or through other proper means. Strife should not be encouraged. A parasite is not a good example. Even giving and taking improperly should be avoided. 'What really matters is the degradation of personality, but not dying in hunger.' The famous saying of a Confucianist can be quoted to illustrate this point.

2. The selection of quality should be governed by the principle of *i*. Do the proper thing in a particular situation. For instance, it is proper for an old man to use silk and to take meat and to have lots of leisure; but a young man should be trained to endure hardship. What is proper in Winter is not necessarily proper in Summer. What is proper in the North is not necessarily proper in the South. Similarly, different positions may influence a situation differently. A ruler, or an army commander, must have some authority; while those of a lower rank should not enjoy the same thing, but should respect discipline. Thus, what is proper is influenced by age, season, location, and rank; the selection of quality varies in different situations.

3. The manner in which materials are used should be governed by the principle of *li*, which includes natural law, social rules, and national discipline, as explained in the former chapter.

The inter-relationship of these four virtues has already been fully discussed. When applied to daily life, this is even more true. All virtues should be carefully observed. If one of them is neglected, there is a black spot in our life.

V. THE PROCEDURE OF THE NEW LIFE MOVEMENT

1. *Organisation*

1. The whole movement should be conducted by the Nanchang Association for the Promotion of the New Life Movement. If a similar movement is started in other provinces, municipalities, or districts, similar associations may be organised, but a district association should be directed by a provincial association.

2. The provincial, municipal, or district associations should be organised and directed by the highest administrative authority of that area. The local Party organisation, the bureau of civil or social affairs, the bureau of education, the bureau of public safety, and the local military authorities should each send a representative of high rank to participate in the work of the association. Social groups may also send representatives.

3. Let the farmers be guided by the county officers; workers by the managers or the responsible persons of the trade unions; merchants, by trustees of the Chambers of Commerce; students, by their teachers; soldiers, by political secretaries or Party representatives in the Army; civil servants, by their superiors; and women, by their organisations. But the local association should control all.

2. *The Work of the Movement*

1. Investigation,
2. Planning, and
3. Execution.

3. *Expenses of the Movement*

Funds should be used economically. They should be collected from the organisers of the movement or from the local government. No contributions should be raised from the public.

4. *Activities of the Movement*

The Nanchang Association should decide general policies for the whole movement. In the beginning, the movement should be confined to two campaigns: (1) good manners, and (2) cleanliness.

5. *The Working Principles of the Movement*

1. The movement should be started first from oneself, and gradually be extended to others.

2. It should first be started with civil servants and gradually extended to the general public.

3. It should be started with simpler matters and gradually extended to others.

4. Easy and inexpensive matters should be taken up first.

5. Public organisations or public places, such as schools, offices, stations, piers, theatres, parks, etc., should be improved first.

6. *The Methods of the Movement*

1. Inspection follows instruction. The public should be taught with personal examples, lectures, pictures, literature, plays, and cinemas. Then the Association should send out, from time to time, agents to inspect the results of the movement and rewards should be given to those who deserve them.

2. Only superiors are allowed to interfere with the daily activities of their inferiors. Friends can advise one another.

7. *The Time of Work*

Week-ends and holidays, as well as leisure hours, may be used to promote the movement. The activities of the movement should not replace the regular duties of the individual.

CONCLUSION

In short, the main object of the New Life Movement is to substitute a rational life for the irrational, and, to achieve this, we must observe *li*, *i*, *lien* and *ch'ih* in our daily activities.

1. By observing these virtues, it is hoped that rudeness and vulgarity will be got rid of, and that the natural life of our people will be more refined, in accordance with cultural and artistic standards. By art, we are not referring to the special enjoyment of the gentry. We mean the cultural standard of all the people. It is the boundary-line between civilisation and barbarism. In ancient times, the Chinese knew the six arts (etiquette, music, shooting, driving, writing and mathematics). It is a pity that most of us have neglected our own arts, for, as a result, we are somewhat behind the Western nations in these fields of artistic achievement. A lack of artistic training is specially revealed in the prevailing social conditions to-day. Suspicion, jealousy, hatred and strife are symptoms of barbarism. To remedy these, we have to emphasise art.

2. By observing these virtues, it is hoped that beggary and robbery will be removed, and that officials will be honest and

patriotic, that corruption will cease, and that people will pursue more productive enterprises. The poverty of our nation is primarily caused by the fact that there are too many consumers and too few producers. Consequently, many people have to live like parasites. To remedy this, we have to emphasise the four virtues, and we have to make people work harder and spend less, and the officials must be honest. This was the secret of success of the two ancient kingdoms of Ch'i and Ch'u. It is also the primary cause of the strength of present-day Italy and Germany.

3. By observing these virtues, it is hoped that social and official disorder will be remedied, and that people will become more military-minded. If a country cannot defend itself, it has every chance to lose its existence. The larger its territory, the more attractive it looks to the invaders. There is only one way for national salvation—that is, to promote the economic stability of the country and develop the patriotic and fighting spirit of the people. Now, the Communists are not yet completely suppressed, and our territory shrinks every day in the face of foreign invasion. In order to pass through this crisis successfully, we have to pacify the interior and resist external aggression. To do this, we have to rely upon force. Our people, therefore, must have military training. As a preliminary, we have to acquire the habits of orderliness, cleanliness, simplicity, frugality, promptness, and exactness. We have to preserve order, emphasise organisation, responsibility and discipline, and be ready to die for our country at any moment.

In conclusion, the life of our people will be more refined when we have more artistic training; we will be richer when we are more productive; and we will be much safer when we are more patriotic, better trained and equipped to defend ourselves. This rational life is founded on *li*, *i*, *lien* and *ch'ih*. The four virtues, in turn, can be applied to food, clothing, shelter and action. If we achieve this, we will have revolutionised the daily life of our people, and we will have laid the solid foundation for our nation.

APPENDIX II

SOME REFLECTIONS ON MY FIFTIETH BIRTHDAY

HAVING devoted a good portion of my life to the cause of the Revolution, but before accomplishing one-hundredth part of the work I wish to do for my country, I find myself at the age of fifty. Educated and maintained by the State for more than thirty years, I have since manhood enrolled myself in the Army and dedicated myself to the cause of the National Revolution.

During all these years, what I ate, what I wore, and what other things I needed daily, were derived from the State, in other words, from the sweat and toil of the people. My debt to the country is great indeed.

The hearty and inspiring spirit with which my compatriots, both at home and abroad, men and women, young and old, have contributed towards the purchases of the aeroplanes as a birthday present for the Government made me deeply conscious of the profound trust and great hopes that are reposed in me. Unworthy as I am, it awes me even more to think that I should be the recipient of such an honour which I know not how to repay.

I recollect now the counsel of my teachers, the assistance of my comrades, and the heroism and sacrifice of my colleagues. They are as vivid as if they were before my eyes, and I reflect upon them with extremely mixed feelings.

Among such deep impressions is the indelible memory of my mother who endured so much in educating and bringing up the fatherless boy. Now, while the trees by her grave have grown tall and thick, I cannot but realise how little I have accomplished and how I have failed to live up to the hopes that she had placed in me.

The difficulties confronting the Party and the State are numerous, the misery of the people is still great, and the road to recovery is long. It makes me ashamed to think that I have allowed time to slip by without accomplishing my duty.

While my mind is full of these unrestful thoughts, I choose at this time to make public the hardships and difficulties which my mother endured in bringing up her family, so that the world

may better realise and appreciate the position of the helpless and the poor. I also hope that this may serve in some measure as an incentive for us to practise self-restraint and self-training, and to remind us of the great task of national salvation.

I was born in a little village where my grandfather and my father maintained a farm and pursued their studies. Through diligence and frugality they had acquired a little wealth. My father died when I was nine years old. After that, my family had to undergo all sorts of difficulties and tribulations.

It will be remembered that the then Manchu régime was in its most corrupt state. The degenerated gentry and corrupt officials had made it a habit to abuse and maltreat the people.

My family, solitary and without influence, became at once the target of such insults and maltreatment. From time to time usurious taxes and unjust public service were forced upon us, and once we were publicly insulted before the court. To our regret and sorrow none of our relatives and kinsmen was stirred from his apathy.

Indeed the miserable condition of my family at that time is beyond description. It was entirely due to my mother and her kindness and perseverance that the family was saved from utter ruin. With an iron determination she bodily undertook to save the family from its threatened fate and, with the same determination, she resolutely undertook to bring up the children in the proper manner.

Her task was neither light nor enviable, for she had to look after everything herself. As a boy she loved me very deeply, but her love was more than the love of an average mother; she was a very strict disciplinarian. She never failed to hold me to strict account whenever I was unusually mischievous.

Upon returning home she would ask me where I had been and what I had been doing, and when I got back from school she would question me on the lesson of the day. She taught me how to conduct and behave myself. She would make me do manual labour in order to train me physically. In a word, all her time and energy were devoted to my well-being.

Having reached manhood, I determined to go abroad for a military education. At first many of our kinsmen and neighbours were quite surprised at, and some of them were hostile to, my decision. They certainly would have prevented me from carrying out my wish had it not been for my mother's resolute will and her efforts to supply me with the necessary funds. Later, when the general principle of our National Revolution

became more deeply rooted in my mind, I decided to dedicate myself to the Party and the nation—a step which involved much difficulty and subsequent dangers. At that time, all my relations forbore from communicating with me. The only one who still believed in whatever I had undertaken to do, and did everything to help me, spiritually and materially, was my mother.

At the time of the establishment of the Republic, I found myself at the age of twenty-five. By then I had been able to improve our home for my mother and to gratify her wishes a little. Unfortunately, the establishment of the Republican form of government was not followed by the establishment of perpetual peace.

Already internecine conflicts among warring militarists had occurred all over the land. In such circumstances, the application of Party principles was absolutely impossible, and for a time the cause of the Revolution seemed hopelessly lost. At this critical time, my mother again came to me with valuable advice. For a period of seventeen years—that is, from the time I lost my father at the age of nine till I was twenty-five years old—my mother had never spent a day free from domestic difficulties. Though often anxious about my fugitive life during that period, she remained persistently calm and self-confident and regarded the reconstruction of our home as her only responsibility.

Once she said to me: 'I had become such a poor widow since your father's death, and sometimes the conditions were so unbearable that I really did not know how to preserve ourselves. My sole conviction was that a fatherless child like you must be carefully brought up before we could expect any success in this world. Our house must be carried on by an heir who could keep untarnished the good reputation of our family.' At another time she said: 'Such things as misfortunes, dangers and human sufferings are of daily occurrence in every corner of the world, but in the face of these we must practise self-reliance and self-betterment in order to find a way out. Hence, the greater our domestic difficulties, the more important it is to uphold our family traditions; the worse our domestic disaster, the stronger we have to make our will. For a poor widow and a poor orphan, or anyone who is trying to support himself in this cruel world, there is nothing better than the strict observance of self-reliance and self-betterment.'

At the first disappointment I encountered in the early days

of the Revolution, my mother again came to my aid. She taught me how to make the principle of filial piety applicable to the whole nation. She told me to recall to mind how we overcame our home difficulties in the earlier days, and wished me to apply the principle in a broader sense—in a national sense—so that injustice and oppression might forever disappear from human history. She impressed upon my mind that to be merely a dutiful son does not fulfill all the exacting conditions of the principle of filial piety; the principle demands also an unflinching devotion to the cause of the nation.

All these good counsels were given by my mother with the purpose of guiding my life in this world. Although it has always been my ardent desire to do everything in accordance with my late mother's wishes, yet so far I have not been able to live up to her great expectations. Whenever I reflect on the conditions in which we two—a widowed mother and a fatherless son—lived in the shadow of cold realities, I cannot but pray for the day when I should be able to fulfil my mother's wishes in a worthy manner.

Such is the great debt I owe to my country, and such is the great debt I owe to my mother. In some of my leisure moments, I have reflected upon my experiences during the past fifty years. I cannot but confess that the first twenty-five years of my life were beset with great difficulties. I suffered the loss of my father, I was handicapped by the want of means, and again I was handicapped by my limited knowledge in the struggle for a better life.

The latter twenty-five years were equally difficult, for upon my shoulders has fallen the great task of national salvation. All these long years of hard struggle appear to me as if they had happened yesterday. Fellow countrymen and dear comrades, it all depends upon one's own endeavour to bring back one's old glories, and, as the reflection on things gone by inevitably throws light upon the things to come, I take this opportunity to dwell a little further on the principles whereby a nation may establish itself.

There is a proverb which says: 'From the family is built a nation.' The cause by which a family rises or falls can be equally applied to a nation. Just as with a family, a nation may be powerful at one time and weak at another. Whether a nation perishes or flourishes depends upon the endeavour and determination of its people. The past hundred years have witnessed a number of nations establishing themselves after years of hard

struggle, and these nations have set us a noble example to follow. No crops can be harvested without a due share of labour, and no labour is ever denied its due reward. If we can keep on struggling with singleness of purpose, we are sure ultimately to triumph over our difficulties.

At this point I would like to draw an analogy from my own experience. During my childhood, as I have just related, my family was in a most difficult situation, but, difficult as our situation was, and oppressed as we were by those in power, yet my mother went on boldly with her noble task of safeguarding the sanctity of her home and the supreme duty of bringing up her children. From this we may learn a profitable lesson. In our march towards national salvation, there is no difficulty too great for us to overcome if we have the courage and resolution, but I must point out that our success depends entirely upon our own efforts.

Ever since the death of Dr Sun Yat-Sen in 1925, China has encountered numerous disasters both within and without. The country was first overrun by Communists, who almost succeeded in overthrowing the Republic and the Kuomintang. Following came a series of foreign aggressions which resulted in the loss of the Three North-eastern Provinces. In the midst of these disasters and sufferings, which covered a period of ten years, and which endangered the very life of the nation, the people began to lose confidence in their leaders and, in turn, to lose confidence in themselves. The situation undoubtedly was critical, and the crisis confronting the nation was unprecedented in our history, but in spite of this I still cherish great hope; I find despair neither in the defeat of international justice nor in our own apparent impotence.

By hope lies in the revival of our old national traits of self-reliance, self-improvement, temperance, and self-consciousness.

Should each and every one of us devote himself to the cause of national salvation with the same persistence and endurance as my mother showed in raising her family, it will not be long before China takes her place once more among the great Powers of the world. Should the women of the nation do their best to have their homes well-managed and their children properly brought up, I am sure their effort will contribute immensely towards the upbuilding of the nation.

Our late leader, Dr Sun Yat-Sen, once said that the existence of China as a nation depends entirely on following the line of her destiny. We should not imitate the superficialities of the

West, nor plagiarise the Doctrine of Might of the imperialistic nations. The eight great virtues—loyalty, filial piety, kindness, love faithfulness, righteousness, peace and justice—are in accordance with the true spirit and time-honoured characteristics of the Chinese race. Filial piety is particularly emphasised in the testaments of our late Leader. We should, therefore, observe filial piety as one of our fundamental principles in rebuilding the nation.

In practising the virtue of filial piety, we must strictly observe two fundamental codes of conduct. The one is to do honour to our parents, and the other to conduct ourselves without disgrace. In order to do honour to our parents we must endeavour to improve ourselves and to follow the teachings of our forefathers. To conduct ourselves without disgrace, we must be fair and honest in our daily dealings, in order not to bring humiliation upon our parents. The Chinese nation has had a very long history and a glorious civilisation. No nation can ruin us unless we first ruin ourselves. If each one of us recognises his own weakness and endeavours to correct himself accordingly, he will have no difficulty in removing any obstacle he may encounter in life, and if we can do this collectively, we can remove all obstacles confronting the nation.

For my own part, I have been painfully conscious of my inability to discharge my responsibilities in such a way as to fulfil the expectations of my countrymen and the fervent wish of my late mother. I am always mindful of two things—that, so long as the people are still in distress, I have not fulfilled my mother's long-cherished wish, and that, so long as the task of national salvation is not yet accomplished, I shall be responsible for the distress and sufferings of the people. Therefore, I sincerely appeal to my countrymen to help me to fulfil my mother's ardent wish—to fulfil the great task of national salvation.

APPENDIX III

NEW TREATIES, NEW RESPONSIBILITIES

Fellow Countrymen:

ON October 10, 1942, the United States and Great Britain spontaneously announced the relinquishment of the special rights and privileges they had enjoyed in China under the unequal treaties. Yesterday our Government signed with them in Chungking and Washington new treaties based on equality and reciprocity.

My countrymen! It may be recalled that last year was the one hundredth anniversary of the first of the unequal treaties concluded between China and the foreign Powers in the Ching Dynasty. After fifty years of bloody revolution and five and a half years of war of resistance during which great sacrifices have been made, we have at last transformed the painful history of one hundred years of the unequal treaties into the glorious record of their abolition. This resurrection constitutes not only an important page in the history of the Chungkai nation, but also means the setting up by Great Britain, the United States and other countries, of a beacon of equality and freedom to enlighten the world. By doing this, the United Nations, who are our comrades-in-arms, have shown beyond peradventure that their object in this war is to fight for humanity and justice. It is indeed an act which reflects the greatest honour and credit on the British and American Governments and peoples. Especially gratifying is the attitude of the United States, which is at one with us in our hopes and aspirations and has made no reservations whatsoever. The action the British and American Governments have taken has not only increased the fighting strength of the Allies, but has dealt a particularly severe blow to the morale of the aggressor nations!

However, our countrymen must understand that independence and freedom are something 'to be obtained through our own efforts', I have repeatedly told our countrymen that 'only when we can stand on our own feet is it possible to have independence, and only when we can make our nation strong is it possible to have freedom'. The Chinese Republic must

be able to stand on her own feet and make herself strong before she can be a free and independent nation, and our people, the armed forces and civilians, must be able to stand on their own feet and make themselves strong before they can be a free and independent people. The abolition of the unequal treaties and the attainment of independence and freedom, therefore, can only increase the responsibility of our nation, and arouse our people's consciousness of their duties and obligations, instead of justifying in the slightest degree self-conceit or self-satisfaction on their part. Hereafter, if they cannot fulfil the obligations and discharge the duties which are incumbent upon them in order to make China a completely free and independent nation and accomplish the task which they owe to humanity, our independence and freedom will be lost again; and after the conclusion of the present war the entire Chinese nation may still have to suffer from the shackles of former days and the endless distress resulting therefrom. Should this unfortunately come to pass, we would have to wait, for I don't know how many hundreds of years, before we could hope to regain our nation's independence again, and all our future generations would forever have to suffer the tragic fate of slaves and beasts of burden. In a word, China's future destiny entirely rests on the shoulders of the present generation. In order to preserve the vast territory that our forefathers have left to us as well as the existence and happiness of future generations, all of us must from this day forth, when our independence and freedom have just been recovered, make up our minds to serve our country and as a united people do our best to discharge our duty of strengthening our nation and enabling her to stand on her own feet.

Our victory in this world war against the aggressor nations is now in sight. The brutal Japanese aggressors and their Axis partners, Germany and Italy, will surely collapse in the near future and the coming year is going to be the most crucial year in our war of resistance. There are people who think that China's destiny will be decided at the international conference to be held following the conclusion of the present world war. There are others who think that after her war of resistance has ended in glorious victory the status China has already attained will, in common with other nations, automatically enable her to enjoy the blessings of justice and peace and that there is nothing else to worry about. Such notions are all born of a psychology characterised by self-conceit, smugness,

lack of self-reliance and blind following of others. Our people should fully wake up to the folly of this sort of mentality. They ought to understand that China's destiny should be decided now when we are striving to strengthen our nation, and we should not sit idle waiting for the opening of the peace conference after the termination of the war. China to-day has reached a stage where it must be decided whether she is to survive or to perish, to be her own master or to be a slave of others. Are we going to survive or to perish? To be our own master or be slaves of others? This is the choice our countrymen have to make within this year! From now on, all of us must not again be apathetic or be content to muddle along. We shall have no time for indecision and hesitancy. Beginning from this very day we must bear more hardships and sufferings than we have done during the last five years of bloody struggle with the enemy, and must bestir ourselves to march forward, for present circumstances no longer permit us to live a life of idle ease.

Fellow countrymen, heretofore we were justified in saying that the failure of our Revolution and national reconstruction had been mainly due to the existence of the unequal treaties. During the last century China has been suffering from the manifold oppressions of the unequal treaties, and this has resulted in political disunity, backwardness of economic development, and evil social tendencies. The cumulative effect of these factors is to make moral cowards of our people, who have forgotten even how to save themselves while the lowering of their ethical standard has deprived them of their sense of honour. Up to the present, therefore, the Chinese people's moral degradation and loss of self-confidence may be said to have reached their nadir. Directly or indirectly this is entirely due to the influence of the unequal treaties. The foreign Concessions and Garrison Areas have been the breeding-ground of decadent customs and evil habits. Now since the unequal treaties have been abolished, the unhealthy conditions caused by these treaties will have no harbourage, and the decadent customs and evil habits will surely be uprooted. Moreover, the forces which have given rise to these conditions and those who have become tainted by such customs and habits will no longer be able to put the blame on others. These conditions, however, which have developed and accumulated in the course of one hundred years, may still exist below the surface in the life of our people and in our customs and habits; nay, they

may even be the media through which selfish desires and feudalistic thoughts continue to exist—desires and thoughts which are contrary to the trends of the day, obstructive of the National Revolution and detrimental to the nation's existence without our being aware of it. For this reason our people must be of one mind and with singleness of purpose encourage one another, sincerely repent their past faults and completely get rid of their undesirable customs and habits to the end that under the inspiration of their common belief in the Three Principles of the People they may devote themselves to the great task of bringing the war of resistance to a victorious conclusion, thus consummating the work of national reconstruction.

The object that we ought to strive to achieve—the success of the Nationalist Revolution—has long been clearly placed before the entire nation. China's future destiny depends on the greatest and best efforts that our people will jointly make for the attainment of this object. We must sincerely abide by the instructions of Dr Sun Yat-Sen, Father of our Republic, believe in the Three Principles of the People, follow the plans of the National Revolution, obey the laws of the National Government, and loyally and honestly with all our mind and heart discharge all duties incumbent upon us. We must each and all strictly live a war-time life, carry out the scheme for the control of commodity prices, observe the law of general mobilisations, practise economy and increase production, so as to enhance our power of resistance on the one hand and effect psychological, ethical, social, political and economic reconstruction on the other, in the hope that we may within the shortest time possible carry out the whole plan of reconstruction for the co-ordination of our culture, economy, and national defence and lay the foundation of our country and people.

My fellow countrymen! The present moment which marks the turning-point in China's destiny is the best opportunity for the people to make up their mind to serve the country. Moreover, we ought to consider it our very good fortune to live in this extraordinary age when, with our past humiliation wiped out and our independence and freedom regained, we can have the chance to make our country strong. A few words more: at this moment when China's fate is hanging in the balance, we must be careful in our actions and guard against unseemly conduct, and above all we must have self-respect. Since our nation has now already attained a position of equality with other nations, the nationals of friendly Powers residing

in China will henceforth receive the protection of our laws. All of them, whether tourists, merchants or missionaries, provided they deal with us on a footing of equality and abide by Chinese laws, should be treated courteously and in a friendly manner according to the traditional spirit of China as a country that values courtesy and justice. I earnestly hope that my countrymen will seriously ponder over the lessons taught by the history of the last hundred years and do their utmost to discharge their present responsibilities. Furthermore, they should bear in mind that they cannot secure the independence of their nation by just waiting for it, and that the people in all walks of life must pay special regard to courtesy and justice, understand the importance of honesty, develop their sense of honour, and, of one mind and with singleness of purpose, make redoubled efforts before they can hope to attain true victory, equality and freedom. Only in this way can we keep pace with our allies in sharing the responsibilities for the reconstruction of the world, the safeguarding of peace, and the emancipation of mankind.

hope I welcome this memorable day of our independence and

My countrymen! To-day with unbounded confidence and freedom which is the beginning of a new destiny for the Chunghua nation. It is with the utmost sincerity that I thank you all for the patriotic spirit with which you have shared with me all dangers and hardships despite sacrifices and sufferings, ever since the commencement of our war of resistance. It is with the same sincerity that I hope to comfort the departed spirits of our martyrs, soldiers and civilians, who have laid down their lives for their country. Lastly let us pray for our victory!

Long live the equality and freedom of the Chinese Republic!

Long live the success of the National Revolution!

Long live the Three Principles of the People!

APPENDIX IV

PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH

ON this day every year we recall China's glorious past with great rejoicing and animation. It is on such an auspicious occasion to-day that I assume the post of President of the National Government.

At a time when China's war defence is entering into a decisive stage, when national reconstruction is begun in all earnestness, when military and economic machinery is to be strengthened, and when home administration and foreign relations are to be developed, I feel ever more the weightiness of my responsibilities, and I shudder at the thought of the great task which falls upon my shoulders.

As early as thirty-two years ago, Dr Sun Yat-Sen laid down the policy for building up the Republic of China. In regard to foreign relations, it provides that China 'should fulfil the obligations and enjoy the rights of a civilised nation' and 'should foster closer relations with friendly nations on the principle of peace, with a view to elevating China's position in the family of nations and realising the ideal of universal brotherhood'. In regard to home administration, it aims at 'welding together the territories of the Hans, Manchus, Mongols, Muslims, and Tibetans into one country, and linking them into one nation' and also at 'firmly establishing a republican form of government, improving the people's livelihood and fulfilling the high aspirations of the nation through the consummation of the revolution'.

The titanic struggle we are now engaged in is in pursuance of this consistent policy. Internally we strive for the realisation of local autonomy throughout the country, consolidation of national unity, establishment of government by law and consummation of democratic rule. Externally we seek to cultivate closer relations with friendly nations, to win the war against aggression, to collaborate with our Allies in establishing permanent world peace after the war, to develop our rich natural resources and carry out economic reconstruction and to enhance the well-being of mankind through self-exertion as well as international collaboration.

Since we concluded new treaties with Great Britain and the United States last January on the basis of equality, our ideal of national independence and equality may well be said to have been realised. After the realisation of the principle of nationalism, we have to carry out the principles of democracy and people's livelihood. In this connection all our fellow-countrymen should thoroughly understand the significance implied in the following bequeathed teaching of Dr Sun Yat-Sen:

'The people are the foundation of the State.'

'The fortunes of the people hinge upon the State.'

We should bear in mind the close relationship between the people and the State. I wish now to explain how we should exert ourselves for the realisation of the principle of democracy and the establishment of democratic government.

As far back as three thousand years ago, when writing was invented in China, there were already manifestations of democratic ideas. The Kao Tao Mu in the Shu Ming (Rock of History) says: 'The wisdom of heaven is reflected by the wisdom of the people, and the reward or punishment by heaven is based upon the judgment of the people.'

Confucius says: 'Love what the people love and hate what the people hate.' Mencius says: 'The people are to be valued.' All these ancient maxims are the source of the democratic thought and the crystallisation of the Chinese traditional spirit.

It is in this ancient and profound civilisation that Dr Sun Yat-Sen's principles of democracy originated. Dr Sun Yat-Sen's programme of revolution has as its objective the awakening and rallying of the people to join the common struggle. The significance of his principle of democracy lies in the investment of political rights in the people. In other words its ultimate goal is to make all the people take part in the administration of State affairs. In view of the grand achievements made by only a handful of patriots in the Chinese revolution in 1911 towards the total realisation of the principle of democracy, 450,000,000 Chinese will jointly shoulder the heavy responsibilities of the country.

However, there is an important prerequisite to the realisation of the principle of democracy. The democratic spirit lies in the observance of law and discipline. Failure in this will undermine the foundation of the democratic system and endanger the republic, therefore, it is imperative that our citizens should grasp fully the true meaning of freedom and government by

law, and cultivate the good habit of respecting freedom and observing law and discipline; for only thus can a solid foundation of democracy be laid. We should not evade, but fulfil, all obligations prescribed by law and, of course, at the same time enjoy equally rights and privileges as provided by law.

If China wants to continue to exist as a nation in this world, we should one and all form the law-abiding habit. We should consider it an honour to respect and observe law and a disgrace to violate and undermine it. Not only should we not work for personal gain under the pretext of freedom, but also not evade our responsibilities, thereby neglecting our duties as citizens. Just as Government officials should loyally perform their duties, so all the people should jointly share the responsibilities and do their part. Only thus can China attain equality.

As a public servant, I will from to-day work unswervingly for the welfare of the nation in the same spirit of patriotism as before. If I should ever transgress the limit of my power, it is the duty of every citizen to censure and correct me. I will observe all laws and respect public opinion in order to set an example of democratic rule in China. Now that our ultimate victory is in sight and a great future for China is dawning, I will strive for the Nation's advancement courageously and conscientiously together with my fellow-countrymen.

APPENDIX V

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

- 1887—Born in Brookmouth on October 31st.
1888—Aet. 1:
1889—Aet. 2:
1890—Aet. 3: Puts a chopstick down his throat.
1891—Aet. 4: Nearly drowned in a water jar, and in the Brook.
1892—Aet. 5: Starts to study at home.
1893—Aet. 6: Still studying 'The Great Learning' at home.
1894—Aet. 7: Finishes his first book; his grandfather dies.
War with Japan breaks out over Korean question.
1895—Aet. 8: Studies 'The Analects of Confucius' and 'The Sayings of Mencius'; his father dies. China signs Peace Treaty dictated by Japan; Sun Yat-Sen starts his revolutionary activities.
1896—Aet. 9: Starts to study 'The Book of Odes'. Sun Yat-Sen is imprisoned in London but set free after James Cantlie's intervention.
1897—Aet. 10: Begins to take up active duties in his family; discusses democratic principles.
1898—Aet. 11: Finishes 'The Book of Odes'; learns classical essays; his younger brother dies. China leases various settlements to the Powers; Reform Movement starts and collapses in Peking.
1899—Aet. 12: Studies 'The Book of Ancient History': writes his first poem on 'Bamboos'.
1900—Aet. 13: Finishes studying 'The Book of Changes'; helps his mother in housework. Boxer's uprising breaks out in Peking; Sun Yat-Sen strikes again in Kwangtung and fails.
1901—Aet. 14: Studies 'The Spring and Autumn Chronicles'; marries Miss Mou according to his mother's orders. China accepts the dictated Peace Treaty with the victorious Powers.
1902—Aet. 15: Reads and punctuates 'The Chronicle Outline of the General Mirror'; tries his hand at the State Examination.

- 1903—Aet. 16: Studies in the Phoenix Mountain School, and finishes 'The Book of Rites' under a private tutor. Russo-Japanese War starts in Chinese territory.
- 1904—Aet. 17: Studies works of ancient philosophers and 'The Art of War'; begins to be interested in revolutionary work.
- 1905—Aet. 18: Studies in the Dragon River Middle School; decides to study military art in Japan; his maternal grandmother dies; sails for Japan; returns because unable to get into a military school.
- 1906—Aet. 19: Enters Paoting Military Academy; defies Japanese instructor who has insulted China; selected for going to Japan.
- 1907—Aet. 20: Enters Preparatory Military Academy in Tokyo; joins Sun Yat-Sen Revolutionary Society, the China Union introduced by Chen Chi-Mei.
- 1908—Aet. 21: Devotes his time to revolutionary works whilst studying in the Military Academy. Both the Emperor Kuang Hsu and the Empress-Dowager, the Motherly and Auspicious, die.
- 1909—Aet. 22: Graduates from Military Academy and joins the Field Artillery in Takada; continues his revolutionary activities.
- 1910—Aet. 23: Remains with the Field Artillery in Takada; continues his revolutionary work. Many unsuccessful attempts at revolution made by Sun Yat-Sen.
- 1911—Aet. 24: Returns to Shanghai in the summer and works jointly with Chen Chi-Mei for the revolution; sails for Japan in September and comes back again in October when the Wuchang outbreak starts; takes Hangchow, the capital of his Province; goes to Shanghai to train a new infantry regiment. Sun Yat-Sen comes back from abroad.
- 1912—Aet. 25: Resigns his command; sails for Japan. Sun Yat-Sen elected Provisional President of Chinese Republic; Hsuan Tung (Henry Pu-Yi) abdicates; Sun Yat-Sen resigns his Presidency in favour of Yuan Shih-Kai.
- 1913—Aet. 26: Returns to Shanghai to start revolution against Yuan Shih-Kai who has prosecuted the Chinese Union and assassinated Sung Chiao-Jen, a brilliant member of the Union; fails in his attempt and escapes to Japan again. Sun Yat-Sen calls all his followers to denounce and fight against Yuan Shih-Kai.
- 1914—Aet. 27: Returns again to Shanghai to begin another up-

- rising; fails again and goes to Manchuria to inspect revolutionary forces in the North; joins Sun Yat-Sen in Tokyo; studies philosophy. Yuan Shih-Kai dissolves Parliament; war breaks out in Europe.
- 1915—Aet. 28: Starts his third uprising in Shanghai against Yuan Shih-Kai and is nearly made a captive, falls dangerously ill, his mother coming to Shanghai to nurse him. Yuan Shih-Kai accepts Japan's twenty-one secret demands on China, and later acclaims himself the new Emperor.
- 1916—Aet. 29: Launches a surprise attack on the Kiang Yin Fortress between Nanking and Shanghai; fails and goes to Shantung as Chief-of-Staff to Revolutionary Army which is later disbanded. Chen Chi-Mei, Chiang Kai-Shek's sworn brother, is assassinated by Yuan Shih-Kai; many provinces denounce Yuan Shih-Kai who abdicates in favour of his own Presidency and dies.
- 1917—Aet. 30: Stays in Shanghai and proposes Northern Punitive Expedition. Sun Yat-Sen goes to Canton and is elected Generalissimo of Chinese Army and Navy and head of a New Government in Canton in opposition to the one in Peking which is in the hands of War Lords.
- 1918—Aet. 31: Goes to Canton to join Sun Yat-Sen; appointed Head of Field Operation Department of the Cantonese Army under the command of Chen Chiung-Ming during the Fukien Campaign; directs operations against the Fukien Forces; promoted to be Commander of the Second Detachment. European War ends.
- 1919—Aet. 32: Resigns his commands and goes back to Shanghai and his native place; travels and visits many places.
- 1920—Aet. 33: Rejoins Chen Chiung-Ming's Cantonese Army in its Kwangsi Campaign and prepares his operational plans for this expedition; breaks with Chen Chiung-Ming and retires in spite of strong persuasion by his friends to come out again.
- 1921—Aet. 34: Goes to Canton again because of Sun Yat-Sen's invitation and joins Chen Chiung-Ming reluctantly; foresees Chen Chiung-Ming's rebellion and warns Sun Yat-Sen of it; his mother dies and he returns home for mourning. Sun Yat-Sen is elected President of China by extraordinary Parliament; Peking Government orders Southern Expedition.
- 1922—Aet. 35: Severs friendship with Chen Chiung-Ming;

- joins Sun Yat-Sen on gunboat when Chen Chiung-Ming's rebellion breaks out; escapes to Shanghai with Sun Yat-Sen; appointed Chief-of-Staff to New Cantonese Army commanded by Hsu Chung-Chih and goes to Fukien.
- 1923—Aet. 36: Goes back to Canton to join Sun Yat-Sen as his Chief-of-Staff; Sun Yat-Sen has returned to Canton after Chen Chiung-Ming has been defeated; advises Sun Yat-Sen in fighting further rebellions; goes to Russia on Good Will Mission as Sun Yat-Sen has established cordial friendship with Soviet Russia.
- 1924—Aet. 37: Returns to Canton and is appointed member of Military Council of Kuo Min Tang and later President of Whampoa Military Academy; puts out Merchants' Corps Rebellion in Canton. Kuo Min Tang holds its First National Congress after reorganisation; Russian political advisers and military staff officers are engaged by Sun Yat-Sen who goes to Peking hoping to unify China peacefully.
- 1925—Aet. 38: Leads Cadet Army in mopping up Chen Chiung-Ming's remaining forces and other rebellious armies. Sun Yat-Sen dies in Peking; National Government established in Canton.
- 1926—Aet. 39: Elected member of Central Executive Committee at the Second National Congress of the Kuo Min Tang; made Chairman of the Military Council; takes quick and drastic measures against Chinese Communist and Russian who plot against him; appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Punitive Expedition; defeats the Northern War Lords Wu Pei-Fu and Sun Chuan-Feng; conquers nearly all the Southern and Eastern Provinces.
- 1927—Aet. 40: Reaches Nanking and Shanghai; Chinese Communists attack him; suppresses Chinese Communist Party; establishes National Government in Nanking while anti-Chiang Kai-Shek movement spreads from Wuchang; resigns and goes to Japan; returns to Shanghai to marry Soong Mei-Ling after announcing the dissolution of his first marriage; is persuaded to return to Nanking.
- 1928—Aet. 41: Resumes post of Commander-in-Chief and continues the Northern Punitive Expedition; reaches Peking while the last of War Lords dies; appointed Chairman of the State Council; brings over the Young Marshal to support the National Government; China is unified.
- 1929—Aet. 42: Opens Demobilisation Conference; calls the

Third Rational Congress and is attacked by Wang Ching-Wei and his followers; several revolts break out and are suppressed.

- 1930—Aet. 43: Several military leaders demand his resignation; civil war breaks out in the North; Wang Ching-Wei joins the rebels; the Young Marshal marches to Peking in support of Chiang Kai-Shek; the rebellion is suppressed.
- 1931—Aet. 44: Calls First National People's Convention to adopt Provisional Constitution; disagrees with Hu Han-Min over Provisional Constitution; conducts Anti-Communist Campaign; South revolts; Japan invades Manchuria; resigns all posts.
- 1932—Aet. 45: Is recalled to Nanking; Japan invades Shanghai; moves Nanking Government to Lo-Yang; concludes Shanghai Truce with Japan; resumes anti-Communist Campaign in Kiangsi; Government moves back to Nanking. Henry Pu-Yi is installed as Japanese puppet-Emperor of 'Manchukuo'.
- 1933—Aet. 46: Japan invades Jehol; concludes Tangku Truce with Japan; continues anti-Communist Campaign; revolts break out in North and South.
- 1934—Aet. 47: Suppresses revolts; continues anti-Communist Campaign; initiates 'New Life Movement'; tours North-West by air; drives Communists out of Kiangsi. Japan initiates Mongolian rebellion.
- 1935—Aet. 48: Drives Communists out of Kweichow; tours South-West by air; reorganises and reforms Provincial Governments in South-West; establishes training camps for officials in Szechuen. Japan invades the Province of Charbar.
- 1936—Aet. 49: Drives Communists further north from Shansi to Shensi; Japan spreads her influence in North China; nation celebrates his birthday by presenting aeroplanes to the State; is captured by pro-Communist forces in Sian while touring Shansi and Shensi, but is soon released; resigns all his posts and retires to his native place. Japan signs anti-comintern pact with Germany.
- 1937—Aet. 50: Resumes office; establishes training corps in Kiangsi; Japan invades North China and South China; leads the whole nation in defensive war; moves Government to Chungking.
- 1938—Aet. 51: Is elected Director-General of the Kuo Min Tang; proclaims immediately that war is to go on after

- the fall of Hankow and Canton. Wang Ching-Wei leaves Chungking secretly.
- 1939—Aet. 52: Launches general counter-offensive; warns England and America when Japan invades Hai-Nan Island; establishes the Central Training Corps. Germany invades Poland; war breaks out in Europe; Poland partitioned.
- 1940—Aet. 53: Launches more counter-attacks; Wang Ching-Wei is installed as Japanese Puppet in Nanking; the Burma Road is closed for three months by England. Italy enters European War; capitulation of Belgium and France.
- 1941—Aet. 54: Concludes Barter-Agreement with Russia; disbands the New Fourth (Communist) Army; declares war on Japan, Germany and Italy when Japan attacks Pearl Harbour and Shanghai. Germany invades Russia; America enters the war; England at war with Japan.
- 1942—Aet. 55: Makes new fair treaties (so called 'equal Treaties') with England and America; visits India; finds Chinese Communists not co-operative; gives Lieut-General Stilwell command of Chinese Expeditionary Forces in Burma. Japan takes Singapore; takes Java; takes Corregidor; takes Burma.
- 1943—Aet. 56: Tries in vain to secure the co-operation of Chinese Communists; publishes *China's Destiny*; installed as Chairman of State Council; goes to Cairo for Four Power Conference. Tide of war begins to turn in favour of the Allies; Italy surrenders.
- 1944—Aet. 57: Still tries to parley with the Chinese Communists; discusses the draft Constitution; asks President Roosevelt to recall General Stilwell; critical situation in South-West China is saved; Burma Road is recaptured. Allies land in France.
- 1945—Aet. 58: Announces the Convention of National Assembly to adopt the Constitution as soon as the military situation improves; negotiates new treaty with Russia. Germany surrenders; Atomic bombs are dropped in Japan; Russia declares war on Japan; Japan surrenders; the world war is ended.
- 1946—Aet. 59: Appeals to the whole nation for reconstruction; calls political consultation conference; moves back to Nanking; General Marshal and Ambassador Leighton Stuart's efforts in bringing the Government and Com-

munists together fail. Russia and Western Democracies begin to be at variance.

—Aet. 60: Breaks with Communists; calls National Assembly; adopts Constitution; civil war starts; Yenan, the Communist capital, is captured; civil war spreads; Cominform is established in Europe; Marshall's plan is opposed by Russia and her satellites; Europe is virtually divided.

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